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ABSTRACT 
The behaviour of a nation's stock market is increasingly seen as a barometer 
of its economic growth, strength and stability. While the behaviour of well established 
equity markets is well researched and documented, the behaviour of small and 
developing exchanges is still not much studied. This thesis examines and analyses 
some aspects of the behaviour of an emerging equity market known as the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) - the national stock exchange for Malaysia. 
To serve as the groundwork for our empirical investigation, this study begins 
with a survey of the related literature. The literature on efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH); the literature on various theories and models which are complementary and 
contradictory to the EMH - are reviewed. 
Empirically, four major aspects of the behaviour of the KLSE are examined. 
Using both share price indices and individual company share prices/returns for a 
sample period 1984:01 through 1994: 12, we study some statistical properties of stock 
returns, correlations with other markets, stock market forecastability and the presence 
of mean reversion/mean aversion in stock returns. The behaviour of the KLSE market 
indices are compared in several respects with the indices of selected developed 
markets. 
Our study has resulted a number of findings, some of which could be 
considered as intriguing and novel for a relatively unresearched market like the KLSE. 
Similar to many previous researches, our study has provided evidence that the 
distributions of stock returns are not normal. Rather, they are leptokurtic. 
Variances/standard deviations of stock returns on the KLSE were found to be large 
compared with, for example, the New York and London stock exchanges, but the 
realised returns were not significantly different for the period of study. 
The KLSE is found to be positively correlated with most foreign exchanges, 
although these correlations are far from unity. These correlations however, are not 
constant/stable through time. 
Our evidence also suggests that the Malaysian market tends to exhibit strong 
regional links. Additionally, the KLSE appears to have significant lagged correlations 
with a number of developed exchanges. 
Three equity markets are identified as the most influential foreign exchanges 
to the KLSE in terms of their comovements (and/or lagged correlations). They are, the 
Stock Exchange of Singapore, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the New York 
Stock Exchange. 
We found no evidence that the "forecastability" of stock prices/returns on the 
KLSE could be improved when an 'out-of-sample' forecasting procedure known as the 
multi-process models was employed. Moreover, we have found that the returns for 
some stocks are more forecastable than others. 
Variance ratio tests indicate that over long horizons, some stocks listed on the 
KLSE tend to exhibit mean reversion, some are mean aversive and the rest seem to 
follow a random walk. 
The present research has also raised a number of issues which rrtight be 
interesting for further study. These issues are discussed in Chapter Seven of the thesis. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
l.l-Introduction to Chapter One 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the WorJd Bank 
Group, classifies stock market into two major categories: developed and emerging 
markets I. The principal concern of this thesis is the behaviour of an emerging market, 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) - which is the national stock exchange for 
Malaysia. 
This introductory chapter is divided into three sections. In Section 1.2 we 
highlight and explain the objectives of the study. The plan or the structure of the 
thesis is given in Section 1.3. 
IWbile there is no universally accepted definition of an emerging capital market [Barry and Lockwood 
(1995)), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), defines an emerging stock market as one in a 
developing country. It follows from the World Bank's guideline that a developing country is one with low-
to-middle income, which in 1992 had a per capita GNP (gross national product) of less than US$8,356. 
See also Errunza (1983). 
1 
te2-0bjectives of the Study 
Studying some facets of the behaviour of stock prices/returns2 on the KLSE, 
is the domain of the present thesis. Essentially, the thesis is designed to meet the 
fo]]owing objectives: 
(i) To determine whether the statistical distributions of prices/returns of 
shares traded on the KLSE are different from those of shares traded on 
developed exchanges: 
Towards this end, some statistical properties of stock prices/returns on the 
KLSE - mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis - wi11 be examined and 
compared with the those of shares traded on a number of selected we11-established 
exchanges. 
Stock markets in developing countries are relatively young, small in size and 
less sophisticated. Given their idiosyncrasies; given the socio-economic and political 
environments in which they exist - it is commonly perceived that prices/returns of 
stocks traded on these exchanges behave somewhat differently compared with those 
2 As featured in Hsu (1984), empiric:al studies of the behaviour of stoc:k returns are important for several 
reasons: 
(i) The nature of stoc:k return behaviour is fundamental to the formulation of the c:oncept of risk or 
unc:ertainty in various financ:ial theories and models. 
(ii) The measurement of risk depends heavily on properties - such as stationary, long-tailedness. 
finiteness of the second and higher moments - of empirical stoc:k return distributions. 
(iii) Various tests for the empiric:al validity of financial models and the applications of these models 
rely to a c:onsiderable extent on the steadiness over time of stoc:k return distributions and the c:onstancy of 
systematic: risk. 
(iv) Several important pric:ing models for stoc:k options, warrants, c:onvertible debentures, and other 
similar financ:ial instruments usually require explicit estimates of stoc:k return variances: The usefulness of 
suc:h models depends largely on the adequac:y (e.g., the finiteness, acc:urac:y) and the stationarity of the 
varianc:e measurements. 
2 
traded on the exchanges in the developed nations. Do such characteristics describe the 
KLSE which, in the recent past, has been growing quite fast in terms of size, activity 
and sophistication? 
Our investigation into the statistical properties of stock prices/returns on the 
KLSE could be viewed as a stepping stone towards comprehending other aspects of 
the behaviour of stock prices/returns on the Exchange. This preliminary empirical 
investigation could possibly (directly or indirectly) shed new light on some old issues 
or problems and/or raise some new issues - which deserve further investigations. 
(ii) To measure the extent to which the KLSE is integrated with or 
segmented from other national exchanges: 
As a consequence of several political and economic reforms that have taken 
place on many countries since about the tum of the past decade, so-cal1ed global 
investing has become more interesting for the investment community3. As a result, 
it has been contended that international stock markets have become more integrated4• 
Would increased international market integration necessarily imply increased 
correlation between equity markets? Do correlations between equity markets change 
through time? If the correlations between the KLSE and overseas exchanges have 
increased in recent years, are they likely to become lowerlhigher in the future? The 
3The Economist of February the 17th .• 1996. begins its 'Finance and Economics' column with the 
following sentence: 
"Pick up any investment newsletter these days and you will read about the joys of international 
investing" (p. 91). 
"Several recent studies - including those by Cho et.ai (1986). Wheatley (1988). Eun and Shim (1989) 
and Jeon and Von Furstenberg (1990) • have produced results which support the proposition that 
international stock markets are integrated. See also Corhay et.ai (1992); Smith (1991); IMF Survey (March 
7. 1994, p. 72); Rogers (1994) and Sewell et.ai (1996). 
3 
structure of international equity correlations plays an important role in asset 
management/asset a]]ocation decisions. Knowledge of the magnitude of 
interrelatedness of the KLSE and other national stock exchanges is considered 
essential to investors in planning their investment strategies or trading positions, 
particularly from the international investing point of view. 
To obtain a general picture of any correlations between the KLSE and foreign 
exchanges, we begin our study on this subject by using the technique of hierarchical 
cluster analysis. Then, the results obtained under this procedure are reexamined by 
using the method of correlation analysis. 
For the markets which are detected to be highly correlated with the Malaysian 
stock market, we study their interrelatedness in further detail, in order to verify and 
assess whether it is likely that 'common factors' or 'global factors' [see e.g., Grinold 
et.al (1989); Beckers et.al (1996)] affect their covariations. Here, the method of 
partial correlation analysis is applied. 
The presence of low correlations between the KLSE and certain overseas 
exchanges would imply that there is potential for investors to diversify their portfolios 
comprising the Malaysian shares. Conversely, if the KLSE is found to be highly 
correlated with the exchanges in certain countries, innovations on these particular 
stock exchanges might feasibly be utilized by investors as clues when trying to 
understand movements on the KLSE [see e.g., Campbell and Hamao (1992); Chang 
et.al (1994)]. 
(iii) To assess the "forecastabllity" of stock prices/returns on the KLSE: 
Evidence for the view that stock market returns are predictable appears to be 
4 
growing~. If stock returns are predictable, how well can an analyst forecast future 
returns based essentially on historical returns? 
While we all know that financial market forecasts are inherently difficult (see 
e.g.: Gray (1989), p. 36; Jacobs and Levy (1989), p. 26], this study attempts to provide 
some evidence on the above question, which seems to be interesting from both 
theoretical and practical points of view. To accomplish this, some techniques of 
assessment and measurement from the theory of forecasting are employed. 
(iv) To determine whether the price changes or returns of shares traded on 
the KLSE follow a random walk or exhibit nonrandomness: 
While the evaluation of the statistical memory of stock returns has always been 
an attractive topic in both theoretical and practical financial economics [see Chapter 
Three), the revisiting of this issue for the KLSE is justified by the fact that recent 
findings suggest that stock prices and returns on a number of stock exchanges do not 
follow a random walk, but they rather follow a mean reverting or mean averting 
process [see Chapter Four]. 
To meet this objective, the behaviour of stock returns on the KLSE (i.e, for 
individual company shares) are examined by implementing some variance ratio tests. 
As can be found suggested in the literature, values of the variance ratio below one are 
consistent with stock prices models implying negatively correlated returns: the mean 
reversion model. Values above one are consistent with positively autocorrelated 
returns: the mean aversion model. 
The presence of mean reversion/mean aversion in long-tenn stock returns 
1ms subject is discussed in some detail in Chapter Four. 
5 
would have some ramifications for investment management. For example, if stocks are 
found to exhibit mean reversion in their long period returns, then portfolio choice 
would not be invariant to the investment horizon. 
To generalise, in trying to obtain the above objectives, our empirical 
investigations will involve comparative, descriptive and inferential approaches. Some 
aspects of the behaviour of the KLSE are compared, contrasted and correlated with 
those of some selected foreign exchanges. 
Both stock market prices of individual companies and indices covering the 
period of 1984 through 1994 are employed as the data base for the study. Nonetheless, 
since stock markets in general appear to be more stable during the periods after the 
worldwide crash of October 1987, in most cases our analyses concentrate on the 
sample period of 1988 through 1994 (rather than 1984 through 1994). 
1.3-0raanisation of the Thesis 
Given the aforementioned objectives, this thesis can be divided roughly into 
three parts and is organised in eight chapters. Part one which represents the 
introductory part for the thesis, comprises Chapters One and Two. Chapter One 
provides the general introduction to the thesis and Chapter Two introduces the stock 
market of interest for this study - the KLSE. 
Essentially. in Chapter Two we examine the historical, institutional, 
organisational and operational aspects of the KLSE. This chapter also highlights the 
growth and performance of the Exchange since its inception; besides attempting to 
6 
identify its principal characteristics (including its problems and prospects) as an 
emerging stock exchange. Some comparisons will also be made with a number of 
other selected exchanges. The information provided in this chapter helps to provide 
a context for the analysis of the behaviour of stock returns on the KLSE in subsequent 
chapters. 
Part two of the thesis, which particularly deals with the theoretical aspects of 
share price behaviour, contains Chapter Three and Chapter Four. The objective of 
these two chapters is to gather information (theory and evidence) from the research 
literature concerning the behaviour of stock markets. Theories and evidence from 
previous works reviewed in these two chapterscould also provide us insights into the 
contemporary issues or problems that deserve concentration in our empirical work. 
Chapter Three concentrates on the controversial issue of stock market 
efficiency. It attempts to provide a critical examination and discussion of the concepts, 
theory and evidence of stock market efficiency in some detail. 
Chapter Four generally reviews investment approaches - stock market theories, 
models and evidence - which appear to be supplementary and contradictory to the 
theory of stock market efficiency. Some of the most recent developments and findings 
in stock market research and literature are also foci of discussion in this chapter. 
The final part, which can be described as the empirical and concluding part' 
for the thesis. consists of Chapter Five. Chapter Six. Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight. 
Chapter Five presents statements of the issues to be addressed in our empirical work 
together with a review of literature (methodologies and evidence from previous 
studies) more directly related to these issues. 
Chapter Six covers the statistical techniques employed in our empirical 
7 
investigations. Results and findings of our empirical tests are reported and discussed 
in Chapter Seven. 
Chapter eight is the final chapter, providing the general conclusions for this 
research. Specifically, the chapter summarises the empirical issues addressed in the 
thesis; it recapitulates the empirical findings gathered in Chapter Seven and suggests 
some investment management implications of our empirical findings; it highlights 
some limitations of our empirical study. Lastly, this chapter suggests some directions 
for future research. 
8 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE KUALA LUMPUR STOCK EXCHANGE 
2. I-Introduction 
Foreign investor interest in emerging equity markets is one facet of the recent 
trend of internalisation of the global securities business. Sseveral previous studies have 
documented that these relatively young and thinly traded exchanges have some 
peculiarities. The salient ones are as follows: 
a) Both returns and risks (volatility, liquidity and political) have been higher 
for emerging equity markets relative to developed markets [Errunza (1983); Errunza 
and Padmanabhan (1988); Wilcox (1992); Harvey (1995); Solnik (1996)]. 
b) Correlations among emerging markets and between emerging markets and 
developed markets have been shown to be very low [Errunza (1983); Divecha et.al 
(1992); Speidell and Sappenfield (1992)]. A study by Hauser et.al (1994) concludes 
that, despite the low correlations between emerging and developed markets, only 
investors who can stand higher levels of risk may' gain from including stocks of 
emerging markets in their portfolios. 
c) Emerging market returns are more likely than developed markets to be 
influenced by local informationllocal country factors [Divecha et.al (1992); Harvey 
(1995)]. 
9 
In fact, emerging equity markets vary in their 'maturity', structure, 
performance, prospects and principal features. Accordingly, these markets offer a rich 
set of environments for studying important financial issues. 
This chapter provides a close examination of the institutional, organisational 
and operational aspects of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). It explores the 
microcosm of the Malaysian stock market, aiming at providing the background 
information for studying (and comparing) the behaviour of share prices in later 
chapters. 
The present chapter is developed as follows: We begin, in Section 2.2, by 
examining the se'curities industry and the stock market in Malaysia from an historical 
perspective. In particular, this section traces the establishment history of the KLSE. 
Section 2.3 discusses the various regulatory, legislative and organisational changes and 
advances that took place in the early stage of the KLSE's development. We proceed 
further by examining, in Section 2.4, the various changes and improvements 
introduced into the Exchange in recent years. 
To ensure that a market for stocks and shares is well organised; to ensure that 
the trading in stocks and shares is conducted in a healthy and fair manner such that 
the interests of the investing public are protected; and to ensure that the growth of a 
stock exchange is consistent with the nation's aspirations, a regulatory body or bodies 
are necessary. The watch-dog bodies that supervise and oversee the operations of the 
securities industry and stock market in Malaysia are introduced in Section 2.5. The 
following section, Section 2.6, presents the organisational structure of the KLSE. 
Each stock exchange around the globe practises its own trading system and 
procedures which might be different in one way or other, from those practised in other 
10 
exchanges. For the KLSE, we discuss these aspects in Section 2.7. It highlights the 
technical market details of the KLSE. This is followed by Section 2.8 which touches 
on the two listing boards of the KLSE - the Main Board and the Second Board. Then, 
in Section 2.8, we consider the two major indices of the Exchange - the KLSE 
Composite Index and the EMAS Index. 
As a relatively young stock exchange. one might be interested in knowing how 
the Exchange has performed in its history of about three decades. We discuss this in 
Section 2.10. A brief comparison of the KLSE with other stock exchanges is also 
made. and this can be found in Section 2.11. Lastly, before we conclude the chapter 
in Section 2.13, in Section 2.12 we briefly highlight the vision of this ambitious 
Exchange. 
2.2-The Makin& of the KLSE 
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) is the only official stock exchange 
for Malaysia, although there is another stock exchange in existence in the country -
the Bumiputera Stock Exchange l . The 'present' KLSE was formed on December 27, 
1976 in conjunction with enforcement of the Securities Industry Act 1973. 
A company limited by guarantee without a share capital and incorporated under 
the Companies Act 1966, the KLSE was established to serve investors and listed 
~e Bumiputera Stock Exchange or the Pasaran Saham Bumiputera(pSB) as it is widely called, was 
established in February 1969 under the Majlis Amanah Rakyat Act 20, 1966. An exchange specially set up 
for Bumipulera companies, the PSB only admits public limited companies owned by the Bumipulera 
community (i.e., the Malay and other indigenous people), for listing. The main purpose in establishing this 
seperate exchange for Bumipulera companies is to encourage and assist the Bumipulera community in the 
commercial and industrial activities of this country. See Malaysia, Bank Negara (1989), p. 384. 
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companies: to provide a market place for raising new funds. and for trading 
outstanding shares by buyers and sellers who determine share prices freely and 
competitively. Entrusted to provide a fair and orderly market for investors. the 
funCtions of the KLSE as listed in the Information Malaysia 1992/93 Yearbook (p.270) 
are as follows2: 
a) to provide a market place for the purchase and sale of listed securities; 
b) to furnish information on the financial standing of listed companies; 
c) to furnish quotations of stock prices and shares transacted on the Exchange; 
d) to protect the interest of members and the investing public; 
e) to provide investors with service and promote public interest in the securities 
market as a whole; 
f) to work in close cooperation with relevant Government authorities. 
To cater the need of investors and the general public for information. the 
Exchange provides an information service that includes daily bulletins. its monthly 
Investors Digest. statistical data and real-time on-line information. Its library. 
specialising in information on the capital markets. is open to the public. Moreover, the 
Exchange's subsidiary company known as RIIAM. concentrates on research and 
educational service that covers courses, training, seminars and investment expositions. 
Prior to December 27, 1976, the Exchange was known as the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange Berhad (KLSEB). It was incorporated on July 2. 1973. 
Actually. the KLSE was first established as the Malayan Stock Exchange in 
March 1960. Since then. the Exchange had evolved through various reorganisations: 
2For details of the objectives for which the KLSE is established. see the KLSE's Memorandum of 
Association, pp. 1 - 4. 
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From the Malayan Stock Exchange (1960), it became the Stock Exchange of Malaysia 
(1964) and the Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore (1965). When it parted 
company from the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES), the Exchange was 
reestablished as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Berhad (1973) and final1y it is 
known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (1976). 
Historically, the origin of the KLSE can be traced back to 1930 when the 
Singapore Stock Brokers' Association was formed. Indeed, the securities industry in 
Malaysia is believed to have its roots in the late nineteenth century as an extension 
of the British corporate presence in the rubber and tin industries. During those early 
days 
it was British corporate enterprise in Malaya (now Malaysia) that provided the catalyst 
for the emergence of the business of share trading in Singapore and Malaya, where 
stockbrokers performed a convenient and essential service for those who which to buy 
or sell shares of rubber and tin companies - companies which were operating in this 
region, incorporated locally or abroad [see Swee-Hock (1989); Drake (1969b)]. Drake 
(1969a), p. 210) put it as follows: 
"Stock and share brokers have operated in Malaya since the late 
nineteenth century, providing facilities for the purchase and sale 
of shares in companies operating in the area, The brokers came in the 
wake of British corporate investment in the extractive industries", 
Clearly, the growth of corporate enterprises in the plantation and mining 
sectors was the impetus behind the early growth of securities industry and share 
trading in the country, This era witnessed the emergence of those early companies 
such as Boustead and Company Ltd. (1893), Malakof Plantation Company Ltd. (1897), 
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Inch Kenneth Rubber Ltd. (1897), Rahman Tin Company (early 1900) and Guthrie 
Company Ltd. (1905). 
Table 2.2 shows the number of companies listed on the Exchange during the 
early years of its operations. Since those companies are classified by type and 
domicile, we can see clearly that: 
• rubber and tin companies dominated the listed shares: they accounted 
for more than 60% of the share counters traded; 
• about 55% of listed shares are from companies incorporated outside 
Malaya [mostly in London (Drake, 1969b) p. 76]. 
Late in the nineteenth century, the British started to penetrate and colonize 
Malaya or the Malay Peninsular (now Peninsular Malaysia). During the time of the 
British rule, Singapore (which was founded in 1819 by East Indian Compony) had 
pJayed its role as the administrative and commercial centre for the region - providing 
port and financial services to the resource-rich interior. The same currency was used 
throughout the Malay Peninsular (i.e., the Malay States and the Straits Settlements of 
Penang and Malacca) and Singapore [see e.g., Seaward (1993), p. 144]. Due to this 
historical background, a study of the early development of securities industry and 
stock market in Malaysia cannot avoid mentioning the role played by Singapore. "Just 
as their political and economic history is intertwined, the histories of the stock 
exchange in Singapore and Malaysia are likewise connected" [Aron and Aron (1983), 
p. 17]. In fact, both of the stock exchanges in Malaysia and in Singapore had their 
origins as a single market until their separation in 1973. 
When the Malayan Stock Exchange was formed in 1960, shares for companies 
registered in both Singapore and Malaya were traded through the Exchange. The 
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'stock market in Singapore' and the 'stock market in Malaya' continued to be closely 
linked in practice, despite the fact that the two territories did not enter into any 
political union until the formation of Malaysia in September 1963 [see Seaward 
(1993)]. Indeed, until December 31, 1989, the stock market and securities industry in 
Malaysia grew hand-in-hand with those of Singapore. The two stock markets were 
"tightly linked as runners in a three-legged race" [Far Eastern Economic Review, April 
12, 1984, p. 57]. 
Even though securities trading in Malaysia can be traced far back to the late 
nineteenth century, the first formal organisation in this region was only established on 
June 23, 1930, with the formation of Singapore Stockbrokers' Association by 15 local 
brokers. The Association was formed with the objective of regulating the conduct of 
its own members and protecting the investing public [see Swee-Hock (1989)]. 
Brokerage business continued to expand; and by the late 1930s, Malaya had 
seen a fairly rapid growth of its own stockbroking activities [see Swee-Hock (1989)]. 
So, as share trading developed into a much more pan-Malayan than purely 
Singaporean activity, the Singapore Stockbrokers' Association was reregistered in 
1937 under the new name: Malayan Share Brokers' Association. The association 
which had its own code of conduct was renamed to reflect its pan-Malayan 
membership. 
The Malayan economic scene was more prosperous in the 1950s. The Korean 
War brought about a period of boom in both rubber and tin prices. With this postwar 
prosperity, a greater number of people were able to invest and the financial market 
was strengthened. Moreover, the achievement of independence by Malaya in 1957 and 
the increasing sophistication of its financial market as a result of the business and 
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industrial developments of the time, created the pressing need for a proper stock 
exchange. With some gentle encouragement from the Government, on the 21 st. of 
March 1960, a group of stockbrokers throughout Malaya and Singapore reconstituted 
. 
the Malayan Stockbrokers' Association into the Malayan Stock Exchange. In designing 
and implementing a trading system for the Exchange, the service of A.H.Urquhart, 
then Chairman of the Sydney Stock Exchange, was employed3• 
Public trading started on May 9, 1960 when four stockbrokers - Malayan 
Traders, Ariffin & Co., HaIJam & Co. and Charles Bradburne & Co. - gathered 
together in the clearing house of the Central Bank in Kuala Lumpur to conduct their 
first afternoon 'call' and price marking. Subsequently, under the direction of and with 
clerical assistance and telephone facilities provided by the Central Bank, these four 
Kuala Lumpur brokers met regularly to 'call' shares and mark prices [see Malaysia, 
Bank Negara (1989), p. 374]. 
With the formation of the Malayan Stock Exchange, and the beginning of 
public trading for shares in 1960, a new era in the history the Malayan (Malaysian) 
securities industry began. The remaining years of the 1960s saw continuous 
improvements in the organisation and operations of the Exchange, including 
improvements in physical facilities. 
Physical facilities for share trading were further improved with the introduction 
of a Big Board system similar to the one used in Sydney. By 1961 the Trading Post 
Open-Cry System (modelled after the Sydney Stock Exchange ) was practised. 
The fledgling Malayan Stock Exchange was established with two trading 
rooms: one in Kuala Lumpur and the other in Singapore - about 400 kilometres apart. 
3 See c.g., Neoh (1985), p. 38; Aron and Aron (1983), p. 16. 
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By 1962, the trading room in Kuala Lumpur moved to a new premise in Mercantile 
Bank Building4• Direct telephone lines between the two trading rooms were installed 
to provide investors with the best and latest price available. Thus, such a link 
eliminated arbitraging, and effectively integrated the two trading rooms into a single 
pan-Malayan market [see e.g., Lin (1989), p. 228]. 
In 1963, on September the 16th., the federation of Malaysia was formed and 
Singapore became one of its member countries. The following year, on June 6, the 
trading rooms in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur were reconstituted to form a new joint 
exchange, under the name of the Stock Exchange of Malaysia (SEM). 
In August 1965. in the wake of Singapore secession from Malaysia, this 
conunon stock exchange continued to function as a single entity for the two nations, 
but was given a new name: the Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore (SEMS). 
This state of affairs continued for another eight years until May 1973, following the 
termination of the currency agreement between Malaysia and Singapore in March 
1973. 
On May 8. 1973. the Finance Minister of Malaysia announced in Parliament. 
that the joint Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore was to be split. The reason 
Malaysia initiated this break was to increase the importance to the market in Malaysia, 
to speed up the development of financial institutions in Malaysia relative to Singapore. 
and to enable Malaysia to act independently in the stock exchange [Sheng-Vi (1974). 
p. 190]. The Malaysian authorities sought greater domestic control over the industry 
[see van Agtmael (1984). p. 74]. A separate stock exchange was considered 
'The Kuala Lumpur trading room was moved to the Bangkok Bank building in 1967. and to Damansara 
Centre on the 12th. of March 1973. On the 26th. of March. 1987. the KLSE moved again to the present 
premises at the Bukit Naga Complex. 
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advantageous for Malaysia since the majority of shares listed on the joint Exchanges 
were those of companies incorporated in Malaysias. 
In Singapore, the decision made by the Malaysian Government to split the 
SEIVIS, necessitated the incorporation of a new exchange - the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore (SES), on May 24, 1973. Its operations as a separate exchange - with a new 
set of Rules, Bye-Laws and Requirements, a Listing Manual and Corporate Disclosure 
Policy [see Swee-Hock (1989), p. 57] - commenced on June 4, 1973. On the 
Malaysian side, the action led to the setting up of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
Berhad (KLSEB) under the Securities Industry Act 1973 and the Companies Act 1965, 
on the second of July, 1973. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the two 'new' exchanges - the KLSEB and the 
SES - were deemed to be separate exchanges, all companies previously listed on the 
SEMS continued to be listed on both of them. In fact, it was reported that more 
trading in Malaysian stocks especially by foreign investors, took place in Singapore 
rather than in Kuala Lumpur. There was also active arbitrage between the two markets 
[see van Agtmael (1984), p. 74]. 
Another significant development in the making of the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange took place in 1976 with the bringing into force of the Securities Industry 
Act (SIA) 1973. On the same day. on the 27th. of December, 1976, a new company 
known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (limited by guarantee and governed by 
the Companies Act, 1965), officially took over the functions of the KLSEB. 
7 At the time of the split announcement was made. of the 223 companies listed on the SEMS, 152 were 
Ma]aysian-incorporated with a combined issued capital of $1,549 million. versus the 71 Singapore-based 
companies which had a total paid-up capital of $],318 million. 
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2.3-Developments and in Le2islation, 
Rewlation and Or2anisation 
Since its inception in 1960, various legislative, regulatory and organisational 
changes and improvements had been introduced to the Exchange, aimed at creating 
an orderly and hannonious share trading environment. Time, events and experience 
had proven that the legislative and regulatory framework needed to be changed and 
improved in order to ensure a steady and orderly growth of the stock exchange and 
the securities industry in the country. 
Since the early years of its operations, in order to protect the investing public 
and to instil public confidence in the stock market, regulatory measures for the listing 
of and trading in shares on the Exchange were initiated. Standards (as embodied in the 
'Official List Requirements') for the admission of companies' shares to the Exchange 
were also set [see Drake (l969b)]. 
A new listing manual was issued in 1964. On June the 21 st. of the same year, 
New Rules and Bye-Laws were adopted. Al1 these Rules and Listing Requirements 
were drawn up (after some redrafting) from the report and recommendations made 
by Mr. A.G.Wallace (from the Sydney Stock Exchange). He was commissioned by the 
Exchange to survey and report on matters relating to the Exchange and submit 
recommendations on the manner in which it should be developed so that it couid 
function efficiently. These rules and requirements could be considered to be the first 
official attempt to regulate trading activities and to control companies seeking to 
achieve listing on the Exchange. 
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A more comprehensive legal framework in supervising the operations of 
companies in the country - the Malaysian Companies Act 1965 - came into force in 
August, 1965. With the objectives of ensuring the protection of investors as well as 
of promoting the growth of a well-informed and discriminating body of investors, the 
provision of the Act, for the first time, obliged public companies to certain standards 
of information disclosure. The Act also established certain rules governing the conduct 
of directors and insiders of public companies. 
The latest major step that had been taken during the decade of sixties in 
supervising and controlling the development of the Malaysia capital market was the 
formation of Capital Issue Committee (CIC) by the Minister of Finance in 1968. With 
the formation of the Committee, the ad hoc arrangements set up in 1963 among the 
Central Bank, the Exchange and the Registrar of Companies in guiding and nurturing 
the development of the stock market, was formalised. 
As a body that was established to supervise the issue of shares and other 
securities by companies applying for listing, the CIC's main functions include: 
a) To examine the draft prospectuses or announcements of any company 
intending to make a new issue or to seek listing on the Exchange. This aspect of 
disclosure is important in ensuring that the public is provided with all pertinent 
information about the financial position of the companies concerned; 
b) To regulate the timing of the various issues of shares to ensure the operation 
of an orderly market. 
In the seventies. especially after the split of the Stock Exchange of Malaysia 
and Singapore, the Malaysian Government seemed to play an increasing role in 
moulding and nurturing the growth of the Malaysian stock market and securities 
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industry. Various direct and indirect measures were taken not only to create an 
environment where the stock market could function orderly and efficiently but also to 
achieve certain national goals. 
In July 1973. the Securities Industry Act 1973 (SIA 1973) was enacted. The 
Act which provided for greater Government control of the securities industry. and 
greater protection of the investors [see e.g .• Aron and Aron (1983)]. carne into force 
in December 1976. Under the Act, the Minister of Finance could, from time to time. 
consult the CIC on all matters relating to the securities industry; the Registrar of 
Companies could also consult with the CIC for the proper and effective 
implementation of the Act. 
The SIA 1973, the implementation of which was the responsibility of the 
Registrar of Companies. provided the much needed legal authority for the Government 
to curb the unhealthy practices in the stock market such as excessive speculation, 
insider trading, share rigging and other forms of market manipulation. Indeed, in the 
Act, there were provisions for the licensing of share dealers to ensure that only 
persons of good character and high business integrity could become members of the 
Stock Exchange; there were also provisions for the proper and orderly conduct of 
listings and dealings in the market. The Act required that dealers. dealers' 
representatives, investment advisors and their representatives as well as financial 
journalists, to maintain proper records of their dealings in securities, which might be 
inspected by the Registrar of Companies. In general, the SIA 1973 was introduced to 
generate a more orderly conduct of the securities business in the country, to protect 
the interests of investors. 
With the implementation of the SIA 1973 in 1976 and under the supervision 
21 
of the CIC, the Malaysian corporate securities market was provided with a somewhat 
healthy atmosphere for the steady growth in the remaining years of the 1970s. 
The decade of the 1980s was an eventful period in the history of the country's 
securities industry. A number of significant reforms and advancements took place 
during the period. "While the equities market enjoyed rapid growth in the 1960s and 
1970s, it was only in the 1980s that far-reaching changes were made that brought the 
KLSE to its current level of sophistication" [Lin (1993), p. 232]. 
In the eighties, trading in the stock market became more popular and wide-
spread. At the same time, as the market for corporate securities grew into a more 
sophisticated one, excessive speculative activities and market manipulations were 
found to be practised in the Exchange; market rigging and instances of conflict of 
interests were also rife [Lin (1989), p. 239]. These unhealthy developments and 
negative market behaviour (particularly in 1981 and 1982) proved that the underlying 
principle of self-regulation which was the basis of the SIA 1973, did not produce the 
effects anticipated [see Aziz (1989), p. 32]. Recognising the inadequacy of the SIA 
1973 in effectively checking the above state of affairs and in creating an orderly 
conduct of securities business in the country, the Government introduced a new 
Securities Industry Act which came into force in July 1983. 
The Securities Industry Act 1983 (SIA 1983) which replaced the SIA 1973, 
contains legislation providing for more effective supervision and control of the 
securities industry in the country. It regulates the operations of dealers in order to 
prevent false trading and market rigging transactions, stock market manipulations and 
insider trading. 
With the enforcement of the SIA 1983, the status and functions of the CIC 
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were also formalised. Prior to this, the CIC (which was charged with the responsibility 
to safeguard the interests of the investing public and to ensure a steady and orderly 
growth of the capital market) had functioned only informally. 
Even though the Malaysian Government consistently recognises the principle 
of stock market self-regulation and the need for the KLSE to conduct its own affairs, 
it also has responsibility to oversee the Exchange in the interests of investors [see 
Section 2.6]. With regard to this matter, the SIA 1983 empowered the Minister of 
Finance to regulate the activities of the KLSE, particularly to initiate amendments to 
the Rules of the Exchange. 
In the early years after the enforcement of the SIA 1983, the securities market 
in the country was dominated by bearish sentiments [see Malaysia, Bank Negara 
(1989), p. 377]. With the slowdown in the Malaysian economy in mid-eighties [see 
Table 2.1], trading activities on the KLSE were quite sluggish [see Table 2.5]. Further, 
the 'Pan-Electric crisis' in Singapore had caused an unprecedented closure of trading 
in the KLSE and the SES for three days from December 2 to 4, 1985. 
Following the Pan-Electric crash, the authorities in both Malaysia and 
Singapore attempted a series of measures to remedy the consequential loss of 
confidence in their respective stock exchanges [see Aziz (1989), p. 34]. In Malaysia, 
one of those measures to revive the securities industry into a healthy state, was the 
move to amend the SIA 1983. 
Amendments to the SIA 1983 came into force on October I, 1987. It 
introduced the concept of corporatisation of stockbroking companies where only 
stockbroking companies rather than individuals, will be entitled to dealing licences. 
The objective behind this move were: to improve the financial strength of the industry 
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Table 2.1 
MALAYSIA: ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) 
AT CONSTANT PRICE 
(1960 - 1993) 
1960 9.9 1977 7.8 
1961 1.4 1978 6.7 
1962 6.9 1979 9.3 
1963 5.S 1980 7.4 
1964 5.8 1981 6.9 
1965 5.6 1982 6.0 
1966 6.2 1983 6.2 
1967 1.0 1984 7.8 
1968 4.2 1985 -1.1 
1969 10.4 1986 1.2 
1970 5.0 1987 5.4 
1971 10.0 1988 8.9 
1972 9.4 1989 8.8 
1973 11.7 1990 9.7 
1974 B.3 1991 8.7 
1975 O.B 1992 7.8 
1976 11.6 1993 8.5 
Por1960 (Peninsular Malaysia only), ~960 _ 100 
1960 - 1970: 1965 .100 
1971 - 1980~ 1970 .100 
1981 - 1993: 1978 -100 
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Table 2.2 
COMPANIES LISTED ON MALAYA AND SINGAPORE STOCK EXCHANGE 
(December 31,1964) 
l)Industrial and General 28 26 54 l4 68 
2) Property 5 7 12 1 13 
3) Rubber 24 26 90 116 
) Rubber Investment 1 1 6 7 
5)Tin 20 2 22 29 5l 
Mining Investment 1 1 3 4 
7) Oil Palm and Coconut 3 3 7 10 
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(to enable brokerage firms to handle larger volumes of business), to inject expertise 
and professionalism into the industry (so that it will be more competitive), and to 
generate greater international interest in dealing on the KLSE. It is hoped that through 
corporatisation, "we can also build the international image of our firms and enable 
them to increase their dealings with foreign brokers" [see The New Straits Times, 
August 15, 1987]. These 'corporations' are expected to take the lead in making the 
KLSE an international stock exchange through the enhancement of technical expertise, 
professionalism and widening of the network of operations [see The New Straits 
Times, July, 19, 1988]. 
Domestic banks, both commercial and merchant, as well as large domestic 
investment institutions were allowed to participate in the corporatisation of stock 
broking companies. In late 1987, new brokerage licences were issued to three largest 
domestic banks. 
The Malaysian Government also has been quite active in encouraging reputable 
foreign stockbrokers to take up equity in local brokerage firms [see de Caires and 
Fletter (1990), p. 260]. An example of the Government's effort to encourage foreign 
stockbroking firms to participate in the country's securities industry - to expose the 
stockbroking industry to international market and technology - was in 1988. In July 
of that year, the Government decided to increase the maximum limit allowed for 
foreign corporate ownership of stockbroking firms from 30% equity interest to 49%, 
provided the foreign corporate shareholder is able to bring in a certain volume of 
foreign business [see See Lin (1993), p.233]. 
Other important changes and improvements introduced and initiated by the 
Government in the 19805 to promote efficiency in the market, would include the 
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following:-
a) The formalisation, in April 1986, of the set of guidelines on policies of the 
CIC. The guidelines, which stressed especially the need for timely as we)) as adequate 
corporate and financial disclosures, stated in clear terms the CIC criteria and 
standards to be complied by the public companies. For example, companies seeking 
public issues should include a full disclosure of information in their final prospectus, 
as required in the Companies Act 1965. 
b) On April 1, 1987, the Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1987, 
carne into force. The purpose of the code is to establish the principles and procedures 
for takeovers and mergers, to ensure that a)) takeovers are conducted in an orderly 
manner, while at the same time the interest of minority shareholders are protected. 
c) The introduction of a 'Code of Ethics: Guidelines on Share Trading' by the 
Central Bank, to ensure proper development of the stock market. Designed to prevent 
the occurrence of grey market and insider trading, these guidelines are particularly 
directed to the merchant banks. As corporate advisors and underwriters for share 
issues, these banks are privy to insider financial information of the companies 
concerned. 
At the end of 1988, the Government took a drastic measure by changing the 
structure of the KLSE. Rules of the Exchange were amended and the Minister of 
Finance appointed a full time Executive Chairman and three Government 
representatives on the nine member-committee of the KLSE. Previously, the KLSE 
Committee comprised of only elected brokers and the Chairman was elected by the 
Committee. Although this move was considered controversial, it was felt that the new 
structure would project a more independent image and enhance the Exchange in the 
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eyes of foreign investors, who previously seemed to prefer to go through the Stock 
Exchange of Singapore to trade in Malaysian shares [see Creffield (?), p. 106]. 
Throughout the 1980s, to compliment the various measures taken by the 
Government, the management of the KLSE itself also effected various changes in the 
Exchange in their effort to upgrade and improve the operations and efficiency of the 
KLSE, so that it could be placed abreast with other international stock exchanges. The 
following were among those major changes and improvements: 
a) The implementation of the first phase of a computerised share scrips 
clearing system in November 1983, with 20 selected counters (companies). The 
following year, the clearing house known as Securities Clearing Automated Network 
Services Sdn. Bhd. (SCANS) was established. By November of the same year (i.e., 
1984), the entire clearing system was fully computerised. 
b) The Incorporation of the Research Institute of Investment Analysts Malaysia 
(RIIAM) in May 1985. It was established with the objectives of educating the public, 
disseminating information and conducting research, so that the standard and quality 
of security analysis and research in the country could be enhanced. On the first of 
October 1985, RIIAM was admitted as a full member of the ASAC (Asian Securities 
Analysts Council). 
c) On April 14, 1986. the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index 
(KLSECOMP) was introduced to the public. Representing cross-sectoral components, 
this new index reflected more accurate movements in share prices on the KLSE, 
compared to the then existing six sectoral indices. 
d) In addition to the computerisation of the entire clearing system in 1984, 
three years later. in 1987. automation was further expanded by the installation of a 
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real-time share price reporting system (MASA)6 for brokers. The service, which is a 
joint venture with the official national news agency, Bernama, also announces 
corporate news and general economic news via computer terminals. So through 
MAS A, brokers and investors are able to have the latest information on the market 
without any delay. The system was then upgraded to MASA IT in 1990. 
e) Learning from the 'Pan-Electric debacle', the Advanced Warning and 
Surveillance Unit (A WAS)' was formed in July 1987, to monitor the public listed 
companies and member firms. In other words, A W AS was established to alert the 
KLSE if any stockbroking finn or public listed company is facing problems. 
f) In line with the growing sophistication of the Malaysian stock market and 
securities industry, in July 1987 the Exchange introduced its new Listing Manual. An 
entirely new section on corporate disc]osure policies and penalties on errant companies 
was included. Through these new listing requirements investors are assured that all 
tradings of securities are conducted on a fair and open basis, alJowing the public 
access wherever appropriate. 
g) To cope with the buoyant activity in the economy and the rapid growth and 
expansion of companies, on november 11, 1988, the KLSE launched its Second Board. 
This new board was established to cater for listing of smaller and younger companies. 
With the launching of this Second Board, smaller companies (with a minimum paid-up 
capital of MRS million but not exceeding MR20 million) which are viable and have 
6rn Malay, 'maso' means 'time'. However 'MASA' here is the acronym for 'lIIIIklumat ,aham' (shares 
information). 
7'awas', in Malay means 'caution' 
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strong growth potentials are able to tap additional capital from the market through 
their listing on the KLSE. Thus, the Board not only helps increase the variety of 
financial instruments (shares) available for trading on the Exchange, it also assists in 
the development of the economy in that smaller companies can now raise funds 
through the stock market for their development and expansion programmes. 
h) With the rapid expansion in transactions and the dynamic changes that had 
taken place in overseas bourses, the need to modernise the KLSE arose. After one and 
a half years of hard work, in May 1989, the KLSE successfully made a leap into a 
new era of modem technology with the launching of an electronic trading system to 
replace the then existing open-outcry system. This new semi-automatic trading system 
known as 'System on Computerised Order Routing and Execution' (SCORE), was 
introduced on the 15th. of May, 1989. The SCORE which was designed to do away 
with the inefficiency of the open-outcry system in matching and executing orders, was 
implemented in stages started with 30 companies. Subsequently, the traditional open-
outcry trading system came to an end on the 10th of November 1989 with all counters 
being traded through the SCORE. Since then, trading on the KLSE has been floorless. 
This has enabled the KLSE to handle much larger trading volumes with greater speed. 
i) To expose investors to a greater choice of financial instruments, listing of 
warrants and transferable subscription rights (TSRs) have been allowed on the KLSE 
since December, 1989. For the first time, TSRs were listed on the KLSE in June 1990. 
2.4-Recent ChanKes and Developments in the KLSE 
With the growing differences in the philosophy, vision, aspirations and policies 
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of the securities industry in Malaysia and Singapore, it became clear that the 'final 
split' between the 'Siamese twin' markets of the KLSE and the SES was inevitable. 
On October 27, 1989, the Malaysian Finance Minister announced in his Budget 
Speech that Malaysian registered companies should delist themselves from the Stock 
Exchange of Singapore (SES). 
In response to the above direction, the KLSE decided that Malaysian 
incorporated companies listed on the SES must be delisted from the SES by December 
31, 1989. Consequently, the SES announced the reciprocal delisting of Singapore 
incorporated companies from the KLSE, also by the end of 1989. 
So, the 'final split' between the KLSE and the SES took effect on the first of 
January, 1990, making the KLSE as the sole official market for Malaysian shares. 
With the split, 182 Malaysian companies were delisted from the SES. Similarly, 53 
Singapore-based companies were delisted from the Official List of the KLSE. 
The Malaysian Government decided to 'split' the two exchanges "as a matter 
of national policy" (see e.g., New Straits Times, October 14, 1989). Thus, the decision 
to establish the KLSE as an 'independent' exchange can be viewed as an effort to 
further the growth of Kuala Lumpur as a major financial centre in this region. By 
confining dealings on the Malaysian counters/companies to the local exchange, it 
would attract more international investors to trade on the Malaysian shares through the 
KLSE. The rationale for the Malaysian Government to take this move was also to 
reduce the market's wlnerability to unfavourable developments on the SES8 [see 
8For example, in December 1985, the collapse of the Pan-Electric Group (of 13 companies) in 
Singapore, forced the temporary closure (i.e. for three days) of both the SES and the KLSE. With this Pan-
Electric debacle, Singapore's image as a financial centre was considerably damaged [see Sheng-Yi (1990), 
p.94]. 
Public holidays for the two countries are also different. In his connection, an event on November 
14, 1986, bore testament. On that date, a public holiday in Malaysia, the selling spate in Singapore led to 
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Malaysia, Bank Negara, Annual Report 1989, p. 150]. In addition, both exchanges 
were common only in respect to companies with dual listings, but the KLSE and the 
SES had their own rules and regulations. 
With the split, it was hoped that, in the long run, the KLSE would develop into 
an internationally recognised independent exchange [see Lin (1993), p. 234]. However, 
the split brought about two immediate impacts on the Malaysian stock market:-
(i) On January 2, 1990, the number of counters fell by 53 to only 254 
companies [see Table 2.3]. As a result, the market capitalisation of the KLSE declined 
from RM 156.1 billion to RM 11 0 billion - a reduction of RM46.1 billion or 29.5 % 
[See Malaysia, Bank Negara (1994), p. 384; see also Table 2.4]. 
(ii) The emergence of a new 'over-the-counter' market known as the CLOB 
(Central Limit Order Book) International in Singapore on January 2, 1990. It listed 
133 actively traded Malaysian stocks together with six other foreign stocks. However, 
the KLSE has declared the CLOB International as an unofficial market for the 
Malaysian shares because it was not bound by any corporate disc10sure rules or listing 
requirements (see e.g., New Straits Times, September 18, 1990). 
It is interesting to note here that the split between the KLSE and the SES had 
also given rise to the problem of misplaced scrips among the Malaysian stockbrokers, 
for some time. As the KLSE was getting part of the business that was previously done 
in the SES. the volume of trading on the KLSE increased very rapidly [ see Tables 
2.4 and 2.5]; see also de Caires and Fletter (1990), p. 260]. With this unprecedented 
surge in trading volume, a number of stockbroking firms were caught with the 
the plunging of prices on certain Malaysian counters to almost half their value [see Malaysia, Bank Negara 
(1994), p. 384]. 
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Table 2.3 
NUMBER OF COMPANIES LISTED ON THE KLSE BY COUNTRY OF 
INCORPORATION 
(1973 - 1993) 
I··.¥~i'\ 1\..:::vn»'UM_?> [:j.: • .... .... ........ . . .IC~ 
[ •••• : •••••••••. · ..••.•. · •..••.••.•. ·.· ••..•.•. ·.1 ••••••••••.•... ~ .• ; ••.•••.•••••.•••.•••• :·· ••• ·I::;.~·~[·~~~.I ....................... '. :· ....... :.0~8;! ••• ·i!.i.]i.··I •••••• ·~0~ ••••• 1;1 •••• i~1:~ ••••.•  •. 
1973 155 69 38 262 262 
1974 163 67 34 264 264 
1975 167 67 34 268 268 
1976 173 64 27 264 264 
1977 177 59 20 256 256 
1978 180 57 16 253 253 
1979 185 56 12 253 253 
1980 182 56 12 250 250 
1981 187 55 11 253 253 
1982 194 56 11 261 261 
1983 204 56 11 271 271 
1984 218 56 8 282 282 
1985 222 56 6 284 284 
1986 227 5S 6 288 288 
1987 232 54 5 291 291 
1988 238 53 4 295 295 
1989 249 53 3 305 2 307 
1990 268 3 271 14 285 
1991 289 3 292 32 324 
1992 314 3 317 52 369 
1993 326 3 329 84 413 
_ ••••.•••••• :j; 
•••••• 
...•.•. :.;. 
_ •. :· •. :.·· .. %·.~·ifl·:;; 0:;:·:;0(8:';;·:· 
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Table 2.4 
THE KLSE; NOMINAL VALUE AND MARKET CAPITALISATION 
(1973 - 1993) 
AS.A.'1' nAIl mm ·<>:»OXlNALVA.LUE MAR.D:T CAPITALISATION 
'a.M,il;UQn 'Ch~. . ..••••. JU( JU,lUcn 'Change 
1973 3.8 13.3 
1974 4.3 13.2 8.1 -39.1 
1975 4.8 11.6 11.7 44 .4 
1976 5.0 4.2 12.7 8.5 
1977 5.2 4.0 13.7 7.9 
1978 5.9 13.5 lB.5 33.6 
1979 6.5 10.2 24.6 34.4 
1980 7.9 21.5 43.1 75.2 
1981 10.7 35.4 55.4 2B.5 
1982 13.6 27.1 52.9 -4.5 
1983 16.3 19.9 80.3 51.8 
1984 20.4 25.2 69.3 -13.7 
1985 22.6 10.8 58.3 -15.9 
1986 23.5 4.0 64.5 10.6 
1987 26.6 13.2 73.9 14.6 
1988 29.4 10.5 98.7 33.6 
1989 34.3 16.7 156.1 58.2 
1990 35.3 2.9 131.7 -15.6 
1991 41.7 18.1 161.3 22.5 
1992 53.2 27.6 245.8 52.4 
1993 61.6 15.8 619.7 152.1 
:< 
....... 
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problem of scrip processing and delivery as they had limited financial and 
administrative resources. Being unable to cope with the massive backlog of scrip 
deliveries, the problem of misplaced scrips arose among those stockbroking firms9 . 
The aforementioned problem highlighted the various shortcomings among the 
local brokers. The incident had proved that it was time for stockbroking firms to 
improve their capacity, not only in terms of marketing and financial strength but also 
in terms of professionalism and technical expertise - to enable them to handle the 
rapidly increasing trading volume as well as to provide high standards of service to 
international clients. Capital adequacy is considered very important in ensuring the 
overall financial soundness and liquidity of the Malaysian stockbroking industry. 
Recognizing the above situation and need, in its move to further enhance the 
financial strength and professionalism of the stockbroking industry, the Ministry of 
Finance decided that MR20 million should be the minimum paid-up capital for every 
stockbroking firm. At the same time, smaller broking firms were encouraged to merge 
among themselves or with institutional or foreign partners [see Malaysia, Bank Negara 
(1994), p. 384]. Accompanying this, the Exchange's Rules on minimum paid-up 
capital were amended. It then became mandatory for all stockbroking companies in 
all parts of the country to have a minimum paid-up capital of RM20 million by the 
end of 1991 [see e.g., ASAC (1992)]. Prior to that, in February 1990, to enable them 
to improve their financial strength, the CIC gave approval for stockbroking firms with 
a paid-up capital between RMS million and 20 million to seek listing on the KLSE. 
On the whole, however, the split between the KLSE and the SES did not bring 
much adverse effects on the growth and performance of the KLSE. O'Connor and 
9SCC Investors Digest (April 1990) and Malaysia. Bank Negara (1994), p. 384. 
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Table 2.5 
THE KLSE: ANNUAL TRADING VOLUME AND VALUE (1973-1993) 
1973 0.5 0.5 2.0 2.0 
1974 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.7 
1975 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.3 
1976 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.0 
1977 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.0 
1978 1.1 1.1 2.5 2.5 
1979 0.6 0.6 1.6 1.6 
1980 1.5 1.5 5.6 5.6 
1981 1.6 1.6 8.1 8.1 
1982 1.1 1.1 3.3 3.3 
1983 2.3 2.3 7.9 7.9 
1984 1.9 1.9 5.7 5.7 
1985 2.9 2.9 6.2 6.2 
1986 2.3 2.3 3.4 3.4 
1987 5.3 5.3 10.1 10.1 
1988 4.0 4.0 6.8 6.8 
1989 10.18 0.02 10.2 18.4 0.06 18.5 
1990 13.1 0.08 13.2 29.3 0.22 29.5 
1991 12.1 0.28 12.3 29.2 0.85 30.1 
1992 18.6 0.71 19.3 49.2 2.28 51.5 
1993 105.0 2.74 107.74 372.6 14.6 387.2 
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Smith (1991, p. 284) elucidate this fact in the following words [see also Tables 2.4 
and 2.5]: 
"The separation has not unduly altered the scope and size of the KLSE. 
After the separation, there were 254 companies worth M$110 billion on 
the local bourse. Within one year, 30 new listings expanded the 
bourse to 284 companies valued at M$131.7 billion at the end of 1990". 
The KLSE continued to expand rapidly in recent years despite the Pan-Electric 
Crash in 1985, the World Stock Market Crash in 1987 and the split with the SES in 
1990. In their efforts to meet the new challenges of the nineties, to boost public 
confidence and to promote greater efficiency in the stock market, the Government and 
the authority of the Exchange have undertaken a host of improvement measures in 
recent years. With the rapid industrialisation of the Malaysian economy, and to keep 
up with world trends of the globalisation of financial markets, several measures were 
designed and implemented to improve the administration of the KLSE and to expose 
it to new technological advancements. 
In January 1990, the Exchange introduced the 'daily netting system' for the 
broking firms, whereby all outstanding sales and purchases of stocks transacted will 
be netted out on the day of the contract. The system was introduced with the objective 
of reducing physical movement of shares between broking firms and the securities 
clearing house. 
In February 1990, the Fixed Delivery and Settlement System (FOSS) was 
implemented by the KLSE. with the objective of developing a more organised and 
efficient system of scrip delivery and payment. It was hoped that the FOSS would 
help to enhance the management of cash flow among stockbroking firms. With the 
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new system, broking houses would be in a better position to plan their funding 
requirements more efficiently. Before the introduction of the FOSS, there was a 
trading period system whereby sellers of shares during a particular week were given, 
up till Wednesday the following week to deliver their scrips; making it difficult for 
the buying broking house to predict when the scrips will be delivered. 
On the 14th. of April 1990, as a step to further improve the settlement system 
of the Exchange - a move towards introducing scripless trading (in tandem with trends 
in developed markets) - the Malaysian Central Depository Sendirian Berhad (MCD), 
an associate company of the KLSE, was incorporated. This company (which has been 
accepted as an eligible foreign custodian under the United States Investment Company 
Act, 1940) was charged with the responsibility to implement the establishment of the 
Central Depository System (CDS) that will do away with the present physical 
movement and delivery of scrips. 
The CDS is effectively a 'scripless' trading system - a system of securities 
trading without involving share certificates or scrips changing hands. Under the 
system, ownership of shares is transferred through a computerised book entry instead 
of by physical delivery. So, to trade in shares under the CDS, an investor needs to 
open a CDS account with the Malaysian Central Depository Sdn. Bhd. (the company 
that manages the CDS) through its agents (i.e., stockbroking firms). 
A CDS account has all the security features of a bank account. Indeed, the 
CDS is to shares what a bank is to cash. When an investor buys a share, his or her 
account will be credited; similarly it will be debited when a share is sold. 
The Act which provides for the regulation of the CDS - the Securities Industry 
Act (Central Depository System) 1991 - was passed in Parliament, in February 1991. 
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The opening of the CDS accounts by investors was launched in November 1992. Since 
then, the CDS accounts can be opened with the stockbroking finns which are 
appointed as the ADAs (Authorised Depository Agents). However, trading under the 
CDS system only commenced on March 2, 1993, with an existing second board 
counter (company), Autoways Holdings Berhad, to be the first counter brought into 
the system. By end-1993, all the 84 companies listed on the Second Board had been 
prescribed into the system, while prescribing of counters from the Main Board only 
commenced in 1994. 
When the CDS is ful1y operational, the KLSE is expected to be able to handle 
a greater volume of trading than currently possible. Moreover, the CDS will not only 
help to reduce the cost of trading (as all scrips will be unmobilised), but also reduce 
financial losses arising from problems related to scrips such as forgeries, stolen 
certificates, tampering and misplaced certificates, and delays in share registration. 
In addition to the changes and advancements discussed above, the following 
are among other changes and improvements initiated and implemented by the 
management of the KLSE in recent years:-
• The establishment of the Market Development Unit in April, 1990, to 
monitor developments in the domestic and foreign securities markets. 
• To enhance its price reporting efficiency, the KLSE upgraded its real time 
price dissemination system (MASA) with MASA n. It provides additional infonnation 
to users. 
• The launching of the Second Board Index in January 1991, to provide 
investors with an indicator of the performance of stocks listed on the Second Board. 
With the implementation of this index, smaller companies become more attractive to 
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institutional investors since there is a better track of price movements for those shares 
(see Malaysia, Ministry of Finance, Economic Report 1991/92, p. 204). 
• In early 1991 also, with the cooperation of Telekom Malaysia, the Exchange 
launched the telestock service. Through this service, information on counters listed on 
the KLSE such as the selling and buying prices of shares and total volume traded can 
be obtained via telephone. 
• On October 17, 1991, the Exchange launched the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange Main Board All-Shares Index known as EMAS Index. Consisting all shares 
listed on the Main Board, the Index supplements the Composite Index in gauging the 
performance of the KLSE. 
• Commencing from the 19th. of October 1992, matching of orders under the 
SCORE is automatic. However, the automation was implemented in stages. By end 
of November 1992, measures to facilitate full automation of the former semi-automatic 
trading system in the KLSE were completed and all listed stocks were automatically 
matched. This would enhance the efficiency of the KLSE and investors should benefit 
from the increased transparency. 
• In November 1992, the KLSE launched the Real-time Analysis Stock 
Information Service (RASIS). With this service, further up-to-date information is 
available for investors. 
• Shares listed on the KLSE were previously grouped into eight sectors 
namely, Industrial, Finance, Property, Palm Oil, Rubber, Hotels, Tin and Property 
Trust. Nevertheless, with effect from the first of September 1993, to better reflect 
businesses of companies listed on the Exchange, to help investors focus on a particular 
sector more accurately, the KLSE reorganised and reclassified its Main Board sectors. 
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Consequently: 
(i) four new sectors were introduced to replace the then existing 
Industrial Sector of the Main Board which was getting too big. The new sectors are 
known as Consumer Products, Industrial Products, Construction and Trading/Services; 
(ii) the Loan Sector comprising loan stocks/notes and bonds was also launched; 
(iii) both Palm Oil and Rubber Sectors were merged and known as Plantation 
sector; 
(iv) the Tin Sector was renamed as the Mining Sector. 
On the same date, new indices to represent the above sectors were also introduced . 
• The SCANS formed an alliance with Dow JoneslTe]erate - the Te]erate 
Scans - to provide a customised real-time equity and international markets information 
service, for the exclusive use by member companies of the KLSE. The Telerate Scans 
was formed with the objective of providing financial information on regional and 
global markets. With this, beside easy access to information on a particular exchange 
that the international capital market will have, perhaps further international interest on 
the KLSE could a]so be generated. 
In February 1992, the CIC made another revision to its listing guidelines to 
tighten the requirements for new listings; and also set additional criteria for rights 
issue proposal [see e.g., Malaysia, Bank Negara, Annual Report 1993, p. 23]. After 
this date, it was decided that applications to the CIC for listing on the KLSE would 
be subjected to this new listing requirement guidelines. Listed below are among the 
salient features of the new listing guidelines: 
(i) For companies seeking listing on the Main Board, an average pre-tax profit 
of not less than MR4 million per annum (compared with only MR2 million 
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previously) must be made for the past three years to five years. A pre-tax profit of at 
least MR2 miUion per annum is also required to be made for each of the past three 
years to five years. 
(ii) For listing on the Second Board, a company is required to make an average 
pre-tax profit of not less than MR2 million per annum (compared with MRI million 
previously) for the past three years. In addition, a pre-tax profit of at least MR 1 
million per annum must be obtained for the past three years. 
Besides, the KLSE itself amended its listing requirements in August 1993. This 
move was consistent with the commitment of the KLSE to encourage high standard 
of corporate disclosure and protect the investing public [see Malaysia, Bank Negara 
(1994), p. 390]. The following are among the major additional requirements: 
(i) To help reduce nepotism and thus minimise influences of interested parties 
in the administration of a company, a]] listed companies are required to set up audit 
committees whose composition of members have to meet certain requirements. All 
listed companies were given a year, from August 1993, to set up an audit committee. 
Similarly, all companies which are seeking a listing must also meet the requirement 
of having an audit committee. 
The functions of the audit committee are, among others, to review the audit 
plan and reports; also to evaluate the system of internal accounting control. In this 
respect, all listed companies are required to include in their annual reports, their audit 
committees' report disclosure. 
(ii) Public listed companies which are required by the KLSE must report within 
48 hours from the date of the query. This move will help to protect investors from 
extreme price fluctuations in cases where information may be price sensitive. 
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On the regulatory ground, the establishment of the Securities Commission (SC) 
commencing operations on March 1, 1993 (with the coming into force of the 
Securities Commission Act 1993), marked a milestone in the development of the 
domestic capital market. The SC was established with a statutory role in ensuring law 
and order in the capital market . 
The SC, which absorbed the functions of three agencies, namely, the Capital 
Issues Committee (CIC), the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers and some of the 
functions of the Registrar of Companies, is responsible for the enforcement of the 
Securities Commission Act 1993 (SCA 1993). Together with the Registrar of 
Companies (ROC), the SC is also responsible for the enforcement of the Securities 
Industry Act 1983 and the Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991. 
As the Malaysian capital market grew in size, complexity and sophistication, 
regulation was felt to be an urgent issue (see New Straits Times, October 23, 1992). 
The time had come for the country to establish a single regulatory body - the SC - to 
supervise and regulate the securities industry to see its orderly development so that an 
environment for fair play in Malaysian capital market could be provided. 
In tabling the Securities Commission Bill 1992 in Parliament, the Minister of 
Finance was reported to stress that, even though some quarters claimed that the market 
mechanism could regulate itself, the confidence in the so-called self-regulated market 
had more often than not, been disappointing. "The Government cannot afford to 
gamble away the interests of the national economy and the investing public with an 
unregulated market". In supporting the need for a regulatory body to ensure the 
integrity of a capital market and the protection of investors, he added, "Well-known 
international exchanges have also encountered crisis after crisis as a result of the greed 
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of individual market manipulators" [see New Straits Times, October 22, 1992]. 
2.S-Le2islations and Re~ulatory Bodies 
In Malaysia, supervision of the securities industry comes under the purview of 
the Ministry of Finance [see Figures 2.1 a and 2.1 b]. Listed below are laws that govern 
the administration of securities industry in Malaysia. In general, these acts seek to 
provide for the development and management of a healthy capital market and 
securities industry and to ensure that the investing public are protected: 
(a) Securities Commission Act 1993; 
(b) Securities Industry Act 1983; 
( c) Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991; 
(D) Companies Act 1965. 
Currently, there are two key regulatory agencies in the Malaysian financial 
system: the Central Bank (Bank Negara) and the Securities Commission. While the 
Central Bank supervises and regulates the banking system (including the money 
market), the Securities Commission (SC) which concentrates on the broad capita) 
market, is responsible specifically, for the regulation and development of the securities 
industry, financial futures and options markets, unit trust and property trust schemes 
and the takeover and merger of companies. 
Despite the fact that the SC was established to entrust the governance, 
regulation and supervision of the securities industry within one central body, more 
than one authority still monitor, manage and admonish the capital market. Apart from 
the se, there are effectively four other regulatory organisations responsible for the 
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Figure 2.la 
REGULATORY STRUL'TIJRE 010' TilE SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL FUfVRES INDUSTRY: SUPERVISORY AND MONITORING 
SECURITIES INDUSTRY ACT SECURITIES COMMISSION ACT 1993 
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L ___ .. _______________ I 
• SCANS operales as the clearing house for The KLSE and is its wholly owned subsidiary. 
+ MCD is a subsidiary of The KLSE and opera&es abe Central Deposicory Sysaem pursuant 10 die Securities Induwy (Central Deposicories) Act 1991. 
Source: The KLSE 
Figure 2.1b 
REGULATORY STRUCTUR.E OF THE SEClJRITIFS AND FlNANCIAL nrruRES INDUSTRY: LICENSING 
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J 
SECURITIES INDUSTRY ACT 1983(SIA)I 
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Source: The KLSE 
supervision and management of the stock market in particular and the securities 
industry in general [see Figures 2.1 a and 2.1 b] . The bodies are, the Registrar of 
Companies (ROC), the Licensing Officer (SecuritieslFutures Trading) of the Ministry 
of Finance (LO), the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC), and the KLSE itself. With 
the exception of the KLSE which is basically a self-regulatory body run and managed 
by the private sector, the other three bodies are Government agencies. 
The major functions and responsibilities entrusted to the five regulatory 
authorities mentioned above are briefly elucidated below: 
a) The Securities Commission (SC) 
The SC was established under the Securities Commission Act 1993 as a 
watchdog organisation to centralise powers governing the regulation and supervision 
of the securities industry within one authority from the previously fragmented system 
of several regulatory agencies 10. The SC's functions, as stipulated in the Securities 
Commission Act 1993 (Act 498, p. 13) are listed below: 
(i) to advise the Minister of Finance on all matters relating to securities and 
futures contract industries; 
(ii) to regulate the issue of securities; 
(iii) to regulate the designation of futures contracts; 
(iv) to regulate the take-overs and mergers of companies; 
(v) to regulate all matters relating to unit trust schemes; 
IOpreviously, as we have already examined. the watching and warning. the supervision and regulation. 
of the capital market. rested with six major bodies: the Registrar of Companies. the Capital Issue Committee. 
the Panel of Takeovers and Mergers, the Foreign Investment Committee, the Central Bank and the KLSE. 
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(vi) to be responsible for supervising and monitoring the activities of any 
exchange, dearing house and centra] depository; 
(vii) to take an responsible measures to safeguard the interest of persons 
dealing in securities or trading in futures contracts; 
(viii) to promote and encourage proper conduct amongst members of the 
exchange and aU related persons; 
(ix) to suppress illegal, dishonourab]e and improper practices in dealings in 
securities and trading in futures contracts and the provision of investment advice or 
other services relating to securities or futures contracts; 
(x) to consider and suggest reforms of the law relating to securities or futures 
contracts including changes to the constitution, rules and regulations of any exchange 
and its dearing house; 
(xi) to encourage the development of securities and futures market in Malaysia; 
and 
(xii) to perform any function conferred by or under any other act. 
b) The Registrar of Companies (ROC) 
Established as the overseer of thousands of companies - public and private -
the ROC administers the Companies Act 1965. It also administers and regulates the 
relevant provisions of the Securities Industry Act, 1983 (with regard to both listed and 
unlisted companies and their officers). The ROC is responsible to supervise the 
behaviour of the 4OO-over companies listed on the local bourse. 
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c) The Licensing Officer (SecuritieslFutures Trading) 
The office of the Licensing Officer (LO) was established together with the 
setting up of the Sc. The LO which is appointed by the Minister of Finance, is 
responsible for the issuance of the relevant licences under the Securities Industry Act 
1983 (previously under the purview of the ROC) and the Futures Industry Act 1993. 
Working within the Ministry of Finance and under both acts, the LO is endowed with 
the authority to issue permits to trade or deal in securities, futures and options. 
d) The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
As a formal stock exchange for the country. the KLSE not only provides a 
market place for the trading of securities but also responsible for the surveillance of 
the market place. This self-regulatory organisation with its own Memorandum and 
Articles of Association as well as a set of Rules, governs the conduct of its members 
and stockbroking companies in securities dealings. Besides, the KLSE is also 
responsible for the enforcement of its Listing Requirements which spell out the criteria 
for listing, disclosure requirements and standards to be maintained by public listed 
companies ll 
e) The Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) 
Formed in 1974. the FIe is concerned with the distribution of equity ownership 
consistent with the New Economic POlicy12. Its main role is to implement the 
lISee the KLSE. Investing in the Stock Market in Malaysia. PP 681212193. p. 04. 
12TM New Economic Policy (1970 - 1990) spelled out twin objectives of socio-economic development 
for national unity. These two-pronged objectives are: 
(i) the eradication of poveny irrespective of race; and 
(ii) the restructuring of society to eliminate racial economic dominance: to eventaully eliminate the 
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Government's guidelines on regulation of acquisition of assets or interests, mergers 
or takeovers of companies and business. In addition, the FIC is also charged with 
responsibility for major issues pertaining to foreign investment. 
To summarise, there are three major anns of the Government that regulate and 
supervise the trading of securities or shares in Malaysia: the LO that has power to 
license, the SC which is authorised to regulate and the ROC which has the mandate 
to prosecute contradiction of the law. The duties and functions of these bodies are 
supported and complemented by the KLSE - a private sector organisation - which has 
its own set of rules, regulations and requirements to be enforced. 
2.6-0raanisational Structure of the KLSE 
In Malaysia, the establishment of a stock exchange requires the approval of the 
Ministry of Finance. The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) is the only body 
approved by the Minister of Finance, under the provisions of the Securities Industry 
Act 1983 (SIA 1983) as the stock exchange in the country. 
As a public company limited by guarantee, the KLSE has no shareholders and 
no share capital. It only has members who must be shareholders in any stockbroking 
company (or the KLSE member company, as it is often referred to) that is recognised 
by the Exchange. 
Membership is confined to individuals and corporations (including foreign 
corporations) who are licensed under the SIA 1983 to deal in securities. Put 
identification of race within economic functions. 
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differently, the members of the KLSE can be either natural persons or corporations 
who shaH be the shareholders of the stockbroking companies l3 [see Articles of 
Association of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, p. 8]. The maximum number of 
members allowed by the Exchange's Articles of Association is 250 (i.e., 200 natural 
persons and 50 corporations). 
A stockbroking company is not directly a member of the KLSE however. This 
is because, a corporate member must be represented on the Exchange only by a 
corporate nominee. A corporate nominee, whose acts and defaults shall be deemed to 
be those of the corporate member, is required by law to hold a dealer's representative 
licence. 
Following the British model [see van Agtmael (1984)], the KLSE is a self-
regulatory organisation, conducting its own affairs in the securities industry. However, 
the Exchange is closely monitored by the Ministry of Finance. The Malaysian 
Government, acutely aware of the importance of a properly regulated equity market 
in economic development. has proclaimed its desire to avoid market excesses [see 
Aron and Aron (1983)]. 
As a self-regulatory body, the KLSE is administered by a committee. 
monitoring shares trading and stock broking operations. The Exchange also establishes 
listing requirements. 
Like any other company, the KLSE has its own Memorandum and Articles of 
Association (M&A). In addition, to govern the conduct of its members in securities 
dealings, the Exchange has two sets of rules, namely, Rules Relating to Member 
I~e business of dealing in securities in Malaysia is crried out by stockbroking companies with limited 
liabilities. Stockbroking business in the fonn of partnership or sole proprietership is not allowed. 
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Companies and Rules for Trading by Member Companies. 
The Exchange's M&A as well as its Rules can be amended by the members 
of the KLSE. Under the provisions of the SIA 1983, the Minister of Finance also can 
amend the Exchange's M&A and Rules, after consulting the Securities Commission 
and the KLSE Committee. 
The affairs of the Exchange are managed and regulated by a Committee of nine 
members. The current nine member Committee consists of four members elected from 
individual members, four independent members including the Executive Chairman who 
are appointed by the Minister of Finance and one elected corporate nominee. The 
maximum number of corporate nominees allowed to be represented on the Committee 
is two. 
The day-to-day management and administration of the Exchange are handled 
by the Executive Chairman and a management team, all of whom are answerable to 
the KLSE Committee. The General Manager (appointed by the KLSE Committee) 
who heads the day-to-day operations of the Exchange, is assisted by a team of 
executive personnels heading various departments. 
The organisational structure of the KLSE is exhibited in Figure 2.2. 
2.7-Tradioa Systems and Practices 
The KLSE operates on the basis of a five-day week (i.e., Monday to Friday). 
Trading begins at 9.30 a.m. and finishes at 12.30 p.m. for the morning session. The 
afternoon session begins at 2.30 p.m. and ends at 5.00 p.m. 
Activities and practices of trading on the Exchange are defined, regulated and 
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Figure 2.2 
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governed, primarily by the Exchange's Rules for Trading by Member Companies. 
2.7.t-Execution of Orders: The Open Outcry and the SCORE 
As has been mentioned, the open outcry was the method of trading previously 
practised by the KLSE. Under this scoreboard system which had been in existence 
since 1961, trading clerks of the member companies did the trading on the floor of the 
Exchange's trading room. Bids and offers received by the Exchange's clerks from the 
trading clerks through voice or hand signals would be entered on the board. 
Transactions were based on individual auction, with a recognition of preference for 
time and price. A transaction could only occur when a bid and an offer matched. 
Under the currently existing automatic trading system - the SCORE which was 
developed with the professional and manpower help from the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Corporation [see Investors Digest, April 1990, p. 38] - the brokers directly key in 
clients' orders on the SCORE terminals at their offices which in tum are routed to the 
KLSE's matching room. In this case, the stockbroker concerned is fully responsible 
for the accuracy of the details of orders entered. 
As noted earlier, the SCORE started as a semi-automatic trading system. Under 
this semi-automated trading system, orders were matched and executed (by the KLSE 
staff) in the matching room under strict rules and surveillance. However, by November 
30, 1992, the matching was fully automated. So, under the currently existing trading 
system, there is no more human intervention in the matching process. 
As soon as an order is matched, the stockbroking company concerned will get 
the infonnation which is relayed to the broking company's office via a matched 
infonnation order printer located at the broking company's office. Details of the 
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information would include the quantity matched, the price and the identity of the 
sellinglbuying broker. 
2.7.2-Settling and Clearing: The SCANS and the FDSS 
The Securities Clearing Automated Network Services Sdn. Berhad or the 
SCANS, a subsidiary of the KLSE established in 1984, is the clearing house for the 
KLSE. It effects the settlement of all business done through the SCORE. In other 
words, all matters relating to the delivery and settlement of trades and scrips come 
under the purview of the SCANS. As a clearing house, the SCANS is also responsible 
for settling payments and claims between clearing members. 
However, only domestic contracts of all securities listed by the KLSE are 
cleared by the SCANS. It does not provide clearing facilities for cross-border trades. 
Under the 'daily netting system' the amount to be settled daily between the 
SCANS and each clearing member is the difference between the values of scrips 
delivered to the SCANS and collected from the SCANS by the clearing members. To 
selling members. the SCANS will have to issue cheques. and on the other hand. 
buying members will have to issue cheques in favour of the SCANS and credit its 
account at the clearing bank. 
The SCANS maintains clearing accounts with Malayan Banking Berhad (MBB) 
and all clearing members have to open an account with the MBB. At the end of each 
trading day, the MBB produces its daily statement of all clearing accounts for the 
SCANS. From this statement, the SCANS can detect any default clearing members 
and thus, appropriate action can be taken against them. 
Transactions on the KLSE can be classified into three types of bargains: 
47 
immediate or prompt contract, ready contract or ready bargain and settlement contract 
or time bargain. However, the bulk of trading is on a ready basis [see e.g., van 
Agtmael (1984)]. 
Ready contract requires delivery of scrips and transfer documents between 
three to seven market days after the day of contract. For immediate contract on the 
other hand, delivery would have to be done no later than 3.00 p.m. on the first market 
day following the day of contract. A transaction on a settlement or time basis, can be 
settled within a month; i.e., it requires delivery after four week following the day of 
contract. 
The present settJement system known as FOSS (Fixed Delivery Settlement 
System) which was introduced in 1990, detennines the exact dates for the delivery of 
share certificates and settlement (as opposed to the previous system where dates were 
not fixed). The dates of delivery and settlement are all based on a specific number of 
market days from the date of transaction or contract, usually denoted as T day. 
For a contract on a ready basis, under the FOSS, a selling client must deliver 
share certificates to his or her broker by 12.30 p.m. on the fourth market day after the 
date of the trade (i.e., T+4), while the selling broker must deliver the certificates to 
the SCANS on the fifth market day after the transaction (T +5). The SCANS then will 
have to deliver the scrips to the buying broker on the sixth market day (T+6). 
In the event that the selling broker is unable to deliver the scrips to the 
SCANS by 4.00 p.m. on day T+'s (because the selling client fails to deliver the scrips 
to the selling broker on the due date). the KLSE will institute automatic buying-
in I4(Le .• it will repurchase the shares) against the broker concerned, on the market 
14See the KLSE Rules for Trading by M~mb~r Compani~s (Rul~ B, p. JOB) 
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day following the due date to the SCANS. Further, by 12.30 p.m. on day T+7 the 
buying broker is required to deliver the scrips to the buying client. 
In the process of settlement, payment to the selling client must be made by the 
selling broker on the sixth market day following the transaction day (T +6), latest by 
4.00 p.m. The SCANS in tum, is required to make payment to the net selling broker 
by 11.30 a.m. on day T+6. Similarly, the net buying broker is responsible to pay the 
SCANS by 11.30 a.m. on day T +6. 
Buying clients are given any time up to 12.30 p.m. on day T + 7, to pay for 
their scrips. In case, by the due date, there is a buying client who still does not make 
payment to his broker, then the broker is entitled to institute the selling-out on day T + 
8. The broker concerned may, at any time thereafter sue such a client for the 
difference and all losses and expenses that resulted from the selling-out. 
The KLSE has imposed its settlement terms rigorously. With the surge in the 
volume of transactions since early 1991, the KLSE has decided to apply its buying-in 
rules strictly. A hefty buying-in price is fixed: 10 bids higher than the last-done prices. 
A further five bids will be added to the 10 bids, for shares not attained on the first 
day. 
Buying-in takes place every market day at 9.30 a.m. and 2.30 p.m. 
2.7.3-Types of Transaction 
There are two types of trading commonly practised by investors trading on the 
KLSE. They are, the cash transaction and the margin transaction. 
Cash transactions refer to trades in which the financing of the purchase of 
shares is entirely borne by the buyer. Settlement for cash transactions must be made 
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within the time period as specified in the settlement rules of the Exchange (see 
Section 2.7.2). 
With the margin transaction, a buyer is required to place certain acceptable 
fOnTIS of collateral when buying securities. The sum of collateral and securities bought 
must not be less than 150% of his or her outstanding balance. 
Under the Securities Industry Act 1983, short selling is forbidden, except under 
certain circumstances. In the event that a short sale was made, under the allowed 
circumstances, the documents evidencing the sale must be endorsed with a statement 
to this effect. 
2.7.4-Types of Orders 
As noted in the KLSE's (PP6 6812/93) Investing In the Stock Market in 
Malaysia (p. H2), the types of orders most frequently used by the KLSE investors are 
limit orders and market orders. Limit order is defined as an order which is to be 
executed at a price entered into the system, or better. A market order on the other 
hand, refers to an order which is to be executed at the matching price. 
2.7 .s-Trading Lot 
The minimum unit of trading known as 'board lot', is usually 1,000 shares. In 
other words, every bid and offer should represent a minimum of one board lot (or al~o 
known as even lot). Marketable parcels or board lots for a stock with a market price 
of RM 10.00 or less comprise 1,000 units of shares. If the market price of a stock is 
above RMlO.OO, a board lot may comprise 100 shares, 500 shares or 1,000 shares. 
Quotations on stocks of less than board lot may be put on the Special Lots 
SO 
Board or transacted by private negotiation. 
2.7.6-Transaction Costs 
For transactions on Malaysian equities, both buyers and sellers are charged 
brokerage commissions IS • These commission charges are fixed by the KLSE and 
they are not open for negotiation [see Seaward (1993)]. 
Transaction costs involved in investing on the KLSE, as specified in the 
KLSE's Fact Sheet, January 1995, are as follows: 
(i) Brokerage rates: For shares priced at less than MRO.50, the commission 
is fixed at MRO.05 per share. For shares priced between MRO.50 and MRO.99, the 
commission is raised to MRO.l for ready contracts and MRO.lS for other contracts. 
If shares are traded at MRI and above, the commission is 1 % of the value, for 
ready contracts, and 1.5% for other contracts. Commissions for shares quoted in 
foreign currencies are fixed at 1 % of the value if they are transacted under ready 
contracts and 1.5% for other contracts. 
(ii) Clearing fees: Each party to the transaction is also required to pay a 
clearing fee of 0.05% of transacted value. For the issuance of share certificates, 
payment to the company registrar must be made at the rate of MR3.00 per share 
certificate. 
(iii) Stamp duty: Share transactions are subject to contract stamp tax as well 
as transfer stamp. The contract stamp tax for both purchases and sales is fixed at 
RM1.50 for MRl,OOO or fractional part of value of securities. The transfer stamp 
"For details, see the KLSE Rules for Trading by Member Companies (Rule 6, pp. 105 - 107b). See 
also the KLSE Fact Sheel, January 1994. 
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which is MR3.00 per MR1,OOO or MRO.30 per MR100 value of securities, on the 
other hand, is payable by the buyer if he or she wants to register. 
(iv) Taxation: In Malaysia, interest and dividend income on corporate 
securities are subject to income tax. However, there is no tax on capital gains. 
2.7.7-Policy and Replation Regarding Stock Price Fluctuations 
Under the open outcry trading system, there had been no specific regulation 
for controlling fluctuations in share prices. However, as a matter of policy and 
practice, when there was a move in the price or volume of a particular company's 
shares by a substantial percentage within a day or a week, the Exchange would 
normally query the company concerned. 
Under the present, computerised system - the SCORE - there is a limit imposed 
on the highest and the lowest price that a stock can be traded for each trading session 
of the day. At present, share prices must be confined within a range of %30% relative 
to the closing price of the previous trading session 16 
2.8-The Main Board and the Second Board 
Shares traded on the KLSE are listed on two boards: the Main Board and the 
Second Board. The Main Board is for shares from big companies, whereas the Second 
Board is meant for companies which are smaller in size and younger in age. 
The launching of the Second Board in 1988, coincided with the raising of the 
16See the KLSE,/nv,sting in the Stock Market in Malaysia, PP 6812193 p. H2. 
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minimum paid-up capital required for companies seeking a listing, from RM5 million 
to RM20 million. As a result of this increment, without the existence of the Second 
Board, smaller companies (with a paid-up capital of less than RM20 million) would 
be disqualified from taping additional capital in the capital market through a listing 
on the KLSE. Therefore, the establishment of the Second Board, provides access for 
such small companies to equity financing. 
Listing requirements for the Second Board are essentially the same as the Main 
Board'sl7. The Second Board companies still have to comply with all corporate 
disclosure rules as those of the Main Board companies. However, they are given 
certain concessions in addition to the lower paid-up capital requirement. The prelisting 
requirement for these smaller companies is a profit track record of only two-to-three 
years, compared with the Main Board requirement of five years unbroken profitability. 
Another concession given to the Second Board companies is that they are not required 
to print full prospectuses as advertisements in two local newspapers prior to the public 
offer: they need only to print summaries of their prospectuses [see e.g., Seaward 
(1993)]. 
2.9-Share Price Indices: the KLSEMAS and the 
KLSECOMP 
The general movement of the stock market is usually measured by a stock 
I7For the details of listing requirements for both the Main Board and the Second Board. see the KLSE. 
Investing in the Stock in Malaysia. PP 681212193. pp. 11 - 12. See also New Straits Times. September 27. 
1990 
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market average or index consisting of a group of securities that is supposed to reflect 
the entire market [Amling (1984)]. In general, a share price index is a yardstick that 
measures the changes in the market value of shares which make up a stock market 
over time. Thus, a well-formulated share price index or stock market index can be 
used as an indicator of the performance of the underlying economy, and as a useful 
summary measure of the current expectations of future economic (and political) 
outlook. 
In Malaysia, there are several share price indices available for investors and 
market observers to gauge the performance of the KLSE. Beside the KLSE itself, New 
Straits Tines and Business Times also have their own set of share price indices. 
Since 1973, the KLSE has been computing sectoral indices - the Industrial, 
Finance, Property, Plantation and Tin indices - for its listed shares.This was followed 
in 1996, with the introduction of a single broad-based index known as the KLSE 
Composite Index (KLSECOMP). To assist investors and fund managers in evaluating 
the performance of the Second Board, an all-share index for the Second Board was 
launched in January 1991. To complement this move, in October 1991, the Exchange's 
Main Board All-Share (EMAS) Index was launched. 
Lastly. as mentioned earlier, when the KLSE Main Board was revamped in 
September 1993. four new sectoral indices, namely, Consumer Products. Industrial 
Products, Construction and Trading/Services were launched. Thus, to date, there are 
12 share price indices available from the KLSE. In order to provide an 'updated' 
indication of the market's performance during a trading session, beginning from 
January 1990, all of these indices were calculated by the Exchange every 15 
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However, as reported in the New Straits Times (April 11, 1995), effective from 
April 18, 1995, the KLSE indices are computed on a minute-by-minute basis, "in line 
with the local bourse's objective to increase the transparency of the market and give 
investors more timely information". These indices, are made available to stockbroking 
firms immediately through their MASA terminals. 
Among the various share price indices mentioned above, the KLSE Composite 
Index (KLSECOMP) and the EMAS Index (KLSEMAS) seem to be the most widely 
followed and used. 
The KLSECOMP which was formulated by a special committee comprising 
representatives from various agencies, has the following objectives [see the KLSE 
Composite Index (1986), p. i]: 
(i) to effectively reflect the performance of shares listed on the KLSE; 
(ii) to be sensitive to investors' expectations; 
(iii) to be indicative of Government policy changes; 
(iv) to be responsive to underlying changes in the economy. 
To ensure that the Index meet the aforementioned objectives, stringent criteria 
were used in the selection of the KLSECOMP components. The following are among 
the criteria used in the selection of the stocks to be included as the KLSECOMP 
components [see the KLSE Composite Index (1986). p. ii]: 
(i) the company selected must have its major business in Malaysia; 
(ii) the stock must be actively traded in the KLSE; 
(iii) to avoid multiple counting, both parent and subsidiary companies are not 
I~viously. the indices were calculated twice daily. 
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included together in the component stock. 
The KLSECOMP is calculated by the weighted average method, using the 
number of shares outstanding (Le., aggregate market value) as weight. Each 
component stock price is weighted by the number of the ordinary shares listed, to 
reflect its relative market importance. The base year for the calculation of the Index 
is 1977. As reported in the New Straits Times (April II, 1995), effective from April 
18, 1995, the number of component stocks in the KLSECOMP was increased to 100 
(from the previous 86). 
On October 16, 1991, as previously mentioned, the KLSE announced the 
creation of a new index known as the EMAS Index (KLSEMAS). It is the second 
Main Board all-share index for the Exchange; the first being the Business Times I (BT) 
Ordinary Index launched in 1990. 'EMAStl9 Index is actually the acronym for the 
KLSE Main Board All-Share Index 
Similar to other KLSE indices, the EMAS Index is calculated by the weighted 
average method, using the number of shares outstanding (or aggregate market value) 
as the weight. The base year used for the calculation of the Index is 1984. 
Like other KLSE indices also, the KLSEMAS is calculated electronically every 
minute, and is displayed on the MASA terminal. The opening and closing indices for 
the day are computed at 10.00 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. respectively. 
As an index that comprises an shares listed on the Main Board, the KLSEMAS 
essentially reflects the performance of the entire Main Board of the KLSE. Then, this 
should prove to be very useful for fund managers and individual investors alike, since 
it could provide a more accurate picture of the overall market sentiment, and hence 
l~n Malay, emas means gold. 
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the average market activities. 
2.10-Growth and Performance of the KLSE 
From its modest beginnings as a group comprising only four brokers in 1960, 
the KLSE has grown and transformed itself into one of the largest and most modem 
bourses in the developing world [see Table 2.7]. From a simple structure, within some 
thirty years of its establishment, the Exchange has evolved steadily to reach a 
reasonable level of maturity and sophistication. In recent years, the Exchange has 
grown remarkably in size owing not only to the performance of traded equities but 
also to the process of privatization [see Table 2.6]. 
Consonant with the dynamic and steady growth of the Malaysian economy [see 
Tab]e 2.1], since its inception in 1960, the Exchange has recorded impressive 
achievements and development. Even though borrowings from the banking system stilJ 
represent an important source of finance in the economy, businessmen and 
entrepreneurs have increasingly begun to tum towards equity financing as an 
alternative source for their growth and expansions [see Malaysia, Bank Negara, Annual 
Report 1992, p. 173]. The privatisation of the Government-owned 
departments/corporations since the late 1989, has added substantial impact on the 
growth of equity financing and thus the equity market. Nevertheless, the contribution 
of the stock market in financing private investment in the country was still small: it 
amounted to only 27% of total private investment in 1992 [see Malaysia, Bank 
Negara, Annual Report 1992, P. 173]. 
An unforgettable event in the history of the KLSE took place in 1987. Like 
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Table 2.6 
MALAYSIA; MARKET CAPITALISATION OF PRIVATI SED COMPANIES 
(As At End 1993) 
) Tenaga National 58,194.7 
) Telekom 43,884.9 
) MISe 7,263.8 
) Proton 6,152.9 
) Malaysia Airline System (MAS) 5,460.0 
6) EON 3,743.2 
7) Sports TOTO (Berjaya Leisure) 1,969.7 
B) Kedayah Cement 1,482.4 
9) CIMA 1,319.2 
10) Pernas International Hotel (PIHP) 1,019.0 
11) KCT 975.0 
12) Tradewinds 854.0 
13) TV 3 653.4 
14) Cement Manufacturing Sarawak Bhd (CMS) 576.0 
15) Far East Holding (FERB) 375.2 
133,923.2 
(oftheKLSE tota11llllrket capitalisation) 21.6 
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Table 2.7 
TOP THIRTY STOCK MARKETS OF THE WORLD: 
Market Capitalisation. Yalue Traded and Number of Listed Companies. 1993 
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other stock exchanges, the KLSE was adversely affected by the global stock market 
crash of October 1987. While, on Monday, October 19. 1987, the Dow Jones 
Industrial Index was reported to plummet by 508 points or 23% within the day, in 
London the Financial Times Stock Exchange Index, closed 11 % down and the Tokyo 
market, on October 20, declined by 12%, the impact of the Crash on the KLSE can 
be summarised as follows20: 
• Due to heavy selling pressure, during the week following the Crash. the 
KLSE Composite Index fell by about 25%. 
• During the period between October 19 to October 28, 1987, the KLSE 
Composite Index fell by 173 points or 42%. 
• To prevent short selling, on October 20, 1987, the Exchange had to place 
trading on an immediate delivery basis. 
• The market deteriorated further in November, though it started to revive 
moderately in late December 1987. 
• At the end of 1987, the KLSE Composite Index was reported to close at 261 
points, which was 44.4% lower than the peak for the whole of 1987 (recorded on 
August 10, 1987). 
• Market capitalisation of the Exchange was reduced to RM70.9 billion on 
October 28, 1987, from RMIlO.8 billion on October 15, 1987 - a loss of 36%. 
There were two other international events in the 1990s which had affected the 
Exchange quite significantly [see Malaysia, Ministry of Finance. Economic Report 
1992193, p. 265; see also O'Connor and Smith (1991), p. 285]: 
20See Malaysia. Ministry of Finance. Economic Report 1988189. p. 143; Economic Report 1992/93. p. 
261. 
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(i) The Gulf Crisis (Kuwait InvasionlDesert Stonn Operation) which started in 
August 1990, was accompanied by reduced trading on the Exchange [For comparison. 
see The Economist, January 19, 1991, p. 91]. The Gulf War caused the KLSE 
Composite Index to decline to 505.9 points at the end of 1990, a drop of 20% from 
the highest level of the year ( i.e., 632.22 points recorded on August 1, 1990). For 
comparison, the KLSE Composite Index stood at 562 points at the end of 1989. 
(ii) Following the outbreak of brokerage scandal in Tokyo and weak overseas 
bourses, prices on the KLSE weakened towards mid-1991 but then recovered 
moderate]y towards the end of 1991. 
From Table 2.5 [see also Table 2.4], we find that the vo]ume of trading has 
increased remarkably since the 1989. Even though the Gulf War had affected the 
trading on the Exchange considerably, the volume of trading in genera] continued to 
rise steadily. This rise, according to O'Connor and Smith (1991). p. 285] was 
encouraged by the following factors: 
• the deli sting of Malaysian incorporated companies from the SES; 
• the full conversion of trading to the computerised SCORE system; 
• the robust economic fundamentals; 
• a steady inflow of funds from overseas; 
• the good performance of companies and fairly lively corporate activity. 
Today. in terms of market capitalisation. the KLSE has emerged as the largest 
stock exchange in South-east Asia [see Table 2.7]. In Asia, it was ranked fourth (in 
1993) after Tokyo. Osaka and Hong Kong [see Malaysia, Bank Negara. Annual Report 
1993. p. 194]. In terms of price performance in 1992. the KLSE was one of the best 
ten stock markets of the world [see IFe. Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1993, p. 
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9]. 
Market capitalisation of the KLSE, which amounted to only RM8 billion or 
35% of the GNP at the end of 1974, expanded by 763% to RM69 billion at the end 
of 1984 and further to RM246 billion or 176% of the GNP in 1992. The figure at the 
end of 1993 was recorded to reach RM620 billion or four times the size of the 
nation's GNP. Put differently. in 1993. the market capitalisation of the KLSE 
increased by 152% over the figure of the previous year, and this outstanding growth 
placed the Exchange among the IS largest stock markets in the world21 • 
The profile of the Malaysian stock market was further enhanced when, 
beginning May 1. 1993. a leading United States fund manager, Morgan Stanley, 
incorporated 68 selected Malaysian stocks into its widely followed indices: the EAFE 
(the Europe, Australia-Asia and the Far East) Index and the World Index [see e.g., 
Investors Digest, May 1993. p. 47]. The KLSE was the only emerging market to be 
included in both the World Index and the EAFE Index22• 
Overa]), the number of companies listed on the KLSE has also grown rapidly 
[see Table 2.3]. At the end of 1961. there were only 138 companies listed on the 
Exchange with a nominal paid up capital of RM708 million. The figure rose to 262 
in 1973 and further to 369 in 1992. At the end of 1993. the number of companies 
listed on the KLSE was 413 (with a total nominal value of RM61.6 billion) - an 
increase of 12% over the figure of the previous year23 
21See Malaysia, Bank Negara, Annual Report 1993. p. 194; see also Table A2.7. 
22See Malaysia. Bank Negara (1994); see also Malaysia. Ministry of Finance. Economic Report 
1993/94. p. 230. 
23See the KLSE, Investing in the Stock Marker in Malaysia, pp 681212193. 
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To sum up, the KLSE's history of over thirty years has witnessed the 
Government's commitment and role in introducing and effecting various regulatory, 
legislative as well as institutional changes and reforms with the objectives of 
moulding, promoting and developing the Exchange into an orderly, well-organised, 
more efficient and strong bourse. Complimentary to the Government's 'catalytic role', 
various improvements and advances have been and being introduced and accomplished 
by KLSE authority itself with the objective of strengthening and modernising the 
Exchange to enhance its professional and international image and to instil greater 
confidence to enable it to compete with other bourses in the region. In addition, the 
robustness of the country's economy, strong corporate results, price and political 
stability, ample liquidity in the economy as well as the presence of a reasonable level 
of speculative activities [see Malaysia, Bank Negara Annual Report 1993, pp. 192 & 
193], was the combination of factors that continued to attract investors into the 
Exchange and paved the way for the KLSE to chart a remarkable growth and 
outstanding performance. 
2.11-The KLSE and Other ExchanKes: A Brief 
Comparison 
In the previous sections we have examined several aspects of the KLSE as an 
individual exchange. The purpose of this section is to take a glance at the KLSE from 
the comparative perspective. 
As an emerging equity market which was established just in 1960, the KLSE 
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is very young and far from being mature compared to the well-established exchanges 
of the world such as the London Stock Exchange which was named 'the Stock 
Exchange' in 1773 [see London Stock Exchange, Fact Book 1994, p. 10], the New 
York stock Exchange which celebrated its bicentennial in 1992 [Euromoney, May 
1993, p. 108], and the Tokyo Stock Exchange which was established in 1878 [see 
George (1991), p. 30]. 
Even though the KLSE is relatively a very young and less complicated market, 
in some aspects it is a more advanced and successful exchange compared to some 
developed bourses. For example, in coping with the advancements in modern 
technology. the KLSE has successfully implemented its electronic trading system, 
whereas the London Stock Exchange (LSE) has to incur a loss of many millions of 
pounds with the failure of its ambitious Taurus Project and has to start with a new 
project - the Crest Project [see e.g., The Times, March 12, 1993; The Economist, April 
2nd., 1994, p. 85; June 12th., 1993, P.118]. 
Being an emerging market, no doubt, the KLSE is a relatively thinly traded 
exchange. In terms of market capitalisation, the number of listed companies and the 
volume of trading, the KLSE is a very small exchange compared to, for example [see 
Table 2.7], the New York Stock Exchange which is the largest stock exchange in the 
world [Euromoney, May 1993, p. 108], the London Stock Exchange which is the 
third24 largest exchange in the world [Euromoney, May 1993, p. 57] and the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange which ranks third as the world's most active stock exchange2S 
24 As shown in Table Al.7, the Tokyo Stock Exchange is in the second place after the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
21be New York Stock Exchange is the world's most active stock exchange. followed by the NASDAQ 
(National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations) exchange. which is also in New York. 
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[Euromoney, May ]993, p. 78]. 
The KLSE's shares are relatively quite expensive. According to the FIC 
caIculations26, the price-earnings (PIE) ratio for Malaysian shares at the end of 1992 
was 21.84 (an increase by 2.29% from the ratio for 1991) compared with the ratio for 
the United States and the United Kingdom which was 22.70 and 19.70 respectively. 
While the ratio for Japan was the highest in 1992 (i.e., 38.90), the PIE ratio for South 
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand was respectively 21.43, 16.57 and 13.93. 
Euromoney (December 1993, pp. 68 -70) has made an attempt to measure and 
compare the 'maturity' and 'efficiency' of emerging equity markets worldwide. The 
'study' involves two approaches or stages:-
• 'Objective approach': Under this approach, emerging equity markets are 
compared using the following 'objective criteria': 
(a) Market size: 
(i) market capitalisation; 
(ii) number of listed stocks. 
(b) Liquidity: 
(i) value traded; 
(ii) ratio of value traded to market capitalisation; 
(iii) weekly trading hours. 
(c) Concentration: 
(i) percentage of market capitalisation of ten largest stocks; 
(ii) percentage of value traded of ten largest stocks. 
(d) Transaction costs which include brokerage commissions, stamp duty, 
26See IFC (1993), Emerging Markell Factbook 1993. 
63 
stock exchange registration or handling fees and taxes such as V AT. 
(e) Settlement: 
(i) settlement period; 
(ii) degree of automation. 
(f) Hedgeability (measured by the availability of derivatives). 
(g) Openness: 
(i) degree of openness: 
(ii) withholding tax (%); 
(iii) capital gains tax; 
(iv) repatriation controls. 
The aforementioned criteria are used to measure the level of 'maturity' and 
'efficiency' of emerging equity markets in fifty countries. Among these markets, with 
a total score of 158.89, Malaysia is in the third place after Taiwan (164.14) and Korea 
(161.52). 
• 'Subjective approach': By polling institutional investors and equity 
researchers, asking them to give their opinion on countries of which they have 
experience. Under this method, the scores are listed under the following headings: 
(a) quality of accountinglJegal infrastructure; 
(b) reliability of settlement; 
(c) liquidity; 
(d) prevalence of insider-trading; 
(e) international brokers; 
(f) domestic brokers; 
(g) quality of research. 
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For this 'subjective approach' thirty eight emerging equity markets are 
compared. The total poll score obtained by Malaysia is 53.03, ranking it second after 
Mexico which obtained 57.06. 
Clearly, from both of these 'objective' and 'subjective' approaches, the scores 
secured by Malaysia are among the highest. Thus, these results indicate that among 
emerging equity markets, the KLSE is one of the most 'mature' and 'efficient' 
exchanges. 
2.12-A World-Class Stock Exchan2e? 
The KLSE is a very ambitious stock exchange [see e.g., Lin (1993); Salleh 
Majid (1994)]. The authority of the Exchange has made no secret of its vision and 
aspiration to develop the KLSE into a world-class stock exchange for investors: "The 
KLSE is committed to becoming a world-class stock exchange, offering unique 
investment opportunities in a fast developing capital market within the industrialising 
Malaysian economy". In trying to transform this aspiration into a reality and to forge 
the KLSE ahead of its rival bourses especially within the region, the following are 
among the targets that have been set [see The KLSE, World-Class Exchange for 
Investors; see also Lin (1993)]: 
* To have a trading and settlement infrastructure, information system, ski1l~d 
resources. accessibility, and a fair and orderly market place that ranks with the best 
in the world. 
* To offer a wide range of diverse and exclusive quality stocks, coupled with 
a growing number of market instruments. making the Exchange attractive for both 
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domestic and foreign investors. 
Consonant with its aim of transforming the Exchange into a world-class stock 
market, to strengthen investors confidence and to upgrade the trading infrastructure, 
. 
the KLSE was reported to have implemented a number of projects in the past few 
years [see Malaysia, Ministry of Finance, Economic Report 1994195, p. 205]: 
a) The setting up of the Exchange's Dealing Facility (EDF) site, that is, an on-
site full disaster back-up system within the KLSE premises and the building of an off-
site disaster computer recovery centre in Petaling Jaya. The purpose of both projects 
is the creation of a 100% disaster recovery environment to prevent any disruption of 
the operations of the Exchange. The EDF site became operational in March 1994. 
b) A new information technology system known as the WinScore or Broker 
Front End (BFE) System for stockbroking companies. With the BFE, trading, 
monitoring real-time market information (MASA II) and checking order status will be 
integrated within one single terminal. This BFE project is initiated to facilitate more 
efficient and secure trading operations, to cope with the tremendous increase in the 
volume of transactions. The BFE began operations on a pilot basis at three 
stockbroking firms in June 1994. 
c) The introduction of an electronic surveillance system, also by mid-1994. The 
purpose of this project is to enhance the market surveillance of the stockbroking and 
public listed companies, to replace the present AWAS (Advanced Warning and 
Surveillance) system which is operated manually. 
Lastly, given the rapid growth and development of the Malaysian economy27 
27As reported in Fo1'tUM. October 30.1995. the World Bank forecasts that for the next decade. Asia's 
developing econimies will be growing 8% ayear. on average - roughly three times the pace of gross 
domestic oproduct (GDP) growth in the U.S .• Europe and Japan [see also Morgan (1993/94)]. Malaysia is 
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in an environment of the present trend of capital market globalisation, the question at 
this juncture is, when might the KLSE's vision become a reality? 
2. 13-Conclusion 
Based on the facts and figures that we have already examined, it is clear that 
the KLSE is a fast growing exchange. Within about thirty years of its existence, the 
Exchange has undergone various stages and levels of changes, transfonnations and 
advances to attain its present stature (as an emerging market). In this successful 
context we have also seen that the Exchange has improved its level of operational 
efficiency considerably. It would be reasonable to suppose that the KLSE has 
improved its level of efficiency in pricing shares as well, but this is an empirical 
question. If the KLSE is price/infonnationally efficient, then we might expect prices 
of shares traded on this emerging stock exchange to behave similarly to the prices of 
those traded in the so-called developed stock exchanges. 
considered as one of the world's fastest growing economies. See e.g. World Link (September/October 1992), 
p. 77), Form1l#! (June 21, 1994), p. 81); Far Eastern Economic Review, (June 23, 1994), p. 1); 
Busi1l#!ssWeek (July 10, 1995, p. 82). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EFFICIENCY OF THE STOCK MARKETS 
A Review of Theory and Empirical Evidence 
3. I-Introduction 
The concept of market efficiency is the foundation for much of the theoretical 
and empirical research in financial economics. The proposition that capital markets are 
efficient - a proposition that has come to be known as the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) - is a concept which, according to Jensen (1978), progressed from the state of 
curiosity taken seriously by only a few scientists in the economics and finance 
communities, to that of a dominant paradigm in finance and the basis of an emerging 
revolution in macroeconomics (where the principle is generally known as rational 
expectations). 
The proposition that capital markets are efficient - an important doctrine which 
was reborn in the late 1950s and early 1960s under the rubric of the 'theory of 
random walks' in the fmance literature and 'rational expectations theory' in the 
mainstream economics literature [Jensen (1978), p. 96] - is likely to continue (at least 
for some time) becoming one of the most rooted beliefs in economics and finance. 
Indeed, market efficiency was the first area of finance that matured into a science 
[Ross (1989), p. 1]. 
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'Efficiency' is a term which has many connotations. More precisely. in 
economics and finance, 'efficiency' is a crucial concept which has a variety of related 
but distinct meanings. As far as stock markets are concerned, there are three concepts 
of efficiency that can be found widely discussed in the literature; namely, 
informational or pricing (external) efficiency, operational (internal) efficiency and 
allocational efficiencyl. Since the concern of the present study is with the behaviour 
of share prices, our focus will only be on price efficiency. Accordingly, throughout 
the thesis, the phrase 'efficient market' or 'efficient stock market' is used to refer to 
price efficiency or informational efficiency (unless stated otherwise). 
A capital market is said to be informationally efficient if it utilizes all of the 
available information in setting the prices of assets [Ross (1989), p. 2]. A market is 
said to be efficient with respect to some information set, if asset prices would be 
unaffected by revealing that information to all participants [Malkiel (1989), p. 127]. 
In Fama's (1976a) words, in an informationally efficient market, "the market correctly 
uses all available information" in determining security prices. 
In an efficient market, information flows swiftly throughout the market and 
investors react immediately. Their decisions to buy or to sell securities drive the price 
IWest (1975) distinguished market efficiency into two types: informational (or outside) efficiency and 
operational (or inside) efficiency. Whereas outside efficiency refers to the performance of a market as an 
information processor and a price setter. inside efficiency refers to the performance of a market as an 
exchange system [see Hawawini (1988). . 
Tinic and West (1979, p. 92) define an operationally efficient morlcet as one in which buyers and sellers 
can purchase transactions services at prices that are as low as possible, given the costs associated with 
having these services provided. So, lower the transactions costs are, the more operationally efficient a market 
can be. 
A market on the other hand, is said to be allocationally efficient, as dermed by Copeland and Weston 
(1988, p. 330). when prices are determined in a way that equates the marginal rates of return (adjusted for 
risk) for producers and savers. Thus. in an a1locationally efficient market, scarce savings are optimally 
allocated to productive uses in a way that benefits everyone. 
69 
quickly to the fundamental values - the 'true prices'. In such a market, securities are 
priced so quickly and fairly that investors, on average, cannot expect to earn abnormal 
profits. With prices reflecting forecasts of expected benefits from owning future cash 
flows discounted at appropriate discount rates, the net present value of expected 
returns in an efficient market would be zero [see e.g., Franks et.al. (1985)]. Investing 
in an efficient market can then be viewed as a 'fair game' since all participants have 
an equal opportunity for gains [see Fama (1970); Tinic and West (1979)]. 
In contrast, if information disseminates rather slowly throughout the market, 
and if investors take time in analyzing the information and reacting, and possibly 
overreacting to it, prices may deviate from values based on careful analysis of all 
relevant information; then such a market could be characterised as being relatively 
inefficient [see Haugen (1990)]. If a market were inefficient in its response to new 
information, the delay in discounting through price adjustments, would present 
investors with opportunities to profit from such relevant information. Then, in a 
market of this nature, diligent investors could possibly gamer abnormal profits by 
practising active investment strategies (as opposed to passive investment strategies 
often advocated by proponents of the EMH). 
In a nutshell, market efficiency, as pointed out by Beaver (1981), can be 
viewed as a property of an equilibrium mechanism or process by which security prices 
are formed. Having said this, understanding the issue of market efficiency - an issue 
which has long been perceived as the cornerstone of modem finance theory [Keane 
(1991)] - is crucial for investors in visualizing the general behaviour of security prices 
so that appropriate approaches could be employed in making investment decisions. As 
stressed by Boldt and Arbit (1984), each investor's beliefs regarding market efficiency 
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are implicit in his investment philosophy. decision-making process and perhaps, most 
fundamentally, in his assessment of his unique competitive skills and how best to 
exploit those skills. 
"Since market efficiency and equilibrium-pricing issues are inseparable" [Fama 
(1991)]. this chapter attempts to provide a discussion on stock market efficiency in 
some detail: the concept and the evidence. In substance. some theory and empirical 
results regarding the way in which security prices tend to behave over time are 
reviewed. Our discussion here is also addressed to the theoretical and practical 
meaning and implications of the EMH and its evidence. for investors. The chapter thus 
serves as a stepping stone for our further investigation into the behaviour of share 
prices in the chapters that follow. 
The present chapter is divided into seven sections. We begin. in Section 3.2. 
with a brief historical perspective of the development of the efficient market doctrine: 
examining the early ideas concerning the process of price formation that preceded the 
birth of the EMH. A discussion on the formal presentation of the EMH can be found 
in Section 3.3. 
It is common in the literature that the informational efficiency of a stock 
market is distinguished into three levels or forms. A review of theory and evidence 
on these three forms of the EMH is provided in Section 3.4. 
While most evidence supporting the EMH are drawn from various studies 
based on the highly developed and well-established exchanges. in Section 3.5 we 
provide a review on a number of studies investigating the validity of the EMH when 
applied to the small. less-developed and less-active markets. 
Perhaps no other hypothesis in either finance or economics has been studied 
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and tested more extensively than the EMH. Consequently. it is not surprising if, along 
with the predominance of evidence that supports the EMH, there have been scattered 
findings that contradict the hypothesis. We examine this so-called anomalous evidence 
in Section 3.6 before we conclude the chapter in Section 3.7. 
3.2-Early Ideas: The Random Walk and the Fair 
Game 
In an efficient market. prices adjust rapidly to new relevant infonnation. Since 
the flow of infonnation into the market appears to be random [see e.g. Smidt (1968)] -
unpredictable by definition - the period-to-period changes in securities prices are 
believed to be random or statistically independent of one another. Since security prices 
are "typically very sensitive, responsive to all events. both real and imagined" 
[Cootner (1964, p. 1)], random events are likely to affect those prices positively and 
negatively. Movements in share prices under such conditions, describe what 
statisticians call a random wallC and physicists call Brownian motionJ• "A Brownian 
walk, like the walk of a drunken sailor, wanders indefinitely far. lifting the with wind" 
[Samuelson (1965), p. 785]. 
1t is believed that the term "random walk" was first used by Karl Pearson in a 1905 issue of Nature 
Magazine to describe the path of a drunk left to wander on an open field [see Blume and Siegel (1992). 
According to Schwartz (199lb). a random walk in stock price is not caused by the pattern of information 
arrival. but rather by investor responses to information. 
~n his article published in 1959. Osborne (1959) compared changes in stock prices with the random 
movement of microscopic particles suspended in a solution. known to physicists as Brownian motion. 
Brownian motion is named after the Scottish botanist who first identified the phenomenon in the nineteenth 
century, from his observation of the movement of pollen grains in water [see Griffiths (1990)]. 
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Share prices are said to follow a random walk when their changes are 
independent of each other. There are no clear trends or patterns in their movements -
much the way molecules move in a solution (Brownian motion). 
The idea that security prices in an organised market might follow a random 
walk was first put forward by Louis Bachelier, a French mathematician, in his doctoral 
thesis, Theorie de Ie Speculation, in 1900. Although the mathematical properties of the 
random walk were rediscovered five years later by Albert Einstein, the importance of 
BacheJier's work had been little noticed by economists. Bachelier's work was virtually 
ignored by economists for over half a century [Granger and Morgenstern (1970)]. 
While the earliest empirical work on 'random walk theory' was performed by 
Bachelier (1900), in the finance literature, major interest in the theory primarily started 
with the papers by Kendall (1953), Roberts (1959) and Osborne (1959). Osborne 
(1959) who reintroduced the random walk model [Granger (1968)] for example, found 
that stock price movements were very similar to the random Brownian motion of 
physical particles • that the logarithms of price changes were independent of each 
other. 
Subsequently, Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) pioneered the fair 
game approach to the theory of price formation and market efficiency. They proved 
that, in a speculative market where there are no transaction costs, where information 
is freely available to all market participants and where all investors share the same 
expectations over a common time period, prices would change instantaneously to 
reflect new information. 
Fama (1970) argues that the random walk model can be viewed as an extension 
of the general expected return or 'fair game' model. The EMH is basically an 
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elaboration of the fair game or "fair market" hypothesis [see Boldt and Arbit (1984)]. 
Moreover, from the theory of stochastic processes, the process and principle of 
random walk implies a martingale [see e.g., Rubinstein (1975)]. Correspondingly, in 
the literature of time series behaviour of stock market prices, three types of related 
models can be identified; namely, the fair game model, the martingale and 
submartingale models and the random walk model: 
a) The Fair Game Model 
The fair game concept of market efficiency states that, a market is efficient if 
there is no trading strategy that yields a consistent abnormal return [Dyckman and 
Morse (1986)]. This model which is based only on the behaviour of average returns 
(rather than the entire probability distribution of returns) can mathematically be 
expressed as follows [see Copeland and Weston (1988, p. 346)]: 
where 
Xj,I+1 = 
= 
E(Pj,'+II4>,) - Pjl 
Pjl 
Pj.I+1 - E(Pj,'+II4>,) 
Pj , 
Pjl = the actual price of security j at time t; 
Pj •I+1 = the actual price of security j at time t+ 1; 
(3.1) 
E(Pj,'+II4>,) = the expected price of security j at time t+ I, given the current 
information set, 4>,; 
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Xj •I+! = the difference between the actual and expected (or theoretical) returns. 
In other words, this is the return at time t+ 1 in excess of the equilibrium 
expected price projected at time t. 
The one-period return on security j at time t+ 1 is defined as 
~.'+I = 
Pj .HI - Pjl 
Pjl 
Then, equation (3.1) may be rewritten as 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
In an efficient market, the information set, «1>1' is fully utilized by the market 
in fonning the equilibrium expected returns. In an efficient market, where price at any 
point in time represents the best estimate of a security's 'intrinsic value' (or 
eqUilibrium price), the expected difference between the realized return and the 
expected return will be zero [Tinic and West (1979), p. 95]. In equation (3.3), Xj •I+! 
is the excess return on security j when the ex-post return, R, exceeds the ex-ante 
return E(R). Since in a fair game this is zero by definition, equation (3.3) may be 
rewritten as 
(3.4) 
A fair game model of price formation implies that the market provides equal 
opportunity for all investors. On average, and across a large number of samples, the 
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expected return on a security equals its actual return [Copeland and Weston (1988), 
p. 347]. Therefore, in an efficient market, investing is a fair game in the sense that no 
investor possessing today's information has an advantage over any other investor. 
Nobody can beat the market consistently if the market is a fair game. 
b) The Martingale and Submartingale Models 
If a price series follow a martingale, the expected value of future prices is the 
most recently observed price [pinches (1970)]. A martingale model states that, given 
information set 4>1' the next period's price is expected to be the same as today's price. 
Notationally. 
(3.5) 
A martingale, which is a fair game, is based on the assumption that expected 
returns and price changes are equal to zero. Thus, in returns form, equation (3.2) can 
be rewritten as fonows: 
E(Pj.,+1Icll,) - Pjl 
PjI 
(3.6) 
A submartingale is a version of the martingale model which is modified to 
deal with either or both of the following [Frankfurter and Lamoureux (1988), p. 386]: 
(i) the fact that stocks are risky assets and investors are risk averse; and 
(ii) the notion of time preference or the time value of money. in a risk neutral 
environment. 
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A sequence of prices is said to follow a stochastic process known as a 
submartingale when the expected value of price in one period is equal or greater than 
the price in the previous period [see Tinic and West (1979)]. Stated differently, in a 
submartingale (which is also a fair game) the expected value of the variable is at least 
its most recent realization: tomorrow's price is expected to be greater or equal to 
today's price. Mathematically, a submartingale is defined by the following 
relationship: 
(3.7) 
or equivalently, 
(3.8) 
which merely states that the expected return on security j in time period t+ 1 subject 
to information set. 4>1 - available at in period t - is greater than or equal to zero. This 
assumption is a reasonable one since we could not expect people to invest without an 
expectation of a positive return. Price changes are expected to exhibit upward drift 
because risk averse investors demand a positive expected return [Schwartz (1991b)]. 
Following from the assumption that information is impounded in prices at any 
point in time and that expected returns are nonnegative. a submartingale in stock 
market prices has an important implication for investors. Investors who are making 
decisions based on infonnation. 4>" available at time t, , cannot expect to earn more 
by 'trading' a security than they can expect from buying and holding it [Tinic and 
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West (1979); see also Fama (1970)]. 
In an efficient submartingale market, prices are expected to increase over time. 
Thus, comparison with a buy-and-hold control portfolio must be made when testing 
for abnormal returns on an experimental portfolio [see Copeland and Weston (1989)]. 
The performance of both portfolios should be the same: they will have a positive 
mean return, and the difference between their mean returns will not be significantly 
different from zero. 
To recapitulate, following Granger (1975, p. 4), a stochastic process Y, is said 
to be a submartingale if 
(3.9) 
The process of Y, is said to form a martingale if the inequality (~) in equation 
(3.9) is replaced by equality. Then, using this definition, the sequence of share prices 
P, is a martingale if 
(3.10) 
The martingale, a model which only places restrictions on the first moment, 
is less restrictive than the random wal~. As defined by Frankfurter and Lamoureux 
(1988, p. 386), a stochastic process (Yt ; t = 1. 2, ... ) is a martingale if: 
EIYtl < 00 ; and 
E(Yt+1IY1 .... , Yt) = Yt 
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(3.11) 
(3.12) 
c)The Random Walk Model 
Random walk is a tenn which has both a mathematical and statistical meaning. 
A random walk involves a less general process than the martingale model. 
As applied in the stock market literature, the tenn generally refers to the 
unpredictability of share price changes: they wandered aimlessly over time. 
Statistically, there would be no correlation - technically, either linear or nonlinear 
[Jacob and Pettit (1984)] - between subsequent price changes. 
A concept which predated the popularity of the 'efficient market' terminology, 
the random walk is one of the oldest models of stock market price behaviour and 
fonnation. Perhaps no other subject in the area of investment analysis and selection 
has received more attention than the idea of randomness of stock prices: the theory 
or hypothesis of random walk [see Pinches (1970)]. Perhaps the primary reason for 
the interest in the random walk theory is its relation to the EMH [see Hagerman and 
Richmond (1973)]: that the random properties of security returns had been 
fundamental to the development of the EMH [Blume and Siegel (1992)]. 
The random walk theory - an hypothesis which has cast serious doubt on many 
other methods for describing and predicting stock price behaviour [Fama (1965b) 
appeared to be disputed and not well understood by practitioners and market 
professionals [see e.g. Levy (1967), Fama and Blume (1966)]. "The random-walk 
hypothesis was almost universally derided in the financial community as implying that 
the market was senseless or irrational; but, properly understood, the random behaviour 
of stock prices is a consequence of intense competition between a large number of 
competent and avaricious investors" [Lorie and Brealey (1978), p. 102]. 
Being a relatively old and popular model, the random walk has been 
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interpreted in various ways by statisticians, economists and financial analysts. In fact, 
the random walk model "is almost certainly the simplest model found in the field of 
economics and is probably by now also the most over-tested and most over-
misinterpreted model within the field" [Granger (1975), p. 3]. 
In statistical terms, the random walk hypothesis can be modeled in many ways. 
In the original work of Bachelier (1900), a random walk hypothesis implies that price 
changes have independent and identical normal distributions [see Taylor (1986; Allen 
(1985)]. Fama (1965a,) however, dropped the assumption of normal distributions4• 
According to Fama (1965a, pp. 35 & 40). the theory of random walk in stock 
prices is actually based on two hypotheses: 
(i) successive price changes for an individual security are independent, and; 
(ii) the price changes conform to some probability distribution. 
Fama (1965a) further stressed that of the two hypotheses, independence is the most 
important: "In the general theory of random walks the form or shape of distribution 
need not be specified" (p. 41). 
Godfrey et ai. (1964) as well as Granger and Morgenstern (1970) argue that, 
to follow a random walk, price changes need not be identically distributed. but all of 
the distributions must have zero mean values. Taylor (1986) suggests that for practical 
purposes, zero correlation will be sufficient "to ensure that out-of-date prices are 
irrelevant when forecasting" (p. 9). 
4parna's (196Sa) study on the distribution of share price changes has led him to reject the nonnality 
assumption. See also Mandelbrot (1966), Praetz (1969). Frankfurter 
and Lamoureux (1988. p. 387) define a return generatina process as following a random walk if successive 
returns are independent, identically distributed (Hd). Referring to equations (3.11) and (3.12). for t = 1.2, ...• 
a stochastic process is said to foUow a random walk if f(y,+,) = f(Y.). However, Yalawar (1988, p. 75) 
suggests that the condition that successive price changes be 'identically distributed' is difficult to be satisfied 
owing to the evolution of economy. markets and corporations over time. 
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The sequence of random variables (YI ; t = 1, 2,... ) can be considered as 
following a random walk process if the increments 
(3.13) 
are independently distributed. 
Rewriting (3.13), a random walk model for stock price series can be 
represented as 
(3.14) 
where p. is the price at time t; ~ is a random disturbance having zero means, finite 
variance and distributed so that the covariance between ~ and ~., is zero for all non-
zero values of s. The property of the residual or error series may be stated formally 
as 
E[~] = 0 
E[~, e..,l = 0 for all s 'II: 0 (3.15) 
The random walk is a special case of the martingale because it has more 
restrictions than the martingale. According to leRoy (1982), every random walk is a 
'According to Conrad and JUttner (1973. p. S78) zero mean is not necessary because "positive or 
negative expected price changes are also consistent with this theory". 
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martingale but the reverse is not true because higher-order dependencies among E, may 
exist without impairing the martingale property. 
A random walk model of equation (3.14) implies that, the price of any 
particular share in any period, will be equal to the price of that same security in the 
immediately preceding period plus some value randomly chosen. Simply put, the 
model states that changes in the price of shares cannot be predicted from the sequence 
of historical prices. Past price changes provide no clues to future changes: that the 
probability of a change in price of any magnitude, Q, is independent of the previous 
history of such changes. So, in a random walk market, the conditional probability of 
a change in price, Q, at time t, will not be different from the unconditional probability: 
(3.16) 
By applying the expectation operator to equation (3.14), we can obtain the 
following equation (see equation 3.12): 
(3.17) 
which implies that the best predictor of tomorrow's price, given today's price, is 
today's price. 
The random walk hypothesis which is put forward as an explanation of 
speculative price changes, according to Godfrey et al. (1964), is not intended to 
explain long term trends in price series. Praetz (1969) contends that the random walk 
hypothesis is essentially a short-term hypothesis, as the intervals between prices in 
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most tests have not been large. "This is confinned by spectral analysis, where short-
term components fit the hypothesis well but long-term components do not" [Praetz 
(1969), p. 137]. 
The most obvious and important implication of the random walk hypothesis 
for investors is that, the past values of the random walk contain no information useful 
for prediction of future values [Godfrey et al. (1964),]. If the random walk hypothesis 
is correct, then there is no trading rule based on past prices that will garner economic 
profits. As nobody can use today's information to beat the market, investing in a 
market of this type is a fair game. 
Despite the overwhelming acceptance in the academic community that the 
random walk is a good approximation of share price behaviour, predictive systems 
based on historical data appear to continue in widespread use in every stock market 
around the world. Thus, empirical investigations of the random walk hypothesis are 
of considerable practical as well academic, interest. 
Empirical work employing several procedures to assess the validity of the 
random walk hypothesis have taken place since around the middle of the 1950s. Serial 
correlations tests, runs tests, spectral analyses andfilter tests are among the methods 
popularly applied by the random walk researchers6, 
Kendall (1953) was among the earliest to employ the serial correlation' 
approach in investigating statistical dependence between share price changes8• Testing 
6All these methods are discussed in some detail in Taylor (1986) and also in Fama (1965a). 
'Granger and Morgenstern (1970. p. 72) point out that the correlation coefficient is only a measure of 
the degree to which two random variables are linearly related: "Complete independence is impossible to 
prove statistically althou8h one can 80 some way toward it". 
'In fact. Kendall was notable in that he was the rust person (after Bachelier) to introduce the concept 
of the random walk into financial market research. 
83 
the United Kingdom (U.K.) data, he found that there was not enough statistical 
dependence present to pennit prediction of price movements by using past history of 
their changes. Similar empirical works using British data were performed, among 
others, by Dryden (1970a, b), Brealey (1970) and Cunningham (1973). 
In the United States (U.S.), an enonnous growth in serial correlation testing has 
taken place since the 19605. Among the major ones are by Moore (1964), Fama 
(1965a) and Hagennan and Richmond (1973). Fama for example, found a very small 
amount of positive dependence in price changes - an average serial correlation not 
statistically different from zero. 
Other serial correlation tests of dependence, to name a few, were conducted 
by Praetz (1969) for Australian data, Solnik (1973) for Europe, Conrad and Jtittner 
(1973) for German, Jenergren and Korsvold (1974) for Norway and Sweden, Ang and 
Pohlman (1978) and Hong (1978) for Japan and Cooper (1982) for many countries. 
A number of researchers, including Godfrey et.al.(1964), Praetz (1972,1973), 
Sharma and Kennedy (1977) and Cooper (1982), used spectral analysis' techniques 
pioneered by Granger and Morgenstern (1963). The results of spectral studies on 
American shares by Granger and Morgenstern (1963) and Godfrey et.al. (1964) 
support the random walk hypothesis very well for short-tenn price movements, 
although for the long-tenn movements, there exist deviations from the random walk 
hypothesis. 
'Spectral analysis which provides a powerful method of testing for independence of price changes [see 
Praetz (1969), MaUdel (1989)], analyzes the characteristics of a series of price changes through the 
frequency domain as opposed to the time domain and can detect the presence. if any. of long-term 
dependence as well as oscillatory in the data [Hawawini and Michel (1984)1. For details. see e.g. Granger 
and Morgenstern (1970). 
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The analysis of runs10 in the data is another method which is commonly 
applied in the testing for the randomness in stock price movements. Being non-
parametric, a runs test may be preferable for testing the random walk hypothesis since 
it is easy to perform and is independent of the normality and constant variance in the 
data [see Praetz (1969); Taylor (1986)]. 
Roberts (1959), Alexander (1961), Fama (1965a), Praetz(1969) and Jennergren 
and Korsvold (1974) are among the early researchers who applied runs tests in their 
studies. In his careful study of daily log price changes of thirty U.S. companies, Fama 
found some small positive dependence between price changes, but such dependence 
was too small to be of any importance either from an investment or from a statistical 
point of view. 
The interrelationships of price changes may be so complicated that standard 
statistical tools such as serial correlations might not find them and might provide 
misleading measures of the degree of dependence in the data [see Granger & 
Morgenstern (1970); Fama and Blume (1966)]. An alternative way of testing the 
random walk hypothesis which is considered capable of meeting some of the 
objections to the use of standard statistical tests is by examining the profitability of 
applying mechanical trading rules (such filter rules, point-and-figure charts, moving 
averages and relative strength rules) to the price series [see e.g. Dryden (1970b), 
Hawawini and Michel (1984)]. 
Filter rules or filter tests were advocated and used by Alexander (1961, 1964) 
in his early tests of the random walk hypothesis. Later, this procedure was also 
applied by (inter alios) Fama and Blume (1966) and Beaver and Landsman (1981) for 
lOA run, as defined by Fama (196Sa, p. 74) is a sequence of price changes of the same sign. 
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U.S. data, Dryden (1970a, 1970b) for U.K. data and Jennergren (1975) for Swedish 
data. In general, these tests arrived at the conclusion that filter rules are not profitable 
in comparison to a buy-and-hold strategy. Firth (1972) in his survey, reported that: 
"None of the research has shown that any of the technical rules investigated could 
consistently beat the buy and hold policy". 
In summary, empirical tests of the random walk hypothesis, applying various 
techniques, have been undertaken on almost all major stock markets around the world. 
With relatively few exceptions, the results of most studies conducted essentially 
around the 1960s and the 1970s, indicated that for the particular samples and time 
periods studied, prices in major stock markets fluctuate randomly [see e.g. Bicksler 
(1977); Hawawini and Michel (1984)]. 
Even though many empirical tests do indicate some dependencies in successive 
price changes, such dependencies are considered to be too small to provide the basis 
profitable treading rules. Malkiel (1989, p. 127) contends that while empirical data are 
remarkably consistent in their general finding of randomness, equity markets do not 
perfectly confonn to the statistician's ideal of a random walk [see also Copeland and 
Weston (1988), p. 349]: "The probability distributions of stock prices may be a 
submartingale rather than a random walk" [see also Fama and Blume (1966); Dryden 
(1969)]. Moreover, for prices in the smaller and less developed markets, deviations 
from the independence assumption of the random walk are often reported II. In 
consequence, we conclude our discussion on the random walk theory of share prices 
with a statement made by Granger (1975, p. 11): 
lISee e.,., Theil and Leenden (1965). Praetz(l969). Conrad and JUttner (1973), Solnik (1973). 
JeMclJTen and Konvold (1974), JeMcrgren (1975). Cooper (1982) and Keane (1983. p. 48). See also 
Section 3.7. 
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"Although there are some exceptions, the majority of studies find the random 
walk hypothesis, in one form or another, to give at least an extremely good 
approximation to whatever may be the truth. It is, however, clearly only an 
'average' kind of law, and may not hold true for all securities at all times". 
3.3-Formal Presentation of the EMH 
As noted earlier, the EMH linking the concepts of information, prices and 
economic returns in a specific way, occupies the centre stage in financial theory and 
research. The EMH which is a more comprehensive model of share price behaviour 
than the random walk theory [Rutterford (1993)] has emerged not only as an obviously 
significant issue for individual investors and security analysts, but also for firms and 
for the economy as a whole. If a market is efficient, security analysts would face 
difficulty in providing stock recommendations that would outperform the market. 
Individual investors would like to be sure that they have paid 'fair' prices for 
the securities they boughe2 , Similarly, firms that issued securities to finance their 
operations are equally interested that their securities are 'fairly' priced in the market. 
When a market is efficient, shareholders of successful companies can enjoy higher 
prices and at the same time, the managements of the companies can use the more 
valuable shares to finance expansions or acquisitions, 
l?rices in an infonnationally inefficient market are considered to be 'unfair' because: 
(i) when the infonnation is favourable but not reflected the price, the seller of the share would be 
hanned; 
(ii) when the infonnation is unfavourable but not reflected in the price, the buyer of the share 
would be hanned. 
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For the economy as a whole, when its equity market is efficient, prices which 
may be described as fair indicators of economic values, would provide accurate signals 
for the efficient allocation of resources. 
In an informationally efficient capital market, prices communicate information 
to participants [Ross (1989, p. 7)]: information which includes what is knowable and 
relevant for judging securities is very rapidly reflected in security prices. Then, in such 
a market, the available information set cannot be exploited so as to yield abnormally 
high returns - the economic or supernormal profits. Other than by chance, investors 
are not expected to outperform the market: they cannot expect to earn extra profits 
other than as a reward for bearing risks. In order to reduce the risk caused by the 
future price adjustments, investors can diversify their stock portfolios. 
In sum, given an efficient capital market, investors can expect a fair return, and 
firms can expect a realistic and reasonable cost of capital. Given an economy with a 
healthy, active and efficient securities market, the allocation of savings and 
investments towards a more optimum national economic development can be expected. 
The concept of market efficiency owes much of its articulation to Fama (1970) 
in his landmark article. Beside providing a review of the previous work concerning 
market efficiency, Fama also produced a common set of terminology, a more unified 
theoretical basis for future research and a fairly standardized set of methods. This 
article is viewed as the galvanizing force behind the EMH [see Mandell & O'brien 
(1992)]: it may be taken as marking the watershed of the EMH research. However, 
as previously noted, Samuelson (1965) should get the credit for becoming the first 
economist to enunciate the theory that price changes will be random if they rationally 
reflect available economic information. 
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According to Fama (1976a), market efficiency requires that in setting the price 
of securities at time t-l. the market correctly uses all available infonnation. The 
process of price fonnation in an efficient market can be described as follows: Let <1>,,1 
be the set of all infonnation available at time t-l, and let <l>m'_1 be the set of 
information actually used by the market in the determination of security prices at time 
t-1. In addition, assume that the prices of securities at t-l depend only on the 
characteristics of the joint distribution of prices to be set at time t. If the market is 
efficient in pricing the securities at time t-l, then all available information is correctly 
used to assess the joint distribution of prices at time t. Therefore. in an informationally 
efficient market 
(3.18) 
where fm(P It •••• , Pn,l<1>m'_I) is the joint distribution of security prices PII' ... ,PD, at 
time t assessed by the market at time t-l on the basis of the information set <1>mH; 
while f(P II, •••• Po, 1<1>,_1) is the joint distribution of security prices at time t. as 
implied by the infonnation set <1>'_1-
Hess and Reinganum (1979, p. 3) alternatively, formulate the process of price 
formation in a market where current security prices 'fully reflect ' all relevant and 
available information. in the following way [see also Allen (1985, p. 133)]: 
(3.19) 
or 
(3.20) 
89 
where 
pel = N-dimensional vector of equilibrium security prices at time t; 
Cl>, .= the set of information available at time t; 
cl>m, = the set of information actually used by investors in the determination 
of security prices at time t; 
'11(.) = 'II: A_RN. Here, 'II maps A, the set of all potential information, into RN, 
the security price space. From the economic point of view, 'II is the model of 
eqUilibrium that links a particular information set with equilibrium prices. 
Expression (3.18) and equivalently expression (3.20) state that, equilibrium 
prices determined based on the information set investors actually used, are identical 
to the equilibrium prices implied by the set of all available information. Consequently, 
in an uncertain world, if the EMH were true, no investor should expect to earn returns 
in excess of those normally associated with a risky portfolio by predicting asset prices 
from the set of available information [Hess and Reinganum (1979), p. 4]. 
If expression (3.18) or expression (3.20) does not hold, then the EMH must be 
rejected. Nevertheless, the description of an efficient market given by either the 
expression (3.18) or the expression (3.20), is still too general to be testable. They are 
just formal notations for the statement that prices in an efficient market fully reflect 
available information. 
Referring to the expression (3.18), one still cannot directly make a decision to 
reject or to accept the EMH since fm(P" , ...• PD,/Cl>m,.,) cannot be observed. A more 
detailed specification of the link between F(Ph •••• , PDt lCl>m,.,} and P""" ...• PD,t.! 
is needed. Put differently. we need to specify how eqUilibrium or market-clearing 
prices at time t-l are related to the market assessed joint distribution of prices for time 
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t. Hence, in testing the EMH, some model of market equilibrium is required \3. 
In tenns of the expression (3.20), ideally, verification of the EMH would 
simply be a matter of substituting <l>mt and <l>t into the specified \jI(.) function to check 
that the equilibrium prices implied by both information sets corresponded to the 
equilibrium prices, pet, actually observed. The hypothesis would be rejected if 
(3.21) 
In reality however, the functional fonn of 'V(.) is not known a priori and thus, 
has to be estimated. We can only obtain an estimate of pet via the estimated function, 
'V.(.). In this connection, according to Hess and Reinganum, the observable prices can 
be decomposed into an estimated part plus an error tenn: 
(3.22) 
where 
'V"(<I>mt) == the estimated equilibrium prices implied by the infonnation set used 
by investors; 
u = error tenn. 
Since some model of market equilibrium is required in testing the EMH, any 
empirical test of the EMH is actually a test of the joint hypothesis that [see Fama 
(l976a), p. 143; (1976b), p. 137]: 
(i) security prices 'fully reflect' all available infonnation; and 
l~odels of market equilibrium are discussed in Chapter Four. 
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(ii) the model of market equilibrium is correctly specified. 
Said differently, any test of the EMH is a test of at least two distinct 
hypotheses: that the market is efficient; and the manner by which securities are 
(efficiently) priced [Frankfurter and Lamoureux (1988)]. It follows that, if the result 
of a test cannot reject the EMH, then simultaneously, the assumptions about the nature 
of market eqUilibrium also cannot be rejected. On the contrary, any rejection of the 
EMH can be due to a misspecified model or an inefficient market, or both. 
As Fama (1 976b) points out, the usual general assumption is that the conditions 
of market equilibrium can be stated in terms of expected returns. The characteristics 
of the market assessed distribution, fm(P lt, ••• , Pntlct>mt.I ), determine the equilibrium 
expected returns on securities. Simultaneously, the market sets the prices of securities 
at time t-l so that it perceives expected returns to be equal to their equilibrium values. 
More specifically, if Pj,t.1 is the price of security j at time t-l; if Em(~tlct>mt.l) is the 
equilibrium expected return on security j implied by fm(P1t, ... , Pntlct>mt.l) and if 
Em(Pjtlct>mt.l) is the market assessed expected value of the price of security j at time t, 
then the market sets the price of security j at time t-l such that 
Em(Pjtlct>mt.l) 
Pj.tol = 
1 +~(R;tlct>mtol) 
(3.23) 
The price, Pjt. of security j, will however, be drawn from the true distribution 
of prices f(P II •••• , PDtlcJ)tol)' If E(PjtlcJ)tol) is the true expected price of security j 
implied by the true joint distribution f(P It, ••• , PjtlCl>tol) and if E(RjtICl>t.l) is the true 
expected return implied by E(PjtICl>H) and Pj.tol ' then the market is efficient [i.e., 
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expression (3.18) holds) if 
(3.24) 
and 
(3.25) 
That is, when a market is efficient, it correctly uses all available infonnation 
to assess the distribution of future prices and its assessment of the expected future 
price of any security is the true expected price. Furthermore, when the correct prices 
are set, the market's assessment of the expected return on any security is also equal 
to the true expected return. 
In an inefficient market on the other hand, in setting prices at time t-l, the 
market may neglect some of the information in <1>1-1' or it may analyse and use the 
infonnation incorrectly in assessing the distribution of future prices. In such a case, 
the equality of equations (3.24) and (3.25) may not hold. 
Ross (1989) relates the concept of capital market efficiency to the neoclassical 
equilibrium theory of efficiency in economics: Pareto efficiency l4. He argues that, 
when prices depend on information available to the economy, it is not unreasonable 
to think of the efficient market definition of finance as being a requirement for a 
competitive economy to be Pareto efficient. "If a capital market is competitive and 
efficient, then neoclassical reasoning implies that the return that an investor expects 
14Pareto efficiency, a fundamental concept in welfare economics, refers to an economy where resources 
are allocated in such a way that no-one can be made better off without others becoming worse off [see 
Vickers (1995), p. 1]. In other words. an economic system is defined to be Pareto efficient if there is no way 
to improve the well-being of anyone individual without making someone worse off. 
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to get on an investment in an asset will be equal to the opportunity cost of using the 
funds". 
Representing the opportunity cost by the riskless rate of interest, r - according 
to Ross, the EMH asserts that 
(3.26) 
where ~ is the total return (Le., capital gains as well as payouts) on the asset over a 
holding period from t to t+ 1. E is the expectation taken with respect to a given 
infonnation set, <1>1 (including rl), that is available at time t. 
In tenns of price 
(3.27) 
From equation (3.27), equation (3.26) can be rewritten as 
(3.28) 
Equivalently, PI may be written as discounted price which follows a martingale: 
1 
PI = - E(P,+1I<I>,) 
(1+rJ 
(3.29) 
This means that, when the market is weak-fonn efficient; that is, the current 
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price of a security embodies all of the information contained in the past prices 
(3.30) 
or, in returns form 
(3.31 ) 
Equation (3.31) implies that, when a market is weak-form efficient, an 
investment decision which simply uses the 'technical' information of past prices, can 
only expect to earn a return of the opportunity cost (1 H,). (3.34) 
3.4-Levels of Market Efficiency 
In an ideal setting, a market can be said to be informationally efficient if it 
is 'fully informed'. A securities market is information ally efficient when security 
prices reflect all available information. The basic empirical issue therefore is, whether 
the information set used by the market in pricing securities includes all available 
information. Nonetheless, given the fact that the universe of relevant information is 
extremely vast, in the real world, the conditions for full efficiency are unlikely to 
exist. 
Whilst the definition of 'information set' is partially a philosophical matter 
[Hess & Reinganum (1979)], the question of market efficiency has emerged as an 
issue of degree rather than merely black or white. By definition, there is no market 
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which is perfectly efficient or strictly inefficient. 
Given the fact that real life social phenomena are seldom so clear-cut and that 
individuals would apparently differ in their views as to how much the available 
info.rmation the price of a security reflects, there appears to be no quantitative way in 
which the EMH can be adequately tested [see Firth (1977)]. One way of measuring 
the level of efficiency of a market is by asking the types of information, encompassed 
by the total set of available information, that are reflected in security pricesl~ [see 
Haugen (1990)]. 
Based on Roberts's (1959) suggestion, Fama (1970) distinguished three types 
of information sets by which the efficient market model could be appraised and tested: 
past prices (Le., the historical sequence of prices), publicly available information and 
all information including private information. Since then, it is customary to classify 
the level or form of market efficiency into three: the weak-form (price-information or 
predictability) efficiency, the semi-strong form (or public information) efficiency and 
the strong-form (private or inside information) efficiency l6. 
The three levels of market efficiency, form a hierarchy: a market will not be 
efficient in the strong-form unless the semi-strong form of efficiency exists. Likewise, 
the presence of semi-strong form efficiency must ipso facto imply that the market is 
also efficient at the weak level. 
The weak-form efticiency which is at the bottom of the ladder of the 
efficiency hierarchy, requires only that the current and past price history be 
lSHowever, the exact mechanism by which prices incorporate infonnation. as Ross (1989) points out. 
is still a mystery and an attendant theory of volume is simply missing. 
16Keane (1983) proposed further classification. For practical purposes. he distinguished three potential 
degrees of efficiency; namely. perfect efficiency. near efficiency and inefficiency. 
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incorporated in the information set. If a market is weak-form efficient, current prices 
will fully reflect all past market information, future prices will be independent of past 
price changes and price changes from one period to another can be approximated by 
a random walk. 
Consequently, if a market is weak-form efficient, investors cannot devise an 
investment strategy on the basis of past price changes or past market information to 
yield abnormal profits. Trading rules (technical analysis) using 'past price patterns' 
to predict future changes, should have little economic value because any information 
from such an approach will have already been impounded in current market prices. 
Major tests of the validity of the weak-form of the EMH were tests for 
randomness in successive price changes. In general, these tests can be grouped into 
two: 
(i) statistical testing of the independence of price changes; and 
(ii) testing the efficacy of the various mechanical trading rules (which are 
based only on prior price performance) used by chartists and technical analysts. 
Early tests ofthe EMH were tests of the weak-form efficiency. Such tests have 
been performed as early as the 1950s by Kendall (1953), Robert (1959) and Osborne 
(1959). As we have examined in the foregoing section, in general, empirical tests 
present strong evidence in favour of the weak-form EMH17: that no discernible 
predictable patterns of price changes that speculators or investors can exploit. Even 
though "the random walk hypothesis is not strictly upheld, the departures from 
randomness that do exist are not large enough to leave unexploited investment 
17Hawawini and Michel (1984) in their review of the evidence of price behaviour and efficiency of the 
European Equity Markets for example. concluded that: "In general. European Equity Markets regardless of 
their size. are efficient in the weak fonn" (p. 25). 
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opportunities" [Malkiel (1989), p. 127]. 
A market is efficient in the semi-strong sense if it uses all of the publicly 
available information in pricing securities. The value of information (i.e., current as 
well as past publicly available information) is rapidly discounted in share prices. 
When a market is efficient (in the semi-strong-form), only new or shock 
information will cause prices to change; but new information cannot be predicted: A 
continuous stream of information is becoming public knowledge randomly, and then 
the affected share prices, in respond, will be 'walking' randomly [see Tarascio 
(1984)]. This implies that the semi-strong-form efficiency of a market is consistent 
with the weak-form efficiency. 
Hence, in a market which is efficient in the semi-strong sense, current prices 
reflect not only the information contained in the sequence of past prices, but all 
available published information. Consequently, investment decisions based on either 
technical analysis (which focuses on stock price patterns) or fundamental analysis 
(which focuses on the determinants of the underlying value of the firms), will not 
yield abnormal economic profits. Since both approaches are based on publicly 
available information, neither would be able to beat the market. 
Tests of the semi-strong-form of the EMH attempt to establish whether share 
prices adjust precisely and rapidly to new items of information. The general approach 
involved in these studies has been to take an economic event (hence event studies l8) 
and measure its impact on the share price (and returns). A classic example of the so-
called event study, was the one conducted by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll [FFJR 
l~n his recent paper, Fama (1991) has even proposed the change of the "semi-strong-form tests of the 
adjustment of prices to public announcement" to a new common title: event studies 
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(1969)] - a study that set the fashion and technique for most of the subsequent tests 
of the semi-strong form of the EMH. In their study, the authors investigated the 
reaction of stock prices to the event of stock split announcements. 
Even though the splits themselves provide no economic benefit, stock splits 
are usually accompanied by dividend increases. Thus, stock splits are often interpreted 
as implicitly conveying favourable information to the market - information about 
management's confidence about the future progress of the enterprise. While splits 
usually are associated with higher share prices, when the market is efficient, prices 
will fully and immediately adjust to the information. 
In their study, FFJR (1969) divided their sample into two: companies that 
increased their dividends after the splits, and companies that did not. They found that, 
while substantial abnormal returns were observed prior to the split announcement, 
there was no evidence of abnormal returns after the public announcement. For the 
firms that did not increase their dividends following the splits. the market reduced the 
price of the shares because the anticipated dividend increase did not materialise. Firms 
that raised their dividends as expected. exhibited only very little additional gain. FFJR 
(1969) concluded that their study provided evidence in support of semi-strong-form 
efficiency of the New York Stock Exchange. The evidence provided by the study does 
not contradict the hypothesis that current prices already reflect all publicly available 
information relevant to the value of a company's stock. 
A similar study using U.K. data on scrip issues was implemented by Firth 
(1977). Results of the study revealed a considerable increase in the price in the week 
prior to the announcement. but no systematic price movement in the month after the 
announcement. 
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The variety of economic events or new items of information that have been 
used by researchers to test the semi-strong level of the EMH, include the following: 
* Analyst's information/recommendations: Diefenbach (1972) for the U.S. and 
Firth (1972) for the U.K.; 
* capitalisation issues - stock splits and/or dividends): Fama et.al (1969); 
Charest (1978) and Reilly and Dryzcmski (1981) for American data; Firth (1977) for 
the U.K. and Ball, Brown and Finn (1977) for Australia; 
* dividend announcements: Petit (1972) and Watt (1973); 
* earnings announcement: Ball and Brown (1968); Aharony and Swary (1980); 
Morse (1981) and Hans, Wild and Ramesh (1989); 
* earnings estimates made by company officials: Foster (1973); 
• issuance of new shares of an existing security: Hess and Frost (1982); 
* large blocks of shares being bought or sold: Kraus and Stoll (1972); Dodd 
and Ruback (1977); Dann, Mayers and Raab (1977) and Carey (1977); 
• macroeconomic factors: e.g., discount rate changes [Waud (1970)]; monetary 
growth [Rozeff (1974)]; money and other key macroeconomic variables [Darrat and 
Mukherjee (1987)]; and 
• merger bid announcements: Franks, Broyles and Hecht (1977); Firth (1976). 
Although there are some exceptions, the vast majority of these studies support 
the semi-strong version of the EMH. While most evidence is consistent with the 
existence of the semi-strong form market efficiency, there has also been some 
evidence that suggested that stock markets tended to overreact or underreact to the 
value implications of published piece of information [see e.g., Charest (1978), Latane 
and Jones (1979)]. 
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The strODe: form of the EMH, as its name implies, takes the notion of market 
efficiency (with respect to information) to the ultimate extreme. A market is said to 
be strong-form efficient if it exhibits prices that not only reflect public information but 
also private information. Then, in a market which is efficient in this sense, prices are 
liable to reflect not only everything that is known but also everything that is knowable 
[Lorie & Brealey (1978)]. 
Even though this form of market efficiency is so extreme that "few people 
have ever treated as anything other than a logical completion of the set of possible 
hypothesis" [Jensen (1978)], and "we would not, of course, expect this model to be 
an exact description of reality" [Fama (1970), p. 409], there are mechanisms that could 
lead to strong-form market efficiency. For example, competition among privately 
informed investors might be sufficient to produce prices that reflect private 
information [Dyckman & Morse (1986)]. Malkiel (1989, p. 131) even maintains that 
there is considerable evidence that "the market" comes reasonably close to strong-form 
efficiency. Blume and Siegel (1992), however, argue that since the set of relevant 
information is theoretically infinite, it is unreasonable to expect that the market would 
literally incorporate all information into stock prices at every point in time. 
As all available information - public as well as private - is rapidly impounded 
in securities prices, it would be impossible for any investor to garner superior returns 
consistently. As such, in testing for strong-form market efficiency, researchers are 
concerned with whether company insiders or other privileged groups possess special 
or inside information which can be used to make above average profits. In Fama's 
(1970, p. 409) words, tests of the strong-form of the efficient market model are 
"concerned with whether all available information is fully reflected in prices in the 
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sense that no individual has higher expected profits than others because he has 
monopolistic access to some information". Thus, finding that the 'better informed' do 
not make excess profits would be evidence in support the strong-form of the EMH. 
The problem with testing strong-form market efficiency is that the existence 
of nonpublic or private information in the market cannot be directly observed. 
Consequently, indirect approaches are used by investigators. In general, we can 
roughly group the strong-form tests of the EMH into two major subclasses [see e.g., 
Elton & Gruber (1991), p. 425]: The first type of tests attempt to examine the 
performance of major market participants or institutional investors. The second type 
of tests involve investigating the investment performance of individuals or groups who 
can be identified as in a position of possessing nonpublic information - the insiders -
such as directors, managers and owners of at least 10% of the shares of a company. 
If stock markets are found to be strong-form efficient. then any day is as good 
as any other day to buy any stock. Nonetheless, in general, empirical evidence appears 
to refute market efficiency of this form. Indications that markets are probably not 
strong-form efficient are documented, among others, by Lorie & Niederhoffer (1968). 
Jaffe (1974), Penman (1982), and Dimson & Marsh (1984). 
In a more recent study, Seyhun (1986) provides evidence indicating that 
insiders can predict abnormal future price changes. He concluded that the evidence 
was consistent with (the semi-strong-form) market efficiency because outside investors 
were found to be unable to use the publicly available information about insiders' 
transactions to eam abnormal profits. 
To generalise, empirical evidence suggests that most matured securities markets 
are efficient at the semi-strong level, but they may not be efficient in the strong-fonn 
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sense. Alternatively stated, major exchanges are believed to be efficient to the general 
public and to their agents such as fund managers, but they might not be efficient to 
the company insiders. 
3.5-Evidence From the Small and Less Developed 
Exchan&es 
Empirical studies and evidence on stock market efficiency are voluminous. 
Collections and excellent summaries of empirical tests and findings on the EMH for 
the developed markets can be found, inter alia, in Cootner (1964), Fama (1970,1991), 
Lorie and Hamilton (1973), Firth (1977), Cooper (1982), Keane (1983), Hawawini 
(1984), Hawawini and Michel (1984), Dyckman and Morse (1986), Copeland and 
Weston (1988) and Elton and Gruber (1991). The general consensus of a large number 
of these studies is that the world's major exchanges are efficient in the weak and 
semi-strong fonn. While the 'matured' exchanges are generally accepted as being both 
weak-fonn and semi-strong form efficient, it is an interesting empirical question 
whether, and to what extent, that the small and developing stock markets are also 
efficient. 
Research tradition for the developing capital markets, is relatively young and 
yet, steadily growing. Interest in investigating the price behaviour and efficiency of 
these relatively young exchanges has increased rapidly, particularly since the 
publication of Fama's (1970) seminal work. 
The findings of studies using data from the smaller, less complicated and thinly 
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traded exchanges are less obvious and generally mixed. They appear to be 
inconclusive. Some of these researches provide evidence supporting market efficiency, 
while others do not. To name a few, studies were conducted by Roux and Gilbertson 
(1978) for South Africa (Johannesburg); Palacios (1975) for Spain; Ang and Pohlman 
(1978) for the Far Eastern Countries; Darrat and Mukherjee (1987), Sharma (1983), 
Kapur (1988) and Yalawar (1988) for India (Bombay); Hong (1978) and D' Ambrosio 
(1980) for Singapore; Gandhi et al.(1980) for Kuwait; Dawson (1982, 1984) and 
Wong and Mak (1982) for Hong Kong; AI-Hmoud (1987) for Jordan; Buttler and 
Malaikah (1992) for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Khilji (1993) for Pakistan. 
Errunza and Losq (1985a) investigate the behaviour of stock prices for "a 
group of well established and newly emerging" securities markets in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Greece, India, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Thailand and Zimbabwe. The data 
used in the study covers the period from December 1975 through April 1981. One of 
the conclusions of the study is that, these markets, even though not as efficient as 
major the markets in developed countries, they "are quite comparable to the smaller 
European markets" (p. 574). 
Empirical research on the efficiency the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) was initiated some time in the early 1980s. Studies performed by M. Nasir 
Lanjong (1983), Neoh (1985), Barnes (1986) and Laurence (1986) provide some early 
indications of the weak-form efficiency of the Exchange. 
M. Nasir Lanjong (1983) conducted serial correlation and runs tests on monthly 
returns of 104 KLSE companies, from January 1974 to June 1980. He found that 
successive returns of those shares are randomly distributed and thus confirming the 
weak-form efficiency of the market. 
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Various aspects of the Malaysian stock market, including its efficiency, were 
studied by Neoh (1985). By applying Beaver's (1981) concept of "signal efficiency" 
rather than Fama's concept of "form efficiency", seven type of signals, organised into 
two categories were tested: 
(i) Transaction information: price periodicity, price moving average and relative 
strength. Under this category, he found that the Malaysian market was less efficient 
than the U.S. market. However "when applied to all stocks over the long term, the test 
methods do not yield much inefficiency" (p. 321). 
(ii) Accounting information: dividend yield, dividend growth, stock split and 
earnings forecast error. He concluded that "overall, the Malaysian market is much less 
efficient with regard to accounting information" (p. 326). 
Barnes (1986) examined the weak-form efficiency of the KLSE using the data 
consisting of thirty companies and six sectoral indices for the six years ended 30th 
June 1980. Based on serial correlation and runs tests, he found that there was very 
little departure from the random walk hypothesis within confidence intervals of two 
and three standard errors. Using spectral analysis. he further found that "this technique 
confirmed that the KLSE is fairly efficient in the weak form" (p. 614). Barnes then 
concluded that "although there were certain departures from the hypothesis, the KLSE 
overall exhibited a surprisingly high degree of efficiency, in view of thinness and its 
age as a stock exchange" (p. 616). 
Laurence (1986) studied the weak-form efficiency of the KLSE and the 
Singapore Stock Exchange (SES) using serial correlation and runs tests. His 
conclusion was that the two independence tests manifested mixed behaviour: "Some 
sample stocks exhibit random behaviour while others - particularly many of those 
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from the SES - appear to deviate from a random walk" (p. 444). 
One of the earliest work investigating the efficiency of the KLSE was carried 
out by Dawson (1981), whereas the most recent ones were accomplished, inter alios, 
by Othman Yong(1987), Mansor Md Isa (1989), Annuar Md Nasir (1990) and Rokiah 
(1992). Dawson (1981) analysed the returns earned by investors who bought the stocks 
recommended by analysts: 'stock of the month' published in the Malaysian Business 
(a monthly trade journal) from January 1973 through March 1980. The purpose of the 
study was to see whether those recommended stocks (i.e. 85 stocks of the month in 
the sample) did better than the market. Those stocks were found to rise on average in 
value over the following year, and over a six month period they outperformed the 
market. " These results suggest that the KLSE is not yet an efficient market although 
it may be closer than many observers think since the stocks of the month did not 
finish well above the market" (p. 72). 
Othman Yong (1987) conducted a study (using runs tests and serial correlation 
tests) on weekly data of 170 stocks (from January 1977 to May 1985) to investigate 
whether or not the KLSE conforms to the weak-form of the EMH. Overall "this study 
provides evidence that a small and thinly traded stock market is less efficient in the 
weak-form sense of the EMH compared to larger stock markets in the United States" 
(p. 71). Price changes for all stocks on the KLSE were also found to be non-normal, 
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality. 
From his examination of the behaviour of Malaysian stock prices, Mansor Md 
Isa (1989) detected. inter alia, the following: 
(i) The KLSE stock returns were not normally distributed. (He further inferred 
that the KLSE stock prices followed a stable Paretian distribution), 
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(ii) "Since the random walk model requires independence, it is not therefore 
a good description of Malaysian stock prices" (p. 18). 
Using monthly data in a period from 1975 to 1986, Annuar Md Nasir (1990) 
tested the three levels of the EMH in the KLSE. Despite apparent minor inefficiencies, 
on the whole, he concluded that the market confonned well to the behaviour predicted 
in a weak-fonn EMH. The study also reached to the conclusion that the market 
appeared to be near efficient in the semi-strong form, with respect to the adjustment 
process of share prices to announcements of earnings and dividends. In testing for 
strong-fonn efficiency of the Exchange, the researcher analysed the perfonnance of 
'stock of the month' recommendations published by Malaysian Business. The result 
indicated that the KLSE was not strong-fonn efficient. 
Rokiah (1992) examined price perfonnance and aftennarket efficiency of the 
unseasoned new equity issues in Malaysia. According to the researcher, " .. .it would 
suffice to conclude that the market is only near efficient in the semi-strong fonn" (p. 
317). 
Similar to many other developing stock exchanges, empirical studies on the 
efficiency of the KLSE do not provide clear-cut results. On the whole, however, the 
previous researches (as we have examined above) have shown that the Exchange is 
efficient in the weak fonn. Investigations into the semi-strong-fonn efficiency of the 
KLSE are few and the results appear to indicate that the market may not be efficient 
in this sense. 
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3.6-Some Anomalies: Evidence of Market 
Inefficiencies? 
Tests of the EMH are legion. While a plethora of empirical evidence has been 
supportive, there are some findings which are not in favour of the EMH. 
Probably, the EMH is the most controversial topic in finance, and possibly in 
economics in general. Although early evidence in support of the EMH appeared very 
strong, the validity of the hypothesis has increasingly been challenged. "Why do many 
economists refuse to be convinced by twenty years of successful empirical testing?" 
asked James Tobin [Tobin (1987), p. 126]. Perhaps recent developments in empirical 
work that provide evidence which casts doubt on the validity of the EMH could partly 
be explained by the fact that new studies can always benefit from improved techniques 
to challenge the results of the previous ones. 
The more recent evidence suggesting that stock markets might not be as 
efficient as most academics once believed, falls in two parts. First, the evidence that 
appears directly to challenge the EMH; and secondly, the so-called 'anomalous' 
evidence. 
The incidence of stock market crash in October 1987 (also known colourfully 
as "October meltdown") is often cited by efficient market sceptics as a serious blow 
on the EMH. The October "meltdown", as Rao (1992) points out, immediately 
provided a forum for vigorous attacks against the EMH. For example, BusinessWeek 
of October 22, 1988 even expressed the view that, "Efficient market theory is useless 
in explaining the biggest stock market calamity in 58 years". 
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While the stock market crash of October 1987 can be considered as a special 
case in the EMH controversy, the so-called market anomalies had been in existence -
detected and reported - many years before the October "meltdown". They are, de 
facto, not new; some of them have existed as market folklore for many years [see 
Bowers and Dimson (1988)]. 'Certain Observations in Seasonal Movements in Stock 
Prices' have been reported as early as 1942 by Wachtel (1942). 
In the 1970s, empirical regularities appeared in the work of a number of 
authors. Officer (1975) observed monthly stock return seasonalities in Australia. Early 
indications of seasonality in the US capital market can be found in the work of Rozeff 
and Kinney (1976), whereas the early case of seasonalities in the UK and other 
European markets was reported by Richards (1978). Contravening the random walk 
model which implies that stock returns are time invariant, Rozeff and Kinney (1976) 
for instance, observed that in the US, stock returns for January were significantly 
larger than the returns for other months. During the time however, anomalies were not 
'in fashion' and therefore, the evidence reported did not attract much attention [see 
Constantinides (1988)]. 
Today, some of the most persuasive evidence against the EMH, is believed 
to come from the "anomaly,,19 literature [see Blume and Siegel (1992»). Several 
unusual patterns in the price behaviour of shares that appear to be contrary to the 
efficient market concept can be found in this anomaly literature. 
Fundamental analysis, an investment approach which uses much wider 
information than does technical analysis (see Chapter Four) in creating portfolios, has 
19 Anomaly is a term used by Thomas Kuhn (1970), a scientific historian. to refer to the evidence of 
departure from conventional theory. 
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revealed evidence that seems inconsistent with the EMH [see Bodie et al.(1989); BalI 
(1978)]. Such 'unexplained empirical results' are often referred to as market anomalies 
because economists cannot (perhaps for the time being) realIy 'understand' and hence 
cannot offer 'satisfactory' reasons and explanations for their existence [see e.g., Elton 
and Gruber (1991); Tinic and Barone-adesi (1988); Schwertz (1983)]. 
Market anomalies, according to Bowers and Dimson (1988), takes the form of 
observed capital market regularities that are not explained by theory or institutional 
practice. The existence of market regularities could be interpreted as implying 
informational inefficiency because market participants could, by devising certain 
trading strategies. exploit such regularities to earn above normal profits. 
In 1977, Sanjay Basu [Basu (1977)] published his study on the price-to-
earnings (PE) ratio which was conducted in a risk-adjusted framework. Basu's results 
which became known as the PE etTect or the PE anomaly - an anomaly that had long 
been popularised by practitioners2o - provided dramatic contradiction to the semi-
strong form of the EMH. Basu (1977 & 1983) found that stocks with low PE ratios 
have higher average risk-adjusted returns than stocks with high PE multiples. Basu' s 
findings imply that an investor who purchase shares with low PE ratios, will find that 
the historical perfonnance in tenns of returns is higher. and risk in terms of betas is 
lower. Clearly, Basu's results challenged the concept of a positive trade-off between 
risk and return and hence, the concept that risk-averse behaviour was reflected in 
security prices [see Mandell and O'brien (1992)]. 
2'1t has become a market folklore for some time that shares of companies with low PE ratios may be 
undervalued. According to Keirn (1988), earnings related strategies have a long tradition in the investment 
community. 'Buying shares that sell at low earnings multiples' which is the most popular of such strategies. 
can be traced at least to Graham and Dodd (1934). 
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Reinganum (1981) confirmed and extended Basu' s results. Examining the 
relationship between the size of the firm and the PE ratio, he found that it was the size 
of the firm and not the PE ratio that was the important discriminator. 
The so-called small-finn-effect or size effect21 appeared to be one of the 
most important anomalies or empirical regularities so far observed, with respect to the 
EMH. The tendency towards the size effect in stock returns - that the risk-adjusted 
stock returns are a monotonically decreasing function of firm size - was first noted by 
Banz (1981). He discovered that stocks of small capitalisation firms earn, on average, 
higher risk-adjusted returns than those of large firms. 
Results of studies by both Reinganum (1981) and Banz (1981) indicate that the 
difference in returns between small and large firms cannot be explained by the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Differently stated. both studies have shown the 
tendency of small firms to yield returns greater than those predicted by the traditional 
CAPM. Almost similar results are provided by Dimson and Marsh (1984) for the 
U.K., Brown et al. (1983) for Australia, Berges et al.(l984) for Canada and Kato and 
Schallheim (1985) for Japan. 
The fact that the small-firm-effect is a world-wide phenomenon, has also been 
documented by Keirn (1988). His analysis of stock returns in four major stock 
exchanges in Australia, Canada, Japan and United Kingdom revealed that there was 
an inverse relation between stock returns and market capitalisation in each of those 
countries. A size effect on the London Stock Exchange was also found in a more 
recent study covering the period from April 1961 to March 1985, by Levis (1989). 
21 For the survey of various attempts to explain the size effect. see e.g.. Keim (1988). Some 
explanations of the size effect and January effect are also discussed in some detail by Chen (1988). Brown 
et al.(1983) accentuate and show that the size effect has even manifested itself beyond academic circles. 
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Some studies nonetheless, have found that the small-firm-effect is virtually a 
small-firm-in-January effect. Among others, studies by Keirn (1983), Reinganum 
(1983) and Blume and Stambaugh (1983) demonstrated that excess returns on small 
firms' shares (in the U.S.) concentrated in January, particularly during the first few 
days of January. 
Much literature has been produced, supplying evidence of a tendency for share 
prices to fall towards the end of the year and rise during the month of January: the 
January effect or the turn-of-the-year effect. While Rozeff and Kinney (1976) 
conducted the first rigorous study which confirmed the existence of the January effect 
in the US, Berges et al.(l984) and Tinic and Barone-adesi (1988) demonstrated a 
January seasonal in Canada. Gultekin and Gultekin (1983) empirically examined stock 
market seasonality in major industrial countries. The study revealed that the January 
effect was even stronger in many other countries than in the United States. The 
January effect has also been documented by numerous other studies which, among the 
most recent ones, were accomplished by DeBondt and Thaler (1985), Gultekin and 
Gultekin (1987), Cohay et al.(988) and Lakonishok and Smidt (1988). Lee (1992) 
provides evidence of seasonalities in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
In addition to the January effect, several studies have also documented 
empirical regularities that are related to the time of the month or the day of the week 
(i.e, the day-of-the-week effect). Gibbons and Hess (1981) for example, reported that 
the U.S. market exhibited negative returns on Monday and large positive returns on 
Wednesday and Friday. For other evidence of the day-of-the-week effect, see Keirn 
and Satarnbaugh (1984),. Jaffe and Westerfield (1985), and Lakonishok and Smidt 
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(1988), to name a few. 
Analysing stock returns drawn from seven national equity markets; namely, 
New York, Sydney, Toronto, London, Tokyo, Paris and Singapore, Condoyanni et 
al.(1988) identified that the weekend effects were the norm rather than being U.S. 
specific. Based on these results they concluded that the "weekend effect is a pervasive 
feature of capital markets around the world" [po 61]. 
For the well-established stock markets essentially, there are many investment 
advisory services selling advice that predicts the performance of various types of 
securities. The Value Line Investor Survey is one of the largest and most consistently 
successful investment advisory services in the United States. The Value Line 
predictions and recommendations which are believed to be based on historical data 
such as earnings-related information [see Keirn (1988)], have been the subjected of 
many academic studies [see e.g., Kaplan and Weil (1973) and Holloway (1981)]. 
Several investigations of the Value Line system of ranking securities conducted 
by, inter alios, Black (1973), Copeland and Mayers (1982) and Stickel (1985), have 
demonstrated that the service could be used to produce abnormal profits. Value Line's 
apparent success in predicting stock performance, which has become known as the 
Value Line Enigma, is as puzzling as the size and PE effects: "predetermined 
variables are used to construct portfolios that have abnormal returns relative to the 
CAPM" [Keirn (1988), p. 26]. The Value Line significant performance, which would 
be a violation of the semi-strong version of the EMH (or of the CAPM as a joint 
hypothesis), is considered an enigma. 
Consonant with the growing literature on market anomalies and other empirical 
evidence that contradict the EMH; and with the scattered resistance to the EMH in 
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place in the 1980s, there appears to be a growing body of 'new schools of thought' 
suggesting that equity markets are inefficient. They include, the revival of the idea of 
market psychology, the issue of noise trading, the overreaction hypothesis, mean 
reversion in share prices, noisy rational expectations model and the uncertainty 
information hypothesis. These contemporary developments in stock market theory 
which represent serious attacks on the validity of the EMH, have been advanced in the 
recent academic literature. These issues are to be reviewed in Chapter Four. 
At this stage, a number of questions concerning market efficiency might be 
asked: Once anomalous evidence suggesting profit opportunity has been published, 
would not investors react quickly to this information and thus, arbitrage away the 
reported 'inefficiencies,?22 Could such inconsistencies be viewed as evidence of 
market inefficiencies or "evidence that we don't yet completely understand 
equilibrium" [Elton and Gruber (1991), p. 431]? Could such anomalies and empirical 
regularities be considered as manifestations of "the fact that there are inadequacies in 
our current state of knowledge" [Jensen (1978), p. 100] and hence the imperfections 
in research methodology? Could all those evidence, issues and developments that 
question the validity of the EMH highlighted in this section, be judged as reflections 
of the fact that we are in some stage of advancement in knowledge and with "the 
advancement in knowledge, it is the fate of all theory to be encompassed, superseded 
or outright rejected in the long run" [Merton (1987), p. 97]? 
Reinganum (1984, p. 839) in his 'discussion' entitled "What the anomalies 
mean" has written: 
22For example, if small company shares are identified as superior investments, why not the market bids 
up their prices until they reach a level at which risk-adjusted returns to future investors would merely be 
normal? [see Seligman (1983)]. 
114 
"They mean that the theories of capital asset pricing (at least as they pertain 
to equity markets) have been toppled. They mean that the most interesting 
insights into the pricing behaviour of stocks are being discovered by tedious 
and painstakingly thorough examination of data. They mean that, in the 
constant ebb and flow between theory and empirics, empirics currently holds 
the upper hand". 
As was implicitly noted, one basic problem that empirical researchers of the 
EMH have to confront is that, tests of the EMH are tests of the joint hypothesis: 
choice has to be made between rejecting the EMH or rejecting the testing procedure. 
By opting to reject the procedure, researchers are left with no conclusion about market 
efficiency23. 
A model of market equilibrium needs to be specified in testing the joint 
hypothesis of the EMH. Such a model serves the benchmark in verifying whether 
abnormal profits can be earned by exploiting the available information. In this case, 
model misspecification might lead to misleading results and conclusions. For example, 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which enjoys widespread use in the testing 
of the EMH, has been identified as having a number of weaknesses [see e.g., Roll 
(1977), Blume and Siegal (1992). See also Chapter Four]. 
In essence, the growth or rather, the explosion of anomalous evidence and 
literature regarding market efficiency that has taken place in the recent past - "a 
coming mini-revolution in the field" as described by Jensen (1978) - provides a 
challenge to both the theorist and empiricist. To the empirical researchers, as stressed 
23For example, Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) who find persistent abnormal returns in their tests 
and being unwilling to reject market efficiency, have to suggest that their results might be due to the 
misspecification of the CAPM rather than to market inefficiency. 
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by Bowers and Dimson (1988), the challenge not only lies in the realm of identifying 
anomalies and testing possible explanations for them: "There is also a serious question 
mark posed about the integrity of much of the methodology of financial research" [po 
3.7-Summaryand Concludin2 Comments 
Efficiency of the securities markets is a concept that refers to the tendency of 
security prices to reflect economic information rapidly and accurately; i.e., everything 
known about the prospects of individual companies and the economy as a whole. 
When a market is efficient in that observed security prices reflect fundamental 
economic values, it is efficient in performing its role of allocating capital resources 
among the society's alternative uses of capital [see Mandell and O'brien (1992); 
Copeland and Weston (1988)]. Due to its fundamental importance in the theory of 
finance, the efficient market doctrine has permeated almost every part of modern 
financial theory and has become the mainstay of much of financial research. 
The speed by which security prices adjust to fundamental information or new 
information is influenced by the efficiency of the market as an 'information 
processor'. Under the EMH, a capital market is viewed as an efficient information 
processor. 
In an information ally efficient market, information is rapidly disseminated and 
24Some of the methodological problems in testing the EMH are discussed by Merton (1987). See also 
Schwertz (1983). 
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reflected in prices. In a perfectly efficient capital market, as defined by Sharpe (1985) 
every security's price equals its investment value (or fundamental value) at all times. 
Prices are accurate signals of true values. 
If stock markets are perfectly efficient, the following will be the major 
implications for investors: 
(i) Since prices reflect all available information, the only reason for prices to 
change is the arrival of new (unanticipated) information. Since new information is as 
likely to be favourable as unfavourable, movements in security prices are as likely to 
be upward and downward: unpredictable. 
(ii) Since prices reflect all available information, there will be no method of 
analysis -technical or fundamental - that will produce abnormal profit over and above 
the expected reward for the bearing of risk. Being efficient, the markets and their 
prices can be said to be fair in that every investor is given the same chance of making 
profits and losses on their investments. 
(iii) In an efficient market, there are no rewards for taking on risks which can 
be avoided. Specific risks or unsystematic risks can be avoided by diversification; and 
rewards are only offered for bearing market risk or systematic risk which cannot be 
avoided. 
(iv) Since prices reflect all available information, and changes in security prices 
are random and unpredictable, all one can hope to do is to buy and hold a well-
diversified portfolio of shares which is expected to grow with the economy. In the 
absence credible evidence of a realistic prospect of achieving superior performance, 
buying and holding an internationally diversified portfolio with minimum costs, as 
suggested by Keane (1991), would be the optimal strategy for most investors. 
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Employing an active trading strategy on the contrary, would only increase brokerage 
costs without increasing the expected returns. Switching investments will only incur 
transaction costs and the possibility of taxation [Dobbins et al.(1994). 
If a market is weak-form efficient, share price changes will be statistically 
random. Price history cannot be expected to repeat itself. Then, the foundation 
underlying technical analysis becomes vacuous because 'technical information' is no 
longer effective in detecting profitable trends. 
If an equity market is semi-strong-form efficient, all publicly available 
information will be useless in predicting future prices. Investors cannot profit 
abnormally by acting on such information. 
If a stock market is strong-form efficient, not only experts, analysts and 
professional investors will be unable to exhibit distinctive performance, but also 
insiders will be unsuccessful in trying to beat the market. 
It is obvious then, that the issue of market efficiency is central to investor 
behaviour. The question is, however, do we really know that stock markets in general 
are efficient? 
In the 1970s, the evidence summarised in Fama (1970, 1976b) led to 
widespread acceptance as a scientific fact that stock markets are efficient. Nonetheless. 
since about the second half of the 1980s, the subject of stock market efficiency has 
developed into a polemic in academia. Along with a huge body of evidence providing 
evidence consistent with stock markets being efficient (essentially in the semi-strong 
sense), there has also been a growing body of hypotheses and evidence suggesting that 
equity markets are, to some extent, inefficient. 
Whilst, since the 1980s, the number of proponents for the EMH has been 
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extremely large, the number of opponents to the hypothesis has also been rapidly 
increasing. In 1979, a staunch proponent of the EMH and the eventual Nobel price 
winner, Franco Modigliani [Modigliani and Cohn (1979)] argued that in the late 
1970s, because of inflation-induced errors, investors had systematically undervalued 
the stock market by 50%. He then admitted that "our conclusion is indeed hard to 
swallow - and especially hard for those of us who have been preaching the gospel of 
efficient markets" (p. 35). Robert Shiller [Shiller (1979, 1981a, 1981b, 1991)], a Yale 
economist and one of the leaders of the revolt against the EMH, suggested that 
financial markets display excess volatility and overreact to new information. Similarly, 
Summers (1986) showed that the strength of existing evidence confirming the 
hypothesis of market efficiency has been exaggerated. Tobin (1987) also does not 
believe that stock prices are rational estimates of fundamental values. 
At this juncture, after considering and comparing the views and evidence 
provided by both sides of the debate on the EMH, we incline towards a stance 
expressed by Haugen (1990) that the stock markets are not strictly efficient with 
respect to any of the so-called levels of efficiency [see also Seligman (1983); Beckers 
(1988)]. While the evidence indicates that a great deal of information available at all 
levels, at any given time, is reflected in share prices; while the evidence indicates that 
the stock markets in general may not be easily beaten, 'the market' "appears to be 
beatable, at least if you are willing to work at it" [Haugen (1990), p. 666]. 
Notwithstanding that some minor or temporary inefficiencies may exist even 
in the well-established exchanges, such inefficiencies need not significantly affect the 
stock market's function in allocating capital resources. This suggests that, instead of 
asking a qualitative question of "are markets efficient?" we ought rather ask the more 
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quantitative question of "how efficient are markets?" As noted by Keane (1991, p. 31), 
the issue raised by the new evidence is not whether it makes the market inefficient, 
but whether it reduces its efficiency to a level that has significant economic 
consequences. 
To date, although tests of the EMH have not yielded unanimous results, the 
balance appears to lie in favour of the EMH. Although the proliferation of anomalies 
and other new issues in stock market theory in recent years has perhaps put the EMH 
into the status more tentative or in the state of needing some updating, the efficient 
market paradigm still remains the dominant 'explanation' of stock price determination 
among academic researchers [see Tarascio (1984 )].The important question. and 
perhaps the most relevant issue is, whether the EMH is sufficiently correct to provide 
useful insights into market behaviour [see Lorie and Brealey (1978)] 
Correspondingly. whatever view one may hold about the EMH debate, as 
Keane (1991, p. 30) emphasises, it is beyond dispute that the its status is central to 
fundamental policies of investment practice. corporate financial management and 
corporate financial reporting. As there currently appears to be no promising candidate 
to supersede the efficient market paradigm. it is likely that the EMH will continue 
guiding a large body of theoretical and empirical work in modern finance and 
investment. 
Given published evidence to date. and with the belief that the debate on this 
controversial issue of market efficiency is still far from being closed, we conclude the 
chapter with a statement made by Ross (1989) concerning the efficient market 
paradigm. as follows: 
"Its usefulness is beyond question. but its fine structure is not" (p. 8). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EQUITY PRICING, INEFFICIENCIES 
AND PREDICTABILITY 
OF THE STOCK MARKETS 
A Review of Theory, Evidence and Practice 
4.1-Introduction 
The process of equity price fonnation under the assumption that markets are 
efficient, has been discussed in Chapter Three. As an extension to the foregoing 
chapter, the focus of the present chapter is on the various theories and investment 
approaches that provide alternative explanations to stock market behaviour and price 
fonnation. For the sake of comparison besides concentrating on those theories and 
models that appear to be in contradiction to the idea of market efficiency, theories or 
models that seems to be complementary to, or in accord with, the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH), are also reviewed. 
The chapter is structured as follows. We begin in Section 4.2 by reviewing the 
view of John Maynard Keynes - the noted British economist who was also known for 
his ability to make substantial profits (as well as losses) in the stock market -
regarding stock market operations and behaviour. The philosophy and procedures of 
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technical analysis - the one which is believed to be the oldest investment approach -
is discussed in Section 4.3. 
So-called fundamental analysis is another investment approach which is 
believed to be widely followed and employed by stock market investors. The rationale 
behind the theory and practices of fundamental analysis is examined and analysed in 
Section 4.4. Comparison between technical analysis and fundamental analysis is also 
made in this section. 
Early empirical studies of share price behaviour revealed that share price 
movements are essentially random. This apparent random character in share price 
changes, led to the development of the EMH. Since it was difficult, if not impossible, 
to 'beat' an efficient markets, investors were advocated to relate their investment 
returns expectations to risk; and to reduce risk, they should diversify portfolio. This 
led to the development of two elegent models of equilibrium asset pricing, known as 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). 
Prior to the development of CAPM, there had been a 'statitical' model known as the 
Market Model (MM). These models are diasucssed in Section 4.5 
In more recent years, stock market theory and evidence have witnessed a 
number of new results and developments that seriously question the notion of market 
efficiency and investor rationality. Some of these contemporary issues in stock market 
theory and evidence are surveyed in Section 4.6. Section 4.6 offers summary and 
conclusion for the chapter. 
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4.2-The Beauty Contest and the Castle-in-the-Air 
Theory 
In a market, information is the input that drives trading, and security prices are 
an input of the system [Schwartz (1991 b)]. While information can be classified into 
two broad categories - floor information and fundamental information -there is 
disagreement among theorists about what information will be utilized by investors in 
making their investment decisions'. Regarding this matter, Forsythe et.al (1982) 
identified four different hypotheses or 'models', one of which is termed by Copeland 
and Weston (1988) as the speculative equilibrium hypothesis. This hypothesis is 
based on Lord Keynes's (1936) famous 'beauty contest' metaphor, that the successful 
investors must base their investments on their expectations of others' expectations of 
value - on "what average opinion believes average opinion to be" [Keynes (1936), p. 
159] - rather than solely on their own estimates of value [see e.g, Flood and Hodrick 
(1990)]. 
Analysing the operations of stock markets in his well-known book, The 
General Theory oj Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes (1936)2 drew an analogy 
between stock selection and a beauty contest (p. 156): 
'While we are interested in understanding how an investor's decision-making process, given the receipt 
of information, is reflected in the market prices of assets, this is not easy because it is impossible to observe 
the quantity and quality of information or the timing of its receipt in the real world [see Copeland and 
Weston (1988). p. 339]. 
2John Maynard Lord Keynes. the famous British economist and variously successful investor, devoted 
an whole chapter (Chapter Twelve) of The General Theory to discuss stock market and the importance of 
investor expectations. The General Theory was ftrst published in 1936, the aftermath of the 1929 stock 
market crash and the worldwide recession that followed. 
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" ... , professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions 
in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred 
photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most 
nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; 
so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds 
prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other 
competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of 
view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one's judgement, 
are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks 
the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our 
intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion 
to be. And there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher 
degrees". 
Although we might debate about what Keynes really meant [Copeland and 
Weston (1988)], his analogy suggests one way of relating share prices to expectations 
[Schwartz (1991b)]. Investors are said to base their investment decisions entirely on 
their anticipation of the behaviour of market participants without any necessary 
reference to the actual payoffs expected from the assets3 • Even though investors are 
able to make objective assessment of the assets, their decisions are more influenced 
by psychological factors. Being unwilling to lose out, investors tend to buy when 
others buy and sell when others sell. If an investor anticipates that other investors will 
3 According to Malkiel (1973, p. 23), Keynes applied psychological principles - mass psychology -
rather than financial evaluation in his study of the stock market. that "any price will do as long as others 
may be willing to pay"; that it is "perfectly all right to pay three times what a stock is worth as long as later 
on you can find some innocent to pay five times what it's worth". 
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anticipate a price increase, he or she will buy the share. If there is a preponderance 
of investors in the market who have the same anticipation, buying pressure will 
increase the current market price of that particular share: the anticipation turns into a 
reality. This phenomenon of the stock market was described by Keynes (1936, p. 154) 
in the following eloquent terms: 
"A conventional valuation which is established as the outcome of the mass 
psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals is liable to change 
violently as the result of a sudden fluctuation of opinion due to factors which 
do not really make much difference to the prospective yield; ... ". 
This psychological approach to stock market investments which is based on the 
premise that stock prices are guided by emotion rather than reason [Chandra (1993], 
enunciated most lucidly by Keynes in 1936, has been described vividly by Burton O. 
Malkiel [Malkiel (1973)] as the castle-in-the-air theory. According to Malkiel (1973, 
p. 22), it was Keynes's opinion that professional investors prefer to devote their 
energies to an analysis of how the crowd of investors is likely to behave in the future 
and how during periods of optimism they tend to build their hopes into castles in the 
air. 
The castle-in-the-air school of thought suggests that the value or price of a 
stock depends entirely on the psychology of the investing crowd and has nothing to 
do with the intrinsic value or market fundamentals [see Sivalingam (1990); Malkiel 
(1973)]. In other words, in order to understand and anticipate share price movements 
and hence, to make investment positions - to make the "buying before the crowd" 
[Malkiel (1973), p. 22] - advocates of the castle-in-the-air theory ignore intrinsic 
values and just look to the interpretation and prediction of investor sentiments and 
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actions [see Maturi (1994)]. The theory just "concentrates on psychic values" [Malkiel 
(1973), p. 22], propounding that the price of a stock depends on what the next person 
in the market is willing to pay for it. 
As 'irrational animals', investors are believed to be overly optimistic or 
pessimistic: they tend to build 'castles in the air' and push prices up when they are 
optimistic; they sell shares in panic when they are pessimistic, pushing the price down. 
Under this school of thought, an investor is advocated to read and understand the mind 
of the market, so that helshe can buy just as the crowd starts to buy, and conversely, 
sell as the crowd starts selling. 
It is believed that market psychology and herd instinct often playa leading role 
if not major role, in the determination of stock prices and market direction [see Maturi 
(1994]. Thus, studying and understanding how the crowd thinks and reacts, both in 
normal circumstances as well as in panic situations are considered central, so that 
proper investment moves could be taken. 
Pratten (1993) has accomplished a study to assess the contemporary relevance 
of Keynes's writings about the stock market. In his concluding remarks, he writes: 
"The conclusion of this study is that Keynes did provide important insights 
which apply to the operation of the contemporary stock market, and to the 
explanation of the erratic movement of asset prices. Uncertainty about the 
future, which was the focus of Keynes's analysis, and the reaction of agents 
to that uncertainty also undermine the apparent virtuosity of the finance theory 
that Professor Brealey finds so convincing" (p. 186). 
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4.3-Technical Analysis 
Technical analysis is, perhaps, the oldest approach to stock market investment. 
Probably, it is also one of the most controversial aspects of investment management. 
Technical analysis is an approach to predicting stock price behaviour based 
on the premise that the value of a stock depends primarily on supply and demand and 
may have very little relationship to intrinsic value4• It refers to the study of stock 
market actions both in aggregate and for individual securities [Maturi (1994); see also 
NYIF Grouop (1989)]; it refers to the study of price movements of the immediate past 
for telltale indications of movements in the immediate future [see Firth (1972), p. 39]. 
Glydon (1995) defines a technical analyst as one who studies market action, 
primarily through the use of graphs, for the purpose of forecasting future prices. 
Technical analysts believe that because people make markets, and people change little, 
they will repeat their previous actions under similar conditions [Teweles et.ai (1992)]. 
Technical analysts who agree with the 'castIe-in-the-air' perspective [Sivalingam 
(1990)], believe that market operators as creatures of habit, under similar situations, 
tend to behave in the same predictable manner. Based on this belief, technical analysts 
contend thatS [see Teweles et.al (1992), p. 438]: 
(i) the study of statistics involving transactions can forecast the direction of 
future prices - that past price behaviour (and other market indicators) contain useful 
4See Pinches (1970, p. lOS); Fischer and Jordan (1987, p. SI2); NYIF Group (1989, p. 3) and Levy 
(1967). 
SThese contentions are clearly in contrast with the EMH which asserts that the travel of information 
in a market is random and unpredictable and hence, share price changes are random, independent and 
unpredictable. 
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information that can be harnessed to predict future price levels and movements; 
(ii) the market has so much nonrandom and predictable elements in it that 
studying its actions and behaviour is profitable over time6• 
In general, technical investment analysis involves two approaches: 
(i) the qualitative techniques which rely on the interpretation of some typical 
configuration of the ups and downs of price movements (such as head and shoulders, 
bottom and top and Elliott Wave formations); and 
(ii) the quantitative techniques which try to isolate runs from non-directional 
movements using statistical transformations. 
Chartists or technicians claim that by taking time to chart past prices (and other 
related historical financial data) and analyse them carefully, investors will be able to 
make superior forecasts of prices and hence abnormal profits. This is because, they 
believe, history repeats itself; that "what goes up must come down"; that "what has 
hit rock bottom must rise again" [ Sivalingam (1990), p. 4]. 
Chartists maintain that history repeats itself because people tend to 'repeat' 
themselves. "Human psychology being what it is, investors and traders tend to react 
the same way to a set of market conditions every time they occur" [NYIF Group 
(1989), p. 4]. 
In contrast to the view of fundamental analysts (see Section 4.4), technical 
analysts do not believe that it is necessary to study economic fundamentals in order 
to know where the price of a security is going [see Reilly (1985)]. Instead, they 
6 According to Levy (1967), technicians have the view that stock markets are oligopolistic in nature and 
therefore, they believe that there is an unequal distribution of critical information throughout the market 
place. "As the awareness of critical information gradually spreads, influencing the actions of market traders. 
recurring patterns and continuing trends in price movements are produced" (p. 69). 
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contend that all variables affecting value (e.g., economic, financial, political and even 
psychological variables) are eventually reflected in price [Levy (1967)]. Studying 
economic fundamentals is considered futile because price is governed by basic 
economic and psychological inputs so numerous and complex that no individual can 
hope to understand and measure them correctly [see Bhalla (1983)]. 
The basic philosophy and assumptions of technical analysis can be summarised 
as follows7: 
• The market value of a security is determined solely by the interaction of 
supply and demand. 
• Supply and demand are governed by numerous factors - some rational and 
some irrational. Included in these factors are fundamental elements (i.e., those relied 
upon by the fundamentalists), opinions, moods, guesses (good and bad) and blind 
necessities. The market weights all these factors continually and automatically. 
• Though there are fluctuations in the market, share prices tend to move in 
trends that persist for an appreciable length of time. 
• Reversals or changes in trends are caused by shifts in supply and demand. 
• Shifts in supply and demand (and hence price movements) - which are 
gradual rather than instantaneous - whatever their cause, can be detected sooner or 
later in charts of market actions. 
• As history repeats itself. many chart patterns tend to recur. Consequently, 
chart monitoring is fundamental in forecasting price movements. 
Clearly, technical analysts have sought to rationalise the basis of what they are 
7See Levy (1967), p. 83; Pinches (1970), p. lOS; Francis (1988). p. 581 and Hirt and Block (1990). 
p.263]. 
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doing on the widely accepted economic premise that prices are determined by supply 
and demand. In fact, in one respect, the philosophy that underlies technical analysis 
appears to concur with the thinking of the EMH supporters: that the market as a whole 
has a superior knowledge to that of individual investors; whatever causes stock price 
to go up or down already reflected in the price of current trades [see NYIF Group 
(1989), p. 3]. 
The major differences between the philosophy and assumptions of technical 
analysis and the EMH relate to the information dissemination process and to how 
quickly investors adjust stock prices to reflect this new information [Reilly (1985)]. 
When new information comes to the market, technicians believe that it will not be 
available to everyone [see footnote 11]. Moreover, analysis of the information and 
subsequent action by the various groups in the market, are believed to take place over 
a period of time rather than rapidly. Thus, given this gradual dissemination of 
information and gradual analysis and action, contradictory to the EMH, technicians 
hypothesize that stock prices move slowly to a new equilibrium, following the release 
of new information into the market [see Reilly (1985), p. 195]. 
Because price adjustment is believed to be gradual, technical analysts contend 
that during the adjustment period, prices tend to move in a trend ( i.e., in one 
direction) that persists (for a significant period) until a new equilibrium is reached. In 
this connection, the task of a technician is to derive a system that enables himlher to 
detect the beginning of a movement from one equilibrium value to another, so that 
advantage can be taken from this 'gradual change in eqUilibrium value' to gamer 
above average returns. So, given this basic premise that stock prices move in trends 
that persist - at least until influencing factors alter the demand-supply relationship [see 
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Maturi (1994)] - technicians employ a wide variety of tools or 'barometers'S to assess 
the strength of supply and demand factors [see e.g., Pinches (1970), p. 105; Fischer 
and Jordan (1987), p. 88]. 
Quite a large number of tests have been conducted attempting to obtain 
statistically reliable estimates of the worth of various technical trading strategies. As 
we have discovered in Chapter Three, these tests have given less than overwhelming 
support to the various technical theories examined to date, while at the same time not 
supporting random walk unequivocally. For example, Kemp and Reid (1971) in an 
early study of the behaviour of equity prices in Britain write, 
"Our conclusion is that share price movements were conspicuously non-random 
over the period considered. This result, we feel, should be a caution to those 
who have been startled by the apparent finding of randomness in share price 
movements in their studies. Their findings are often as much a product of the 
method of analysis as they are an intrinsic feature of the data" (47). 
The widely held view among academicians is that technical analysis is useless 
because, in their early studies they did not find enough evidence of patterns in past 
share price changes [see e.g., Lofthouse (1994)]. Since the studies of technical analysis 
that have demonstrated careful data collection, risk adjustment and testing procedure 
are rare, some have countered the academicians' view with the following points [see 
e.g., Fischer and Jordan (1987), p. 535]: 
a) The same technical theories are often applied differently by different 
technical analysts. The success of the strategy is often dependent on the man rather 
~eweles et.al (l992) classify technical devices into four broad categories: (i) pattern on price charts; 
(ii) trend-following methods; (iii) character-of-market analysis; (iv) structural theories. 
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than the method alone. Whether the tests that have been performed on technical 
theories or technical tools as they are used in practice, could be questioned. For 
example, the joint evaluation of price and volume is central to some kinds of technical 
analysis, whereas in the academic literature, tests that have jointly analysed volume 
and price are rare. 
b) Many technical analysis schemes have not been tested. Only selected phases 
of technical analysis have been rigorously tested, and at a time, only one. It is possible 
that technical methods that have yet been untested will prove to have greater 
usefulness that those already examined. Moreover, technicians frequently use a 
combination of numerous technical indicators or methods. 
Joy and Jones (1986) point out that weak-form market efficiency is not 
synonymous with market efficiency with respect to technical analysis because the 
latter is broader than the use of past price changes alone. The analysis of past price 
history is only one form of technical analysis. Believing that technical analysis has not 
been tested thoroughly, and in the spirit rigorous academic research. Joy and Jones 
(1986) criticise the claim that technical analysis has been shown to be useless, on the 
following grounds: 
a) There is not a one-to-one mapping between weak-form analysis of market 
efficiency and technical analysis. 
b) Many weak-form tests of market efficiency are not direct tests of specific 
forms of technical analysis. These tests do not actually attempt to measure the returns 
from trading. 
The profit validity of technical analysis which has been the subject of a rather 
heated debate over the last 30 or 40 years, is still an open controversy [see Mandell 
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and O'brien (1992)]. While in the random walk literature, many researchers have 
seriously questioned the overall value of technical analysis - that the market is 
efficient enough to enable abnormal profit from trading based on past security prices -
adherents of technical analysis have done very little to defend their theories against 
such critiques. 
All that chartists appear to have done is to claim that their various trading 
systems and tools work [see e.g., Damant (1971)], without proving or demonstrating 
that their methods can consistently outperform a simple buy and hold strategy [see 
Fischer and Jordan (1987)]. Treynor and Ferguson (1985). "In Defence of Technical 
Analysis" - in an attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of knowing past price 
information in making investment decisions, using a "Bayesian probability estimate" -
have shown that past prices, when combined with other valuable information can 
indeed be helpful in achieving "unusual profit". They however conclude that, "it is the 
nonprice information that creates the opportunity. The past prices serve only to permit 
its efficient exploitation" [po 773; see also Sorensen (1985)]. 
A number of recent studies using more sophisticated procedures have 
demonstrated that technical analysis is a worthwhile activity9. Golberg and 
Schulmeister (1988) for example, have conducted an interesting study of the efficacy 
four major types of "objective" technical trading rules using the S&P 500 Index. 
Different from the previous studies (which concentrate on testing filter rules using 
daily and lower frequency data), they test the profitability of a number of widely used 
technical trading rules (i.e., moving average models. momentum models, the point and 
9Por a brief survey of literature that appears to suggest the profitability of technical trading strategies. 
see e.g .• Pruitt and White (1988). 
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figure technique, and filter rules) in both the cash and futures markets, using hourly 
data. The study arrived at the following conclusions (p. 2): 
(i) "stock price movements do possess systematic price runs and that past 
prices do contain infonnation relevant for predicting future price movements"; 
(ii) "although this price infonnation may be unexploitable in the cash market 
for stock, it is exploitable in the futures market for stock, i.e., there are exploitable 
profit opportunities available in stock index futures"; 
(iii) "one of the major results of this study is that all of the technical rules 
examined are considerably more profitable with hourly data than they are with daily 
data"; 
(iv) ... the stock market, in the broader sense, is therefore inefficient". 
Pruitt and White (1988) use what they tenned as "the CRISMA (Cumulative 
volume, Relative Strength, Moving Average) trading system" to detennine the 
profitability perfonnance of a mUlti-component technical trading system incorporating 
price, volume, and relative strength indicators on individual security issues. Their 
conclusions are as follows (p. 58): 
"The results of the study, which are consistent across several different retum-
generating models, provide impressive support for the success claims of 
technical analysts. They suggest that the CRISMA trading system is capable 
of outperforming a simple buy-and-hold strategy over a significant period of 
time, even after adjusting for timing, risk, and transaction costs". 
Based on their results, Pruitt and White (1988, p. 58) confidently write: 
"Who says technical analysis can't beat the market? Not us. Not any more". ti> 
examination of technical analysis from a number of aspects leads us to some puzzles: 
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If the technical trading rules really are profitable, why does not everyone use them? 
Why does not the use of these rules lead to disappearance of the initial profit 
opportunities? If technical analysis is useless and has no value to investors, how can 
it survive over long periods of time? What is the significance, if any, of trading based 
on technical strategies (i.e., noise trading) for stock price movements? Seemingly, the 
answers to these questions are deceivingly complex. Given the imperfections, 
inefficiencies and irrationalities that appear to characterise (to some extent) some stock 
markets [see e.g., Ariff and Johnson (1990)]; given the increasing evidence 
documented in the literature that stock returns ( to some extent) are predictable (see 
Section 4.6), technical analysis might be helpful to investors 10. According to such 
arguments, technical analysis might be of some, albeit limited, value in conjunction 
with fundamental analysis ll in guiding investment decisions in such 'inefficient' 
stock markets [see e.g., Fischer and Jordan (1987); Teweles (1992)]. 
4.4-Fundamental Analysis 
Fundamental analysis - an investment approach which is perhaps most 
commonly employed by investment professionals - as defined by Mandell and O'brien 
I!l.y-echnical analysis is claimed to have a number of advantages [see e.g., Reilly (1985), pp. 475 - 476; 
Francis (1988), pp. 603 - 604]. Although there is little theoretical basis for the technical approach, there are 
enough investors (charting practitioners) who do believe in its predicting power [see e.g., Teweles et.al 
(1992), p. 438; Maturi (1994), p. 32; Bhalla (1983), p. 3081 that it could perhaps become self-fulfilling. With 
this in mind (and although there is very limited empirical evidence that would support such a belief), the 
impact of technical analysis on stock market behaviour should not be simply ignored. 
IIIn the investment community, investors are often recommended to put their money in quality stocks, 
but buy and sell them on the basis of technical analysis. As described by Bhalla (1983, p. 3 to), "The 
orthodox synthesis between the two basic approaches is that once fundamental analysis has found the stocks, 
their purchases or sale can best be timed through technical analysis". 
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(1992, p. 339), refers to the examination of economic factors of supply and demand 
that are expected to influence the future income and value of an investment. In 
Spooner's (1984, p. 79) words, "Fundamental analysis is a method of systematically 
modelling facts - economic and industry statistics, financial ratios, et.al - in order to 
derive in a logically coherent manner an explanation, hence an understanding, of 
observed phenomena". 
The fundamental approach to security analysis which is based on what Malkiel 
(1973, p. 19) describes as the firm-foundation theory, involves a detailed, objective, 
scientific examination or analysis of all components of the value of a security [see 
Mandell and O'brien (1992)]. Spooner (1984, p. 79) accents that fundamental 
approach to security analysis is procedurally congruent to the method articulated by 
Darwin with respect to the natural sciences. As "applied business scientists", 
fundamental analysts or fundamentalists observe, model and draw conclusions with the 
object of making progress: They buy shares issued by a company only after 
determining that it is structurally fit to survive in a growth industry and suited to the 
dynamics of the economy12 [see Spooner (1984, p. 80]. 
The basic tenets of fundamental analysis can be summarised as follows l3 : 
• At any point in time, every stock has an intrinsic value. This intrinsic value 
depends on the earnings potential of the stock which, in tum, depends upon underlying 
llnus implies that fundamentalists buy shares based on the principle of survival of the fittest (which 
was introduced by Charles Darwin in his book, Origin of Species) and by doing so. according to Spooner 
(1984, p. 80), they contribute in a self-fulfilling way to a company's fitness. Further. it is believed that. with 
their 'coexistence in competition with one another' (under the principle of survival of the fittest). they 
instigate "behaviour that results in the most efficient alJocation of financial resources" [Spooner (1984. p. 
80]. 
13See Chandra (1993), p. 18; Fischer and Jordan ( 1987), p. 87; Reilly (1985). p. 196 and BhaJJa 
(1983). p. 283. 
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economic (fundamental) factors. Thus, the intrinsic value of a stock - in principle, 
should be equal to the present value of the future stream of income from that 
particular stock, discounted at an appropriate risk adjusted rate of interest - can be 
established by a penetrating analysis of the fundamental factors relating to the 
company, industry and economy . 
• At any point in time, there are some securities, the prevailing market prices 
of which, would differ from their intrinsic values. Sooner or later however, the market 
prices of those securities would approach their intrinsic values . 
• Above-average returns can be earned by buying undervalued securities and 
selling the overvalued ones. 
Accordingly, the focus of fundamental analysis is on intrinsic value (sometimes 
known as the present value or the economic value) or what fundamental analysts 
consider as the real worth of a stock [see Teweles et.al (1992), p. 437]. Believing that 
actual prices tend to move towards their intrinsic values or equilibrium prices, then 
endeavouring to estimate the intrinsic value of a security is considered equivalent to 
making a prediction of its future price; and this, according to Fischer and Jordan 
(1987), is the essence of the predictive procedure implicit in fundamental analysis. 
Fundamental analysts argue that the price of a stock is equal to the discounted 
value of the stream of future income from the stock, and hence, at any time, it is a 
function of a set of anticipated payoffs and anticipated capitalisation rates 
corresponding to future time periods [Pinches (1970), p. 104]. The price of a stock 
changes as anticipations change and a major source of altered anticipation is of new 
information [Fischer and Jordan (1987), p. 98]. 
In case there is something less than complete dissemination of information, it 
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is argued that, the actual price of a stock will generally be away from its intrinsic 
value or theoretical valuel4• Fundamentalists believe that, more often than not, the 
market can be wrong in appraising the value of a stock. Hence, the job of a 
fundamental analysts is to detect the mispriced (Le., overvalued or undervalued) stocks 
based on their 'unbiased' estimate of intrinsic values. 
Fundamentalists assert that, at any given point of time, some stocks may be 
selling at levels significantly above or below their fair levels (Le., intrinsic values) 
because some information concerning those stocks has not yet been correctly evaluated 
by the market. Given such a phenomenon, it is possible to isolate and quantify 
information about the market (or the economy), industries, or individual companies' 
operations that has not yet been discovered and used by others to create profitable 
opportunities. 
Using the dividend valuation model, the intrinsic value or present price (Po) of 
a share is determined by the present value of an expected stream of future dividends 
(the first of which is D 1) discounted at an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate (r). 
The formula - the Gordon-Shapiro (and Williams) model - that is normally used by 
financial analysts is 
DI 
(r - g) 
or, in terms of the rate of return 
14See Pinches (1970. p. 104; Bhalla (1983). p. 283 and Fisher and Jordan (1987). p. 87. 
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(4.1 ) 
where g is an assumed constant compound rate of annual growth in the finn's cash 
dividends. 
Another popular fundamental approach to estimating intrinsic value is using 
earnings valuation models. A variation on the dividend model, this approach 
substitutes earnings as the main income stream for valuation IS. 
Even though professional fundamental analysts and technical analysts appear 
to have enjoyed a peaceful coexistence - and in the investment community, both 
fundamental and technical approaches are commonly viewed and employed as 
complementary rather than alternatives to one another - for decades they have been 
quarrelling intellectually [see Francis (1988)]. The fundamental approach to security 
analysis is in sharp contrast to technical analysis. Indeed, technical analysis is 
sometimes considered to be the antithesis of fundamental analysis because it involves 
relatively very few of the scientific tools of economics [see Mandell and O'brien 
(1992)]. 
The basic difference between the philosophy of fundamental analysis and 
technical analysis is in terms of factors supposed to determine movements in share 
prices. According to fundamental analysts, forces outside the market - fundamental 
economic and political conditions - are the major determinants share price behaviour 
[see e.g., Teweles (1992)]. Technical analysts, on the other hand, posit that forces 
ISFor a discussion on this approach, see e.g., Hirt and Block (1990), pp. 196 - 208 and Francis (1988), 
pp. 515 - 518. 
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inside the market - human psychology: people's opinion, belief, attitude and sentiment 
(towards the market) - are the major elements worth considering in 'stock pricing' or 
in making investment decisions. So, if fundamental analysts believe that the stock 
market is rooted 90% in economics and 10% in psychology, technical analysts 
hypothesise that it is 90% psychological and only 10% logical [see Chandra (1993); 
Bhalla (1983)]. Correspondingly, if technical analysis is in accord with the castle-in-
the-air theoryl6, fundamental analysts disagree with this theory [see e.g" Sivalingam 
(1990)]. 
If the focus of fundamental analysts is on intrinsic value, technical analysts 
concentrate on trends of historical price movements. This implies that fundamental 
analysts seek to forecast security values, whereas technical analysts are trying to 
forecast security prices [see Francis (1988), p. 581]. Put another way, fundamental 
analysts are interested in the total return l7 in stocks over relatively long periods, 
whereas technicians are interested in the interpretation of stock price movements over 
short periodsls [see Teweles et.al (1992); Francis (1988),]. Therefore, the 
fundamental approach to security analysis is more likely to be favoured by long term 
investors, whereas technical approaches are more commonly employed by speculators 
or traders interested in short term capital gains. 
The neo-classical economists and financial theorists who in general, conjecture 
that stock markets are efficient, disagree not only with the chartists and the believers 
16 According to Chandra (1993, p. 19), those who subscribe to the castle-in-the-air theory generally use 
some fonn of technical analysis. Odd-lot theory, contrarian investing and consensus indicators are among 
the major investment approaches that are based on investor psychology [see Maturi (1994), p. 95]. 
17 And hence, they carefully consider dividend return as well as expected price appreciation. 
IS And hence, they try to forecast short-run shifts in supply and demand that will affect the market price 
of one or more securities. 
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in the 'castle-in-the-air' school of thought, but also with fundamental analysis. As we 
have examined in the previous chapter, advocates of the efficient market theory 
maintain that the market adjusts very rapidly to new information, and because of this, 
shares tend to be correctly priced at any given time. As prices randomly readjust their 
equilibrium values, there will be no such thing as undervalued or overpriced securities; 
and price movements are unpredictable. 
When a market is perfectly efficient, it is said to be in continuous 
equilibriuml9• If any disequilibrium exists in the market, even temporary in nature, 
then the market is said to be less than perfectly efficient. 
In Chapter Three, the empirical evidence that we have gathered, suggests that 
stock markets are not perfectly or strictly efficient. Regarding this issue, Francis 
(1988) has the view that stock markets might behave somewhat similar to the one 
suggested by Cootner's (1962) 'price-value interaction model' 20 that prices tend to 
fluctuate randomly in pursuit of constantly changing intrinsic values; that prices will 
fluctuate freely within the reflecting barriers [see Francis (1988), p. 435]. A market 
of this nature is termed an intrinsic value random-walk market2 l . 
19The concept of continuous equilibrium was developed by Paul Samuelson (1973). The concept refers 
to the perfectly efficient market where the market prices of securities equal the randomly fluctuating intrinsic 
values at every instant in time. When a new piece of information is released. the intrinsic value of a security 
changes and consequently. its market price adjusts towards the new value. 
2'1n Paul Cootner's model, security prices are viewed as a series of constrained random fluctuations 
around their intrinsic values or true values. He hypothesizes that there are two groups of investors in the 
market. The flTSt group, which Francis (1988, p. 433) refers to as the "unsophisticated investors" are those 
who just have access to public news media for their information but may not know how to interpret that 
news. These investors are largely responsible for share prices diverging from intrinsic values. 
The second group - the "professional investors" [Francis (1988), p. 433) - are those who have the 
resources to discover news as well as the ability to estimate intrinsic values before the "nonsophisticated 
investors" can even get the news. So, when a security's price appears to differ significantly from its true 
value, the "professional investors" find it profitable to correct the diseqUilibrium. 
21The phrase was coined by Fama (l965a). 
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In an intrinsic value random-walk market, fundamental analysis could play an 
important role in evaluating security prices. Fundamental analysis could be very useful 
in detecting the occasionally mispriced shares [see Aczel (1988)]. Fundamental 
analysts who discover valuable information that the market has not yet digested and 
reflected in its security prices, may be able, as suggested by Francis (1988), to select 
shares that earn higher-than-average retums22. Whether a stock market is 'an intrinsic 
value random-walk market' or not, however, is an empirical issue. 
4.5-Models of Market Equilibrium 
Although there have been traditional arguments about whether technical 
analysis or fundamental analysis is more important and effective in understanding 
share price behaviour and hence, in making investment decisions, a great deal of 
attention has been directed towards the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and its 
implications for all types of investment analysis. Hypothesizing that stock markets are 
well-ordered and efficient, the neo-classical financial economists proposed that shares 
should be picked based on their risk and return characteristics: that the return to a 
share is dependent on its risk class. Based on this belief and assertion, they then 
developed what some authors call the 'modem investment technology' comprising 
Modem Portfolio Theory, Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (APT). 
The aforementioned theories are parts and variants of a collection of theories, 
22ntat is, after considering various types of costs such as transaction costs, the cost of getting access 
to infonnation and the cost of interpreting the infonnation. 
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generally known as the capital market theory, which attempts to explain the behaviour 
of securities markets. While portfolio theory which deals with what investors should 
do - describing how rational investors should build efficient portfolios - is an aspect 
of nonnative economics, models of asset pricing which describe how assets might be 
priced, are in the realm of positive economics. 
The story of modem portfolio theory began in the 1950s, with the classic 
contributions of Harry Markowitz (1952, 1959) who developed a theory of portfolio 
selection. His work has resulted in a revolution in the theory of finance leading to the 
development of modem capital market theory. Doubtlessly, these frameworks and 
rules for selecting efficient securities and portfolios not only revolutionized capital 
market theory but also laid the foundations for subsequent development of general 
equilibrium models of asset prices known as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
and the Arbitrage Pricing Model (APT). Both of these models are based on the 
concept of linear relationships between risk and return, a concept which was first 
systematically analyzed by Markowitz and then extended by William Sharpe (1963). 
4.5.1-The Market Model 
Notwithstanding that portfolio theory provides a basis for determining efficient 
frontiers or efficient portfolios, the determination of such portfolios requires a 
substantial amount of data and calculations. With this in mind, Sharpe (1963) 
formulated a model which was considered a major breakthrough in the practical 
utilization of portfolio theory developed by Markowitz (1952, 1959). 
In his article. Sharpe (1963) introduced the idea that the return of any security 
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could be related to the return of the market as a whole23 : that the computation of the 
covariance between individual pairs of stocks could be considerably simplified if their 
relationship could be linked through the market as a whole. This relationship, known 
as the market (single-index or diagonal) model (MM), is specified as a simple least 
squares regression as follows 
(4.2) 
where 
~I = the return on security i in time period t; 
~I = the market return for the same period; 
~i = beta, representing the slope of the line24 ; 
ai = alpha, the intercept term for security i; 
til = the unexplained residual return (which is the difference between the actual 
and the expected return) observed in period t. In other words, til is the classical mean-
zero normally distributed error term. 
The MM (equation 4.2), is the simplest of the three basic types of models of 
asset pricing that have most frequently been employed by capital market 
researchers2s , The model is based on the fact that returns on security i can be linearly 
2lne return of the market could be approximated by using the return on a suitable stock market index. 
For a mathematical discussion of the market model, see e.g., Fama (1973). 
24n,e line showing the average tendency of a stock's returns to vary with the market's, that can be 
drawn from equation (4.2), is known as the characteristic line [see e.g., Lofthouse (1994, p. 17; Francis 
(1988), p. 760]. 
2SThe other two models are the CAPM and the counterpart to the CAPM which has come to be known 
as the empirical market line [see Copeland and Weston (1988), pp. 361 - 362]. 
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related to returns on a 'market' portfolio. 
From the model, ~i indicates the expected responsiveness of the return of security i 
to changes in the level of the market index. The intercept term, (li' represents the 
expected return on security i when the market return is zero. The 
market itself has a beta of 1 and thus, if a security has a beta equal to 1, the security's 
returns is expected to go up and down with the return for the market. If beta is greater 
than 1, assuming (l is zero, returns on the security are expected to be higher than the 
market when market returns are positive and lower than market returns when market 
returns are negative. A negative beta would imply that the returns on the security and 
the market tend to move in opposite directions. 
The MM is very similar to the CAPM (see Section 3.5.2); it can be regarded 
as the ex post version of the CAPM26 [Griffiths (1990), p. 88]. Both models express 
the mean return on a risky asset as a linear function of a 'market' factor [Peasnell 
(1986), p. 34]. The MM which provided the conceptual foundation for the CAPM 
[Dobbins et.al (1994), p. 48], permits a practical implementation of the CAPM: it 
provides an empirical link that allows us to test the theoretical relationships that are 
contained in the CAPM [Jacob and Pettit (1984), p. 381]. 
Perhaps, because of the similarity of mathematical construct between the two 
models, the CAPM is sometimes confused with the MM. These two models are 
essentially different however, in a number of respects27 [see Peasnell (1986), p. 34; 
26 According to Jacob and Pettit (1984, p. 4(0). in equilibrium. a j will equal (1 • Bi)~ if the security 
is priced according to the CAPM. Also. ex post. a; reflects the past performance of the security if the market 
index used in the relationship is the market portfolio of the CAPM. 
27Tbese fundamental differences explain why researchers have encountered considerable difficulties in 
designing appropriate tests of the CAPM: the MM is testable. while the CAPM is not. 
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Hawawini (1984), p. 13]: 
(i) The MM which is simply a statistical model28 developed in order to reduce 
the data used in the construction of efficient portfolios, unlike the economic CAPM. 
is not supported by economic theory [see Copeland and Weston (1988), p. 362]. 
(ii) The MM applies to both future and historical prices, whereas the CAPM 
is simply a statement about expectations. 
(iii) The 'market factor' in the MM can be any convenient stock market index, 
whereas the market portfolio in the CAPM must be the value-weighted aggregate of 
all risky assets. 
(iv) The intercept term in the MM can take any value, whereas in the CAPM 
it is precisely specified. 
The validity of the MM has been well established by a large number of studies 
using the data from the New York Stock Exchange [see King (1966); Fama et.ai 
(1969)]29. Studies that have been performed on European data have produced similar 
results [see e.g., Hawawini (1984)]. 
4.5.2-The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The MM, albeit a very useful model from the practical research point of view, 
has some weaknesses. For example, as mentioned earlier, the model is developed 
without any theoretical foundation. To overcome such shortcomings, Sharpe (1964) 
proposed another model known as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
28Being just a statistical description of the association between the returns of individual securities and 
those of a market index, unlike the CAPM. the MM is actually not an eqUilibrium asset pricing model [see 
Hawawini (1984), p. 11]. 
29For a survey of early literature on the market model. see e.g .• Jensen (1979). 
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The CAPM de facto, was independently and more or less simultaneously, 
developed by Sharpe(1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) - about twelve years 
after Harry Markowitz laid down the foundation for modem portfolio management in 
1952. The theory is therefore, often referred to as the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM. 
The birth of the CAPM is of great historical significance because it was the 
first equilibrium model of asset pricing under the assumption of uncertainty30. Today, 
this mean-variance Capital Asset Pricing Model has emerged as a very important 
concept in modem investment theory and practice. The CAPM has been the basis of 
a very large number of empirical studies which, as claimed by Hakansson (1989), 
show that the CAPM provides a rather good first approximation of observed return 
structures in the financial markets of various countries. The importance of the CAPM 
in the literature of investment, has been aptly described by Lofthouse (1994, p. 33) in 
the following words: 
"The capital asset pricing model is part of the vocabulary of investment, and 
anybody who reads the academic and professional literature has to know the 
gist of the theory". 
The CAPM or the security market line (SML) as it is also called, is a 
relationship explaining how assets should be priced in the capital markets [Fischer and 
Jordan (1987)]. It seeks to specify the relationship between risk and return. 
For a well diversified portfolio, the only relevant risk is systematic risk because 
the unsystematic risk tends to approach zero as the number of randomly selected 
securities in the portlio is increased. Since unsystematic risk can be diversified away 
lOpor a historical perspective (in some detail) of the development of the theory of asset pricing under 
the assumption of uncertainty about future asset returns, which started at least with the work of Irving Fisher 
in 1906, see Brennan (1989). 
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easily, the main factor that risk-averse investors should consider in deciding whether 
a security yields enough rate of return for them to invest, is systematic rise l • In 
equilibrium, the market should only reward investors for bearing the undiversifiable 
risk32 - the systematic risk. 
The CAPM - "a centerpiece of modern financial economics" [Bodie et.ai 
(1989, p. 228] - which provides a methodology to determine asset prices under the 
conditions of equilibrium, relates the expected return to each level of systematic risk. 
These expected returns can be interpreted as the appropriate rate of return the 
investors should expect for each level of undiversifiable risk assumed. The model 
assumes that extra risk will only be borne for extra return, and assets with the same 
level of risk will yield the same return [Lofthouse (1994)]. 
The CAPM not only prescribes optimal portfolios for investors but also derives 
an equation relating the expected return and risk of any security [Rutterford (1993]. 
The CAPM, as defined by Francis (1988), is a linear relationship in which the 
expected rate of return from an asset is determined by that asset's systematic risk. This 
relationship is summarised in what has been caned the Security Market Line of the 
CAPM [Copeland and Weston (1989); see also Allen (1985)]: 
31The sources of systematic risk are those factors that occur systematically such as changes in the 
purchasing power of money (i.e., inflation). interest rate fluctuations. 'bull and bear' of the market and 
political factors. These factors - encompassing changes in economic. political and sociological environment -
are so general in influencing the riskiness of a security that it is impossible to avoid them via portfolio 
diversification. 
32 An investor will not be rewarded for any risk arising as a result of holding the share on its own. and 
not as part of a diversified portfolio. In other words. in equilibrium. systematic risk is the only risk that 
should be priced because unsystematic risk is assumed to approach zero in a large portfolio. 
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[E(~) - Rr]Cov(Ri , ~) 
crm 
(4.3) 
where E(R) and E(~) are the expected return on security i and on the market 
portfolio, respectively. The SML intersects the vertical axis at the riskless rate, Rf , and 
this riskless rate of interest is the appropriate rate of return for an asset with zero risk. 
Cov(R;, ~) is the covariability of returns on security i with returns of the market 
portfolio; cr m is the variance of returns on the market portfolio. 
Equation 4.3 simply states that the return required (ex ante) by investors on 
any asset or security is equal to the return, Rr, on a risk-free asset plus an adjustment 
for risk. The relevant risk here - the systematic risk or undiversifiable risk - is 
determined by the covariability of returns on an individual security with those of the 
market portfolio. This measure, cov(Ri, Rm)/a2m, is usually referred to as the 'beta' (~) 
coefficient. Thus, the CAPM is frequently written as follows: 
(4.4) 
or [see Rutterford (1993), p. 266] 
(4.5) 
where ~ is equal to Rr - ~iRr and bi is equal to ~i' 
In equation (4.4), [E(~) - Rrl is the quantity that represents the slope of the 
SML. ~i' the independent variable representing the systematic risk of security i. 
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determines the dependent variable, E(RJ In this linear relationship, the higher the beta 
(~J for an asset, the higher the systematic risk and therefore, the higher must be the 
expected return. Further, the difference in beta between any two assets will determine 
the difference in their expected returns. 
In sum, the CAPM suggests that the systematic risk is the only ingredient in 
determining expected returns on an asset [Fischer and Jordan (1987), p. 628]. Further, 
the model suggests that, an expected rate of return is made up of two components [see 
Francis (1988), p. 768]: 
(i) The price of time which is represented by the CAPM's intercept, Re. This 
component of the expected rate of return on an asset, compensates the investor for 
delaying consumption in order to invest. 
(ii) The price of risk which is measured by the slope of the CAPM, [E(Rm -
Re]. This component which is equal to the expected return on the market portfolio in 
excess of the risk-free rate, indicates how much extra risk has to be borne in order to 
obtain an extra unit of expected return. 
When the market price of risk is multiplied by the beta coefficient of an asset, 
we get what is known as the risk premium33• This is actually the 'appropriate extra 
amount' that should be added to the riskless rate in order to find the expected rate of 
return for an investment in a risky asset. 
The expected rate of return from any asset or portfolio, as suggested by the 
CAPM [i.e., equation (4.4)] can then be summarised in words as follows: 
331l is this risk premium that induces investors to invest in risky instead of riskless assets. 
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(Equilibrium 
expected return) 
= (Price of time or 
reward per unit time) 
+ (Price of risk or 
reward per unit risk) 
x (Beta 
coefficient) 
Investors are rewarded for their patience. They are also rewarded for bearing 
risk. The relevant measure of risk is the contribution of each individual security to the 
risk of market portfolio: the systematic risk. Thus, the beta coefficient plays an 
important role in determining an asset's rate of return. For investors who hold a 
security or portfolio which has a beta of equal to 1 (i.e., it has the same risk as the 
market portfolio), they will expect to get the market return. Investors who hold a 
riskless security or portfolio (i.e., the one with a beta of 0), will expect to earn a 
riskless rate of return (i.e., the price of time). 
Markedly, the CAPM - "an accepted model in the securities industry" [Haugen 
(1990), p. 252] - has implications for asset pricing and investment decisions34 [see 
e.g., Francis (1988), pp. 769 - 770 and Rutterford (1993), p. 258]. A key implication 
of the CAPM is that a security's beta determines its equilibrium price: ceteris paribus, 
the higher the beta the higher the security's expected return and the lower its price 
[Jacob and Pettit (1984), p. 363]. In equilibrium, every asset must be priced so that 
its risk-adjusted required rate of return falls on the SML [Copeland and Weston 
(1988), p. 198]. Thus, the SML can be used as a benchmark for security 
performance3S. 
~ CAPM actually lends itself to many applications - for valuing risky securities and portfolios, for 
valuing a firm's cost of capital and for combining securities into portfolios - just to mention a few. For 
discussions on the practical applications of the CAPM, see e.g., Sivalingam (1990), pp. 168 - 172; Lofthouse 
(1994), pp. 25 - 26 and Haugen (1990), p. 252. 
3SHaugen (1990, p. 252) posits that the CAPM will not be so widely used if it were not regarded as 
extremely useful benchmark [cf. Copeland and Weston (1988), pp. 202 - 205]. 
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The CAPM is an extremely useful tool for financial decision making because 
it quantifies and prices risk [Copeland and Weston (1988)]. The true or the required 
rate of return for a security or portfolio, under the conditions of capital market 
equilibrium, can be estimated from the SML [see Sivalingam (1990)]. Since the model 
allows the expected return and risk of a security or portfolio to be estimated, 
alternative investments can be easily compared. 
If the observed or expected rate of return for a security is lower than the rate 
of return determined by using the SML, the security is said to be overpriced because 
its expected rate of return is too low to induce investors to accept its systematic risk. 
The return for such a security is not commensurate with its systematic risk, and this 
therefore, is the signal for investors to sell the security. The resultant selling pressure 
would push the price down and then, the expected rate of return on the security will 
rise. Selling pressure and price adjustments will continue until the security is priced 
on the SML. 
Similarly. if the observed or expected rate of return of a security is higher than 
the rate of return calculated from the SML, the security should be bought because it 
is underpriced. The security offers an exceptional return for the amount of risk an 
investor has to bear. Thus. intense buying activity and price adjustments that follow, 
will bring the security back to its equilibrium position. 
Investors who believe that the method suggested by the CAPM is the right 
approach in valuing securities, will not attempt to select investments by using other 
techniques such a technical analysis and fundamental analysis; they will simply select 
securities on the basis of risk and expected return predicted by the CAPM. In 
contradiction to the technicians or fundamentalists who expect to earn better than 
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average return from their share selection and timing skills, those adherents of the 
CAPM will only expect a 'fair' return for the risk that they have borne. 
Sharpe (1964) and Litner (1965) and others who developed the CAPM have 
shown that a security's expected return in excess of the risk-free rate (Rr) is 
proportional to that security's systematic risk. Nonetheless, this linear model of market 
equilibrium rests on a set of restrictive assumptions concerning the structure and 
organisation of financial markets, the behaviour of investors and the returns of 
securities. These assumptions are summarised below36: 
(i) Financial markets are perfect: no transaction or information costs, no taxes 
and no restrictions on short selling. 
(ii) The quantities of assets available are fixed; all assets are marketable and 
perfectly divisible. 
(iii) Investors are risk-averse individuals whose objective is to maximise the 
utility of their wealth one period hence; each of them always prefers more wealth to 
less. 
(iv) Investors are price takers and have homogeneous expectations regarding 
asset returns. 
(v) There exists a risk-free asset, and investors may issue (borrow) or purchase 
(lend) unlimited amounts at the risk-free rate. 
(vi) Securities' returns are normally distributed. 
These assumptions under which the CAPM is derived are, of course, violated 
in the real world, but the model is fairly resilient to their relaxation [see Copeland and 
3~hese assumptions (and their implications) are discussed. inter alia, in Copeland and Weston (1988), p. 194; 
Peasnell (1986), p. 29; Hawawini (1984). p. 12; Fama (1973), p. 328; Griffiths (1990), p. 82 and Brennan (1989), 
p.95. 
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Weston (1988), p. 205; see also Elton and Gruber (1991), p. 325]. Since the earlier 
work of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), there have been many works [including 
those by Black (1972) and Merton (1973)] - both theoretical and empirical - on this 
so-called two-parameter model [see e.g., Jensen (1972)]. Some of the assumptions as 
outlined above, have been relaxed, and more general versions of the CAPM have been 
developed37• 
For several years, the CAPM received the blessing of the vast majority of 
professional investors and financial academics; it was touted as the "new investment 
technology". The major attractiveness of the CAPM is its ability to present important 
theoretical insights in simple and practical terms that could be applied in practice. 
The CAPM has not only been modified (and used in a great variety of ways) 
but also has been subjected to extensive empirical testing [see e.g., Ross (1978); 
Hawawini (1988)]. The literature and research on the CAPM also involves discussions 
on serious and complex econometric issues [see e.g., Peasnell (1986), p. 34; Huang 
and Litzenberger (1988, Chapter. 10], 
Some of the problems associated with the CAPM has been highlighted by 
Richard Roll in his article in 1977, Among other things, he points out that the only 
testable hypothesis associated with the theory is whether or not the market portfolio 
is mean-variance efficient. In empirical testing, according to Roll, a proxy measure 
must be used for the market portfolio, but unless the market portfolio can be identified 
exactly - or a portfolio where the returns are perfectly correlated with those of the 
37Por summaries and discussions on the various modifications and extensions that have been made to 
the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM - the nonstandard forms of the CAPM - see inter alia, Hawawini (1984), 
pp. 12 & 13; Copeland and Weston (1988), pp. 205 - 212; Brennan (1989), pp. 97 - 100 and Elton and 
Gruber (1991), Chapter Twelve. 
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market portfolio - it is impossible to accept or reject the CAPM. 
Tests of the CAPM using United States data have generally concluded that the 
evidence supporting the model is weak [see e.g., Lofthouse (1994); Hawawini (1984)]. 
The same conclusion, as Hawawini (1984, p. 13) points out, holds true for European 
equity markets; "international evidence is not very supportive either" [Lofthouse 
(1994), p. 12]. 
To conclude, even though the CAPM is not perfectly validated by empirical 
tests38, one cannot generally reject the hypothesis that the behaviour of security 
prices is consistent with some versions of the CAPM39• The CAPM appears to be a 
reasonable approximation to the manner in which securities are priced in the actual 
capital markets. 
Even though returns are likely to be determined by some factors (such as 
market capitalisation and earnings) in addition to beta, beta is probably relevant to 
security pricing. Even though risk is a more complex concept than is assumed in the 
CAPM, the simplicity of the model does help and guide us towards thinking about 
some difficult issues. Accordingly, and given the fact that there are few simple 
alternatives to the CAPM which investors can use to provide estimates of future 
expected returns on a share, it is believed that the model will stilI continue playing its 
pivotal role as 'basic' to much investment thought. While the debate on the CAPM's 
empirical validity and attempts to determine if alternative models fit the data better, 
the model's current usefulness and applicability for understanding security markets and 
38For summaries and discussions on empirical tests of the CAPM, see inter alia, Haugen (1990). 
Chapter 8; Copeland and Weston (1988), pp. 212 - 219; Bodie et.al (1989), Chapter Twelve and Elton and 
Gruber (1990), Chapter Thirteen. 
39See Peasnell (1986); Hawawini (1988) and Copeland Weston (1988) 
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investment decisions is a positive force behind its continued use [Jacob and Pettit 
(1984)]. 
4.5.3-The Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
Formulated by Ross (1976), the APT is a linear return generating model that 
assumes that the return on an investment is a function of more than one factor [see 
also Ross (1994)]. While it is possible for investors to eliminate unsystematic risk 
through diversification, it is not possible to diversify away a share's exposure to a 
variety of macroeconomic factors. Ross (1976) argued that the average long-term 
return of an asset is dependent on its sensitivity to unanticipated changes in a few 
economic variables. 
Like most economic theories, the APT, which is a model of risk-return 
relationship offering explanations about what determines the prices of market assets, 
is developed under a number of assumptions [see Francis (1988). p. 407; cf. Griffiths 
(1990), p. 119]: 
(i) it assumes that most people prefer more wealth to less wealth; 
(ii) it assumes that most people are risk-averse - that they will not buy risky 
investments unless they expect to earn higher rates of return than they could earn from 
investing in risk-free assets; 
(iii) it assumes that investors can assess any asset's risk factor (or factors) and 
assign numerical values to it. 
The underlying assumptions outlined above appear to be plausible and not too 
restrictive. 
Consider a set of N securities with returns R I ••••• Ri •...• RN• The APT 
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assumes that the rate of return on each of the N securities is linearly related to a 
number (k) of systematic factors (FI , ••• , Fj , ••• , F,,) common to the N securities40• 
The statistical relationship between an individual security's (i) return and the factors 
is expressed as 
(4.5) 
where ~ is the random return on asset i, and E(R) is its expected return. ~j" is the 
sensitivity of i's returns to the fCh factor. Fk is the fCh factor where E(F,,) = 041 , and 
e j is a random noise term which has the expected value of zero [i.e., E(e) = ot2• 
Equation (4.5) simply says that the actual return on security i is the sum of its 
expected return, E(~); the positive or negative influences43 associated with the 
factors, Fk, which are common to all securities; and e j which represents the 
unexpected portion of the return on security i which is not explained by the factors. 
This residual or unsystematic risk component, ei , which captures unexpected events 
unique to firm i, is not impounded into the asset's expected return, E(~). 
The APT is developed based on an economic principle - the law of one price 
- which states that the same good cannot sell for two different prices [Francis (1991), 
'"The number (k) of systematic factors is assumed to be smaller than the number (N) of securities. 
Only systematic risk factors are considered in the An' because they are the sources of risk that cannot be 
eliminated through diversification. 
41If E~) is the expected return on the asset, the effect of the factors is expected to be zero (0) because 
the market has already incorporated expectations about these factors in the asset's price. The actual return 
on asset i will only be affected by any surprises in these factors that were not anticipated. 
42Assuming a diversified portfolio. e j approaches zero [see Ross (1978), p. 893]. 
43ute sensitivity coefficient, ~j' can be positive or negative from factor to factor and from stock to 
stock [see Haugen (1990), p. 257]. 
157 
p. 295; see also Jacob and Pettit (1984), p. 409]. In equilibrium44, any asset should 
plot on what mathematicians call the k-dimensional hyperplane. This implies that any 
asset that has an expected rate of return that lies above (below) this k-dimensional 
hyperplane is underpriced (overpriced), and therefore, its price should seek an 
economic equilibrium at a higher (lower) level [see Francis (1988), p. 418]. 
The derivation of the APT also requires the following additional assumptions 
that are shared by the CAPM [see Francis (1991), p. 315; Hawawini (1984), p. 14]: 
(i) capital markets are perfect4~; 
(ii) investors have homogeneous expectations. 
"The arbitrage theory of asset pricing (APT), while conceptually different" 
(from the CAPM), "retains the desirable simple features of the original theory" [Ross 
(1978), p. 893]. 
Apart from the similarities mentioned above, the APT is different from the 
CAPM in a number of facets. The APT, unlike the CAPM, can be derived without 
requiring the existence of the market portfolio. Compared with the CAPM, the APT 
is less restrictive in its assumptions [see e.g., Hirt and Block (1989), p. 647; Mandell 
and O'brien (1992), p. 453], and it admits into the analysis several fundamental 
economic factors that can cause uncertainty in the market. It is this ability of the APT 
to accommodate several sources of systematic risk that has been considered by many 
as an advantage of the APT in comparison with the CAPM [Shanken (1982)]. 
44 According to Hirt and Block (1989, p. 647), the APT does not assume equilibrium markets, but the 
concept of arbitrage behaviour will drive markets to equilibrium as investors try to make risk-free profits. 
4SPerfect markets is an assumption widely used by economists because, by assuming capital markets 
are perfect, economists can exclude the possibility that prices are manipulated or distorted away from their 
eqUilibrium values. 
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Nevertheless, to some extent, the generality of the APT is a weakness: The 
model gives financial researchers no clues about which risk factors may affect the 
pricing of any asset. We do not know the number and nature of the systematic factors 
affecting the return to a given security. These factors have to be determined 
empirically [Hawawini (1984)]: "Investment analysts must act like detectives who use 
economic theory to discover the relevant sensitivity coefficient", (~J, "and then 
estimate the actual values of these coefficients" [Francis (1988), p. 417]. 
Even though there is no universal agreement on what factors have the greatest 
impact on stock returns [Hirt and Block (1990)], Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) isolated 
four major macroeconomic factors as follows: 
(i) unanticipated changes in the rate of inflation; 
(ii) unanticipated changes in the index of industrial production; 
(iii) unanticipated changes in the yield spread between high-grade and low-
grade corporate bonds; 
(iv) unanticipated changes in the slope of the term structure of interest rates, 
as measured by the difference between the yields on long-term government bonds and 
T-bills. 
Previously, Roll and Ross (1984) in their empirical research, have identified 
almost the same factors that significantly influenced security returns. They are, 
unanticipated changes in inflation, unanticipated changes in risk premium and 
unanticipated changes in the slope of the yield curve. 
According to Haugen (1990), the APT is inherently, more testable than the 
CAPM because it does not rely on the observation of a particular portfolio (the market 
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portfolio) which is inherently unobservable46• As suggested by Jacob and Pettit 
(1984), it is useful to think of the CAPM and the APT as different variants of the true, 
but perhaps unknown, equilibrium pricing model. Both of these elegant theories are 
useful in suggesting ways security prices and equilibrium returns might be established. 
4.6-Some Recent Results and developments 
Modem investment theory rests on two basic assumptions [see e.g. Mullins 
(1994); Hawawini (1988)]: 
(i) Securities markets are very competitive and efficient; 
(ii) securities markets are dominated by rational. risk-averse investors, who 
seek to maximise satisfaction from returns on their investments. 
Thus, if. in reality, the markets are inefficient and investors in general are 
found not behaving rationally. then the validity of the theory as descriptor and 
predictor of equity returns and behaviour, could be questioned. Recent theoretical and 
empirical developments in financial economics suggest that stock markets may not 
really be efficient and the markets are not dominated by rational investors. These more 
recent results and findings are treated in the following sub-sections. 
4.6.1-Excess Volatility and Social Dynamics 
Fluctuations or volatility in financial asset prices have long been the concern 
of both financial theorists and practitioners. For practitioners, volatility is important 
~eanwhile. the view that the APT is inherently more susceptible to empirical verification than the 
CAPM has been challenged by Shanken (1982). 
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for the valuation of options, for the assessment and management of portfolio risk and 
for judging the efficacy of market institutional arrangements [see Copeland and 
Stapleton (1988), p. 1 t7. For researchers in financial economics, the issue is 
important in drawing conclusions about the efficiency of capital markets. 
One strand of the efficient markets literature is that asset prices should reflect 
fundamental value alone [see e.g., Pratten (1993)]. An investor who buys and holds 
shares, and pays less than ex post fundamental value receives an abnormal profit. 
Then, in an efficient market, arbitrage activities will push prices to be efficient 
forecasts of "perfect-foresight,,48 fundamentals [see De Long and Becht (1992), p. 8]. 
Since ownership of shares gives the owner rights to a flow of dividends, fluctuations 
in stock prices are commonly argued to result solely from changes in the present value 
of the expected future dividend [see e.g., West (l988a)]. 
While it has long been recognised that the volatility of equity returns has 
changed over time49, recent findings (essentially in the U.S.) indicate that fluctuations 
in stock prices are too large to be justified solely by changes in the present value of 
the expected future dividends (discounted at a constant discount rate). 
The model commonly used in the excess volatility (or variance bound) 
literature is the dividend valuation model50, 
47Cf. Schwert (1989). p. 1115; Scott (1991). p. 582. 
4Lrhat is. the present discounted value of dividends plus the discounted terminal price [see e.g., 
Mankiw et.al (1991)]. 
49See e.g .• Officer (1973), Merton (1980) and Keams and Pagan (1990). 
SOSee e.g .• Shiller (1981a. b. 1984); Kleidon (1986). 
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(4.6) 
where PI and ct.+ t are price and dividend, respectively; r is an assumed constant 
discount rate and (X I <1» denotes the conditional distribution of the random variable 
X given the infonnation ct>. A new variable pOI (which is called "perfect foresight" 
price in much of the variance bound literature), is defined as 
(4.7) 
Comparing (4.6) and (4.7), it shows 
PI = E(p °1 I ct>1) (4.8) 
which according to Shiller (1981a, b) implies the variance bound, 
(4.9) 
Since the price rationality forecasts pOI by (4.8), the variance of the forecast 
(Le., the price) should be less than or equal to that of the variable being forecast (Le., 
pOI)' This is the basis for the inequality which has received increased attention in the 
finance literature in recent years. 
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The increasing interest and controversy on this notion of excess volatility51 
in financial asset prices - that security prices are too volatile to accord with efficient 
markets - has been stimulated by the original work of LeRoy and Porter (1981) and. 
especially, Shiller (1981 a. b). In his seminal work to examine the view that changes 
in the level of stock market reflects news about future dividends. Shiller (1981 a) found 
that the standard deviation of stock prices was about five times greater than would be 
expected from the volatility of dividends. However, those early results have not gone 
unchallenged in the literature. 
A number of works, including those by Flevin (1983), Scott (1985), Kleidon 
(1986), Marsh and Merton (1986) and Mankiw. Romer and Shapiro (1985, 1991) have 
cal1ed into question the validity of Shiller's results, for a variety of (technical) reasons. 
Marsh and Merton (1986) for example, criticised the tests' assumption that dividends 
are stationery around a time trend. Flevin (1983) and Kleidon examined the small 
sample properties of the tests and argued that they are extremely biased towards 
finding excess volatility. 
The criticism of the early volatility tests of LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller 
(1981 a, b) motivated the emergence of "the second generation of tests" [Scott (1991)], 
contained in papers, inter alios, by Mankiw et.ai (1985), Scott (1985), Campbell and 
Shiller (1987) and West (1988a). 
!5·Shiller (1989, p. 2) defines excess volatility as the variability of price movements which is too large 
to be justified in terms of efficient markets models, given the relatively low variability of fundamentals and 
given the correlation of price with fundamentals. There is an excess 
volatility in a stock price, as defined by West (l988b, p. 640) when 
VN") 1 
where V = the volatility of the market's forecast 
of fundamentals (Le., the variance of a stock price); and V· = the volatility of the econometrician's measure 
of fundamentals (i.e., a certain function of dividends). 
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Mankiew et.al (1985) in their "unbiased reexamination of stock market 
volatility" using new tests which they claim "do not suffer from the problem Flevin 
and Marsh and Merton discuss" (and using the same data as Shiller uses) report that 
"while our unbiased volatility tests do not find evidence as striking as that Shiller 
reports, we do find evidence contradicting the model" (p. 696). 
Similarly, West (l988a) examines the presence of excess volatility in stock 
prices by employing an approach which is free from the assumptions required by the 
Shiller (1981) volatility test. His results indicate that stock prices are too volatile to 
be the expected discounted value of dividends, with a constant discount rate. "Among 
the explanations for the test results are that discount rates vary and that there are 
rational or nearly rational bubbles or fads". 
In a more recent study, MacDonald (1994), following the lead of Campbell and 
Shiller (1987), uses cointegration methodology to test the excess volatility in the U.K. 
stock market. He concludes, "Our findings were somewhat mixed . . . One 
rationalisation would simply be to accept the view that stock market prices are driven 
by fads and the market is therefore irrational" (p. 74). 
Summarising, even though early examinations of excess volatility in the stock 
markets undertaken by LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981 a, b) were criticised 
and challenged, more recent studies which relax some of the restrictive assumptions 
and employ new methodologies, continue to produce evidence against the EMH and 
the notion that stock prices reflect fundamental value. Camerer (1989, p. 22) in his 
survey paper on excess volatility (and other related issues) - theory and evidence -
highlights two conclusions that emerge from "the combative debate about variance 
inequalities" (excess volatility): 
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(i) "Stock prices do fluctuate more than perfect foresight prices (calculated with 
constant discount rates), as if prices consist of rational expectations of perfect foresight 
prices and mean-reverting fads"; and 
(ii) "prices might appear to fluctuate excessively even if they were rational, 
because of small-sample bias, non-stationarity of dividends, or variation in discount 
rates". 
There are several researchers who have the view that socio-psychological 
factors do play an important role in affecting the deviation of stock prices from their 
fundamental values. They include West (1988b), Schwert (1989) and Pratten (1993). 
Robert Shiller, a Yale economistS2 who repeatedly asserts that stock prices 
vary too much - and this is the evidence of market inefficiency - was the pioneer in 
recent attempts to 'revive' the behaviourial approach to studying stock markets and 
share price behaviour. In a 1984 Brooking Institute paper, Shiller (1984) posits that 
investing in speculative assets is a social activity, and it is therefore, plausible that 
investors' behaviour (and hence prices of speculative assets) would be influenced by 
social movements: social dynamics. Since fluctuations in attitudes or fashions often 
occur widely in the society and often appear without any apparent logical reason, his 
argument goes, it is plausible that attitudes or fashions regarding investments would 
also change spontaneously or in arbitrary social reaction to some widely noted events. 
Thus, Shiller (1984) hypothesises that social psychology or mas~J psychology may 
S2Por a good review Robert Shiller's work and contribution (as a financial economist and a guru to 
some segments of the financial community) to the theory and practice of capital market investment, see 
Scbwert (1991). 
S3Prom the sociological point of view, a mass refers to a plurality of individuals who are usuaIly 
pbysically dispersed, unknown to one anotber and wbo focus their thoughts and actions to the same subject 
[Klausner (1984), p. 58]. 
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well be the dominant cause of movements in the price of the aggregate stock market. 
According to Shiller (1989), for hundreds of years, it has been commonly 
accepted that prices in speculative markets are influenced by capricious changes in 
investor sentiments, changing fashions, fads or bubbles54 • In the past few decades, 
this commonly accepted view has been dominated and replaced by the EMH. Shiller 
(1989) claims that the developments in the efficient markets literature have been the 
galvanizing force behind his suggestion for the revival of the old idea5s of investor 
psychology in the stock market analysis: 
(i) The concept of market efficiency is defined and interpreted in various 
waysS6. However, the practice in empirical finance literature is to speak of tests of 
market efficiency as if this concept had unambiguous meaning [Leroy (1989), p. 
1595]. 
(ii) Not only the null hypothesis of market efficiency is ill defined57 , but the 
alternative hypothesis also remains ill defined. As a result, no amount of statistical 
evidence can resolve such ill-defined hypotheses [Shiller (1989), p. 52]. 
54 Fads and fashions are sociological terms. A fad which may arise within a diverse range of arenas, 
is defined by Klausner (1984, p. 67) as an ardent but relatively short-lived interest in some idea. object or 
behaviour. 
According to Klausner (1984, p. 68), fashion, as in the case of fad denotes collective change in choice 
regarding some idea, thing or behaviour. The difference between fad and fashion is that, the notion of fad 
refers to a rapid, abrupt and relatively brief change in preference; fashion denotes a slower, continuing 
pattern of change. Further, changes in fashion are more likely to be of a cyclical nature. 
For economic treatment (in some detail) and modelling of the theory of fads and bubbles, see e.g .. 
Blanchard and Watson (1982), Camerer (1989), Cochrane (1991) and West (1988b). 
~~Shiller argues that the efficient market theory itself is actually a very old theory. To justify his 
assertion, he quotes what George Gibbon wrote in his book The Stock Exchange of London. Paris and New 
York published in 1889, that when "shares become publicly known in an open market, the value which they 
acquire there may be regarded as the judgement of the best intelligence concerning them [see Shiller (1989, 
endnote 3, p. 438). 
S6See Shiller (1989, p. 77; LeRoy (1989); see also Chapter Three. 
~7See e.g., Rubinstein (1975); LeRoy (1976); Jensen (1978) and Beaver (1981) 
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(iii) In the literature, the various pieces of "anomalous evidence" regarding 
market efficiency has generally never been connected with psychological alternatives; 
and instead, those anomalies are described as "small" even though they may be the 
consequence of sizable valuation error [Shiller (1989), p. 63]S8. 
(iv) Price movements in the stock market appear to show excess volatility. If 
stock prices were set in accordance with efficient markets models, they would be 
fairly volatile, but not as volatile as we actually observed [Shiller (1989), p. 431]. 
(v) There is evidence that fashions, fads or bubbles do importantly influence 
prices of speculative assets [Shiller (1989), p. 49f9. The results of Roll (1984) and 
French and Roll (1986) are among the evidence that suggests that share price 
movements might be influenced by factors other than economic fundamentals. 
(vi) Many economists have the view that the sudden worldwide collapse of 
stock prices on October 19, 1987, was irrational [Hardouvelis (1989), p. 1]. The 
survey evidence by Shiller (1987) for the U.S. market, and by Shiller, Konya and 
Tsutsui (1988) for the Japanese market, supports this view [see also Shiller (l990b). 
With "complete absence of news that can possibly be related to market 
fundamentals" [LeRoy (1989), p. 1613] and no other recognizable event outside the 
market appears to be immediately responsible for the October 19, 1987 stock market 
sell off, we should tum to consideration of a theory of the crash as being determined 
endogenously by investors: that the timing of the crash was related to some internal 
dynamics of investor thinking, investor reactions to price and to each other (Shiller 
58See also LeRoy (1989). pp. 1609 and 1613; Summers (1986). 
5~n the stock market literature. it has been increasingly suggested that the literature on cognitive 
psychology which documented the way people use information and make decisions might be helpful in 
further understanding the behaviour of stock markets. See e.g .. Arrow (1982) and LeRoy (1989), 
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(1989), p. 398]. 
Despite the increasing evidence that share prices exhibit excess volatility, it 
would be misleading to claim that the debate on the issue of excess volatility and the 
role of socio-psychological factors in explaining this stock market phenomenon, is 
over. In fact, the subject has seemingly become "increasingly sophisticated. 
voluminous and controversial" [Camerer (1989), p. 3]. 
There are already several good surveys of this growing literature on excess 
volatility and social dynamics in financial markets. They include, by West (l988b), 
Shiller (1989, Chapter 4), LeRoy (1989), Scott (1991) and Pratten (1993, Chapters 4 
and 16). 
4.6.2-The Overreaction Hypothesis 
While the rationality of financial markets has been a widely debated subject 
for quite a long time60, the so called overreaction hypothesis represents another 
attempt to represent human elements or irrationality in explaining the behaviour of 
share prices. De facto, interest in market overreactions is not new: it dates back. as 
claimed by Howe (1986), at least as far as the tulip bulb craze in the 1630s. John 
Maynard Keynes is believed to be one of the earliest economists to report observations 
about overreaction in markets. 
Research in cognitive psychology [see e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1973); 
Grether (1980)] suggests that in making forecasts or decisions, individuals tend to 
deviate from the norm of rationality: they tend to give excessive weight to recent 
60See Russell and Thaler (1985), De Long et.al (1990) and De Bondt and Thaler (1990). cr. Friedman 
(1953) and Fama (196Sb). 
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information and underweight prior information (or data). In stock markets, the 
tendency for people to "overreact" to unexpected and dramatic news events might be 
a common phenomenon that moves stock prices. If this is the case, prices would be 
biased by either too much optimism or pessimism, relative to long run fundamental 
values. Then, prices would be consistently pushed to either high or low unstable 
levels. 
One of the most influential and controversial papers in this line of research is 
the work of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) which presents evidence of return reversals 
over long intervals. De Bondt and Thaler interpret their results as a manifestation of 
irrational behaviour of investors which they refer to, as "overreaction,,61. 
Being concerned with the developments in "anomalous" literature of stock 
markets, and motivated by work in cognitive psychology on intuitive prediction, De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) propose what is today known as the overreaction hypothesis. 
They hypothesise that if stock prices systematically overshoot, their reversal should 
be predictive from past data alone (without having to use accounting data). This 
overreaction hypothesis which implies a violation of the weak-form of market 
efficiency, consists of two parts: 
(i) Extreme movements in stock prices will be followed by subsequent price 
movements in the opposite direction (i.e., the direction effect); and 
(ii) the more extreme the initial price change, the greater will be subsequent 
adjustment (Le., the magnitude effect). 
61The tendency of the prior period's worst stock return performers (losers) to outperform the prior 
period's best return performers (winners) in the subsequent period, is labelled as "overreaction" because this 
phenomenon suggests that the market has overreacted in the initial period, and that it subsequently corrects 
itself [see Zarowin (1990), p. 113]. 
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In this preeminent study of stock market overreaction, De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) found that the results are consistent with the predictions of the hypothesis. 
Stocks that experience poor performance (losers) as well as those with the largest 
price increase (winners) over the past three to five years, reverse their behaviour in 
subsequent year. The "overreaction" effect is found to be asymmetric: portfolios of 
prior losers substantially outperform prior winners. More surprisingly the large positive 
returns were earned by the loser portfolio in January. In their follow-up paper, De 
Bondt and Thaler (1987) report additional evidence that support the behaviourial 
hypothesis of investor overreaction. 
According to Howe (1986), any event in which there is a price reaction 
followed by a correction (reversal) can be taken as evidence of overreaction. 
Replicating the previous work of De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Howe (1986) found 
that the evidence is strongly consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. The author 
then conclude that "The magnitudes of the 'overreaction' returns suggest that there are 
economically significant - that is, exploitable" (p. 76). 
Market participants can be said to overreact, as defined by Brown and Harlow 
(1988), when unexpected favourable (unfavourable) announcements induce trading 
behaviour that results in price appreciation (depreciation) that is excessive relative to 
the actual value implied by the nature of the event. 
In their research, Chopra et.al (1992) introduce some improvements to the 
methodology used in the previous studies of market overreaction. They note that they 
have found an economically-important overreaction effect even after adjusting for size 
and "beta effect". According to the authors, in portfolios formed on the basis of prior 
five-year returns, extreme prior losers outperform extreme prior winners by 5-10% per 
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year during the subsequent five years. They claim that it is unlikely that this effect can 
be attributed to risk measurement problems, since returns consistent with the 
overreaction hypothesis are also observed for "the short windows surrounding 
quarterly earnings announcement days". 
Interestingly, Chopra et.al (1992) also report that the overreaction effect that 
they have found is not homogeneous across size group; but instead, it is much stronger 
for smaller companies than for the larger ones. While smaller firms are held 
predominantly by individuals, and institutional investors are the dominant holders of 
large firms (where there is no evidence of overreaction found), these authors posit that 
their finding suggests that overreaction by individuals is more prevalent than 
overreaction by institutions. 
Other empirical examinations of stock market overreaction were accomplished 
among others, by Lehman (1990), Alonso and Rubio (1990) for Spanish equity 
market, Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) for the Toronto Stock Exchange and Stock 
(] 990) for the German stock market. Except for the one by Kryzanowski and Zhang 
(1992), all these studies appear to supply evidence of investor overreaction. 
Kryzanowski Zhang (1992) noted however, that empirical evidence on the reversal 
behaviour of American stock prices appears to depend on the test methodology used. 
There are two interesting implications that could be conceived of, associated 
with the empirical evidence of stock market overreaction: 
(i) The possibility that the markets are dominated by irrational investors; and 
(ii) the possibility for investors to earn abnormal profits by purchasing or 
seJling securities in advance of any subsequent correction. 
Nonetheless, rather than providing us insights into definitive conclusions about 
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the irrationality of stock markets and the economic exploitability of the phenomenon, 
these empirical findings have considerably provoked another controversy in the 
profession. De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) work has received considerable attention in 
the literature not only because the authors find a very large difference in returns (i.e., 
about 8% per year) between winners and losers during the five-year post-ranking 
period, but also because they interpret findings as evidence of systematic valuation 
errors in the stock market caused by irrationality (investor overreaction). A number 
of subsequent papers contend that De Bondt and Thaler's results are subject to various 
methodological problems [see e.g., Brown et.al (1988)]. 
Vermaelen and Verstringe (1986) argue that the overreaction effect is a rational 
market response to risk changes [see also De Bondt and Thaler (1987)]. Further, Chan 
(1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) argue that the winner-loser effect is explained 
almost entirely by intertemporal changes in risks and expected returns. 
Zarowin (1990) presents evidence that he claims shows that the market is not 
characterised by the overreaction phenomenon hypothesised by Be Bondt and Thaler. 
The tendency for losers to outperform winners, according to the author, is not due to 
investor overreaction, but to the tendency for losers to be smaller-size firms than 
winners. Thus, "the winner vs. loser phenomenon found by DeBondt and Thaler 
appears to be another manifestation of the size phenomenon in finance" (p. 124). 
Chopra et.al (1992) generalised that the quantitative magnitude of the 
overreaction effect is highly sensitive to the procedures used in computing abnormal 
returns, particularly in any study which abnormal returns are being computed over 
multiple-year periods. Further, Dissanaike (1994) argued that in many of the 
overreaction studies, the method used to compute cumulative returns - the arithmetic 
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method - is flawed, and therefore, estimates of portfolio performance can be affected. 
4.6.3-Mean Reversion. Mean Aversion and Returns Predictability 
In recent years, the early findings that stock returns are unpredictable, have 
been reexamined and challenged. Recent research into the behaviour of share prices 
employing newly developed methods reports evidence that returns are negatively 
serially correlated over the long periods and also positively autocorrelated (particularly 
over the short horizons). These new findings could be interpreted as a challenge to the 
long-held view that share prices follow a random walk: that the estimated correlations 
are close to 0.0 and therefore the predictability of returns is not economically 
significant. 
Whereas early tests of market efficiency concentrated primarily on examining 
autocorrelations of daily and weekly returns, the more recent research has focused on 
the behaviour of returns calculated over long horizons. Perhaps empirical evidence 
documented in the literature of excess volatility and overreaction hypothesis, has 
provided insights and motivation for a group researchers into further examining the 
possibility of stock returns to exhibit "reversal behaviour"62 over long horizons. 
Perhaps Summers's (1986) critique that early tests of share price behaviour - that the 
conventional interpretation of the autocorrelation for short-horizon returns - have low 
power, has provided stimulus for researchers to initiate new tests using more 
sophisticated procedures. 
Consequently, a series of papers - most of them based on variance-ratio 
62 As we have already discussed, the literature on excess volatility suggests that equity prices tend to 
fluctuate "excessively", and the literature on overreaction hypothesis implies that extreme movements in 
equity prices are followed by extreme movements in the opposite direction. 
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methodology63 of Cochrane (1988) and multiperiod-return autocorrelation (or long-
horizon regression coefficients) tests - of note, by Fama and French (1988a), Poterba 
and Summers (1988), Lo and MacKinlay (1989) and Jegadeesh (1990, 1991) conclude 
that there is a significant negative autocorrelation in long horizon stock returns. Such 
a negative serial correlation to stock returns, a tendency to revert to some average 
values over long periods, is interpreted as an eventual reversion of stock prices in their 
fundamental values [see e.g., Basu and Vinod (1994), p. 51]. Such a reverting 
tendency of stock returns is known as mean reversion in stock prices. 
Engel and Morris (1991, p. 21) define mean reversion as the tendency for 
prices to overshoot but eventually revert to true values. In Poterba and Summers's 
(1988, p. 27) words, "If market and fundamental values diverge, but beyond some 
range the differences are eliminated by speculative forces, then stock prices will revert 
to their mean. Returns must be negatively serially correlated at some frequency if 
'erroneous' market moves are eventually corrected". 
Black (1989, p. 1) points out that mean reversion can occur in two ways: 
(i) the expected return on the market can go in a direction opposite to that of 
the market; and 
(ii) the expected return can revert towards a mean level. 
While strictly speaking, there would be zero serial correlation in share price 
changes and hence no tendency for stock returns to revert to some statistical mean if 
63If stock price follows a random walk. the variance of k-year returns (rt ) should equal k times the 
variance of one-year returns (rl ) [see Engel and Morris (1991. p.27): 
Variance (rt ) = k x Variance (rl ) 
or. 
Variance (rJ/[k x Variance (r,)) = 1. 
A variance ratio of less than unity implies negative serial correlation. and a ratio of greater than unity 
implies positive serial correlation. See Chapter Five. 
174 
prices follow a random walk, the presence of mean reversion over long horizons 
implies that a given change in stock price tends to be reversed over subsequent years 
by a predictable change in the opposite direction. So, if such a finding is really true, 
then long term stock returns are far more predictable than originally thought. 
Explanations of mean reversion commonly offered in the literature primarily centre 
on fads, noise traders, rational speculative bubbles and time-varying expected returns 
[see McQueen (1992), p. 1; Poterba and Summers (1988), pp. 46 & 54]. Claiming that 
the amount of mean reversion may change over time, Black (1988) suggests further 
that changing mean reversion may help us to understand the stock market crash of 
1987. 
Summers (1986), in challenging that most tests of market efficiency have 
virtually no power against what he calls the fad alternative [also see Camerer (1989)] 
shows that most common models of an inefficient market can be characterised as ones 
in which prices take long temporary swings away from fundamental values. He 
translates (models) this into a statistical hypothesis that prices have slowly decaying 
stationary components. 
Subsequently, Fama and French (1988a) used the mean reversion hypothesis 
as proposed by Summers (1986) to examine autocorrelations of stock returns for 
increasing periods and found the pattern which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
stock prices have a slowly decaying stationary component. In these tests of mean 
reversion by regressing multiyear returns on past mUltiyear returns for investment 
horizons of one to ten years, some of the conclusions that they have made are as 
follows [cf. Schwert (1989), p. 1146]: 
(i) "We conclude that the tests for 1926 - 85 are consistent with the hypothesis 
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that stock prices have both random-walk and stationary components" (p. 256). 
(ii) "Our results add to mounting evidence that stock returns are predictable . 
. . that 25 - 45 percent of the variation of 3 - 5 year stock returns is predictable from 
past returns" (p. 247). 
In another paper. Poterba and Summers (1988) use variance ratio tests to 
investigate the presence of mean reversion in stock prices. They hypothesise that a 
stock price is the sum of a permanent component (which evolves as a random walk) 
and a temporary component (which follows a transitory process)64 . Testing the stock 
price data from the U.S. and 17 other countries. they conclude. among other things, 
that: 
(i) "The results consistently suggest the presence of transitory components in 
stock prices. with returns showing positive autocorrelation over short periods but 
negative autocorrelation over longer periods" (p. 28). They further stress that noise 
trading - trading by investors whose demand for shares is determined by factors other 
than their expected return - provides a plausible explanation for the transitory 
components in stock prices. 
(ii) "In recent years, mean reversion is more pronounced in smaller foreign 
equity markets than in the U.S (p. 45). 
The hypothesis that the stock prices contain slowly decaying components65 
~wo possible interpretations are suggested for the presence of the transitory component: 
(i) the transitory component may reflect fads; that is. speculative-induced deviations of prices from 
fundamental values; or 
(ii) it may be a consequence of changes in required returns. 
65If stock prices or the index levels contain a temporary component. then in the long run they tend to 
revert to their trends. In his paper, Jagadeesh (1991) refer to such a nature and behaviour of stock prices as 
mean reversion. 
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has also been tested by Jagadeesh (1991) using the U.S. and the U.K. data. His 
conclusions are as follows (p. 1427): 
(i) "Although the evidence that the equally weighted index of stocks exhibits 
mean reversion is significant in the period 1926 - 1988, this phenomenon is entirely 
concentrated in January". 
(ii) "In the post-war period both the equally weighted and the value-weighted 
indices exhibit seasonal mean-reversion in January". 
(iii) While the above-mentioned results are for the U.S., "A similar 
phenomenon is also observed for the equally weighted index of stock traded on the 
London Stock Exchange". 
Jog and Schaller (1991) are among those who contend that traditional tests of 
market efficiency which focus on daily or weekly returns have low power against 
market inefficiencies which take the form of long swings of actual prices away from 
their fundamental values. Then, alternatively using panel data approach "in a new 
way" in their tests, Jog and Schaller (1991) claim to have provide strong (Le., not only 
statistically but also economically significant) evidence for the existence of mean 
reversion. Therefore, the null hypothesis of serial independence of stock returns is 
rejected "by the variance ratio tests at the .001 level for most horizons". The transitory 
component in stock prices is reported to account for between 16% and 40% of the 
variance of returns. 
While most previous research on mean reversion has focus on the U.S. stock 
markets, Frennberg and Hansson (1993) conduct some tests of the random walk 
hypothesis for the Swedish stock market, covering the period from 1919 to 1990. 
Using both the variance ratio test and the test of autocorrelations of multiperiod 
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returns, they found that the Swedish stock prices "have not followed a random walk 
in the past 72 years" (p. 175). The results of the study suggest that the Swedish stock 
returns are positively autocorrelated for short investment horizons (i.e., one to twelve 
months) and negatively autocorrelated over longer returns horizons (i.e., five years or 
more). Thus, they reject the random walk hypothesis. 
Among the most recent studies of mean reversion in stock returns is the one 
that has been accomplished by Basu and Vinond (1994). They arrive at the following 
conclusions (p. 51): 
(i) stock returns are mean reverting if there are "strict diminishing returns in 
the underlying production technology" 
(ii) stock prices do not tend to revert to the mean in "economies where the 
technology displays increasing or constant returns". 
While several recent studies found negative serial correlation for stock returns 
over long horizons using monthly and annual data, a study by Lo and MacKinlay 
(1988) interestingly demonstrates that stock returns are positively correlated over short 
horizons (Le., using weekly observations). 
De Bondt and Theler (1989) highlight the fact that one type of mean reversion -
"mean reversion in cross-sectional stock prices" (p. 193) - has been discussed in the 
literature at least since the time of Benjamin Graham (1949), one of the pioneers of 
security analysis. The "contrarian" advice (or view) of Benjamin Graham who 
advocated the purchase of shares that seemed to have low prices relative to their 
intrinsic (fundamental) values is based on the premise that such low prices are 
temporary in nature and can be expected to bounce back after one or two years66. 
66AIso see Blume and Siegel (1992), p. 23 and Lehmann (1990). 
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Recent research has not only documented evidence indicating that future 
returns might be predicted on the basis of past returns, but there is also evidence that 
dividend yield [Keirn (1985); Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985)] and price-earnings 
ratio [Basu (1977, 1978, 1983) and Campbell and Shiller (1988)] appear to be useful 
in explaining future returns67• Whereas the hypothesis that dividend yields forecast 
returns has a long tradition among practitioners and academics, Fama and French 
(I 988b ) offer new evidence that the forecasting of power dividend yields increases 
with return horizon. Similarly, using dividends and earnings to measure fundamental 
values, Campbell and Shiller (1988a, b) detected that prices are mean reverting over-
year, three-year and ten-year horizons. 
Despite the increasing evidence documented in the literature that share price 
changes are serially correlated, the issues of mean reversion as well as the 
predictability of stock returns are still controversial. On the one hand, such evidence 
could be interpreted as a violation of the EMH68. The focus of the debate is primarily 
on whether these findings indicate movements of the market away from fundamental 
values as suggested by Shiller (1984) Summers (1986) Black (1986), de Bondt and 
Thaler (1985, 1987) and Shefrin and Statman (1985) or, whether they are related to 
long-term changes in expected returns69• 
On the other hand. the statistical significance of these findings has been 
67 Also see Shiller (1984. t 990). 
~ote however that. it is well known [see e.g .• Leroy (1973). Lucas (1978) and Michener (1982)] that 
serial correlation of retumd does not necessarily imply a violation of market efficiency. Cochrane (1991. p. 
471) points out that most of the finance literature interprets return forecastability (although not unanimous) 
as evidence for slowly changing investment opportunities in the real economy, efficiently reflected in asset 
markets. 
69See Lehmann (1990). p. 2; Blume and Siegel (1992). p. 23. 
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questioned. Shortly after the publication of Fama and French's (1988a) paper, 
Richardson and Stock (1989) rigorously show that for a long return horizons, 720 
observations as used by Fama and French (1988a) is a small sample. With such a 
small effective sample size, the test statistics for mean reversion are said to have low 
power and therefore, the results are less significant than reported. Similarly, Cecchetti 
et.al (1990) challenge the previous findings of mean reversion with the argument that 
much of the serial correlation in historical stock returns could be attributed to small 
sample bias. Further, they conclude that "the evidence drawn from variance ratios and 
return regression coefficients are not sufficient to rule out equilibrium models" (p. 
417). 
Kim et.al (1991) also criticize the earlier papers on mean reversion on 
statistical grounds. They show that the evidence of mean reversion in stock prices 
provided by the variance ratio and multiperiod-return autoregression tests is overstated 
due to the assumption of normally distributed returns. Additionally, they argue that 
mean reversion is entirely a pre-war phenomenon (i.e., the 1926 - 1946 period which 
includes the Great Depression and the World War IT). 
Another critique of mean reversion tests comes from McQueen (1992). 
Reexamining long-horizon stock returns, he found that previous work overstates the 
evidence of mean reversion: "The overstatement is largely due to the implicit 
weighting of ordinary least-squares tests, which place more weight on the Depression 
and World War II observations, which have both large error variances and stronger 
mean-reverting tendencies. Additionally, the reliance on asymptotic statistics and the 
improper focus on only the most negative estimates of mean reversion contribute to 
the overstatement ... the random walk cannot be rejected ... " (p. 1). 
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Markedly, the conflicting opinion expressed in the aforementioned papers 
highlights the fact that the issue of mean reversion and the predictability of stock 
returns is far from being settled. Mean reversion in share price changes has perhaps, 
turned into an more interesting and complicated issue when a group of researchers 
also produce a fair amount of evidence rejecting the hypothesis that stock returns are 
unpredictable but, such rejection is in favour of the alternative of positive 
autocorrelation. In other words, a number of recent studies produce evidence that stock 
returns (instead of mean reverting) display a tendency towards persistence - a 
characteristic that has been termed "mean aversion" by Kim et. al (1991). 
For the U.S. data, while several recent studies found evidence of negative serial 
correlation for stock returns over long horizons using monthly and annual data. a study 
by Lo and MacKinlay (1988) demonstrates that stock returns are positively correlated 
over short horizons (Le., using weekly observations). Additionally, in appraising the 
evidence of mean reversion in stock returns provided by the variance-ratio and 
multiperiod-return autocorrelation tests presented in a number of previous papers. Kim 
et.al (1991) find evidence of mean aversion: post war data displays a tendency 
towards persistence in returns. They note that, "The evidence of mean aversion after 
World War II is shown to be as strong as that for mean reversion over the whole 
period" (p. 527). 
For the U.K. data, evidence of mean aversion has been documented by Mills 
(1991, 1993a). Using monthly data, Mills (1991) reports that the results from the 
variance ratio and other tests point clearly to a rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
unpredictability of U.K. stock returns at horizons ranging from three months up to 
eight years. This rejection is in favour of positive autocorrelation. and hence, mean 
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aversion. The author suggests that the evidence of mean aversion seems to rule out 
the popular mean-reverting models of stock prices that comprise the sum of a random 
walk and a stationary component. He further underlines that these results of positive 
autocorrelation in returns do not necessarily imply that the u.K. stock market is 
inefficient or that prices are not rational assessments of fundamental values, because, 
as Lo and MacKinlay (1988) point out, rational expectations equilibrium prices do not 
need to form a martingale sequence (of which the random walk is a special case). 
Using a modified version of the methodology proposed by Lo (1991), Mills 
(1993a) finds evidence of long-term memory in monthly U.K. stock returns over the 
period 1965 - 1990. The author claims that this finding of a tendency of stock returns 
to be positively correlated at long lags is consistent with findings of mean aversion 
reported for the same data set in Mills (1991). Moreover, according to the author, 
these results which are similar to those of Lo (1991) for the U.S., imply excess 
volatility in the sense of Shiller (1981 a). 
4.6.4-Noise Trading and Alternative Models 
Actually, much of the debate on stock market theory and evidence up until 
1986 has been generalised by Fisher Black [Black (1986)] in his presidential address 
to the American Finance Association, entitled "Noise". Additionally, leRoy (1989) 
provides a survey of literature on capital markets until 1989. Literature surveys on 
market efficiency and equity pricing can also be found in Hawawini (1988), Fama 
(1991) and Blume and Siegel (1992). 
Black (1986) used the term "noise" in a wide context of economics and 
finance. In his "basic model of financial markets" (p. 529), noise is contrasted with 
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, 
information 70. According to Black, noise is what makes our observations imperfect, 
and because of noise, we are forced to act largely in the dark. It is noise that makes 
it very difficult to test either practical or economic theories about the way that 
financial or economic markets work. 
Black (1986) also discussed the usefulness of noise trading - the trading 
activity of those without sound fundamental information - for society. In addition, 
Black went on to suggest a 'modem definition' of an efficient market. 
As far as stock markets or financial markets are concerned, among the salient 
points raised by Black can be summarised as follows: 
• There are two types of traders at work in financial markets: information 
traders who trade on information, and noise traders'l who trade on noise. 
• Because the whole structure of financial markets depends on relatively liquid 
markets in the shares of individual firms, noise makes financial markets possible. 
Noise trading - trading on noise as if it were information - provides liquidity to the 
markets, although it makes the markets imperfect. 
• Noise trading puts noise into market prices, causing them to deviate from 
fundamental or intrinsic values. So, the price of a stock reflects both the information 
and noise. 
• Like a drunk who tends to wander further and further from his starting point, 
the noise that noise traders put into stock prices will be cumulative. The research and 
actions taken by the information traders will cause prices to revert to their 
70Noise, as Rao (1992, p. tOO) points out, is a nebulous concept based on sentiment and beliefs that 
do not necessarily reflect cash flows. 
71Noise traders or uninfonned traders, according to Rao (1992, p. 100). include those who trade on the 
advice of financial gurus, for sentimental reasons, for liquidity, or whatever. 
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fundamental values over time. Information trading will force prices back to intrinsic 
values, but gradually. 
• Both price and fundamental value will look roughly like geometric random 
walk processes with non-zero means. 
• Because price tends to return to its fundamental value, the variance of price 
two years from now will be much less than twice the variance of value two years 
from now. 
• While volatilities do change over time, short term volatility of price will be 
greater than the short term volatility of fundamental value. 
• Because the price of a stock is a noisy estimate of value, we can never be 
sure how far any stock's price is from its fundamental value. 
• Even though noise causes markets to be somewhat "inefficient", at the same 
time noise makes it difficult to trade profitably. Even sophisticated traders will have 
difficulty in recognising and exploiting the substantial differences that exist between 
price and intrinsic value. 
• The market may be "efficient" even though share prices differ from their 
fundamental values: An efficient market is one in which price is within a factor of two 
of value: that is. price is more than half but less than twice, of its fundamental value. 
Under this definition, Black (1986) expressed his belief that almost all markets (Le., 
at least 90%) are efficient almost all of the time. 
The role of noise trading, bubbles72 or fads in affecting share price behaviour 
'2while there are several fonnal definitions of what a bubble is, the basic intuition behind the tenn. 
according to Stiglitz (1990, p. 13), is straightforward: "If the reason that the price is high loday is only 
because investors believe that the selling price will be high tomorrow - when 'fundamental' faclors do nol 
seem to justify such a price - then a bubble exists". 
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has been recognised increasingly in the literature. Apart from the work of Robert 
Shiller discussed in Sub-section 4.6.1, several other attempts to stress the importance 
of noise trading or bubbles in modelling a stock market can be found in the 
literature73 • Among the interesting ones are the models developed by De Long, 
Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1989, 1990, 1991), Cutler, Poterba and Summers 
(1988, 1990, 1991) and Campbell and Kyle (1988)74. 
4.6.S-Some Shortcomings of the Efficient Markets Paradigm 
Apparently, the theory of stock markets has gone through three stages. From 
the belief that the markets are inefficient, it swung to a decade in which the academics 
believed they are efficient. As we have discussed in Chapter Three, the general 
academic view appeared to be that the EMH was true; that the weak-form of the 
hypothesis was true, that the semi-strong form of the hypothesis was mainly true and 
that the strong-form was, probably, not. Empirical research since about the last fifteen 
years however, has produced evidence to suggest that stock markets are much less 
efficient than academics previously thought. Perhaps, the empirical evidence discussed 
in the present chapter warrants the view that it is possible to beat the stock markets: 
"possible but hard" [Lofthouse (1994, p. 39)]. 
An interesting development in the literature of stock markets in more recent 
years has been the reexamination of the basic theoretical model of the EMH. The 
accumulation of asset pricing anomalies, the debate over the excess volatility, market 
'3See e.g., Flood and Garber (1980), Blanchard and Watson (1982), Tirole (1985), Diba and Grossman 
(1986), Diba (1989), Tl1leman (1988), Day and Huang (1990) and Kirman (1991). 
'''Due to limited space, these models are not discussed here. 
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overreaction and mean-reverting in stock returns, and the stock market crash of 
October 1987, have all contributed towards an intellectual environment which 
encouraged the questioning and reexamining of the basic theoretical framework of the 
hypothesis. This reexamination has revealed a logical inconsistency in the EMH itself. 
There is a paradox in the theory of strict informational efficiency of capital 
markets. If markets are fully efficient, prices will adjust instantaneously to new 
information. If the price of a security adjust instantaneously to new information about 
the security, there would never be any trading among individuals as a result of new 
information. If there is no trading, there would be no incentive to collect information 
on any security. Since no information is produced, prices cannot reflect all 
information, and therefore, the hypothesis of efficient markets collapses. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) have shown that when the hypothesis of market 
efficiency is true and information is costly, competitive markets break down. So, in 
the real world, a market must be sufficiently inefficient to allow informationed traders 
to recover their costs of information [cf. Verrecchia (1979)]. 
Laffont and Maskin (1990) have shown that when traders have rational 
expectations, the efficient markets hypothesis breaks down with imperfect competition. 
The authors argue that imperfect competition adds a new complication to the efficient 
market question because, when some traders are large, the amount of information 
conveyed by prices is, to some degree, a matter of their strategic choice. 
LeRoy (1989) highlights the fact that a very striking piece of evidence (which 
is seldom listed in the finance literature as one of the major anomalies conflicting with 
market efficiency) is the high volume of trade on organised securities exchanges. 
Being a zero-sum or negative-sum (if brokerages charges and costs of information are 
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included) game, such transactions in an efficient market can be considered as pure risk 
uncompensated by positive expected gain. Thus, rational agents would not exchange 
securities as much as the real-world market participants do. The willingness of market 
participants to pay for information is another issue. If this purchased information 
makes profitable trades possible, the securities markets cannot be informationally 
efficient. If markets are efficient, market participants are irrationally wasting their 
money in acquiring such information. 
Empirically, the subject of market efficiency will become more complex if we 
take transactions costs into consideration. Joy and Jones (1986) argue that: 
(i) Although the bid-ask spread is an important component of transactions 
costs, typically, EMH studies have associated transactions costs primarily with 
brokerage costs. 
(ii) Since returns are a function of transactions costs, which are in tum, a 
function of security characteristics, returns should be adjusted for incremental 
transactions costs attributable to security characteristics. According to the authors, few 
EMH tests have actually made this adjustment. 
LeRoy and LaCivita (1981) point out that most empirical tests of market 
efficiency are joint tests of three assumptions: (i) stationarity, (ii) rational expectations, 
and (iii) an "expected-value" model. "Each element of the joint hypothesis may be 
challenged" (p. 536). 
Even though the EMH has several weaknesses, as noted in Chapter Three, the 
hypothesis should not simply be abandoned. The efficient markets paradigm which has 
proven to be a powerful engine for intellectual growth in financial economics, is still 
a useful guide for investors as well as for researchers. Even though in reality stock 
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markets may not be efficient, they appear to be highly competitive or nearly efficient. 
If the EMH is discarded, we have to look for an alternative to explain share 
price behaviour. Even though there are several alternative models or hypotheses that 
have been introduced in the literature, the empirical implications of these models are 
still not clear. As Brown et.al (1988, p. 384) put it: 
" ... until we accumulate compelling evidence that stock prices consistently 
under- or overestimate their underlying fundamentals in the long run, 
discarding models based on rational investor behaviour would seem to be 
unwarranted". 
4.7 -Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter examines the various hypotheses and explanations of share price 
behaviour and formation offered under different schools of investment thought. 
Empirical evidence supporting or refuting those 'theories' and models are also 
surveyed. 
The castle-in-the-air theory asserts that the behaviour of share prices is 
influenced by mass psychology. Thus, the theory suggests that share prices can be 
predicted by predicting the behaviour of the crowd in the market. 
The philosophy of technical analysis appears related to that of the castle-in-the-
air theory: that 'the final results of the market' - the prices - are totally determined by 
the people or the 'factors' inside the market. So, in order to predict the behaviour of 
future prices, one has to study the behaviour of the market or past prices. 
Fundamental analysis, on the one hand is similar to the castle-in-the-air theory 
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and technical analysis because it is based on the premise that stock markets are not 
efficient; that at any point in time there are some shares in the markets which are 
underpriced and/or overpriced. So, the task of a fundamental analyst is to identify such 
shares. 
Advocates of the castle-in-the-air theory and technical analysts appear to 
believe that investment is primarily an ares. Fundamental analysts, on the other hand, 
seem to view investment as a science rather than an art. As such, their investment 
decisions are based on a number of 'scientific techniques'. 
Adherents of the EMH also employ a 'scientific approach' to investment 
decisions. Because they believe that the market discounts everything, there is no way 
to garner abnormal profit by making investment decisions based on available 
information. An investor can only earn higher profit if he/she is willing to assume 
higher risk. Thus, to guide their investment decisions, they formulated some models 
of equilibrium asset pricing - the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) - based on a trade-off between risk and returns: The 
higher the riskiness of an asset, the higher its expected return. 
Recent research nonetheless, has produced a growing body of evidence 
suggesting that stock markets are not wholey efficient; that share prices are not solely 
determined by economic fundamentals but also by other factors. Recent results 
indicate that, to a very limited extent, share prices are predictable. 
What then determines the price of an equity security? In the standard 
75 Allen and Taylor (1989) note: 
"Clearly. chart analysis has a large subjective element, and there are probably as many methods of 
combining and interpreting the various techniques as there chartists themselves" (p. 3). 
See also Taylor (1969). 
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economics paradigm, it is the intersection of supply and demand curves for a 
particular asset that determines its price. 
From the literature that we have surveyed, the forces of demand for and supply 
for, a security, are governed by both economic fundamentals (rational factors) and 
socio-psychological factors (irrational factors or noise). Accordingly, the price of a 
share can be decomposed into two components [see Poterba and Summers (1988); 
Fama and French (1 988a): 
(i) A permanent component (the fundamental value or intrinsic value). Poterba 
and Summers (1988) propose that this component evolves as a random walk. 
(ii) A transitory component (the sentimental value or irrational value). This 
component which, according to Poterba and Summers (1988) reflects speculation-
induced deviations of prices from fundamental values76 (or may be a consequence 
of changes in required returns), follows a stationary process. 
When a stock market is efficient, its prices reflect only fundamental values. 
When a market is inefficient, share prices deviate, to some extent, from their 
fundamental values. When stock markets are 'inefficient', equity prices may be 
statistically as well as economically predictable. 
7~ecause of noise trading. prices deviate from their fundamental values, and asset prices reflect more 
than just infonnation about expected cash flows [Rao (1992. p. 101]. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ISSUES TO BE INVESTIGATED 
AND 
THE RELATED LITERATURE 
S.1-Introduction 
Our survey of literature on stock market theory, evidence and practice in the 
preceding chapters, reveals a number of interesting issues and developments. The most 
salient ones, can be summarised chronologically in the following points: 
a) During about the first half of the twentieth century, there was little evidence 
of any awareness that share price behaviour approximates a random walk, albeit the 
foundation for the theory that speculative prices follow a random walk had been laid 
down by the pioneer work of Louis Bachelier since the 1900. 
b) In the 1970s and during about the first half of the 1980s, there was almost 
a consensus in the academic literature that stock markets in general were efficient. 
c) Perhaps, the year of 1987 can be considered as the turning point in the 
history of efficient market hypothesis (EMH). In their quest for the explanations to the 
momentous occasion of worldwide stock market crash of October 1987,many 
researchers have started to question the validity of the EMH. 
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d) Recent findings suggest that stock markets are not really efficient; or, they 
are only nearly efficient. Essentially, by the end of last decade, a body of literature 
suggesting that stock returns are predictable, has emerged. 
e) Along with several worldwide political and economic reforms that took 
place during the decade of 1980s, the concept of global investing has become more 
prominent in the practitioner literature. In this connection, emerging equity markets 
have received increased attention. 
The present empirical research was planned with such developments in mind. 
As the title of the thesis implies, the stock market of interest is the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE). 
The question of the behaviour of stock prices/returns has often been related to 
the issue of stock market efficiency because the two concepts, as we can find in the 
literature, are almost inseparable. Regarding the "current crisis in efficient market 
theory", Keane (1991) has made two interesting statements: 
(i) "The practical issue at stake for investors, however, is not whether the 
market is efficient or inefficient, but how efficient" (p. 31). 
(ii) "The most significant lesson of recent market history, however, is that 
unexplained price behaviour is not necessarily irrational, and that irrational behaviour 
is not necessarily exploitable, and finally that exploitable behaviour is not necessarily 
worth exploiting" (p. 34). 
In the spirit of these Keane' s (1991) statements, in this study we are not going 
to get directly involved in the complex issue of whether a market is efficient or not. 
Rather the theme of our research concerns the issue of how efficient a market is: the 
predictability of stock returns in an emerging stock market. In order to put our 
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findings into context, comparisons between the behaviour of stock returns on the 
KLSE and a number of selected exchanges will be made. 
This chapter is developed in three sections. The major issues that will become 
the focus of our empirical research, are discussed in Section 5.2. Literature related to 
these issues - methods employed in the previous studies as well as their findings - are 
also featured in this section. 
Stock market "forecastability" is one of the major aspects of stock market 
behaviour investigated in the present thesis. To accomplished this, some Bayesian 
methods of forecasting will be employed. Since these methods/models employing out-
oj-sample forecasting are relatively new in the stock market literature, we devote one 
section - Section 5.3 - to discuss these procedures in some detail. 
Concluding remarks for the chapter is in section 5.4. 
S.2·Statements of the Problems 
The subjects of interest for our empirical research have been outlined in 
Chapter One. They are highlighted and discussed in further detail in the following 
subsections: 
S.2.I-The Behaviour of Stock Returns in an EmerginK Market vis-a-vis 
Developed Exchanges: 
Do stock returns on the KLSE behave significantly ditTerently from the 
behaviour of stock returns on the developed exchanges? 
In many respects, stock markets in developing countries are different from their 
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counterparts in the developed world. For example, these emerging markets are 
relatively young, small and thinly traded. 
Given their idiosyncrasies as discussed in Chapter Two, we expect the 
behaviour of stocks traded on emerging stock exchanges to be somewhat different 
from the behaviour of those stocks traded on the well-established exchanges. We 
examine this issue by comparing some statistical properties of daily, weekly and 
monthly share price indices from the KLSE with the same indices from some selected 
well-established stock markets. These examinations and comparisons are considered 
useful and helpful to some extent, in trying to verify the common belief that equity 
investments in emerging stock markets are relatively riskyl. Moreover, this aspect of 
our empirical investigations which is preliminary in nature, could provide use with 
some basic/general information about the behaviour of shares traded on the KLSE. 
5.2.2-The KLSE and International Stock Market Linkages: 
As markets become more integratedl , is there still ample room to diversify 
internationally and/or, can we predict future returns in a domestic market based 
on innovations in major exchanges'? 
Recent history is witness to a remarkable growth in inter-regional flows of 
capital and equity investments. Economic and political reforms that had taken place 
lSee e.g .• IMF Survey. April 16, 1990, p. 121; Errunza (1994). p. 83. 
2See e.g .• World Economic and Financial Surveys: Private Market Financing/or Developing Countries. 
International Monetary Fund. Washington. DC. November 1995. 
3In their study, Longin and Solnik (1995) assert that they have found evidence of predictable 
components in the time-variation of international correlation: "Indeed, we have extensive international 
evidence of predictable time-variations in the equity return distribution. Expected returns seem to depend 
worldwide on a set of information variables such as the dividend yield and various interest-rate-related 
variables" (p. 6). 
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in many parts of the world have made those regions more open to foreign influence 
and foreign investments. Investors Chronicle (February 4, 1994, p. 37) describes these 
recent global "cataclysmic changes", in a sentence: 
"The seismic events in recent years - the demise of Soviet power and of the 
dictatorial clones who suffocated freedoms throughout Eastern Europe, the 
democratisation of Latin America, the economic surge of China and the rapid 
rise of the Pacific Rim countries - have all conspired to foreshadow major 
shifts in the old economic order". 
As a result of these reforms and developments, in recent years, cross-border 
investments or global asset allocation strategies have become a new phenomenon in 
the investment community4. Specifically, this globalisation of financial transactions 
and activities, as Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) point out, is frequently attributed 
to a number of different factors such as the relaxation of controls on capital 
movements and foreign exchange controls, improvements in computer and 
communication technology that have lowered the cost of cross-border information 
flows and financial transactions [cf. Dwyer and Hafer (1988), p. 3], and the expansion 
in the multinational operations of major corporations. 
Halpern (1993) suggests a number of additional factors that have encouraged 
4See e.g., The Economist. January 9, 1993. p. 47; BusinessWeek. September 4. 1995. pp. 40 - 41. 
SAs noted in the Economist (February the 17th, 1996). while foreign investment has been hampered. 
at least until recently, by many factors such as capital controls, opaque markets and the high cost for fund 
managers of setting up overseas, "In the past few years, these barriers have been falling - especially in 
emerging markets, where the gains from diversifying are biggest" (p. 91). 
During 1994 and 1995. developing countries took various further steps to liberalize foreign investors' 
and foreign brokers' access to domestic markets and to remove or reduce obstacles to domestic companies' 
ability to raise capital in international markets. For a detailed survey on these new developments. see the 
World Economic and Financial Surveys: Private Market Financing for Developing Countries. International 
Monetary Fund. Washington DC, November, 1995. 
195 
the integration of worldwide capital markets: the improved disclosure regulations, the 
capital constraint and settlement problems and capital issuer recognition of the benefits 
from diversification of capital sources. 
Actually, the issue of links between national stock markets has long been 
attracting researchers' attention. Since the publication of GrubeI's (1968) study in 
1968, a considerable amount of work has been done on the relationships among 
national stock markets - to investigate the extent to which international markets are 
integrated or segmented. The common theme of these studies concerns the merit of 
international portfolio diversification. 
The benefits that may be derived from portfolio diversification have been 
demonstrated in the pioneer work by Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958). Markowitz 
(1952) developed a rigorous mathematical model of individual behaviour where 
investment portfolios were evaluated in terms of their mean returns and the total 
variance of their returns. The return on a portfolio which is simply the weighted 
average return of its constituents, is given by 
(5.1) 
where E~) is the expected return on the portfolio, Wi is the proportion of the value 
-of the portfolio invested in the security i. E(~) is the expected return on the security 
i. According to Markowitz (1952), the risk of a portfolio is a function of the 
weightings of each of its constituents and of the covariance of each of its constituents 
with each other. This relationship is given as 
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(5.2) 
where Var (~) is the variance of the portfolio; Wi is the proportion of funds invested 
in security i and Wj is the proportion invested in security j. COVij is the covariance 
between returns for securities i and j. 
Markowitz's seminal work has provided an impetus for international 
diversification in general and for diversifying across emerging markets in particular. 
Markowitz's emphasis on the covariation between asset returns and, by implication, 
correlation, underlines the importance of measuring the degree of correlation between 
returns on investment in emerging markets amongst one another and with the more 
developed markets. 
Further devlopment in this field was the work of Tobin (1958). The author 
demonstrated that given the possibility of an investment in a risk-free asset and also 
in a risky asset or portfolio, an investor can construct a portfolio of two assets and 
achieve any desired balance of risk and returns by shifting the proportion held in each 
asset. 
The work of Markowitz (1950) and Tobin (1958) laid the foundations for the 
development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in the I 960s. The Sharpe-
Lintner-Mossin Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) discussed in Chapter Four -
expressing the eqUilibrium implication of portfolio theory (with restrictive 
assumptions) brought out that the correlations between assets could be explainable by 
a common factor (returns on the market portfolio). In partially segmented international 
financial markets however, it seems less plausible that correlations of returns between 
assets traded in the different markets could be explained by a single factor. 
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Subsequent development of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) - also 
discussed in Chapter Four - emphasised that the correlations of returns between assets 
are likely to be explained by more than just one factor. That this may also apply to 
correlation of returns between assets traded in different national markets is an 
empirical question that has received little attention. If we find non-zero correlations 
between returns on assets traded in different markets, then the CAPM and the APT, 
if they apply in international partly segmented markets, would imply that at least one 
or more common factors may be explaining returns in these markets. 
The potential gains from international portfolio diversification depend upon the 
degree to which national markets are dependent upon each other. Theoretically. risk 
in a portfolio can completely be eliminated when the returns from assets are perfectly 
negatively correlated. Part of the risk in a portfolio can still be reduced as long as the 
correlations between stock returns are less than unity6. 
According to Levy and Samat (1970). the existence of a relatively high degree 
of positive correlation within an economy suggests the possibility that risk reduction 
might be facilitated by diversifying securities portfolios internationally. Through 
international diversification, it would appear possible for an investor largely to 
eliminate that part of his (her) portfolio risk associated with the economics of a 
particular country; and consequently, the investor would be left, theoretically, with 
only the risk associated with worldwide economic conditions [Watson (1978). p. 196]. 
The benefits of international portfolio diversification have been well 
documented in several early studies, including those by Grubel (1968), Levy and 
6por an exposition of how international diversification reduces the total risk of a portfolio, see Solnik 
(1996). Chapter Four. 
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Sarnat (1970), Lessard (1974, 1976), Solnik (1974a, b), Agmon (1972, 1973), Watson 
(1978) and Hanna (1980). Meric and Meric (1989) have provided empirical evidence 
that "there is more to be gained from diversification across countries than across 
industries. Diversification across countries, even if within a single industry, results in 
a greater risk reduction than diversification across industries within countries" (p. 639). 
In this study, principal components analysis - a special form of factor analysis -was 
used to analyse patterns of covariance among 17 national stock market indices (from 
developed countries) covering a period of 1973 to 1987. The Box's M statistical tests 
were used to study the inter-temporal stability of the matrix of correlation coefficients 
among these 17 national stock market indices. 
A more recent study by Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) which examined 
monthly index returns (from 1978 to 1992) for 12 European countries, has also 
documented similar evidence [as the one provided by Meric and Meric (1989)]. In 
another recent study, Hunter and Coggin (1990) concludes that, while there is a limit 
on the benefits from international diversification, the potential gain is seizable indeed. 
There are also several studies which concentrated on the possibility of 
diversification into emerging markets. For example, Lessard (1973) Errunza (1977, 
1983), Agtmael and Errunza (1982), Errunza and Padmanabhan (1988) and Bailey and 
Stulz (1990) demonstrate that emerging stock markets should be included in global 
portfolios: that diversification into emerging markets would have been beneficial in 
terms of both increased returns and reduced risk. 
In their study, Bailey and Stulz (1990) used daily, weekly and monthly dollar 
returns on Pacific Basin market (including the Malaysian stock market) indices (from 
January 1977 to the end of 1985) to investigate (using correlation analysis) the benefit 
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to u.s. investors of diversifying into these markets. They found that, while these 
markets were not equally open to foreign investors, risk reduction provided by 
diversifying into these Pacific Basin stocks was substantial. 
Solnik's (1990) study - using monthly price indices which cover the period of 
December 1977 to December 1988 - appears to provide another strong case for 
diversifying into the emerging stock markets of the Pacific Basin. Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand are among stock markets which are found to have demonstrated a very low 
correlation (sometimes negative) among themselves and with stock markets in 
Australia, Japan, Gennany, France, United Kingdom and the United States. However, 
since over the period of his study (i.e., December 1977 to December 1988), these 
markets were closed to foreign investors, the author concludes that, " ... it is unclear 
whether the very large diversification benefits that have been measured in this study 
subsist once investment restrictions are dropped" (p. 13). 
In his survey paper, Errunza (1994) has underlined the following points 
regarding the issue of diversification into emerging stock markets (EMs) for global 
investors: 
(i) The long run path of return correlations is, not surprisingly, unpredictable. 
"In the short term, there is little reason to expect meaningful increases in EM return 
correlations that would threaten their diversification potential " (p. 84). 
(ii) "With respect to currency risk, the evidence suggests that the currency 
factor does not contribute toward increased risk of EM portfolios" (p. 85)7. 
(iii) "One of the most important findings that has investment management 
7Halpem (1993, p. 51) posits that institutional investors, particularly in the United States. historically 
have accepted the wisdom that cllJTency movements cancel one another out over time and do not affect long-
run returns [cf. Hauser et.al (1994)]. 
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implications is that the country factor dominates world, currency and industry 
influences in the case of the EMs and most of DMs" (p. 85). The author refers to the 
work of Errunza and Padmanabhan (1988), Divecha et. al (1992), Lessard (1976) and 
Drummen and Zimmermann (1992) to support his claim. 
A number of papers have attempted to explain the low comovement between 
markets and the cross-sectional differences in volatility. Lessard (1976), Grinold et.al 
(1989) and Drummen and Zimmermann (1992) among others, regress individual stock 
returns on global, industry, and national factors and conclude that national factors 
dominate the explained part of stock price variances. These studies have also detected 
significant role for industry factors. In his paper, Roll (1992) argues that industrial 
composition is important for explaining cross-sectional differences in volatility as well 
as correlation structure of country index returns. Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994), 
besides suggesting that differences in industrial structure can be used to explain why 
some markets are more volatile than others, also provides additional explanation for 
the low international return correlations: differences in local monetary and fiscal 
policies, and differences in institutional and legal regimes. 
While the existence of low correlations (i.e., r < 1) between a domestic market 
and foreign markets is the "necessary" condition for investors to enjoy possible gains 
from diversification outside their domestic capital market, the presence of inter-
temporal stability of the correlations matrix among national stock exchanges is 
considered as the "sufficient" condition for meaningful ex ante international portfolio 
diversification [see Philippatos et.al (1983)]. Should there be a considerable instability 
in international correlations over time, the benefits of international diversification 
might be less obvious. Specifically, inter-temporal instability of the correlation 
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structure will result in a continuously changing efficient frontier and hence, the 
selection of an optimal ex ante investment strategy would be very difficult for investor 
to identify [Maldonado and Saunders (1981), p. 55]. 
Empirical research examining the presence of the "necessary" and the 
"sufficient" conditions for profitable international portfolio diversification has indeed, 
produced conflicting evidence. These conflicting results perhaps, might be explained 
by the divergence of empirical methods used8, separate sample countries, dissimilar 
sample periods9 and variable differing intervals. 
While several early studies - among others, by Levy and S arn at (1970), 
Granger and Morgenstern (1970), Ripley (1973), Agmon (1974) and Panton et.al 
(1976) - have provided evidence that correlations among national equity markets is 
statistically insignificant or very low, a number of studies, including those by Hilliard 
(1979), Schollhammer and Sand (1985), Jaffe and Westerfield (1985), Wheatley 
(1988) and Eun and Shim (1989) report a substantial amount of interdependence 
among national stock markets. A study by Hilliard (1979) using spectral techniques 
for example, found some very close relationships among world's major stock markets 
(located in New York, London, Paris, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Zurich, Milan, Toronto, 
Sydney and Tokyo). Hilliard's results are contrary to the findings of Granger and 
Morgenstern (1970) who also used spectral analysis (on weekly data for stock indices 
in eight countries) but found little or no relationship between major stock exchanges. 
BSolnik (1977) among others, has pointed out some of the methodological problems associated with 
previous empirical studies that might explain the differences in results. 
9Errunza (1977) argues that both Grubel's (1968) study (which examines eleven developed countries 
for the period 1959 to 1966) and Levy and Samat's (1970) study (which examines twenty-eight countries 
for the period 1951 to 1967) suffer from possible bias due to time period selection. 
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Hilliard's (1979) study however, has a number of limitations: The period of study -
from July 1973 to April 1974 - was not only very short but also "includes the OPEC 
embargo, an event of major world wide significance" (p. 107). The data used were 
daily data which were converted to the U.S. numeraire. 
Scholl hammer and Sand (1985) used Box and Jenkins's (1970) ARlMA 
(autoregressive integrated moving average) time series analysis to analyse the possible 
co-movement among national stock price changes on a daily basis from January 1, 
1981 through June 30, 1983. Included in their sample are stock markets from United 
Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland and the United 
States. This study "provides evidence of a statistically significant degree of 
interdependence among the stock price movements of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands" (p. 17). Strong economic 
linkages between the major European countries and the United States is among the 
explanations that the authors offer for this phenomenon: "Since stock market indices 
can be viewed as indicators of the expected, economically relevant developments in 
a country. one might hypothesize that the high degree of economic interdependence 
that exists among the EC countries and the U.S. will manifest itself in the 
synchronization of stock market developments in these countries." (p. 18). 
Wheatley (1988) in testing international equity market integration using Ita 
simple version of the consumption-based asset pricing model". finds little evidence 
against the joint hypothesis that equity markets are integrated internationally and that 
the asset pricing model holds lO• The data for this study are from the U.S and 17 other 
l<lwhetaJey's (1988) results appear to be in contradictory with the results of a previous study by Cho 
et.al (1986) who investigated the validity of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) in an international setting. 
Using data from eleven countries (including the U.S .• Japan. Hong Kong and Singapore), their results led 
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countries (including Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore) for the period 1960 to 1985. 
Eun and Shim (1989) who investigated the international transmission 
mechanism of stock market movements by estimating "a nine-market vector 
autoregression (VAR) system" (p. 241) found that, being "the most influential in the 
world" (p. 243), innovations in the U.S. stock markets are rapidly transmitted to other 
markets "in a clearly recognizable pattern, whereas no single foreign market can 
significantly explain the U.S. market movements" (p. 241). The data base for the study 
were daily stock market indices at closing time, in terms of local currency units, of 
the world's nine major stock markets: Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, France. Germany. Canada and the United States. The period covered was 
December 31. 1979 through December 20, 1985. 
Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) exploited the newly developed theory of 
cointegration "to provide new methods of testing the linkage and dynamic interactions 
among stock market movements" (p. 193). These authors based their study on daily 
closing price indices from five major exchanges in New York. London, Frankfurt, 
Tokyo and Paris. Results of the study indicate that the degree of international co-
movements among stock price indices has increased substantially for the post-October 
1987 period. with a considerable impact of the U.S. market on the French, German 
and the U.K markets. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that results of cointegration tests 
should be interpreted with care. As stressed by Maddala (1992), there are many 
problems with the use of these tests and their interpretation. Among others, the authors 
points out that. in away. in the case of both unit roots and cointegration, there is too 
them to reject the joint hypothesis that the international capital markets are integrated and the APT is valid 
internationally. 
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much emphasis on testing and too little on estimation. There is also the problem of 
the power of these tests, according to Maddala (1992). 
More recently, in examining the common stochastic trends among the national 
stock prices of the U.S. and five East Asian countries (i.e., Japan. Taiwan. Hong 
Kong, Singapore and South Korea), Chung and Liu (1994) found that stock price 
series are nonstationary and yet cointegrated. Using "Johansen's maximum likelihood 
estimation procedure" (p. 241), to analyse weekly data on national stock price indices 
(based on local currencies) from these six countries, they arrived at a conclusion that 
the result suggested that "the U.S. and Taiwan markets may not belong to a 'common' 
stock region containing the remaining four countries" (p. 241). These remaining four 
countries are Japan. Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea. 
The inter-relationship between the Malaysian stock market and a number of 
well-established markets, has been studied - in a series of papers - by Othman Young 
(1987/88, 1989, 1993). In his 1987/88 and 1989 papers, Othman Yong examined the 
validity of the general belief that the performance of a stock market is highly 
influenced by major stock markets in the world. The focus of the study was on the 
performance of the KLSE in relation to the performances of stock markets in Hong 
Kong. Tokyo. New York and Singapore. Using weekly closing indices (for a period 
between January 1983 to December 1987) of the Hang Seng Index, Nikkei Index, 
Dow Jones Industrial Average, KLSE Industrial Index and SES Industrial Index which 
were "transformed into percentage changes in indices"(p. 37), the data were examined 
using correlation analysis. Results of the study indicated that there is some validity in 
the claim of interdependencies between stock markets. The author attributed this to the 
globalisation of information flow and trade relations among these economies indices. 
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However, according to the author, while the correlation coefficients between price 
movements on the KLSE and those on other exchanges under comparison were found 
to be statistically significant, they were not high enough to validate the claim that the 
performance of the Malaysian stock market was highly influenced by the performances 
of major stock markets in the world. 
In his 1993 paper, Othman Yong (1993) used daily and weekly indices of the 
stock markets of Malaysia (KLSE Industrial), Hong Kong (Hang Seng), Australia 
(Australian All Ordinaries), Japan (Nikkei Dow Jones) and the United States (Dow 
Jones Industrial Average) for a period from January 1984 to December 1988. Similar 
to his previous studies these indices were transformed into percentages in indices. In 
this paper however, the issue of stock market comovement was examined from both 
the parametric approach (Le .• correlation analysis) and nonparametric approach (Le., 
the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test and Kruskall-Wallis one-way analysis 
of variance). Two major findings of the study are as follows: 
(i) Correlation coefficients between the Malaysian markets and other exchanges 
mentioned above are statistically significant. 
(ii) Both the parametric and nonparametric tests show that the relationship 
between these markets are not stable over time and therefore "it is difficult to 
construct an optimal investment strategy based on the comovements" (p. 65). 
The works of Othman Yong (1987/88, 1989, 1993) appear to have some 
limitations. The sample period for the studies are quite short and the number of 
countries included in the studies are also limited. In all of these studies, the author 
used only the KLSE sectorial index (i.e., the KLSE Industrial Index) rather than the 
KLSE Composite Index or the EMAS (All-share) Index. The data were transformed 
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into percentage price changes rather than logarithm price changes. 
Using different indices ll , a different time period ( i.e., January 1984 through 
December 1994) and different approaches, we reexamine the extent of covariations 
between the KLSE and other exchanges. We also extend the work of Othman Young 
(1987/88, 1989 and 1993) by including more stock exchanges - most stock exchanges 
in the world - in our study. In addition, this study involves data for multiple time 
periods (i.e., including 1987 and not including 1987). Specifically, the present study 
attempts to address the following issues: 
(i) Is there any potential gain for Malaysian investors to diversify 
internationally? Or, as world economies and stock ownership become more integrated, 
and correlations across markets may increase, has the apparent benefits of regional 
diversification become less obvious [see Halpern (1993), p. 48]? 
(ii) What is the degree of correlation between the Malaysian stock market and 
other stock market? 
(iii) To what extent could the movements of stock returns on the KLSE be 
explained by innovations in other exchanges, particularly the major exchanges of the 
world? How influential are "world factor(s)" in determining these interrelationships? 
(iv) Are the correlations of stock returns between the KLSE and other 
exchanges inter-temporally stable? 
(v) How efficient is the KLSE in processing international news/information? 
Put another way. how rapidly are price movements in one (major) exchange are 
transmitted to the KLSE? 
lilt appears to be a convention in the literature that stock price indices are used in studying the 
interrelationship among the national stock exchanges of the world. 
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If the KLSE were found to be highly correlated with certain other exchanges, 
could we use events or past movements in these markets to 'predict' future 
movements in the KLSE? 
A number of authors hypothesise that the greater the relative economic 
dependence on international trade, the higher would be the correlation between the 
national market and the world market [see e.g., Hunter and Coggin (1990); Eun and 
Shim (1989); Schollhammer and Sand (1985)] 12. Ripley (1973, p. 357) writes: 
"Countries whose incomes move in a similar manner may have stock prices 
that also move in unison .... Countries that trade extensively with one another 
are likely to have strong income ties". 
Malaysia is a relatively open economy [see e.g Fong (1990)]13. Thus, we 
hypothesise that the movements of the Malaysian stock market are highly correlated 
with movements in several foreign exchangesl4 • Nonetheless, there may be some 
national exchanges sufficiently lowly correlated with the KLSE that they offer 
12 As interpreted by Dwyer and Hafer (1988, p. 6), " ... international trade creates a link between at least 
some stocks in different markets". In addition to trade, Dwyer and Hafer (1988) also suggest that 
multinational operations by firms create links (between national stock exchanges) through ownership of real 
assets that can affect firms headquartered in different countries. 
J3See also the Far Eastern Economic Review, April 4. 1996, p. 38. 
14Solnik (1996) contends that economies that are more open to the world - Malaysia. Mexico. Korea 
and Portugal - tend to have the highest correlation with developed markets. 
Lin et.al (1994) suggest three possible reasons for the international correlations of stock market price 
changes: 
(i) International economic linkages: When two economies are related through trade and investment. 
any news about economic fundamentals in one country most likely has implications for the other country. 
(ii) Financial market integration: The growing financial market integration will increase the degree of 
correlation between the stock returns of different countries by making portfolio managers in the home market 
more responsive to changes in foreign markets. 
(iii) Market contagion: Stock price in one country may be affected by the changes in another country 
beyond what is conceivable by connections through economic fundamentals. Under this market-conlagion 
scenario, speculative trading and noise trading [see Black (1986); De Long et.al (1990)] may occur in the 
international context: Price movements driven by fads and a herd instinct may be transmitted across borders. 
The October 1987 stock market crash is often cited as evidence for international bear-market contagion. 
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significant opportunities for international portfolio diversification (involving the 
Malaysian shares). 
To summarise, given the recent trend of international investing, it has been 
widely claimed that international stock markets have become more integrated or highly 
correlated. If this is the case, has the apparent benefits of international diversification 
become less obvious? If this is the case, on the other hand, can we predict movements 
on the Malaysian stock exchange based on innovations in major foreign exchanges? 
5.2.3-The "Predictability" of Stock Returns: 
If stock returns were predictable, to what extent could they be predicted? 
If stock returns were forecastable, could we improve their "forecastability" by 
employing some newly developed forecasting procedures? 
It might be interesting and beneficial to begin by quoting what has been 
written by Makridakis (1986) in introducing his paper on "The Art and Science of 
Forecasting": 
"Can the future be predicted? The answer is 'it depends'. Certainly some 
aspects of the future can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy, whereas 
others are less predictable, or completely uncertain. The exact timing of 
sunrise tomorrow or a year from now can be predicted with a precision 
measured to hundredths of a second. However, it is much more difficult to 
accurately forecast changes in stock prices, exchange rates, or when the next 
recession will hit the economy" (p. 15). 
As the topic for their paper, Fuller and Kling (1990) ask, "Is the stock market 
predictable?". "Predicting the Unpredictable?" is the title of a small book by Mills 
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(1992). In his conclusion for the book, Mills (1992) notes, "Financial markets are 
often predictable to some extent, but the crucial question is whether this predictability 
can be exploited to make excess profits from trading in the markets" (p. 36). 
Whether stock returns (or price changes) are predictable, is an old question -
a question of long-standing interest to both academics and practitioners. Eugene Fama 
(1965a, p. 34) writes: 
"For many years the following question has been a source of continuing 
controversy in both academic and business circles: To what extent can the past 
history of a common stock's price be used to make meaningful predictions 
concerning the future price of the stock?" 
Further, in his book entitled The Art of Forecasting, Bean (1969) begins his 
chapter on "Predicting the Stock Market" with the following words: 
"It was said some years ago that in no other area of human endeavor has so 
much brainpower been applied as in that of forecasting the stock market. 
Perhaps this still holds true today. Where else do we have so many people 
involved daily in trying to anticipate domestic and world-wide developments 
in politics, in economic activity, in weather - and trying to predict the effects 
of these interrelated changes and expectations on the price of securities. If 
expectation is a 'product', then all those engaged in speculation and investment 
constitute the largest 'industry' in the world, with its millions of investors, 
hundreds of thousands in banks, brokerage houses, investment institutions and 
clubs, and practically all corporations - all examining and analyzing facts and 
trends and creating expectations, determining market values. . . . Predicting 
the stock market is therefore an exercise in predicting the predictor" (p. 57). 
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In his paper entitled "Forecasting Stock Market Prices: Lessons for Forecasters" 
which was selected "the best paper published in the International Journal of 
Forecasting in 1991 - 1993"IS. Granger (1992) wrote: 
"Despite stock returns once having been thought to be unpredictable. there is 
now plenty of optimism that this is not so ... .If this optimism justified. and if 
yes. what are the lessons for forecasters working with other data sets? As there 
is an obvious possible profit motive driving research into the forecastability of 
stock prices. or at least returns. one can expect more intensive analysis here 
than elsewhere" (p. 11). 
Granger (1992. pp. II and 12) further argues: 
"It is surprising that more of the studies surveyed do not provide results of 
forecasting exercises ... .If a method exists that consistently produces positive 
profits after allowing for risk correction and transaction costs and if this 
method has been publicly announced for some time. then this would possibly 
be the evidence against the EMH .... Only if a profitable rule is found to be 
widely known and remains profitable for an extended period can the efficient 
market hypothesis be rejected .... This research program agrees with the 
modem taste in the philosophy of science to try to falsify theories rather than 
to try to verify them. Clearly. verification of EMH is impossible". 
Recent findings do suggest that stock returns are somewhat predictable l6• This 
phenomenon has been reported in several studies; the prominent contributions being 
Isne International Journal of Forecasting. Vol. 11. No.4. 1995. p. 585. 
16 As discussed in Chapter Four. there are two major reasons for the predictability of stock returns. 
offered in the literature: the market is inefficient or the required rate of return is changing over time. 
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Keirn and Stambaugh (1986), Poterba and Summers (1988), Fama and French (1988a, 
1988b), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Jegadesh (1990, 1991), Mills (1993a, 1993b) and 
Harvey (1995). 
As we have reviewed in Chapters Three and Four, much of the recent research 
suggests that past prices and returns contain information useful for forecasting 
purposes. Studies that provide evidence of stock market predictability - that expected 
returns, variances and covariances exhibit temporal variation and are predictable -
might be grouped into the following categories based on the approaches/testing 
procedures employedl7 : 
(a) Regression-based tests. Regression tests over medium and long horizons 
have been implemented, inter alios, by Scott (1985), Flood et.al (1986), Fama and 
French (] 988a, b) and Campbell and Shiller (1988a, b). 
(b) Variance ratio methodology. Studies using this approach which provide 
evidence of mean reversion/mean aversion in stock returns are implemented by 
Poterba and Summers (1988), Lo and MacKinlay (1988, ] 989) and Mills (1991, 
1993a, b), to name a few. 
(c) Excess volatility tests begun by Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter 
(] 98 ]). Many empirical tests of asset price behaviour/market efficiency call for the 
comparison of an asset's market price to its fundamental value. This fundamental 
value or intrinsic value is defined as the market's expected discounted present value 
of future cash flows. However, since investors' true expectations cannot be observed, 
in practice an asset's market price is compared with the econometrician's estimate of 
I7Por detailed discussions on the related literature - theories, methodologies and evidence - see Chapters 
Three and Pour. 
212 
fundamental value. While in the traditional approach, this estimation procedure 
involves assuming that market participants expected future cash flows to grow at some 
constant rate as in the popular Gordon model [see Chapter Four], in Shiller's (1981) 
seminal work expected cash flows are replaced with actual dividends. Shiller (1981) 
argued that stock prices are too volatile to be accounted for by changes in 
fundamentals. He assumed that discount rates are constant - a fallacy. 
(d) Tests based on a particular models such as the CAPM [see e.g., Ferson and 
Harvey (1991); Malkamaki (1992)] and the APT [see e.g., Ferson and Korajczyk 
(1995)]. Umstead (1977) utilized "the transfer function model building methodology" 
introduced by Box and Jenkins (1970) to arrive at a conclusion that "aggregate 
quarterly stock prices are inefficient enough so that the application of transfer function 
model building techniques to pubJicly available information could have permitted an 
investor to earn a portfolio return in excess of the return which was commensurate 
with the portfoJio risk" (p. 427). Pesaran and Timmennann (1985) whose study was 
based on "a recursive modelling approach" to examine monthly data from the U.S. 
over the period of 1954 to 1992, also report that the degree to which stock returns 
were predictable "increased to a level where, net of transaction costs, it could have 
been exploited by investors in the volatile markets of the 1970s" (p. 1201). 
(e) Tests/trading strategies which utilize some techniques advocated/practised 
by technical analysts as well as those recommended by fundamental analysts. 
Technical analysis has a long tradition in forecasting movements in financial 
markets [see e.g., Plummer (1993)]. Even though this approach has been criticised and 
even scorned by academics, in recent years with growing evidence against the efficient 
markets hypothesis, technical analysis has been gaining credibility among both market 
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participants and financial economists. As we have reviewed in Chapter Four, a number 
of recent studies have shown that technical trading rules, to some extent, appear to be 
capable of predicting future prices/retums I8• Neftci (1991) has tried to place technical 
analysis on a more firm theoretical foundation and demonstrated that the trading rules 
devised by technical analysts could be formalised as non-linear predictors. 
Similar to technical analysis, some approaches devised by fundamental analysts 
appear to be useful for forecasting financial markets. These have been discussed in 
Chapter Three (Section 3.8 - anomalous literature) and Chapter Four (Section 4.4 -
fundamental analysis). 
Beside its strength, each of the methodologies mentioned above of course, is 
not free from being controversial - has its weakness and suffers from certain statistical 
difficulties l9• For example, Kim, Nelson and Startz (1991) show convincingly that 
the outcome of tests conducted by Poterba and Summers (1988) and Fama and French 
(1988) is strongly conditional by the choice of sample interval. Likewise. volatility 
tests (as featured in Chapter Four) have been criticised, among others, by Kleidon 
(1986), Marsh and Merton (1986) and Merton (1987). The crux of this volatility tests 
criticism is that out-of-sample events might be the dominate determinant of 
fluctuations in stock prices. If this is so, according to Mankiw et.al (1991), in-sample 
dividends will not provide an adequate lever for tests of market rationality. 
Notwithstanding that the aforementioned tests/methodologies are not free from 
being controversial, the relevant issue (particularly for investors) is that stock markets 
180ther studies involving technical analysis: Brock el.ai (1992) and Silber (1994) for stock markets; 
Allen and Taylor (1989) and Taylor and Allen (1992) for foreign exchange markets 
19Some of these issues are discussed in Chapter Four. See also Mankiw el.ai (1991). 
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seem to be "predictable". Accordingly, the relevant question is: if stock returns or 
changes in stock prices were predictable, how well could a forecaster forecast?2o In 
response to this issue, Fuller and Kling (1990) conducted some out-oj-sample 
forecasting tests. To the claim of previous researchers that stock returns are 
predictable, Fuller and Kling (1990) have made some comments, including the 
following (p. 28): 
"Recently, however, there has been some renewed interest in exploring the 
issue. Fama and French (l988a, 1988b), Campbell and Shiller (1988) and 
Shiller (1984) now suggest that long-term market returns are, indeed, 
predictable. These authors, however, generally do not use true, out-oI-sample 
forecasting tests. 
"Fama and French (FF) claim in both papers that their models have highly 
significant predictive ability to forecast market return. Predictability in their 
sense corresponds to finding (ex post) significant in-sample regression 
coefficients. 
"We subjected the FF models to true out-of-sample forecasting tests, with 
mixed findings. One of the FF models failed to outperform even the simplest 
of the alternative models, while the other model may have produced superior 
results. Final conclusions on market efficiency are open to question 
nevertheless" . 
Congruent with the recent findings that stock movements are somewhat 
predictable, and in the spirit of Fuller and Kling's (1990) and Granger's (1992) 
20 Alfred Cowles (1933) was among the earliest researchers to evaluate statistically how well 
professional forecasters predict stock prices. 
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comments highlighted above, the present thesis initiates some "true" out-oj-sample 
Jorecasting tests21 to 'measure' and 'compare' the "forecastability" of stock returns 
in an emerging market. The procedures of measurement to be employed, are discussed 
in Section 5.3 and in Chapter 6 (Le., Sub-section 6.4.4). 
Our decision to implement some out-of-sample forecasting tests for stock 
returns on the KLSE, could be justified by the following: 
(a) Testing the "forecastability" of stock returns/prices from an out-of-sample 
perspective is still very rare in the literature. By accomplishing this approach, we hope 
that our results could provide some contributions towards settling this controversial 
issue of stock market "forecastability". 
(b) Our major objective here is to 'measure' the extent to which stock 
returns/prices are "forecastable". While several previous tests employing various 
methodologies (as highlighted above), in general find a considerable amount of 
"forecastability" to returns (and excess returns) over several year horizons, we initiate 
this attempt to 'measure' the magnitude of stock market "forecastability" in light of 
the claim by Mankiw et.al (1991) that their "statistical tests of stock market 
forecastability and volatility that are immune from the severe statistical problems of 
earlier tests" (p. 455) albeit provide evidence to reject the null hypothesis of market 
efficiency, "the rejections are only marginal" (p. 455). 
(c) These out-of-sample forecasting tests as given in Section 5.3 (and Chapter 
21Renshaw (1993) also appears to believe in the importance of out-ofsampleforecast when he writes, 
" .... the only fair test of a forecasting technique based on extreme values is how well it perfonns in an out-of-
sample period" (p. 80). 
Similarly. Belsley (1988). in expressing his view on "Modelling and Forecasting Reliability". inter alia. 
writes: 
"The real art of forecasting arises precisely when forecasting into novel situations. i.e .• those lying 
outside the experience of the existing data" (p. 439). 
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Six) would involve a number of procedures that appear not to have been used with 
stock market data before. To some extent, perhaps, these time series methods could 
serve as alternatives to several previous methods which are considered to lack power 
by Summer (1986) and Shiller and Perron (1986). 
Summers (1986) questions the power of common tests of market efficiency. 
The inability of these tests to reject the hypothesis of market efficiency, according to 
the author, does not mean that they provide evidence in favour of its acceptance. In 
fact, the data in conjunction with these tests (such as the serial correlation tests), the 
author argues, provide no evidence against the view that financial market prices 
deviate widely and frequently from rational valuation. Shiller and Perron (1986) have 
shown that it is wrong to presume that power of tests of the random walk hypothesis 
must be high just because there are very many observations. 
S.2.4-Tbe Random Walk vis-a-vis Mean ReversionlMean Aversion in Stock 
Returns: 
Do stock prices or returns follow a random walk; or, are they mean 
reverting or mean averting? If they are predictable, they might not follow a 
random walk. 
The random walk is one of the oldest and most well-known models of the 
behaviour of stock price movements. From our survey of the literature in Chapter 
Three, we found that it had been almost the consensus among early researchers that 
the random walk in general, is a good approximation of stock price behaviour. Recent 
researchers have challenged this view however. As we have discussed in Chapter Four, 
the literature on mean reversion, excess volatility and the overreaction hypothesis, 
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appears to reject the belief that stock prices and returns follow a random walk. 
While most results that challenge the idea that share prices follow a random 
walk come from the well-established exchanges, the possibility of mean reversion 
and/or mean aversion in stock prices/returns on the KLSE does not appear to have 
been extensively investigated. Our study attempts to examine this issue of randomness 
in stock returns on the KLSE. 
Our survey of literature indicates that heretofore, there has been only one study 
[by Kok and Goh (1994)] which examined the presence of mean reversion22 in the 
KLSE's stock prices/returns. The data that they used in this study, however, are only 
the weekly closing share price indices over a period of eight years, 1984 to 1991. To 
cover this gap, the data base for our mean reversion study will be the daily 
prices/returns of fifty individual company shares, over a period of eleven years, 1984 
to 1994 [see Chapter Seven] 
5.3-Forecastina Models 
S.3.1-Historical Background 
Many of the forecasting techniques used today have roots that date to the late 
eighteenth century [see e.g., Wegman (1983); Sorenson (1970)]. These methods were 
further developed in the nineteenth century [see Hanke and Reitsch (1992, p. 1]. For 
example, the method of least-squares was apparently used by Karl Friedrich, the great 
German mathematician in 1795, though it was first published by Legendre in 1809 
22Detailed critical review of literature on mean reversion is provided in Chapter Four. 
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[Kailath (1974, p. 147; see also Sorenson (1970), p. 63]23. 
However, the scientific foundations of what was to become the field of 
forecasting had only been laid down by the late 1930s - for example, with the 
development of autoregressive and moving average models [Makridakis (1986)]. The 
Russian mathematician, Kolmogorov in 1941 and Nobert Wiener in 1942, 
independently developed a linear minimum mean-square estimation technique that 
provided the basis of modern smoothing or filtering theory [see Sorenson (1970), p. 
63; Makridakis (1976), p. 48)]. 
By the late 1960s and 1970s, partly due to the work of Kalman (1960) and the 
influence of the Box and Jenkins (1970) methodology, the field of statistical 
forecasting started to become more widely applied. Kalman (1960) for example. 
changed the conventional formulation of the prediction problem into the state vector 
model or the state space model [see Otter (1978, p. 41]. 
By 1970, 'scientific' forecasting had been extensively practised. For example. 
predictions in the areas of population, transportation, energy, material prices, economy 
and business, had been made and recorded [Makridakis (1986), p. 17]. The 
decade of 1970s also witnessed the development of what is known as Bayesian 
Forecasting. Bayesian forecasting (as it is known in the United Kingdom) proposed 
by Harrison and Stevens (1971, 1976), is primarily a univariate time series forecasting 
method24• The mathematical basis of the Bayesian forecasting models of Harrison 
21be method of least-squares was then extended to stochastic processes by KoJmogorove. Krien and 
Weiner [see Otter (1978). p. 41]. 
24 According to Fildes (1983). Bayesian methods have also been proposed in the United States. but Jess 
general than those of Harrison and Stevens. 
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and Stevens is the state-space representation of the Kalman filter [Kalman (l960)f5• 
In fact, these models have their roots in the exponential smoothing models of Brown 
(1959,1963), Holt (1957) and Winters (l960i6• 
During recent years - after several decades of important theoretical 
developments, empirical findings and practical experience gained through applications 
- the field of forecasting can be considered to have been entering into a stage of 
maturity. Today, with the advent and widespread use of electronic computers and with 
the development of more sophisticated forecasting techniques and computer programs, 
the field of forecasting has received increased attention. 
Actually, the forecast, as stressed by Montgomery and Johnson (1976, p. 3), 
is not an end in itself; it is merely a means to an end. Since a forecast is rarely 
accurate, accepting and understanding the size and nature of forecasting errors, as 
underlined by Makridakis (1986), is crucial: it facilitates learning and reduces the 
chances of making similar mistakes in the future. This is so because, the alternative 
of no forecasting is unlikely to improve our ability to cope better with the future. 
Expressed differently. despite the fact that errors are inherently a part of any 
forecasting procedure, forecasting is essential in improving our understanding of the 
future and hence, facilitating the tasks of planning and strategy [see Makridakis 
(1991), p. 123]. In short, forecasting helps us to reduce risk in making decisions. 
The magnitude of the forecasting errors, as suggested by Montgomery and 
25See Harrison and Stevens (1976), Meinhold and Singpurwalla (1983), Makridakis and Wheelwright 
(1977, p. 427) and Duncan and Hom (1972). 
26See Harrison and Stevens (1976), p. 206; Fildes (1983), p. 139. 
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Johnson (1976), depends upon the forecasting system used27 • In his survey of 
literature however, Makridakis (1986) did not find any study that had shown a clear 
superiority of one method over another: there was not any single method, which over 
time, consistently outperformed the remaining methods28 . Thus, Makridakis (1986) 
suggests that, "The attitude that a single method can forecast well across all situations 
is not supported by the empirical evidence" (p. 22). 
At present, there are many forecasting methods and models available for 
users29. This chapter introduces two of the forecasting techniques employed in the 
thesis: the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) and the exponentially 
weighted regression (EWR). 
S.3.2-The Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) 
The techniques of averaging or smoothing are well-known in the theory and 
practice of forecasting30, One of such techniques is known as the moving average. 
In a simple moving average, a constant number of data points (n) is specified 
271n Batchelor and Dua's (1990) words, 
"The accuracy of any forecast depends on objective features of the environment. such as the nature of 
the variable being forecast and the length of the forecast horizon. and on attributes of the forecaster, 
such as his theory (ideology) concerning the process generating the forecast variable. and the technique 
by which that theory is used to generate a quantitative forecast" (p. 3). According to Makridakis 
(1986, p. 35), the more the people can influence the future. the more difficult it is for quantitative methods 
to predict it. This is because, people's actions can change established patterns and relationships and render 
quantitative forecasting inaccurate. 
28Batchelor and Dua (1990) also agree with this view when they write: 
"No ideology or technique yields consistently more accurate forecasts than others" (p. 3). 
29Makridakis (1978) distinguishes the time-series methods into six major methodologies: smoothing 
models, decomposition models, ARMA (autoregressive and moving average) schemes. filters, leading 
indicators, and various forms of trend extrapolation and naive approaches. 
30 According to Hanke and Reitsch (1992), the assumption underlying these techniques is that he 
fluctuations in past values represent random departures from some smooth curve. So, once these short-term 
fluctuations are smoothed, the curve can be used to project into the future in order to produce a forecast. 
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at the outset and a mean is computed for the more recent observation. Then, as each 
new observation becomes available, a new mean is computed by dropping the oldest 
value and including the newest value. The process can be represented as 
(5.3) 
n 
where 
MI = moving average at time t; 
YI+1 = forecasted value for the next period; 
YI = actual value at period t; 
n = number of terms in the moving average. 
Thus, a simple moving average for period t is simply the arithmetic mean of 
the n most recent observations. Equal weights are assigned to each observation. 
However, as pointed out by Davis (1941), if the purpose of estimating the level of a 
series of observations is to use it for forecasting future observations, it would be more 
reasonable and appealing to use a moving average which gives more weight to the 
recent data than past data. For instance, instead of using a simple moving average (n 
= 5) 
(YI-4 + YI-3 + YI-2 + Ylol + YI) 
, (5.4) 
5 
we might use 
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(5.5) 
15 
In the expression (5.3)31 we have given 5 times as much weight to Yt as to Yt-4 , 
instead of equal attention (weight) as given to the ordinary moving average as in the 
expression (5.2). Meanwhile, the weighted moving average in the form of the 
expression (5.3) suffers two disadvantages [Gilchrist (1976, p. 50)]: 
(i) it only uses the five latest observations and ignores the rest; 
(ii) it does not possess a very simple recurrence form. 
To overcome these disadvantages, a set of weights - the 'exponential' set of 
weights -is introduced in a model known as the exponential weighted moving 
average (EWMA). As noted earlier, smoothing (averaging) methods in forecasting 
involve the formation of averages by giving higher weight to the more recent 
observations than the earlier ones. If the highest weight is given to the current 
observation and the weight given to the other observations decline geometrical1y 
(exponentially) as they become more distant, then the resulting average is known as 
the exponentially weighted averages or the exponentially smoothed series [Holden et.ai 
(1991), p. 22]. The operation of the EWMA is known as exponential smoothinR 
[Kendall and Ord (1990), p. 129]. 
Exponential smoothing32, as defined by Gaynor and Kirpatrick (1994, p. 290), 
is a method for continually revising an estimate or forecast by accounting for more 
31The divisor, 15, is the sum of weight: 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5. 
32Por an excellent review of the techniques of exponential smoothing, see Gardner (1985). See also 
Johnson and Montgomery (1979), 
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recent changes or for fluctuations in the data33 • Using this procedure, the forecast for 
period t+l (Le., a new estimate) is the combination of the forecast for the present 
period (Le., period t) plus a portion of the random error (Y. - Y.) generated in the 
present time period: 
(5.6) 
Normally, equation (5.4) is written as34 
S. = S._1 + a.(Y. - S._I) (5.7) 
where 
S. = the estimated or forecasted value for the next time period which is made 
in the present time period, t; 
S._1 = the estimated or forecasted value for the present time period which is 
made in the last time period, t-l; 
Y. = the actual value (or the actual data point) in the present time period; 
Y. - S\_1 or e, = the forecasted error term for the present time period; 
a. = a weight (or percentage), which, in theory, can range from 0.001 to 1.00. 
It reflects the speed at which the new forecast adjusts to the error term. 
By rearranging equation (5.5), we get equation (5.6): 
33Fluctuations in the data could be caused by random error, an unexplained component, or an 
unpredictable outside incident. 
34Gaynor and Kirkpatrick (1994, p. 290); Montgomery and Johnson (1976. p. 49). 
224 
(5.8) 
which can be expressed in words as follows: 
Forecast for the next period = weight x (present period observation) + 
(1 - weight) x (present period forecast) 
The operation defined by equation (5.6) is known as simple exponential 
smoothing or first-order exponential smoothing, and Sl is called the smoothed value 
or the smoothed statistic. 
To see more clearly how a forecast is constructed in an exponentially smoothed 
model (i.e., the EWMA) where past values of a series are smoothed in a decreasing 
(exponential) manner (with more weight given to the more recent observation), 
consider a set of weights: a, a(l - a), a(1 - a)2, .... In other words, to represent 
weight, a is used for the most recent observation, a( I - a) for the next most recent, 
a(l - a)2 for the next. and so forth. Using these weights, each time period, the 
weighted observation together with the weighted estimate for the present period, are 
combined to produce a new period forecast. Through the process of continuous 
substitution, the forecasted level of the series at time t, as shown in Gaynor and 
Kirkpatrick (1994, p. 291), is as follows: 
(5.9) 
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To recapitulate, following Muth (1960), the EWMA forecast arises from the 
following model of expectations adapting to changing conditions: 
Let YI be the part of a time series which cannot be explained by trend, 
seasonal or any other systematic factors; let F, represent the forecast, or expectation 
of YI on the basis of information available through the (t-l )st period. By assuming that 
the forecast is changed from one period to the next by an amount proportional to the 
latest observed error, 
(5.10) 
By solving the above difference equation, we can obtain a general formula for the 
EWMA forecases: 
.... 
FI = a ~ (1 - atlYI. i ,e, (5.11 ) 
Nelson (1973) shows that the EWMA is a true average since the weights sum 
to unity. That is, a + a(l - a) + a(l - a)2 + a(l - a)3 + ... = 1. 
As discussed in Muth (1960), since the weights attached to prior values of Y I 
add up to unity, the EWMA forecasting scheme does not, in this respect, introduce 
any systematic bias36• What makes the EWMA procedure particularly attractive, 
3Scf. Nelson (1973, p. 7), Gilchrist (1976, p. 51) West and Harrison (1986, p. 55), Holden 
et.ai (1991, p. 22), Harvey (1993, p. 110; 1990, p. 25) 
3~n Jones's (1966) words, "Since the weights sum to unity, the smoothed time series has a tendency 
to follow changing mean value" (p. 241). 
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according to Kendall and Ord (1990), is that the model satisfies a recursive relationJ7 
and thus, to update the forecast, we need only the latest observation and the previous 
forecast. 
While the weighting pattern in the EWMA algorithms may be adjusted by 
selecting different values of alpha (a), the appropriate weighting factor is obtained by 
simulating the smoothing process several times until an a value that yields the 
smallest sum of square errors or mean square error, is found38• In doing so, we can 
be guided by the fact that the actual value of (l determines the weight given to the 
current observation - and hence. the extent to which this current value influences the 
forecast. Expressed differently. the speed at which fast values of the data lose their 
importance, depends on the value of a [Gaynor and Kirkpatrick (1994. p. 295]39. 
A large alpha value will result in a forecast that responds quickly to changes 
in the data, since. in this case, large weights are given to the most recent observations 
included in the forecast or estimate. So, if we require a rapid respond to change in the 
data, a large weighting factor would be necessary. According to Harvey (1993. p. 
Ill), a value of unity for (l means that all the information needed for forecasting is 
contained in the current observation. 
37This recurrence relation is clearly shown in Harvey (1993. p. 110). For an excellent review of 
recursive approaches to time series analysis, see Young (1974). 
38 A number of authors, including Kendall and Ord (1990. p. 130) and Harvey (1993. p. 111) 
recommended that the values for a are typically in the range of 0.05 and 0.30, depending on the volatility 
of the series. Brown (1959, 1963) originally argued that the smoothing coefficient should, in general. be 
between 0.001 and 0.3. Gardner (1985) however. notes that there is a considerable amount of empirical 
support for the practical use of larger alpha values (or smoothing constants). Newbold (1989) postulates that 
it is not surprising that the use of larger smoothing constants in many empirical studies has led to smaller 
mean squared errors: "Many business and economic time series follow models that are close to a random 
walk" (p. 525). Accordingly, based on the assumption that share prices follow a random walk, in this study 
we are using a large alpha value as the discount factor. 
39 Cf. Nelson (1973). p. 7. 
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Conversely, when the value of alpha is very small, the new forecast will be 
very similar to the old forecast - the new forecast will not reflect with much speed, 
any changes in the parameters. As such, if predictions are required to be stable and 
random errors to be smoothed out, a small weighting factor is needed [Gaynor and 
Kirkpatrick (1994, p. 295]. Harvey (1993, p. 111) points out that, if a value of ex equal 
to zero were admissible, it would mean that no updating would take place. 
To begin our forecast using equation (5.4) or equation (5.6) [or, equivalently, 
equation (5.9)], we need a value of alpha (which can be obtained by trial and error), 
and an initial forecast value. As suggested in Holden et.al (1991, p. 23), a suitable 
initial forecast might be the average of the first few values of the series or the most 
recent actual value. These authors also have the view that, in general, the smoothing 
methods are particularly applicable when the patterns in the data are changing, so that 
the last few observations include important information. 
To generalise, the ideas behind this forecasting approach, as described by 
McKenzie (1985) are simple and attractive: 
"The forecast of future values are weighted averages of observations with more 
recent having greater weight than those of more distant past. The motivation 
for such weighting is that, in this unstable situation, more recent data are 
inherently more relevant to the future than earlier values" (p. 33). 
S.3.3-The Exponentially Weighted Regression <EWR) 
The method of EWR is virtually an extended version of the EWMA. If the 
EWMA provides a method to predict a constant level, the EWR can be used to predict 
a trend term. To quote McKenzie (1978) in describing the relationship between the 
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EWMA and the EWR (or the general exponential smoothing), 
"It is used to predict a constant level, and a second difference-equation can be 
added to allow prediction of a trend tenn in two distinct ways. A 
generalization which can deal with polynomial trend is known as Multiple 
Smoothing .... An extension enabling the procedure to cope with seasonals 
and growth tenns is called General Exponential Smoothing" (p. 450). 
In general ising the EWMA, Brown (1963) introduced a new approach by 
setting up forecasting procedures in a regression framework and adopting the method 
of discounted least squares. This technique which is known in the literature as 
discounted least squares or general exponential smoothing40 or EWR, is basically 
designed for the estimation and extrapolation of straight lines [West and Harrison 
(1989, p. 218]. 
In the ordinary least squares procedure, the parameters are assumed constant. 
This implies that, in estimating the coefficients by ordinary least squares, each 
observation (recent and past), has the same importance in detennining the estimates. 
The Brown's EWR method on the other hand, was developed to give more weight to 
recent observations by considering a discount factor in the least squares criterion41 . 
To illustrate the general exponential smoothing or the EWR procedure, 
consider a linear growth predictor, so that standing at time t, the forecast of Y1+k will 
be of the form42 
40See e.g .• Abraham and Ledolter (1983). Newbold and Boss (1990). 
41Abraham and Ledolter (1983. p. 101); Montgomery and Johnson (1976. p. 75). 
42See Newbold and Boss (1990. p. 189); Harrison (1967. p. 836). 
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k = 1,2, ... (5.12) 
where the quantities ~ and bl are the intercept and the slope of the linear forecast 
function. In order to implement a forecasting procedure of this sort, we need to 
determine the appropriate values for ~ and b,. The method least squares suggests 
selecting those values for which the sum of squares 
( ... 1 
S = ~ [YI_j - (~ - jb,)f 
\1':.0 
(5.13) 
is minimum. Equation (5.11), according to Newbold and Bos (1990, p. 189), would 
be appropriate if our time series were generated by the global linear trend model 
j = 0,1,2, ... , (t-1) (5.14) 
where YI_j are the observed values, el_j are error terms with zero means, fixed 
variances, and no autocorrelation. Nonetheless, as stressed by Newbold and Bos 
(1990), such global trend models rarely provide a good description of the behaviour 
of real business and economic time series. Accordingly, by thinking in terms of a 
locally evolving linear trend pattern, with the most recent estimate of trend to be 
projected forward for forecasting, equation (5.11) needs to be modified43 • 
Now, under a local linear trend model, information from the past would be 
discounted. If, for example, we attach weight one to the squared discrepancy between 
4~is is because. the expression implies that in forming the sum of squares. the same weight is given 
to the current time period. t, as to less relevant distant time periods. 
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the observation and the forecast function in the current time period. the appropriate 
weight for the previous period would be B. for the period before that would be 02' and 
so on. In this case. B which discounts past observations exponentially and having the 
value between zero and one, is known as a discount factor. Then. using the discount 
factor O. ~ and b, are chosen so that the quantity minimised is44 : 
t -l 
S*I =.L &[YI.j - ~ + jbl ]2 J'=-c 
so that ~ and b, satisfy the recurrence relationships4s: 
(5.15) 
(5.16) 
(5.17) 
where el = YI - ~'I - bl . l • This approach is known as the method of discounted least 
squares or the EWR46• 
According to Montgomery and Johnson (1976. p. 75), a major advantage of 
this method is that it is very efficient computationally: Compared to regression 
analysis as a forecasting technique, in this method the estimated parameters are 
updated in a simpler way to account for the most recent observation. That is, ~ and 
b, are updated each period without reference to information before t-l. Newbold and 
44See Newbold and Bos (1990), p. 190. Cf. West and Harrison (1989), p. 218; Granger and Newbold 
(1986), p. 169; Abraham and Ledolter (1983), p. 101 and Harvey (1990), p. 28. 
4sHarrison (1967), p. 836; West and Harrison (1989), p. 219. 
~or a systematic derivation of this technique, see Brown (1963); Montgomery and Johnson (1976). 
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Bos (1990, p. 191) posit that an apparent advantage of the general exponential 
smoothing algorithm is that forecasts depend on the specification of just a single 
parameter - the discount factor, a. In their expository paper on "Discount Weighted 
Regression", Harrison and Johnston (1984) argue that this recursive procedure47 is 
simple to program and involves no matrix inversion. 
Makridakis et.ai (1983) posit that this Brown's one-parameter linear 
exponential smoothing is the method preferred for nonstationary, nonseasonal data, 
largely because the method has only one parameter (versus Holt's two). In practice, 
this parameter takes only a restricted range of values, although theoretically a can 
assume any value between 0 and 1. According to the authors, experience suggests that 
the optimal value for a lies in the range of 0.1 to 0.2; and with this narrowed set of 
choices for a, this method is usually viewed as being easier to apply. 
Another advantage of this procedure as shown in Kendall and Ord (t 990, p. 
131) is that it may be extended to consider polynomial models. 
S.3.4-Conunent 
This study employs the techniques of exponential smoothing in order to 
examine the issue of stock market forecastability. Exponential smoothing, an approach 
which was first introduced by Holt (1957), was elaborated and widely applied by 
Brown (1959, 1963) and Holt et.al (1960). Other important contributors in this area 
would include Winters (1960), Brown and Mayer (1961), Theil and Wage (1964), 
Trigg (1964) and Harrison (1965). 
47 As pointed out by Zehnwrith (1983. p. 119). a recursive approach allows one to forgo many of the 
computations and storage requirements that would be required if one were to process all the data at the end 
of each time period. 
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The methods of exponential smoothing48 which, in the literature of control 
engineering are known as filtering [Mehra (1974)], are widely used for forecasting and 
modelling time series49• According to Makridakis (1976), while the methods of 
exponential smoothing were introduced around 1960 by operations researchers, within 
a few years they were utilized on a grand scale by business enterprises and the 
military. These methods are popular in many industrial applications such as production 
planning, production scheduling and inventory control50• Nonetheless, our survey of 
literature does not indicate that exponential smoothing methods have been employed 
in any previous studies of stock market behaviour. 
Several authors attributed the popUlarity of exponential smoothing procedures in 
practical applications to a number of advantages~l. Montgomery and Johnson (1976) 
who consider exponential smoothing as one of the most widely used classes of 
procedures for smoothing discrete time series in order to forecast the immediate future, 
attribute the popularity of this approach to its simplicity, its computational efficiency, 
the ease of adjusting its responsiveness to changes in the process being forecast, and 
its reasonable accuracyS2. Pecar (1994) perceives exponential smoothing as an ideal 
method due to its simplicity, acceptable accuracy, efficiency and adaptability. 
48Sometimes these methods are referred to as "adaptive" methods, implying their ability to adjust their 
smoothed vaJue depending upon the magnitude and nature of the error [Makridakis (1976)). 
49For an excellent review of the techniques of exponential smoothing. see Gardner (1985). Makridakis 
and Wheelwright (1977, p. 425) posit that exponential smoothing resembles filters in terms of computational 
simplicity, recursive updating and infinite memory. 
SOSee e.g., Brown (1959. 1963), Gardner (1985), Makridakis and Wheelwright (1989), and Winters 
(1960). 
slTheir disadvantage, as suggested by Makridakis (1976) is that there are several models available: 
users have to select the one best suited to their data and personal preferences. 
52 See also Johnson and Montgomery (1979). 
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The procedure of "adaptive" or "exponential" forecasting as argued by Theil 
and Wage (1964) is based on a weighted average of only two sources of evidence: the 
latest evidence (i.e., the most recent observation) and the value computed one period 
before. "As such, it is an easy, quick and cheap method; very little information is 
needed for a forecast; also, the most recent infonnation is used" (p. 198). 
Gaynor and Kirkpatrick (1994, p. 312) underline the fact that the ease in 
updating a forecast by exponential smoothing often outweighs any gain made in using 
a more complicated technique. For this reason, according to the authors, exponential 
smoothing is frequently used in generating short-tenn forecasts. 
Gardner (1985, p. 1) describes the popularity and advantages of exponential 
smoothing in the following words: 
"Exponential smoothing methods are widely used in industry. Their popularity 
is due to several practical considerations in short-range forecasting. Model 
fonnulations are relatively simple .... Only limited data storage and 
computational effort are required. Tracking signal tests for forecast control are 
easy to apply. 
"Perhaps the most important reason for the popularity of exponential 
smoothing is the surprising accuracy that can be obtained with minimal effort 
in model identification". 
Makridakis and Hibon (1991), suggest two advantages of using the exponential 
smoothing approaches in forecastini3: 
(i) although extremely simple and easy to model, these methods have been 
found by many studies to be as accurate as more complex and statistically 
S3See also Johnson and Montgomery (1979. p. 39). Makridakis (1986). 
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sophisticated alternatives; 
(ii) these methods are robust, easy to program, require a minimum of historical 
data and the cost of running them on the computer is the smallest of all available 
alternati ves. 
In summary, the major advantages of exponential smoothing procedures are: 
their simplicity and their short-term accuracy. 
5.4-Concludin& Remarks 
In this chapter, we emphasise the literature that relates most closely to the 
objectives of this dissertation. Because most of the methodologies we employ are 
relatively unique to stock market research, we are unable to devote much space to 
directly related empirical studies. Instead, we survey material from the forecasting 
literature providing background to methodology adopted in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
6. I-Introduction 
This chapter is developed in four sections and features the statistical methods 
to be employed in investigating the issues highlighted and discussed in Chapter Five. 
These statistical methods given in Section 6.3, are design to test the null hypothesis 
listed in Section 6.2. Section 6.4 concludes the chapter. 
6.2-Hypotheses 
Our empirical investigations of the behaviour of stock prices/returns on the 
KLSE will revolve around the following major null hypotheses: 
HOt: In general, stock returns on the KLSE do not behave significantly 
differently from those on developed equity markets. 
801: The correlations of returns between the KLSE and foreign Exchanges are 
not significantly different from zero. 
H03: In terms of "forecastability", the KLSE is efficient. The "forecastability" 
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of stock returns on the KLSE could not be improved even if some newly developed 
forecasting procedures are employed. 
H04: Stock returns on the KLSE follow a random walk: they are not mean 
reversive andlor mean aversive. 
6.3-Test Desi2D 
The methods of measurement and the techniques to be used in testing our 
hypotheses, are developed and explained in the following sub-sections. 
6.3.1-The Statistical Properties of Stock Returns: A Preliminary 
Comparative Analysis 
To understand the general behaviour of prices/returns of stocks traded on the 
KLSE, we begin our empirical study by examining some statistical properties of stock 
returns, using the two widely referred indices: the KLSE Composite Index and the 
EMAS (all share) Index. The daily, weekly and monthly performances of these indices 
are to be compared with the performances of two indices from the New York Stock 
Exchanges (i.e., the New York Composite Index and the Dow Jones Composite 65 
Index), the London Stock Exchange (i.e., the Financial Times All-share Index and the 
Financial Times lOO-share Index) and the Hong stock Exchange (Le., the Hang Seng 
Bank Index and the Datastream Total Market Index)l. The Daily, weekly and monthly 
IThe New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) are chosen for this 
comparison because they are among the most mature and sophisticated exchanges in the world. The 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) is included in this comparison because of its idiosyncrasies; The HKSE 
is one of the largest stock exchanges in the Asia-Pacific region; it is an exchange which has just, within 
the past few years, "graduated" from its "emerging" status [see Wilcox (1992); it is often considered as one 
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indices from Australia [i.e., the 'Australian Joint Stock Exchange' (AJSE) All 
Ordinary) are also included in this comparison because, like Hong Kong, Australia is 
located in the Pacific Region and geographically quite close to Malaysia2• 
Here, stock returns are defined as 
(6.1) 
where 
Rit = Return on market (index) i at time t; 
1\ = Stock price index at time t; 
1\_. = Stock price index at time t-l; and 
In = Natural or Napierian logarithm. 
The statistical properties to be examined are the mean, standard deviation, 
kurtosis and skewness3• Particularly, our interest here is, to compare the mean and 
standard deviation/variance of stock returns4 on the KLSE with those means and 
standard deviations of stock returns from the selected exchanges mentioned above. 
The mean of stock returns on the KLSE (l.) will be compared with the mean 
of the most speculative markets in the world [see e_g_. Dawson (1982)]_ Allan (1982) concluded that Hong 
Kong was the most volatile of 18 world equity markets which he studied over the period of 1972 to 1981 
[See also Solnik (1996)]. 
2Historically, as mentioned in Chapter Two, the KLSE was modelled after the Sydney Stock Exchange 
when it was established in the early 1960s. 
~e formulae for calculating these statistical propenies, can be found in most elementary statistical 
textbooks. See also Kritzman (1994)_ 
"In financial analysis, it is common that a return distribution is described by its expected return (which 
is also referred to as the first moment of the distribution and is measured by the arithmetic mean of the 
returns) and standard deviation. The variance (i.e., the standard deviation squared) which measures the 
dispersion of the observations around the mean, is commonly known as the second central moment or the 
second moment about the mean. 
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of stock returns on another market (x2), based on the following null hypothesis (Ho) 
and alternative hypothesis (HI): 
The Z-test for two population means defined below5 , will be used: 
Z=-'--- (6.2) 
where ax. x is the standard error of the difference. 
The standard error of the difference between sample means is given by 
(6.3) 
where 812 and ~ 2 are the sample variances. [Here, XJ and X2 are assumed to be 
uncorrelated] . 
In comparing the variances/standard deviations of stock returns (i.e., SJ and S2) 
SSee e.g., Walsh (1990), pp. 108 & 109; Kanji (1993), p. 23; Clark (1991), p. 110. 
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between two exchanges, our hypotheses are as follows: 
Under the null hypothesis that the variances/standard deviations of the two 
populations are equal, we will be using the F-test statistic. In this case, the test 
statistic F = S.2/S/ follows the F-distribution with (n. - 1, n2 - 1) degrees of freedom 
[Kanji (1993), p. 37]. 
6.3.2-Examinina the Interrelatedness of the KLSE and Foreign 
Exchanges 
Following the precedent in the literature, the linkages between the KLSE and 
overseas exchanges are to be examined by using stock price indices6• This 
examination involves a number of steps and procedures as follows: 
6As noted by Ripley (1973. p. 357). a stock price index. while not accurately reflecting the variation 
of anyone stock price. does represent a good description of general market movements. Even though the 
results obtained from any study using stock market indices pertain only to the general market movements, 
they have a direct bearing on the trading strategies of investors· essentially institutional investors· whose 
diversified portfolios may move in tandem with the market average. Meanwhile, one weakness of 
price index. as EI-Erian and Kumar (1995. p. 332) point out is that, it may behave more systematically than 
its components because of the effect of averaging. 
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a) Cluster Analysis 
Techniques for cluster analysis', according to Everitt (1974), seek to separate 
a set of data into groups or clusters. Cluster analysis as defined by Lorr (1983, p. I), 
refers to a wide variety of techniques used to group entities into homogeneous 
subgroups on the basis of their similarities. It is a generic name for a variety of 
mathematical methods - numbering in hundreds - that can be used to find out which 
objects in a set are similar [Romesburg (1984), p. 2]. The end products of these 
techniques are known as classes, types, groups, categories or cluster. 
Since much research depends on the estimation of similarities between pairs 
of things, applications of cluster analysis are found in virtually all disciplines and 
professions8: they are also not new to the social scientists. Indeed, systematic 
grouping of objects on the basis of common properties dates back to Aristotle and 
Greeks [Lorr (1983), p. 7]. However, as our survey of literature seems to indicate that 
the method of cluster analysis which we will be using in this study has not been 
widely employed in the previous studies of stock market linkages9, it needs some 
explanation 10. 
'Besides cluster analysis, these techniques have been variously referred to as techniques of Q-anaiysis. 
topology. grouping, clumping, classification, numerical taxonomy and unsupervised pattern recognition. 
However. as underlined by Johnson and Wichern (1992, p. 573), clustering or grouping is distinct from the 
classification methods. While classification pertains to a known number of groups and its operational 
objective is to assign new observations to one of these groups, clustering analysis is a more primitive 
technique in that no assumptions are made concerning the number of groups or the group structure. In 
clustering, grouping is done on the basis of similarities or distances (dissimilarities). 
8See e.g .• Romesburg (1984), Everitt (1974) 
~rummen and Zimmermann (1992) have used cluster analysis as one of their approaches in examining 
the linkages among European stock markets. 
IOpor comprehensive expositions of the techniques of clustering. see e.g., Chatfield and Collins (1980), 
Romesburg (1884), Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990) and Johnson and Wichern (1992). 
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The techniques of cluster analysis are useful tools for data analysis in several 
different situations: Among others, they could be used to search for natural groupings 
in the data, to simplify the description of a large set of multivariate data and to 
generate hypotheses to be tested on future sample [see Everitt (1974), p. 5]. For the 
purpose of this study. cluster analysis is considered essential because of its ability, as 
claimed by Lorr (1983. p. 3): 
(i) to generate hypotheses within a body of data by discovering unsuspected 
clusters; 
(ii) to test hypothesised classes believed present within a certain group of 
cases; and 
(iii) to identify homogeneous subgroups characterised by attribute patterns 
useful for prediction. 
The input of a cluster analysis consists of a raw data matrix, where the set of 
objects (i.e .• the things whose similarities to each other we want to estimate) is 
represented in the m rows. and the set of variables (i.e., the attributeslI - the 
properties of the objects) is represented in the n columns. In other words. the initial 
step in a cluster analysis, involves the collection of raw data presented in an m x n 
matrix of measurements say X. where 
liThe term anribute here refers to a property capable of further division; it is a quantitative variable. 
Contrarily, the property of an object not capable of further division is known as quality. 
In this case, clustering involves the process of grouping entities (i.e .• things possessing certain 
properties) into subsets on the basis of their similarity across a set of attributes. 
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x = (6.4) 
In most cluster analysis, the next step involves the transforming of the data 
matrix into a square m x n matrix of interobject similarity or dissimilarity measures. 
Given the fact that the number of groups is not known, the problems of a cluster 
analysis as Lorr (1983, p. 3) points out, are threefold: (i) to choose a measure of 
interobject similarity, (ii) to select a method for forming subgroups once the indices 
of similarity (or dissimilarity) have been obtained, and (iii) to decide on the number 
of subgroups present in the data or to construct a hierarchical arrangement. In many 
respects, cluster analysis has been given its major impetus by the development of the 
high-speed computer and the rapid appearance of cluster algorithms, since about the 
middle of the 1950S12• 
While there are several types of clustering techniques, they can be broadly 
classified into hierarchical methods and nonhierarchical methods. For our purpose, 
we will be using the hierarchical methods. 
The hierarchical or multilevel methods can be subdivided as agglomerative or 
divisive. The agglomerative technique begins with all m individual cases or units. At 
each stage, it combines together the two entities or clusters that are closest. Finally, 
all cases are combined into one jamily l3 or cluster. 
12See Lorr (1983). Everitt (1974) 
13 A hierarchy in the context of cluster analysis may be viewed as a family of nested multilevel classes. 
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The divisive procedure on the other hand, operates in the opposite direction. 
It begins with the entire set or collection and subdivides or partitions it into finer and 
finer subsets at each level. 
The results of both agglomerative and divisive techniques may be presented 
in the form of tree or dendrogram [see Figures 6.1 and 6.2] - a two-dimensional 
diagram illustrating the fusions or partitions which have been made at each successive 
level. In this case, if the agglomerative methods build a tree from branches to the root, 
the divisive techniques begin at the root and form a branching sequence. If an 
agglomerative method starts at the base of the dendrogram and works upwards, a 
divisive procedure starts at the top of the dendrogram and works downwards. 
One of the methods for finding a hierarchical tree is known as the single 
linkage or nearest neighbour method. Under this procedure. groups are formed from 
the individual entities by merging nearest neighbours, where the term nearest 
neighbour connotes smallest distance or largest similarity. To illustrate the complete 
linkage algorithm. consider the matrix of distances between pairs of five objects. 
namely D I • as follows: 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 0 
2 9 0 
D. = {dik } = 3 3 7 0 (6.5) 
4 6 5 9 0 
5 11 10 2- 8 0 
[In this matrix, the element in the ith row and the kth column gives the 
distance, dit, between i and k]. 
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Treating each object as a cluster, the clustering starts by merging the two 
closest items. Since 
min (dik) = d53 = 2 (6.6) 
is the smallest entry in the matrix D1, objects 5 and 3 are merged to form the cluster 
(53). The distance between this group and the three remaining objects, 1,2, and 4, are 
obtained from D1 as follows: 
(6.7) 
(6.8) 
d(~I3)4 = min {d~, d34 } = min {8, 9} = 8 (6.9) 
Deleting the rows and column of D1 corresponding to objects 5 and 3 and adding a 
row and column for the cluster (53), we may obtain a new distance matrix Dl , giving 
inter-individual distances, and group-individual distances, as follows: 
(53) 
(53) [0 ! r 
1 
o 
9 
6 
2 
o 
5 
(6.10) 
The smallest entry or distance between pairs in D] is d(s311 = 3. So, we merge 
merge cluster (1) with cluster (53) to get the next cluster, (153). Now, the nearest-
neighbour distance are 
dOS3)2 = min{d12, d(53)2} = min{9, 7} = 7 (6.11 ) 
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(6.12) 
These may be rearranged in a distance matrix DJ : 
(531) 2 4 
(531) 0 
7 o (6.13) 
4 6 
The minimum nearest neighbour distance between pairs of clusters now is d(42) 
= 5. Then, objects 4 and 2 are merged to get the cluster (42). 
At this stage, we have two distinct clusters, (153) and (42). Their nearest 
neighbour distance is given by 
d(53)(42) = min {dOS3)4' dos3)2} = min {6, 7} = 6 (6.14) 
and the final distance matrix, D4, becomes 
(531) 
(531) 0 
(6.15) 
Therefore, clusters (153) and (42) are merged to form a single cluster of all 
five objects (12345). The groupings, and the distance/similarity levels at which they 
246 
occur, are illustrated in the following dendrogram 
Distance/similarity level 
6 
4 
2 1 
o 4 • 4 4 
1 3 5 2 4 
Figure 6.1 - Single Linkage Dendrogram 
Another method of hierarchical cluster analysis is known as the complete 
linkage or furthest neighbour method. This approach proceeds in much the same 
manner as single linkage. However, under this method, at each stage, the distance 
(similarity) between clusters is determined by the distance (similarity) between the two 
elements, one from each cluster, that are most distant. In other words, the distance 
between groups is now defined as the distance between their most remote pair of 
individuals. 
The complete-linkage clustering ensures that all items in a cluster are within 
some maximum distance (or minimum similarity) of each other. Since, in examining 
stock market linkages we are looking for stock markets which are 'nearest' in terms 
of similarity in their price movements, the complete-linkage clustering approach is 
considered not appropriate for our purpose. As such, the single-linkage or nearest 
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neighbour clustering method will be used. Further, since we are using Minitab to 
implement clustering process, we use correlation (as given in Minitab) to measure 
distance. 
The unique feature of a cluster (hierarchical) analysis is that, whichever method 
is chosen, the whole clustering scheme can be summarised in a dendrogram. While, 
at the bottom of a dendrogram all units form separate groups, at its top all units fall 
into a single group. 
In essence, cluster analysis is chosen as an approach in our analysis of stock 
market linkages because of its uniqueness: A dendrogram which is the end product of 
this procedure, as suggested by Krzanowski (1988), provides a good overall 
impression of the information contained in a matrix of dissimilarities. The clustering 
coefficient scale (which can be presented either in terms of similarity or in terms of 
dissimilarity) that can be placed at the side of the dendrogram, provides a graduation. 
Thus, by looking at a dendrogram one can see immediately which groups of individual 
cases or units are similar to each other. By just referring to the scale of the clustering 
coefficient, one can easily judge which groups are most, and which ones are least, 
homogeneous. Moreover, as Krzanowski (1988) advocates, the dendrogram can be 
'cut' at any chosen position to see which members fall into which groups, either at a 
chosen level of clustering coefficient or at a chosen number of groups. 
The techniques of cluster (hierarchical) analysis, albeit they are not new in the 
literature and practice, they are not widely used in stock market analysis. From our 
survey of literature, we have found that heretofore, there are only three studies which 
employed this approach in examining stock market behaviour. Panton et.al (1976) 
employed hierarchical clustering to examine comovement characteristics of twelve 
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major stock markets from developed countries using weekly price indices for a period 
of ] 963 to 1972. 
Cheung and Ho (1991) also used cluster analysis as one of their procedures in 
examining the intertemporal stability of the relationships between the Asian emerging 
markets (including Malaysia and Singapore) and developed markets. However, as far 
as the Malaysian stock market is concerned, the problem with this study is that the 
sample period chosen is between January 1977 and June 1988. During this period. the 
Malaysian stock market and the Singapore stock markets were twin stock markets. As 
such, the two markets were found to be moving very closely together. 
In another study. Drummen and Zimmermann (1992). employed the average 
linkage clustering method to examine "similarity" among twelve European stock 
markets based on daily index returns from January 1986 to November 1989. They 
found that the German stock market was very "similar" to the Swiss stock market and 
the U.K. stock market was very "similar" to the Netherlands stock market. 
As discussed above, hierarchical clustering analysis offers a number of 
advantages. and this method appears to be capable of producing useful results when 
it is employed to study stock market linkages. For these reasons, we chose this 
approach as one of our procedures in examining stock market linkages. 
b) Correlation (Pearson) Analysis 
Correlation analysis is the study of the relationship between two variables, and 
the correlation coefficient (r) is calculated to measure the strength as well as the 
direction of this linear relationship [Clark (1991), p. 65]. One statistic that can 
compute the correlation coefficient between two variables. X and Y. is known as the 
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Pearson product-moment or simply Pearson coefficient, defined as l4 
O'xy Cov(X, Y) 
fxy = = 
O'xOy 
(6.16) 
[\1ar(X)\1ar(Y)]~ 
where O'x and O'y are the standard deviations for variable X and variable y, 
respectively. 
The correlation coefficient can range from + 1 to -1. While a correlation 
coefficient of -1.0 indicates a perfect negative or inverse relationship, a correlation 
coefficient of + 1.0 indicates a perfect positive or direct relationship. When r xy equals 
0, there is no relationship between the two variables (i.e., X and V). 
When the correlation coefficient is squared, it is known as the coefficient of 
determination. The coefficient of determination which is denoted as r2 and may range 
from 0.0% to 100.0%, tells us the percentage of variation in the dependent variable 
(Y) which is explained by the variable (X). 
To test the null hypothesis that the value of r is zero, the test statistic given by 
(6.17) 
is calculated and this follows Student's t-distribution with (n - 2) degrees of freedom 
[Kanji (1993, p. 33]. 
Correlation analysis is a method which has been widely used by previous 
14See Gaynor and Kirkpatrick (1994), p. 44; Ramanathan (1992), p. 30; Walsh (1990), p. 246. 
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researchers in examining international stock market linkages l5 • So, using this method 
in our study would enable us to compare our results with the results of previous 
studies. 
c) Partial Correlation Analysis 
Partial correlation analysis can be considered as a 'more detailed analysis of 
correlation' . It is a special case of correlation analysis: conditional correlation analysis. 
The partial correlation coefficient is a particularly useful tool in searching for 
causal relationships [Stoodley et.al (1980), p. 228]. So, for stock markets which appear 
to be highly correlated with the KLSE, we proceed with our study by examining their 
partial correlation coefficients. 
A partial correlation coefficient as defined by Daniel and Terrell (1992, p. 
559), is a measure of the contribution of an individual variable when the other 
variables are held constant. So, the purpose of computing the partial correlation 
coefficient is to measure the net correlation between the dependent variable and one 
independent variable after eliminating the influence of one or more variables in the 
model. 
Suppose that we have three variables, Y, Xl and X2• In order to exclude the 
influence of X2 on Y, we regress Yon X2 and find the residual e l = yo. To eliminate 
the influence of X 2 on XI' we regress XI on X 2 and find the residual e2 = Xl·. Then, 
Y· and Xl" representing the variations in Y and Xl respectively, left unexplained after 
we have removed the influence of X2 from both Y and Xl. The partial correlation 
ISSee e.g .• Grubel and Fadner (1971). Watson (1978). Errunza and Padmanabhan (1988). Othman Yong 
(1987/88. 1989. 1993). Hunter and Coggin (1990), Divecha et.ai (1992) and SpeideU and Sappenfield 
(1992). 
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between Y and Xl holding X2 constant - denoted by ry1.2 - is nothing else than the 
simple correlation between the residuals, Y· and Xl·; that is l6 
(6.18) 
The partial correlation between Y and XI holding X 2 constant, which ranges 
in value from -1 to + 1 (as does simple correlation), can be expressed in terms of 
simple correlation as 
(6.19) 
As far as our empirical work is concerned, we are going to find the partial 
correlation between Y and X, holding Rand S constant. This process involves the 
following steps: 
(i) constructing Y· by finding residual of y, after regressing Y on R; 
(ii) constructing X· by finding residual of X, after regressing X on R; 
(iii) constructing Y·· by finding residual of Y·, after regressing Y· on S; 
(iv) constructing X·· by finding residual of X·, after regressing X· on S. 
The final stage involves finding the correlation between Y·· and X··, which is 
the net correlation of Y and X after excluding the influence of Rand S. For example, 
we can implement the above process to find the partial correlation coefficient (or the 
l6ro the subscript. the symbol to the right of the decimal indicates which variable is held constant, 
while the two symbols to the left of the decimal indicate which variables are being correlated. 
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net correlation coefficient) between the stock price on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange at time t (KLSEt ) and the stock price on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
at time t (HKSEt) by excluding the influence of the KLSE'_I and the stock price on the 
Stock Exchange of Singapore at time t (SES,). 
It is worth noting here, as Salvatore (1982, p. 156) points out, that partial 
correlation coefficients give only an ordinal and not a cardinal, measure of net 
correlation. The sum of the partial correlation coefficients between the dependent and 
all the independent variables in the model need not add up to I. 
The coefficient of partial determination which is the square of the partial 
correlation. provides useful information about the interrelationships among variables. 
For instance, ~ y\'2 tells us what proportion of the remaining variability in Y is 
explained by XI after X2 has explained as much of the total variability in Y as it can 
[Daniel and Terrell (1992), p. 560]. 
To test the null hypothesis that ry l.2 is zero, we can use the t-test statistic as 
given by equation (5.17). but with (n - 4) degrees of freedom. 
6.3.3-Examining the "Forecastabllity" of Stock Returns 
While most studies found in the literature claiming that stock markets are 
predictable are based on 'in-the-sample' forecasts, this study attempts to examine the 
issue with the 'out-of-sample' approach. In doing so, some techniques from the theory 
of forecasting are used. 
Forecasting means predicting future events. Forecasting as defined by Gaynor 
and Kirkpatrick (1994, p. 2), refers to an attempt to foresee events by examining the 
past. In doing so, according to the authors, forecasting techniques may be based on 
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the experiences, judgements, and opinions of "experts" or on mathematical models that 
describe the pattern of past data. 
Belsley (1988) emphasises that good out-of-sample forecasting requires a 
"meaningful and proper" model: "In order reliably to forecast beyond the experience 
of the data (that is, beyond the situations represented in the data upon which estimates 
are based), it requires a meaningful and proper model, or equivalently for emphasis, 
without a meaningful and proper model, there can be no reliable forecasting beyond 
the experience of the data" (p. 439). 
In general, models are approximations to reality 17. They provide some 
relations between variables to facilitate current decisions or forecasting of the future. 
Models - econometric models essentially - attempt to explain economic or business 
phenomena and increase our understanding of relationships between and among 
variables. 
According to Makridakis (1986, p. 28), data series are characterised by random 
and systematic (or non-random) changes which can, in tum, be of a temporary or 
permanent nature. We hypothesise that, being an economic time series/H, a stock's 
prices or returns exhibit both types of changes - random and systematic changes l9 • 
I7Belsley (1988, p. 440) defines modelling as the act of providing the best possible description of one's 
understanding of the relevant aspects, both statistical and detenninistic, of the process or mechanism (the 
real-life phenomenon) that generates the data of interest. 
18Montgomery and Johnson (1976, p. 7) define a time series as a time-ordered sequence of observations 
(realizations) of a variable. 
19 As expressed in Makridakis (1991): 
..... we well know that economic and business series fluctuate a great deal. It is also well 
recognized that some of these fluctuations are random while others are systematic (which are, in tum, 
temporary or pennanent)" (p. 126). 
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Accordingly, these two types of movements are represented by two types of 
models20: the Steady Model (or also known as the Steady State Linear Dynamic 
Model) - to describe the random movements (or the constant process) in the time 
series; and the Linear Growth Model - to describe the systematic changes (or the 
upward drift and/or downward trends) in the data series. 
a) The Steady Model 
Vnder this model, stock prices or returns are assumed to follow a stochastic 
process represented by the following equations: 
(6.20) 
(6.21) 
where YI is the observed prices (or returns) for period t; VI may be thought of as the 
intrinsic value or the underlying level (of the process) at time t. VI and WI are 
uncorrelated random disturbances or noise, each with zero mean and variances V(V) and 
The first equation, equation (6.20), is known as the observation equation. It 
describes how data is generated from the explained factor plus a random noise (the 
unexplained factor). The assumption that the random component, VI' has an expected 
value of zero and its variance is constant [i.e., E(vl ) = 0 and V(v) = cf(v)1 is equivalent 
to saying that YI is a random variable with mean VI and variance cf(v)' 
2<These two types of models are discussed in Harrison (1967), Harrison and Stevens (197 I, 1976) and 
Smith (1979) So, for a detailed explanation and mathematical derivations of these models, see Harrison and 
Stevens (1976). 
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The second equation, equation (6.21), is known as the system equation. It 
reflects the underlying level which varies through time in the manner of a random 
walk. 
Time series forecasting, as pointed out by Montgomery and Johnson (1976, p. 
13), consists of estimating the unknown parameters in the appropriate model and using 
these estimates, projecting the model into the future to obtain a forecast. Here, 
assuming that we start at time t-l, we are interested in two variables: the next 
observation, YI, and the underlying level at that time, VI. So, as our first step, it is 
convenient to use the system equation to make a forecast of the value of V" given the 
information available at time t-l. In the second stage, we can employ the observation 
equation, and this leads to the forecast of the next observation, YI • 
The optimal predictor for this Steady Model as shown in Harrison (1967) is 
the simple exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA). The formula for the 
EWMA is given by the following equation [see equation (5.8) - Chapter Five]: 
(6.22) 
where 
YI+1 (or St) = the estimated or forecasted value for the next time period which 
is made in the present period, t; 
SI.I = the estimated or forecasted value for the present time period which is 
made in the last time period, t-l; 
Yt = the actual value (or the actual data point) in the present time period; and 
a = a weight ( or percentage). 
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The uniqueness of EWMA as a forecasting technique is that past values of a 
series are smoothed in a decreasing (exponential) manner by giving higher weight to 
the more recent observations than to the earlier ones. The speed at which past values 
of the data lose their importance can be easily manipulated by controlling the value 
of weight, a. In this study, we assign a value of unity to a, because the underlying 
assumption of our Steady Model is that stock prices/returns follow a random walk. 
A value of unity for (l would imply that all information needed for forecasting is 
contained in the current observation. Based on this predetermined (l value, the 
forecasted values (and errors) at various time periods can be obtained by employing 
equation (6.22) given above. 
b) The Linear Growth Model 
As suggested by Montgomery and Johnson (1976), a trend in the level of the 
process of a time series can be represented by a linear trend model. This can done by 
a simple extension of the Steady Model to incorporate the slope. This extended model, 
known as the Linear Growth Model'} states that the price (or return) for a stock at 
one period of time is equal to its value at the previous time plus the slope plus a 
random error: 
Observation Equation 
Y1 = U1+V1 
21Harrison and Stevens (1976, p. 217) claim that this model is highly relevant to applications. 
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System Equations 
v. = V._ I + b. + w. (6.23) 
(6.24) 
where b. represents the slope or growth rate at period t; E. is a random error with zero 
mean and variance V(E)' 
Forecasting under a system given by the Linear Growth Model, as stressed by 
Harrison and Stevens (1976, p. 207), involves two separate stages22: 
(i) to estimate the current parameter values - U. and b. - from the available data 
Y •• Y._ I• Y.-2 •••• ; and 
(ii) to extrapolate this information forward in time to make inferences as to 
future values of the observation variable Y.+k (k = 1, 2, ... ). 
In assessing the predictability of stock returns (or prices) using the Steady 
Model, the method of measurement that will be used, as mentioned above, is the 
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMAi3• For the Linear Growth Model, 
the Brown's (1963) method of exponentially weighted regression (EWR) will be used 
as the method of forecasting [see Chapter Five]. 
The optimal predictor of the Linear Growth Model as shown in Harrison 
(1967), appears to be the particular form of the Box and Jenkins predictor 
recommended by Holt (1957). Nonetheless, Harrison (1967) suggests that there is 
22See also Priestley (1976). p. 229. 
23Harrison (1967) has shown that for the generating process such as assumed under the Steady Model. 
the EWMA supplies the optimal linear least squares predictor. See also Muth (1960). 
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nothing to gain by using Holt's method instead of Brown's24; that Brown's method, 
as many have suggested, is at least as good as Holt's and it should therefore be 
preferred for non-seasonal forecasting [Makridakis (1976, p. 51]. 
This Brown's (1963) EWR - an extended version of the EWMA - is a 
forecasting procedure in a regression framework which is developed by adopting the 
method of discounted least squares. While in the ordinary least squares procedure the 
parameters are assumed constant, under the EWR a discount factor is used to give 
more weight to the recent observations. 
As pointed out by West and Harrison (1989) the EWR is a approach which is 
basically developed for the estimation and extrapolation of straight lines. So, in 
implementing the EWR forecasting procedure using 8 as the discount factor, the 
values of ~ and bl which are the intercept and the slope of the linear forecast function, 
respectively, are chosen so that the quantity (i.e., sum of squares) minimised is [see 
equation (5.15) - Chapter Five]: 
too\ 
S·. =.L 8j [YI.j - ~ + jb.]2 
"to 
(6.25) 
where Y\.j are the observed values; ~ and bl satisfy the recurrence relationship25 [see 
equations (5.16) and (5.17) - Chapter 51: 
24Comparing the Holt's and Brown's methods, Harrison (1967) arrived at the following conclusion: 
"Sampling errors associated with the estimation of Holt's forecasting parameters outweigh any 
theoretical advantage which the predictor may be thought to possess, and, therefore. it is more 
convenient to work with Brown's predictor" (p. 838). 
2SNotice that the weight/discount factor assigned to equation (6.26) is different from the one assigned 
to equation (6.27). This is because. equation (6.26) represents the level whereas equation (6.27) represents 
the growth term. 
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(6.26) 
(6.27) 
and the forecasted error term, el = YI - ~_I - bl_I' 
In the literature, it is suggested that the optimal value for B lies in the range 
of 0.1 and 0.2 [see e.g., Makridakis et.al (1983)]. In the present study, in searching 
for the minimum forecasting errors at various time period ahead, the values of B 
between 0.1 and 0.3 are used (on trial and error basis). 
In summary, the elegance of EWR as a forecasting model lies primarily in the 
fact that this general exponential smoothing algorithm enables us to discount past 
observations exponentially in the least squares criterion. Additiomilly, it is easy to 
apply because the set of choices for 0 values (as note above) is limited, and the 
method is easy to program and involves no matrix inversion. 
c) Combining Forecasts and the Multi-process Models 
Numerous approaches to forecasting economic variables are available. A 
number of authors including Makridakis (1986), advocate that forecasting errors could 
be minimised by combining various models and methods of forecasting26 : Two 
unbiased forecasts can be combined to produce a new forecast which is more accurate 
than either of its components. 
The idea behind the combination of forecasts or also known as composite 
forecasting, according to Bessler and Brandt (1981) is that oftentimes alternative 
26 A number of early works on combined forecasts - of notes, by Bates and Granger (1969), Newbold 
and Granger (1974) and Winkler (1984) - report some degree of success. For an excellent review of the 
literature on 'combining forecasts', see Holden el.al (1990), Chapter 3. 
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forecasts of the same random variable are available; each of them contains infonnation 
which is independent of that contained in the others: "Researchers, using empirical 
data have demonstrated that composite forecasting can, in fact, give forecasts which 
are preferred to any of the individual forecasts. Thus, any forecasting effort ought to 
seriously consider using such methods"27 (p. 513). 
Further, Montgomery and Johnson (1976), have the view that in forecasting 
time series we may need to use different models during various stages - we may need 
to switch from a 'constant-process model' to a 'trend-process model', and vice versa. 
Harrison and Stevens (1971, 1976) introduce the idea of multi-process models or 
alternatively known as mixture models [West and Harrison (1989), p. 437] - an 
approach that involves the handling of uncertainty, not of the parameters within a 
model, but of the model itself. This idea was developed based on the assumption and 
practical experiences that in real socio-economic applications there may be uncertainty 
as to which model obtains at any given time; that the process level may suddenly and 
unexpectedly change over time [Harrison and Stevens (1976)]. 
As discussed earlier, for the purpose of our study, movements in stock prices 
(or returns) are represented by two models: the Steady Model (SM), and the Linear 
Growth Model (LGM) as an alternative. Given the assumption that the true model can 
change from period to period; that share price changes are random - and at times, 
systematic - it appears to be impossible for us to be certain which model will operate 
in any given time period. 
27In concluding his paper on "Combined Forecasts", Winkler (1984) notes. 
"A combination of forecasts from two or more methods may well be more accurate than forecasts 
from individual methods. In general. the idea of combining forecasts has much to recommend it 
for use in actual forecasting practice. . . . 
"Combining forecasts. then. seems to be a very promising approach that has not been studied 
extensively. Thus. it deserves further study" (p. 293). 
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At time t-l, consider for example, the forecasts that can be made for the 
observation for period t. If model 1 (Le., the SM) had been correct at time t-l, it may 
continue in period t, or it may change to model 2 (i.e., the LGM). Similarly, if the 
LGM had been the correct model in period t-1, the correct model for period t might 
either be the LGM or the SM. These four possibilities are diagrammatically 
summarised below: 
time t-l 
SM~------------------~ SM 
LGM 
Figure 6.2 - The Four Possibilities of the Correct Model at Time t 
Such an uncertainty necessitates transition probabilities (1t) from one model 
to another. These transitions need not be equally likely, however. 
For the purpose of our research, we require the transition probabilities that 
model 1 [i.e., MO)t.1 or SMt.l ] which is the correct model at time t-l will continue to 
be the correct model at time t [i.e., 1t,-+,l or it will change to model 2 [i.e., 1tl-+2]; and 
equivalently that model 2 [i.e., M(2)t.1 or LGMt-I] which is the correct model at time 
t-l will continue to be the correct model at time t [i.e., 1t2-+2] or it will change to 
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model 1 [i.e., ~-+I]. These four probabilities were predetermined intuitively28 and are 
as follows: 
1t1-+1 : 0.95 
1t1-+2: 0.05 
1t2-+2: 0.95 
1t2-+1: 0.05 
The aforementioned transition probabilities were chosen/predetermined based 
on the assumption that when stock prices/returns are following a particular model (i.e., 
model 1 or SMi9 at time t-l, it is most likely that it will follow the same model at 
time period t. Hence, we assign a probability of 0.95 to the '1t1-+1' process. Likewise, 
when stock prices are following LGM at time t-l, it is most likely that they will 
follow the same model at time t-l and hence a probability of 0.95 is given to the 
'1t2-+2' process. It might also be plausible to use other combinations of transition 
probabilities, for example 0.90 and 0.10 instead of 0.95 and 0.05. However, this would 
require a more exhaustive study to ascertain better combinations of values, and 
optimisation of parameter values does not necessarily lead to generalisability of the 
results. 
The implementation of forecasts using this multi-process models approach, 
28 As noted in Chopra and Lin (1996), one of the advantages of the Bayesian approach to forecasting 
is that it combines data with intuition: it enables the user to incorporate subjective beliefs into forecasts. See 
also Jacobs and Levy (1989), p. 26. 
29 As previously noted, in representing movements in stock prices/returns, the underlying assumption 
for the SM is that stock prices/returns follow a random walk. 
263 
involves the following operational steps: 
Step 1: Posterior view at the starting time - all states are equal 
We begin at time t-l with the intuitively predetennined transition probabilities 
and posterior probabilities of model 1 and model 2 [i.e., 
PCM(l),.IID,.I) and p(M(2l'.IID'_I)]. 
Step 2: Creating prior at time t 
With a knowledge of the posterior probabilities of the two models and the 
transition probabilities, we can assign a probability that at time t, we expect the 
system to be in a given state as follows: 
(6.28) 
or, 
(6.29) 
where P·(MO\IDH ) is the prior probability (for the next step) that model 1 is the 
correct model at time t, given the data or infonnation at time t-1. Similarly, p·CM(2\IDr• 
I) is the prior probability that model 2 is the correct model at time t, given the data 
and information at time t-l. As these equations imply, each of these prior probabilities 
is just the sum of the two ways this state can be reached. 
Step 3: Making forecasts using the two models 
(The distributions of forecasts for model 1 (M(ll) and model 2 (M(2» are 
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depicted in Figure 6.3). 
Step 4: Prior selection between model 1 and model 2 
If P·(M(I\ID,.I) ~ 0.5, we choose model 1. Otherwise, model 2 will be chosen. 
This selected model is used to forecast the outcome at time t. 
Step 5: Getting the data - to observe Y, 
Step 6: Revising the new posterior view 
When the actual observation, Y" becomes known, the probabilities can be 
revised using the Bayesian method30 in the following way: 
L(Y IM(J) )P·(MO) ID ) ' ,,·1 
L(Y IMO) )P·CM(I) ID ) + L(Y IM(2) )p·(M(2) ID ) I I t '-I ,\ \ \-1 
or, 
P(MO) IY and D ) oc; LCY IM(1) )P"CM(1) ID ) \ \ \-1 I I I 1-1 (6.30) 
Equivalently, 
30As discussed in Zellner (1971). Chapter 2. an essential element of the Bayesian approach is the 
Bayes's theorem. which is also referred to in the literature as the principal of inverse probability. 
Bayes's theorem or Bayes's law on conditional probability can be represented by the following equation: 
P(AIB) = 
P(BIA)P(A) 
P(B) 
where P(AIB) is the probability of A given event B. For a continuous distribution, the representation 
becomes 
P(AIB) oc L(BIA)P(A) 
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or, 
L(Y IM(2) )P"(M(2) ID ) I I I 1-1 
p(M(2\IY, and D I_1) = '-, -----------------
L(Y,IM( 1)1)P· (M(l ),IDI_1) + L(Y.IM(2).)P· (M(2\ID._ 1) 
p(M(2) IY and D ) DC L(Y IM(2) )p"(M(2) ID ) 
., .-1 ., "-1 (6.31 ) 
where DC denotes proportionality31, and L denotes the likelihood32 or probability 
density. P(M(l)IY, and D'_I) refers to the probability of modell, given the observation, 
Y, and information, DI_I . Likewise, P(M(2),IY, and D'_I) refers to the probability of 
model 2, given observation, Y, and information, D.-I' These are the new posterior 
probabilities for time t for the projection to t+ 1 observation. 
L, which is the height of a normal curve, is given by 
1 & .. 
--- e-<\'- (.I) 1(20 ) 
aV(2n) 
(6.32) 
where YI is the actual (observed) value, Jl is the expected value based on the forecast 
and a is the standard deviation of forecast error. For illustration, Figure 6.3 depicts 
the hypothetical distributions of forecasts for modell, (M(I) and model 2, (M(2), 
respectively. If the observed value at time period t is YI • then LI would be the 
31The constant of proportionality is such that the sum of the two posterior probabilities is unity. 
32nte principle ofmllXimum liUlihood is based on the intuitive notion that "an event occurred because 
it was most likely to" [Ramanathan (1992), p. 75]. 
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likelihood or probability density for model 1 and L2 would be the likelihood for model 
2, and the Bayesian equation would increase the probability of M(l) accordingly. 
1.. 
~----------------~--------------9~ t 
Figure 6.3 - Hypothetical Distributions of Forecasts for kill and kl21 
Step 7: Start with new posterior view 
Our revised probabilities obtained in Step 6 will now serve as the new 
posterior probabilities for forecasting next period's observation, Yl+!. So, this step 
actually replaces Step 1 and the operational process will continue recursively. 
By employing this mUlti-process models method as the approach for our 
'combined forecasts', our procedure will be quite different from the simple averages 
of forecasts and the weighted averages of forecasts as discussed in Winkler (1984). 
Under our multi-process models procedure - also known as the Bayesian approachJ3 
to the 'combination of forecasts' - we revise the probabilities of the different models 
33For a discussion on the superiority of the Bayesian approach over other methods as a tool in 
forecasting financial asset returns. see Chopra and Lin (1996). See also Jacobs and Levy (1989). p. 26. 
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throughout time34• The most likely model is then used to forecast the next 
observation, which, when it is received, is used to revise the probabilities as in 
equation (6.30) or (6.31). 
For a detailed treatment of these so-called mixture models, class II or also 
labelled as the multi-process, class II models in Harrison and Stevens (1976), see West 
and Harrison (1989), Chapter 12. 
(d) Methods of Error Measurement 
Errors are an inherent part of any forecasting procedure35 • As Hanke and 
Reitsch (1992, p. 1) put it, "Predictions as to future outcomes rarely are precisely on 
the mark; the forecaster can only endeavour to make the inevitable errors small". As 
such, the smaller the errors that a forecasting model or technique manages to produce, 
the more powerful it is. 
In the literature of forecasting, several methods have been devised to measure 
and summarise the errors generated by a particular forecasting technique. As Hanke 
and Reitsch (1992, p. 113) point out, most of these measures involve averaging some 
function of the difference between an actual value and its forecast value. 
As far as the present investigation is concerned, the standard statistical 
measures that will be used to measure and to compare the accuracy of the three 
34 As previously mentioned, a subjective prior distribution of the values of weights is specified. and 
then, the evidence from the data modifies these weights. For details, see e.g., Bessler and Brandt (1981) and 
Gupta and Wilton (1987). 
35In this complex and uncertain world. despite the inaccuracies of the process, forecasting is necessary 
because we need to make decisions that affect the future. While forecasting systems are often so complex 
that even the expected behaviour of the errors cannot be easily specified [McKenzie (1978, p. 449); while 
the purpose of forecasting is to reduce risk in decision making [Montgomery and Johnson (1976. p. 2]. 
educated guesses about the future are more valuable than are uneducated guesses [Hanke and Reitsch (1992. 
p.2]. 
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forecasting procedures employed, are as follows: 
(i) The Sum of Squared Errors (SSE) 
As its name reflects, the SSE is computed by summing up the squared error 
terms (el ) of the difference between the actual values and the forecast values. If YI is 
the actual datum for time period t and 'VI is the forecast (or fitted value) for the same 
period, then the SSE is defined as 
(6.33) 
(ii) The Mean Squared Error (MSE) 
Under this method, each error or residual is squared; they are then summed and 
divided by the number of observations (n): 
Y\ 
oLL e/ 
....... 
MSE =--- (6.34) 
n 
Similar to the SSE, the method of MSE provides a penalty for large forecasting errors 
because they are squared. This might be useful since a technique of forecasting that 
produces moderate errors may well be preferred to one that usually has smaller errors 
but occasionally produces large ones. 
(iii) The Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) 
The RMSE (or the standard error) is simply the square root of the MSE, 
defined by 
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r 
n ] L e 2 Yl 
RMSE = ~ 
n 
(6.35) 
6.3.4·Revisiting the Random Walk Hypothesis: Variance Ratio Test 
While the standard academic view prominently expressed in 1970 by Granger 
and Morgenstern (1970) that by and large, stock prices follow a random walk and 
hence price changes are inherently unpredictable, reexamining the random walk 
hypothesis would be useful in light of the recent findings that stock returns, 
particularly over long horizon, are not following a random walk but they rather tend 
to exhibit mean reversion and/or mean aversion. If stock returns on developed 
exchanges are found to exhibit mean reversion/mean aversion rather than following 
a random walk, we also expect stock returns on emerging markets to behave in the 
same manner given the fact that they are relatively thinly traded and perceived to be 
less efficient. 
Several recent studies, as discussed in Chapter Four, have tested the random 
walk theory using the variance ratio methodology36. Testing the random walk in 
gross national product (GNP), Cochrane (1988) was among the first researchers to 
apply this methodology. 
The variance ratio test as defined by Poterba and Summers (1988), exploits the 
fact that if the logarithm of the stock price (including reinvested/cumulated dividends) 
follows a random Walk, then the return variance should be proportional to the return 
36 A detailed discussion of the variance ratio test and the application of the test to examine mean 
reversion in a variety of economic contexts can be found, inter alia, in the works by Campbell and Mankiw 
(1987), Huizinga (1987), Cochrane (1988) and Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1989). 
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horizon. That is, as clearly shown diagrammatically in Engel and Morris (1991), the 
variance of the return on k-year investment is just k times the variance of the return 
on one-year investment. If, for example, PI is the logarithm of the dividend-inclusive 
price, the two-year return will be 
Then, the variance of the two-year return will be 
Var(Pl - PI.2) = Var(Pt - Pt.) + Var(Pt.) - Pt.2) 
+ 2Cov(P, - Pt.), Pt.) - PI.2) 
(6.36) 
(6.37) 
If prices follow a random walk, the covariance between the current one-year 
and the lag one-year return is equal to zero. Thus, assuming that the variance of one-
year returns is constant over time, the two-year variance of returns becomes 
Based on the above argument, the variance ratio statistic for q period 
investment horizon - VR(q) - can be calculated in the following way: 
Var[R(q)] 
VR(q) =--- (6.38) 
qVar[R(1)] 
Under the assumption of a random walk, the expected value of Var(q) for any 
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investment horizon, q, is one. When the values of the variance ratio are less than one, 
returns are negatively correlated, and such a behaviour is consistent with the mean 
reversion mode1. One the other hand, a variance ratio of greater than one implies that 
returns are positively correlated and such a behaviour is known as mean aversion. 
Lo and MacKinlay (1989) argue that Monte Carlo evidence suggests that the 
variance ratio test has reasonable power against a wide range of alternatives. The 
authors further claim that the simplicity, reliability and flexibility of the variance ratio 
test make it a valuable tool for inference. 
In the present study, we examine the variance ratios of stock returns from the 
forecasting perspective. Here, the variances of stock returns are measured in terms of 
mean squared errors (MSEs) as given by equation (6.34). 
In obtaining the forecasting errors and then the MSEs or the variances, the 
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) method of forecasting as discussed 
in Sub-section 5.3.2) is employed. Our forecasts are based on two 'types/categories 
of data: 
(i) Data with overlaps. Under this category, in implementing our forecasts, the 
whole set of data is used. Since the same (whole) 'set' of data is used in making 
forecasts at I, 2, 3 ... n periods ahead, the problem of overlapping in the data could 
be considered as a shortcoming for this approach. 
(ii) Data 'without overlaps'. Under this approach, we split the original data into 
several '20 data points' and use each of them to make the forecast at various horizons 
(Le., 1,2, ... 20 periods ahead). Errors (e) from the forecasts using each of these '20 
data points', at a particular time period ahead, are then squared, added together and 
then divided by the number of these '20 data points' (n) - to get the MSE. For 
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example, the MSE for time periods 1 (MSE1) and 2 (MSE2) ahead, respectively, are 
calculated as follows [see equation (6.34)]: 
MSE1 = lInLe,2 
MSE2 = lInLe/ 
It worth noting however, that the variance ratios obtained from the data 
'without overlap' might be less reliable relatively, because the number of data points 
on which our forecasts are based is very small. For this reason, the results obtained 
from the first approach should be the preferred results. 
The statistical significance of the variance ratios is determined by using the F-
test as suggested in Walsh (1990)37. 
Should it be found by the variance ratio tests that the stock market is not 
consistently following a random walk, then the possibility that the market may at 
times be forecastable would gain plausibility. 
6.4-Concludina Comment 
The present study examines the behaviour of stock returns from both 
descriptive and prescriptive perspectives. We begin by examining the mean, standard 
deviation, skewness and kurtosis of stock return distribution. Then, we examine the 
interrelationships between national stock markets by employing cluster analysis, 
37 See Walsh (1990), pp. 132· 134. 
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correlation analysis and partial correlation analysis. The "forecastability" of stock 
returns is tested by using three methods: the EWMA, EWR, and the mUlti-process 
models methods. Lastly, the presence of mean reversion/mean aversion in the KLSE's 
stock returns is investigated by using the variance ratio tests. The MSEs or the 
variances for these tests are obtained by employing the EWMA method. 
For most calculations and statistical operations involved in this empirical 
investigation, two types of software are employed: 
(i) The Minitab statistical package; and 
(ii) Two programs written by Dr. F. R. Johnston, from the Operational 
Research and Systems Group, School of Industrial and Business Studies, the 
University of Warwick. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DATA, EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND RESULTS 
7.1-Introduction 
The present chapter presents the results of our empirical work, which employs 
the methodology discussed in Chapter Six. It is composed of four sections. 
The data used in our empirical investigations are itemised and given in Section 
6.2. This section begins with a description of the two categories of data used in the 
study - share price indices and individual company share prices. Then the concept of 
returns and relative prices are defined. 
Our empirical work involves examining some statistical properties of stock 
returns, stock market linkages, stock market "forecastability" and mean reversion/mean 
aversion in stock returns. Section 7.3 discusses the results of the study. 
Concluding remarks for the chapter are provided in Section 7.4. 
7 .2-Data Set 
The data on which the present study is based, can be divided into two parts. 
These data (obtained from Datastream), which are further described in the following 
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sub-sections, are as follows: 
(i) daily, weekly and monthly share price indices from the various stock 
exchanges in other countries; and 
(ii) daily share prices for fifty individual companies listed on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). 
Following the convention in the literature, in most cases, these indices and 
individual company share prices are converted into their natural logarithmsl. 
7.2.1-Sbare Price Indices 
The data on share price indices are employed in investigating the following 
aspects of the behaviour of share prices and returns: 
a) Examining and comparing some statistical properties of stock returns on the 
INaturallogarithms are logarithms to the base 2.71828, which are generally denoted by the letter e, 
i.e., log. (in honour of the famous Swiss mathematician, Euler) or more commonly, In [to distinguish them 
from the common (base 10) logarithms]. 
Several authors have suggested a number of reasons for the use of natural logarithms in financial 
and economic applications. According to Makridakis et.al (1983, p. 436), a logarithmic or power 
transfonnation of the data is the main approach for achieving stationary in the variance [also see Newbold 
and Bos (1990, p. 79)]. Sharma (1983) asserts that log-transformation partly overcomes the problem of non-
nonnality of the underlying series and therefore, enables the application of parametric tests of significance. 
Fama (1965a) suggests the following reasons for transfonning share price series (or share price 
changes) into log price series [see also Osborne (1959); D'Ambrosio (1980): 
(i) The change in log price is the yield, with continuous compounding. Put differently, the change 
in log price is the return available to the investor for holding the security for that particular day. 
(ii) While the variability of simple price changes for a given stock is an increasing function of the 
price level of the stock, taking logarithms would neutralise most of the price level effect. 
(iii) For price changes less than :tIS per cent. the change in log price is very close to the 
percentage price change [see also Sharma and Kennedy (1977. p. 391)]. 
Gaynor and Kirpatrick (1994, p. 120), summarise the reasons for the importance and popularity 
of natural logarithms in time-series analysis and forecasting, in the following points: 
(i) Natural logarithms are closely associated with any variable that is a function of time. 
(ii) Natural logarithms are often used to make growth calculations for time-series data. 
(iii) Natural logarithms are associated with a special class of functions that exhibit specific growth 
pattern known as exponential growth. 
For an exposition of some desirable properties of natural logarithms (for financial and investment 
applications), see Kritzman (1992). 
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Malaysian stock market vis-a-vis the stock markets in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Hong Kong and Australia. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the following 
daily, weekly and monthly indices (covering a period from 1984 through 1994) are 
used: 
(i) Malaysia: the KLSE Emas (All-share) Index (KLSEMAS) and the 
KLSE Composite Index (KLSECOMP) , 
(ii) United States: the New York Composite Index (NYSEAU) and the 
Dow Jones Composite 65 Index (DJCMP65), 
(iii) United Kingdom: the Financial times All-share Index (FTALLSH) 
and the Financial Times lOO-share Index (FTAIOO), 
(iv) Hong Kong: the Datastream Total Market Index (TOTMKHK) and 
the Hang Seng Bank Index (HANGSENG); and 
(v) Australia: the Australian Joint Stock Exchange (All ordinary) Index 
(AUSTAU). 
b) Studying the linkages between the KLSE and various stock exchanges 
around the world2• 
Whereas in the previous studies of comovements among international stock 
exchanges (using share price indices as the data base) some authors made adjustments 
for exchange rates and some did not, for the present study the indices used (on the 
whole) are not adjusted for exchange rates. The rationale behind following this 
approach are given below: 
2For a list of countries/exchanges and their respective indices used in this study, see Table 7.1. In 
addition to the indices listed in this table, the weekly and monthly share price indices (measured in both 
local currencies as well as the U.S. dollars) - for the emerging stock markets - provided by the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), are also employed in the study. 
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Table 7.1 
SHARE PRICE INDICES USED IN THE STUDY 
AUSTRALIA 
BELGIUM 
CANADA 
DENMARK 
FRANCE 
GERMANY 
HONG KONG 
INDIA 
INDONESIA 
ITALY 
JAPAN 
KOREA (SOUTH) 
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Bank Brussels Lambert [BKBRLAM] 
Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange Index [CHAGENI] 
a) Paris CAC40 [FRCAC40] 
b) Datastream Total Market Index 
a) Commerzbank Index [FURTCOM] 
Datastream Total Market Index 
Bombay Stock Exchange JOO [IBOMBSE] 
Jakarta Composite Index [JAKCOMP] 
Milan Banca Commerciale Italiana 
a) Nikkei Dow Jones Average Index (225) 
[JAPDOWA] 
b) Nikkei Stock Average Index (500) [JAPA500] 
Datastream Total Market Index ...... , .......... 
Kores South Composite Index [KORCOMP] 
Table 7.1 (Continued) 
SHARE PRICE INDICES USED IN THE STUDY 
MALAYSIA a) KLSE Composite Index [KLSECOMP] 
b) KLSE Emas (All-share) Index 
NORWAY Oslo Stock Exchange Index Companies [OSEINDX] 
PHILIPPINES Manila Stock Exchange Composite Index [MANCOMP] 
SINGAPORE a) Singapore Stock Exchange All-share Index [SNGALLS] 
b) Sin~aD'ore Striaits Times 
SOUTH AFRICA Stock 
SPAIN Madrid Stock Exchange Index [MADRIDI] 
SWEDEN Veckans AfJarer Weighted (All-share) Index [VECWALL] 
SWITZERLAND a) Swiss Bank Corporation General Index [SWBKGEN] 
VontobellDatastream Total Market Index 
TAIWAN Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighted Index [T AIWGHT] 
THAILAND Securities Exchange o/Thailand Index [BNGKSET] 
UNITED KINGDOM a) Financial Times All-share Index [FT ALLSH] 
a) Financial Times 500-share Index [IT A500I] 
UNITED STATES a) New York Stock Exchange Composite Index [NYSEALL] 
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(i) A number of previous researches have documented that exchange 
rates have little effect on the degree of correlation of returns among stock exchanges -
that the currency fluctuation problem is not critical in terms of its effect on overall 
(international) portfolio diversification3; 
A study by Grubel and Fadner (1971) indicates that the standard deviation of 
returns from holding foreign assets with and without exchange rate adjustments are 
statistically not different. These authors who assert that theoretically, the effect of 
exchange rates on the stability of the value of foreign assets is indeterminate, found 
further that the correlation of returns between United States (U.S.) and foreign assets 
with and without the exchange rate adjustment are statistically not different. The 
impact of flexible exchange rates on the correlation coefficients among a number of 
equity markets has also been shown to be rather low in a study by Bertoneche (1979). 
Similarly, in trying to quantify the effect that currency fluctuation has on the 
correlations between emerging markets and U.S. securities. Errunza and Padmanabhan 
(1988) have found that the correlations in local currency terms are very similar to 
those based on U.S. dollars. 
Whereas an argument that has often been advanced against international 
diversification is that currency risks (or exchange risks) more than offset the reduction 
in security risks achieved by international diversification, Solnik (1996) contends that 
currency risk is not so large/important that investors should avoid foreign 
investments4• Stemming from the fact that the depreciation of one currency is often 
3See Errunza and Padmanabhan (1988), p. 77. 
4Solnik's (1996) view is supported by the work of lorion (1989) that the contribution of currency risk 
to the total risk of a portfolio that includes only a small portion of foreign assets, is insignificant. See also 
the argument put forward by Errunza and Padmanabhan (1988, p. 77). 
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offset by the appreciation on another, according to the author, currency fluctuation has 
never been the major component of total return on a diversified portfolio over a long 
period of time. The author offers three reasons (which are abridged below) to support 
his contentions: 
[J Market risks and currency risks are not additive; there is only a 
weak - and sometimes negative - correlation between currency and market movements. 
o The exchange risk of an investment may be hedged for major 
currencies by selling futures or forward currency contracts, buying put currency 
options, or even borrowing foreign currency to finance the investment. 
o The contribution of currency risk should be measured for the total 
portfolio rather than for individual markets or securities. 
(ii) Our 'experiments' as discussed in Sub-section 7.3.2, indicate that 
exchange rate adjustments are not critical in determining the magnitude of covariations 
between and among stock exchanges. Whether the indices employed are measured in 
local currencies or in the U.S. dollar, the results (in terms of stock markets which are 
highly and lowly correlated with the KLSE) are detected to be not much different6• 
(iii) If we are really considering the factors that determine the returns 
to be received by international investors, adjustment for exchange rates alone do not 
appear to be sufficient. Other factors such as dividends, taxes on both dividends and 
capital gains, transactions costs and inflation rates in respective countries are also 
equally important to be taken into account. 
5Chapter Five of Solnik's (1996) book features a discussion of the theoretical relationship between asset 
prices and exchange rates. 
6See Table A2.21 and Table A2.22 as well as Figures A3.8a through A3.9b, for the summaries of 
results. 
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(iv) Nonnally, an investor will convert his/her income from foreign 
investment at the end of his/her investment period, and not throughout his/her 
investment period. These considerations support that in studying comovement 
relationships between and among international equity markets (for the purpose of 
planning investment strategies/decisions), adjustment for exchange rates does not 
appear to be necessary. 
7.2.2-Individual Company Share Prices 
A sample of fifty individual company shares listed on the KLSE7 is used in 
examining the forecastability of stock prices and returns. In addition, these daily share 
price data are employed in investigating the presence of mean reversion and/or mean 
aversion in the KLSE's stock returns. 
Almost all of these fifty stocks included in the sample are among the 100 
stocks that constitute the KLSE Composite Index. These companies are not only 
among the biggest companies listed on the KLSE, but they are also among the most 
acti vely traded stock (in tenns of trading volume) in 1993 and 1994 as reported in the 
Investors Digest, a monthly publication of the KLSE8• Here, trading volume and 
company size9 are preferred over random sampling in order to alleviate problems 
'For the names of these companies - their industry classifications (or the economic sectors in which 
they are operating) as well as their rankings (in terms of market capitalisation) - see Table 7.2. 
8See Investors Digest, Mid-January 1994 and Mid-January 1995. 
9Errunza and Losq (1985) posit that investors and hence funding organisations were interested in 
researching securities from the emerging stock markets that were currently most liquid. 
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Table 7.2 
MALAYSIAN COMPANY SHARES USED IN THE STUDY 
ii!l)l;';i;_'~t~t;~~?:::~Jjii\i!;i:I;:'Ij'_'j';·). 
Aokam Perdana Bhd. Industrial Products 31 28 
Arad-Malaysian D" ,.;~ l@ntBhd. n, 83 90 .IVp ........ ", 
Asia Pacific Land Bhd. n 101 96 c.uV". u .. " 
Bandar _Raya D" Bhd. n 118 85 CIUp .. IU .. " 
BerjC1,)'G Industrial Bhd. Consumer Products 69 98 
Boustead Holdino~ Bhd. TradinglServil.:es 77 88 
Chemical r.. I,)' of Malaysia Bhd. Industrial Products 214 152 
D~ .. & Commercial Bank Bhd. Finance . 21 19 
Diversified Resources Bhd. Industrial Products 53 72 
Genting Bhd. T d' ,IC!, .:. ra hngl..,... " ..... " 4 5 
Golden Hope Plantations Bhd. Plantations 16 17 
Golden Plus Holdings Bhd. Mining 78 77 
Guinness Anchor Bhd. Consumer Products 84 81 
Hume Industries (Malaysia) Bhd. Industrial Products 55 31 
Kuala Lumpur J{ ,.ftnno Bhd. Plantations 37 25 
Landmarks Bhd. Hotels 33 64 
Lingui D~ Bhd. Plantations 52 29 
Lion CorpVIGUUII Bhd. Industrial Products 224 250 
Mal!num Corpv ..... u .. Bhd. Tradi.-lgle ... Vi ..... " 8 18 
Malakoff Bhd. Plantations 156 83 
H .. l. J:h,nltino Bhd 
I .. M ... /GU • Finance 5 3 
H .. l. Cement Bhd 
"OMIW.'_I Industrial Products 76 74 
~alayan United Industries Bhd. Industrial Products 27 34 
M~aysian Airline System Bhd. TradinglS ... y ..... " 18 11 
MAI,av"i .... un .. l, Shinning 
Cor -" BltEJMISq T ~ -.,. Tr .J,. ,leo • II auull!;I.:3erv Ices 11 8 
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Table 7.2 (Continued) 
MALAYASIAN COMPANY SHARES USED IN THE STUDY 
65 52 
113 119 
45 47 
47 63 
51 48 
17 33 
Industrial Products 191 215 
108 114 
Perlis Plantations Bhd. Consumer Products 36 36 
Pilecon Bhd. Construction 107 165 
Promet Bhd. Construction 67 79 
Public Bank Bhd. Finance 14 13 
Bhd. Construction 12 12 
Rothmans of Pall Mall Bhd. Consumer Products 10 14 
Shell Industrial Products 50 39 
Sime Bhd. 6 6 
Construction 162 70 
Bhd. Consumer Products 42 51 
13 30 
2 
2 
87 73 
United Bhd. Construction 9 7 
UMW Bhd. Consumer Products 68 67 
Yeo Bhd. Consumer Products 216 170 
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characteristics of thin market and discontinuity in trading lO [see e.g., Ariff and Lee 
(1993)]. 
Another criterion applied in selecting the stocks to be included in the sample 
is 'variety': While most companies in the sample are big companies, some medium-
size companies are also included. These fifty companies as shown in Table 7.2, 
represent all the nine industry sectors II as classified by the KLSE. For the sake of 
variety, the sample also includes the two newly corporatised giant companies - the 
Telekom Malaysia Bhd. and the Tenaga Nasional Bhd. - as well as a U.K. 
incorporated company (i.e., the Tanjong Plc.)12. 
The sample period for these daily individual company share price data is - in 
general - 1988:01 through 1994: 12. The reason for favouring this period is threefold. 
First, 1988 is chosen as the starting year for the study because it is the year that the 
market appears to be more stable (after the October 1987 world-wide stock market 
crash). Secondly. as we have examined in Chapter Two, the periods of 1980s 
(especially the second half of the 1980s) and 1990s are significant decades in the 
growth, development and activity (Le., trading volume) history of the KLSE. Thirdly, 
l'1leinkel and Kraus (1988) suggest a number of approaches to mitigate the problem of discontinuity 
in trading (i.e., days or weeks with no transaction). These include, fIrst, ignore the days with no trading and 
use only return data for trading days. Secondly, assign zero return for days with no trading. 
In the present study. the problem of discontinuity in trading, is handled by using two categories of data: 
(i) Data which ignore the days with no trading. That is, in this set of data, prices which do not change 
(i.e., the 'no trading days') are deleted from the data. 
(ii) Original data; that is, data which we do not delete the 'non-changes in price' (or prices for the 'no 
trading days'). 
The results that we have got for both categories of data are almost the same. Therefore. only the results 
based on the first category of data are reported in the thesis. 
lIThese industry/economic sectors are: consumer products. industrial products. construction, 
trading/services. finance. hotels. properties. plantations and mining. 
17he sample period for the Telekom Malaysia 8hd., the Tenaga Nasional 8hd. and the Tanjong Pic. 
respectively, is only 1991:01 through 1995:06, 1992:07 through 1995:06 and 1991:12 through 1996:01. 
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this is a most recent period and therefore, the stock return behaviour obtained 
therefrom would be more relevant for future projection. 
7.2.3-Defining Returns 
In the preceding chapter, stock returns (~t) based on stock price indices (It) 
have been defined (see equation 6.1) as 
or, equivalently, it may be written as 
~t = In[~] 
~-l 
(7.1 ) 
For the individual company share price data, the concept of the cumulative 
logarithm of returns (R·t) is used. It is defined as follows: 
(7.2) 
where Ru, stock returns in period n, is given by 
(7.3) 
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and 
P n = stock price in time period n; 
Dn = cash dividend in time period n. 
These prices, as defined in the Datastream Definitions Manual, are adjusted 
for capital actions. and become "the default prices offered on all research programs" 
(p. EQ-14). As noted in Appendix A (of the Datastream Definitions Manual), in 
addition to rights and scrip issues, "adjustments to historical data are made as a result 
of material capital distributions and large one-off dividend payments". 
7.3-Analysis of Results 
The objective of this section is to report and discuss the results of our 
empirical investigations. These findings are annotated and analysed in the following 
sub-sections. 
7.3.I-Some Statistical Properties of Stock Returns 
a) Means and Standard Deviations of Returns 
As discussed in Chapter Six, the present empirical work begins with some 
comparisons of the statistical properties of stock returns on the KLSE vis-a-vis a 
number of selected well-established exchanges. The outcomes of these statistical 
analyses are exhibited in Tables 7.3 through 7.12. 
In Table 7.3, the daily, weekly and monthly means as well as standard 
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deviations of stock returns on the KLSE (for the whole period of 1984 through 1994) 
are compared with those on the NYSE, LSE, HKSE and the AJSE. We find that the 
me~ns of stock returns (Le., columns 3, 4 and 5) on the KLSE were not significantly 
different from the means of returns on these actively traded exchanges. As such, the 
null hypothesis that the means of stock returns on the KLSE have not been 
significantly different from those on the developed exchanges - the NYSE, LSE, 
HKSE and the AJSE - cannot be rejected at 5% level (using the Z-tests). 
Columns 6, 7, and 8 of Table 7.3 compare the standard deviations of stock 
returns on the KLSE and those on the NYSE, LSE, HKSE and the AJSE. The standard 
deviations of the daily, weekly and monthly stock returns on the KLSE appear to be 
much higher than those on other exchanges except for the HKSE. Using the F-tests, 
the standard deviations of returns on the KLSE are found to be significantly different 
compared to those on the other exchanges. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the 
standard deviations of returns on the KLSE are not significantly different from those 
on the developed exchanges should be rejected at the 5% level. With these results, the 
general impression that investments in the thinly traded emerging exchanges (such as 
the KLSE) are relatively risky (at least from the view point of standard deviations or 
dispersions of returns l3) could be justified, at least in this case. 
13 According to SoInik (1996), the standard deviation of returns which is traditionally used to indicate 
the risk of a market or an asset, is the simplest statistical measure of volatility of a market or an asset. 
Further, Speidell and Sappenfield (1992. p. 60) point out that most discussions of risk begin and end with 
standard deviation of returns. The square of 
the standard deviation is the variance. Errunza and Rosenberg (1982) have the view that variance of returns 
to investment in common stocks provides a natural measure of investment risk. They use this measure in 
their work to compare the investment risk between the developing and developed countries. See also Errunza 
and Losq (1985), p. 568; Errunza (1994). p. 83. 
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Table 7.3 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE DAILY. WEEKLY AND 
MONTHLY STOCK RETURNS (L0K) FOR THE KLSE. NYSE. LSE. HKSE 
AND THE AJSEi 
1984-1994 
KLSEMAS 0.00030 0.00149 0.00666 0.01257 0.03161 0.07949 
KLSECOMP 0.00031 0.001540.00672 0.01438 0.03357 0.08274 
0.00034 0.00169 0.00725 0.00912* 0.01881* 0.04196* 
0.00032 .00162 0.00688 0.00973* 0.02061* 0.04448* 
LSE 0.00041 .00204 0.00891 0.00862* 0.02235* 0.05523* 
0.00039 0.00195 0.00849 0.00956* 0.02339* 0.05469* 
E 0.00074 0.00370 0.01607 0.01704* 0.03922* 0.09026 
0.00078 0.00390 0.01729 0.01709* 0.03795* 0.09090 
0.00031 0.00157 0.00684 0.01054* 0.02555* 0.06423* 
*Sipifiaautly 4iffa-=-~t U .e., lowar t1:um tbe nSB' •• taudard daviation 
(eKaept!or tha axaB'. whicb .re bigher)] at 5' level (u.ing the 
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b) Skewness and Kurtosis 
An additional two statistical properties of stock returns examined in this 
comparative study are skewness and kurtosis in the datal4• According to Walsh 
(1990), skewness refers to the symmetry or asymmetry of a distribution. The more 
asymmetrical the distribution, the more it deviates from the normal distribution. While 
a positive value of skewness indicates a positive (rightward) skew, a negative value 
of skewness indicates a negative (leftward) skew. 
As shown in Table 7.4, the logarithm of stock returns (for all the daily, weekly 
and monthly data) are in general, similar across all stock exchanges under this 
comparison: they are all negatively skewedls • Nonetheless, whilst the values or 
coefficients of skewness for stock returns on the KLSE are relatively low, the values 
of skewness of stock returns (for the daily data) on the AJSE, HKSE and the NYSE 
Again, the weekly and monthly stock returns on the AJSE exhibit the most 
negative values of skewness. The values or coefficients of skewness are also relatively 
highly negative for the weekly stock returns on the HKSE as well as the LSE. Beside 
the AJSE, the HKSE also exhibits high negative values of skewness for the monthly 
14As pointed out by Levin and Rubin (1994), beside dispersion (i.e., the spread of the data in a 
distribution) two other characteristics of data sets that provide useful information are skewness and kurtosis. 
15Por a negatively skewed distribution, mode> median> mean. Por a symmetrical (unimodal)/normal 
distribution. the mean, median and mode are equal. See e.g., Salvatore (1982), p. 14. 
16A normal distribution, being perfectly symmetrical, has a skewness equal to zero [Walsh (1990), p. 
68]. Since a normal distribution is symmetrical about its mean - not at all skewed - folding the curve at the 
centre creates two identical halves. 
Whereas a normal distribution contains the same number of extreme values in both directions -
high and low - a negatively skewed distribution has a much longer tail to the left than to the right. In other 
words, values in a negatively skewed distribution are concentrated at the higher end of the measuring scale 
on the horizontal axis [see Levin and Rubin (1994), p. 71]. 
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Table 7.4 
SKEWNESS AND KURTOSIS OF THE DAILY, WEEKLY AND MONTHLY STOCK 
RETURNS (1.0&) FOR THE KLSE, NYSE, LSE, HKSE AND THE AJSE: 
1984 -1994 
KLSEMAS -1.17188 -1.99580 -0.0686497 14.9186 19.0550 2.93827 
KLSECOMP -1.53308 -1.26112 -0.0967092 22.0748 10.7212 4.57105 
-4.90096 -1.13404 -1.654 115.434 6.2302 9.48084 
-4.50574 -0.94728 -1.63875 105.133 6.13928 7.90708 
FTALLSH -1.72320 -2.25587 -1.71249 23.620823.339 8.83678 
-1.55821 -2.11770 -1.59943 2.7203 22.3463 8.34888 
-6.78298 -3.13071 -2.49726 146.777 30.9835 16.6810 
HANGSENG -6.09189 -2.58645 -2.04902 128.534 24.2258 13.3180 
-7.74705 -4.86659 -3.44327 198.664 61.8532 24.9471 
NBI 
A Dormal di.tributionha. & .kewne.. equal to sero and a kurto.i. 
equal to three. 
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data. 
The peakedness or height of a distribution is called kurtosis. A normal 
distribution has a kurtosis value equal to three [see e.g., Kritzman (1994)] and is 
known as mesokurtic. A distribution is referred to as platkurtic (flat distribution) when 
it has negative kurtosis, whereas a distribution which exhibits positive kurtosis is 
labelled as leptokurtic (narrow distribution)J7. A leptokurtic distribution has wide tails 
and a tall, narrow peak, with its kurtosis value exceeding three. 
In reviewing columns 6, 7, and 8 of Table 7.4, one sees that in general, stock 
returns on the KLSE, NYSE, LSE, HKSE and the AJSE are similar in that their 
distributions are leptokurtic. Moreover, as noted earlier, the distributions of stock 
returns from these markets are negatively skewed: their distributions appear to have 
more values or observations at the higher end of the scale on the horizontal axis - i.e., 
on the right hand side of the curve - (than does a normal distribution) and have longer 
tails to the left than to the right. 
A long history of research on the distributions of stock returns - reaching back 
at least to Fama (1965a) - has documented that stock returns are not symmetric. In 
general, past researches on stock returns have found that the distributions of stock 
returns or price changes are leptokurtic l8• Recent evidence suggesting that stock 
returns distributions are not symmetric, can be found in Richardson and Smith (1993) 
for U.S. stocks, Harvey and Zhou (1993) and Ratner (1996) for other developed 
markets and Harvey (1995) for emerging markets assets. 
17 See e.g., Walsh (1990), p. 68; Ramanathan (1992), p. 24. 
18See e.g., Fama (196Sa), Praetz (1969), Solnik (1973), Ang and Pohlman (1978) and Laurence (1986). 
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For the Malaysian stock market, Mansor Md Isa (1989) whose study was based 
on a sample of daily closing prices for 26 companies (January 1980 to August 1986) 
found that the daily stock returns are not normally distributed. Similarly, Othman 
Y ong (1990) who examined the daily KLSE Industrial Index for the period 1984 to 
1988, concluded that, "Longer time spans result in stock prices behave not according 
to normal distribution" (p. 54). 
So, our results substantiate the results of previous studies that nonnormality 
in stock returns is a worldwide phenomenon: it occurs both in the actively traded 
markets and the relatively thinly markets such as the KLSE. 
c) Further Examination of the Means and Standard Deviations of Stock Returns 
As previously noted, for the entire period of 1984 through 1994, the data for 
the daily, weekly and monthly stock returns do not indicate that the means of stock 
returns on the KLSE were significantly different 19 from those on the NYSE, LSE, 
HKSE and the AJSE. On the other hand, the standard deviations of stock returns on 
the KLSE are found to have been significantly different from those on these developed 
exchanges. Using the daily and weekly data we explore these findings further, with 
the intention of identifying whether such features are true and stable over time. We 
do so by examining the data on a yearly basis. Tables 7.5 through 7.12 report the 
outcomes. 
As shown in Tables 7.5, 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8, both the daily and weekly data -
even when they are analysed on a yearly basis - by and large, still do not indicate that 
the means of stock returns on the KLSE were significantly different from the means 
l~at is, greater than those on these developed exchanges. except the HKSE. 
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of stock returns on the NYSE, LSE, HKSE and the AJSE. Only in 1993, when the 
KLSE performed more positively20, the means of returns on the KLSE are 
significantly different (i.e., relatively higher) than for alI of these exchanges [see 
columns 4 through 7 (Tables 7.5 and 7.7)], except for the HKSE [see columns 4 and 
5 (Tables 7.6 and 7.8)] . 
In 1984 and 1985, when the KLSE performed negatively21, only the means 
of returns for certain indices22 are significantly different from the means of returns 
for the Malaysian indices. In general, based on the statistics displayed in Tables 7.5, 
7.6, 7.7 and 7.8, the null hypothesis that the means of stock returns on the KLSE are 
not significantly different from those on its counterparts in the developed part of the 
world - the NYSE, LSE, HKSE and the AJSE - still cannot be rejected. 
Tables 7.9, 7.10, 7.11 and 7.12 compare the standard deviations of returns on 
the KLSE with those on the NYSE, LSE, HKSE and the AJSE (when the data are 
analysed on a yearly basis). We still find that the standard deviations of stock returns 
for the KLSE are significantly greater than those for these exchanges, except the for 
the HKSE [see columns 4 and 5 (Tables 7.10 and 7.12)]. Correspondingly, the null 
hypothesis that the standard deviations of stock returns on the KLSE and those on the 
actively traded exchanges are the same, have to be rejected at 5% level of significance 
(using the Z-tests). 
As disclosed by Tables 7.9 through 7.12, in most cases, the standard deviations 
2Opor explanation, see Chapter Two. 
21As can be seen in Table A2.1, Malaysia suffered a negative annual economic growth rate in 1985. 
22rhey are: the FrALLSH and FrSE100 for 1984; the NYSEALL, TOTMKHK and the AUSTALL 
(or AJSE) for 1985. 
288 
1984-1994 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Table 7.5 
MEANS OF THE DAILY STOCK RETURNS (Log) 
FOR THE KLSE. NYSE AND THE LSE: 
1984 - 1994 
0.00031 0.00034 0.00032 0.00041 
-0.00113 -0.00107 0.00005 -0.00010 0.00089* 
-0.00092 -0.00101 0.00089* 0.00088 0.00054 
0.00028 0.00030 0.00050 0.00068 0.00077 
0.00009 O. 00013 -0.00001 -0.00012 0.00016 
0.00093 0.00120 0.00047 0.00056 0.00024 
0.00153 0.00174 0.00085 0.00087 0.00101 
-0.00044 -0.00040 -0.00030 -0.00045 -0.00059 
.00027 0.00036 0.00092 0.00088 0.00054 
.00055 0.00056 0.00018 0.00015 0.00053 
.00330 0.00262 0.00029* 0.00052* 0.00080* 
-0.00116 -0.00105 -0.00012 -0.00031 -0.00039 
0.00039 
0.00080* 
0.00052 
0.00066 
0.00008 
0.00018 
0.00116 
-0.00047 
0.00058 
0.00051 
0.00070* 
-0.00042 
-Significantly 41ff.~&Dt U .•. , loY.~ than th. ItLSB' •• ean of return.) 
t 5\ level (u.iagthe Z-t •• t). 
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Table 7.6 
MEANS OF THE DAILY STOCK RETURNS (LQ2) 
FOR THE KLSE. HKSE AND THE AJSE: 
1984 - 1994 
1984-1994 0.00030 0.00074 0.00078 0.00031 
1984 -0.00113 -0.00107 0.00120 0.00121 -0.00025 
1985 -0.00092 -0.00101 0.00132* 0.00145 0.00125* 
1986 0.00028 0.00030 0.00143 0.00146 0.00148 
1987 0.00009 0.00013 -0.00039 -0.00042 -0.00043 
1988 0.00093 0.00120 0.00062 0.00059 0.00046 
1989 .00153 0.00174 0.00018 0.000:21 0.00040 
1990 -0.00044 -0.00040 0.00012 0.00025 -0.00098 
1991 0.00027 0.00036 0.00133 0.00135 0.00098 
1992 0.00055 .00056 0.00093 0.00095 -0.00024 
1993 0.00330 0.00262 0.00289 0.00294 0.00130* 
1994 -0.00116 -0.00105 -0.00151 -0.00143 -0.00049 
"S1s;pl1fia&lltll" 4Uferent U.e. , higher/lower than the ItLSB'. 
of zoetuJ:II1a)at 5\ level (u.ing the I-te.t). 
Table 7.7 
MEANS OF THE WEEKLY STOCK RETURNS (L02) 
FOR THE KLSE. NYSE AND THE LSE: 
1984-1994 
1984-1994 0.00149 0.00154 0.00169 0.00162 0.00204 
1984 -0.00593 -0.00538 0.00014 -0.00064 0.00434* 
1985 -0.00483 -0.00505 0.00441* 0.00448 0.00263 
1986 0.00180 0.00156 0.00302 0.00383 0.00392 
1987 0.00109 0.00111 -0.00004 -0.00042 0.00169 
1988 0.00385 0.00541 0.00196 0.00225 0.00044 
1989 .00763 0.00872 0.00426 0.00434 0.00505 
1990 -0.00234 -0.00222 -0.00158 -0.00226 -0.00286 
1991 0.00129 0.00187 0.00422 0.00391 0.00208 
1992 0.00308 0.00304 0.00145 o . 00134 0.00304 
1993 0.01610 0.01282 0.00l35* 0.00250* 0.00408* 
1994 -0.00581 -0.00524 -0.00061 -0.00155 -0.00193 
0.00195 
0.00391 
0.00254 
0.00335 
0.00140 
0.00002 
0.00579 
-0.00220 
0.00217 
0.00300 
0.00358* 
-0.00210 
*Signifiaantly diff.rent (1.e. , higher/lower than the ~LSB'. mean of 
) at 5\ level (\l81nSJ the Z-t •• t) . 
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of returns are higher on the KLSE than on other exchanges except for the HKSE. In 
fact these tables reveal that the KLSE and the HKSE are similar in the sense that their 
standard deviations of returns are much higher compared to the two well-established 
exchanges23: the NYSE and the LSE. 
Aside from the fact that we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of similar 
means of stock returns between the KLSE and other selected exchanges - and that the 
null hypothesis of similar standard deviations of stock returns has to be rejected - our 
comparative analysis of these means and standard deviations on a yearly basis (for the 
period of 1984 through 1994) has produced two interesting results. These two related 
preliminary findings might perhaps, have some ramifications for investment decisions 
and therefore, deserve further investigation: 
(i) The standard deviations of returns on all exchanges under investigation are 
not inter-temporally constant/stable. This finding is consistent with the results of 
several previous studies - for example by Praetz (1969) for Australian data and 
Othman Yong (1990) for the Malaysian data - that standard deviations/variances are 
not constant over time. 
Such heteroscedasticity might be attributed to various events and developments 
that have taken place at national and/or international levels. Such a phenomenon might 
be explained by major changes in market forces - major changes in the socio-
political/economic scene that could cause structural shifts in demand and/or supply 
23 A study by Roll (1992) has established that HKSE is one of the most volatile market in the world. 
Solnik (1996) also found that the HKSE is. as are some of the smaller markets (Singapore and Italy), much 
more volatile than other developed markets. 
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Table 7.8 
MEANS OF THE WEEKLY STOCK RETURNS (Log) 
FOR THE KLSE. HKSE AND THE AJSEi 
1984 -1994 
1984-1994 0.00149 0.00154 0.00370 0.00390 0.00157 
1984 -0.00593 -0.00538 0.00574 0.00584 -0.00126 
1985 -0.00483 -0.00505 0.00666* 0.00727 0.00635· 
1986 0.00180 0.00156 0.00708 0.00726 0.00706 
1987 0.00109 0.00111 -0.0010 -0.00114 -0.00244 
1988 .00385 0.00541 0.00241 0.00230 0.00231 
1989 0.00763 0.00872 0.00088 0.00104 0.00215 
1990 -0.00234 -0.00222 0.00077 0.00142 -0.00569 
1991 0.00129 0.00187 .00624 0.00629 0.00491 
1992 0.00308 0.00304 0.00468 0.00482 -0.00151 
1993 .01610 0.01282 0.01455 0.01474 0.00650· 
1994 -0.00581 -0.00524 -0.00755 -0.00716 -0.00262 
*Siguificantly 4ifferent (i.e. , higher/lower than the JtLSB'a 
ofzoet1lrli.) at 5\ level (uaing the I-te.t) . 
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Table 7.9 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE DAILY STOCK RETURNS (Log) 
FOR THE KLSE. NYSE AND THE LSE: 
1984 -1994 
1984-1994 0.01257 0.01438 0.00912* 0.00973* 0.00862* 0.00956* 
1984 0.00729 0.01081 0.00725* 0.00838* 0.00808* 0.00983* 
1985 0.01043 0.01631 0.00585* 0.00625* 0.00639* 0.00742* 
1986 0.01156 0.01499 0.00843* 0.00876* 0.00738* 0.00846* 
1987 0.01914 0.02504 0.01958* 0.02001* 0.01610* 0.01740* 
1988 0.01017 0.01156 0.00946* 0.01020* 0.00723* 0.00778* 
1989 .00995 0.01221 0.00737* 0.00802* 0.00760* 0.00818* 
1990 .01415 0.01388 0.00906* 0.00954* 0.00843* 0.00917* 
1991 0.01177 0.01119 0.00808* 0.00896* 0.00741* 0.00817* 
1992 0.00709 0.00743 0.00546* 0.00648* 0.00908* 0.00967* 
1993 0.01032 0.00986 0.00479* 0.00552* 0.00534* 0.00619* 
1994 0.01913 0.01682 0.00567* 0.00659* 0.00718* 0.00834* 
.Siguifieantly 4iffe~aDt (i ••. , iD geD.~al, lowe~ thaD tbe KLSB'. 
tanda~d 4eviation of return.) at 5\ l.v.l (uaiDg tb. P-t •• t). In tbi • 
• on, the KL8KMAS 1. campar.d with tbeNYSBALL aDd tbe PTALLSH, the 
IKI.SIICO~ 1. camp_red with tbe DJCHP6S aDd the PTSB100. 
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Table 7.10 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE DAILY STOCK RETURNS (L02) 
FOR THE KLSE, HKSE AND THE AJSE: 
1984 - 1994 
1984-1994 0.01257 0.01438 0.01704** 0.01709** 0.01054* 
1984 0.00729 0.01081 0.01787** 0.01827** 0.00786** 
1985 0.01043 0.01631 0.01332*- 0.01352* 0.00638* 
1986 0.01156 0.01499 0.01041* 0.01073* 0.00831* 
1987 0.01914 0.02504 0.03194** 0.03120** 0.02373** 
1988 0.01017 0.01156 0.01054*- 0.01051* 0.00939* 
1989 0.00995 0.01221 0.02333** 0.02261** 0.00898 
1990 0.01415 0.01388 0.01192* 0.01178* 0.00827* 
1991 0.01177 0.01119 0.01078* 0.01102* 0.00875* 
1992 .00709 0.00743 0.01362** 0.01394** 0.00694* 
1993 0.01032 0.00986 0.01310** 0.01394** 0.00722* 
1994 0.01913 0.01682 0.01724* 0.01838** 0.00866* 
.SigDificantly4iffarant (i.e., lower than the ~LBI'a atan4ar4 
.a •• v~--tionof return.) at 5' level (uaiug tb. r-t •• t) . 
•• Significantly diff.r.nt (i ••. , bigber tban the ~LSI' • • tandard 
tion of return.) at 5' l.v.l (uaing tbe r-t •• t) . 
In ~i. co.pari.on, the XLSIMA8 i. compared with tbe TOTMXKK and 
AVSTALL, the KLSICOMP i. compared witb the BANGSKNG. 
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Table 7.11 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE WEEKLY STOCK RETURNS (Log) 
FOR THE KLSE. NYSE AND THE LSE: 
1984 - 1994 
1984-1994 0.03161 0.03357 0.01881* 0.02061* 0.02235* 0.02339* 
1984 0.01671 0.02710 0.01897** 0.02269 0.02200** 0.02512* 
1985 0.02711 0.03679 0.01365* 0.01409* 0.01493* 0.01600· 
1986 0.03032 0.03487 0.02149* 0.02147* 0.02057* 0.02193* 
1987 0.05572 0.05832 0.03314* 0.03479* 0.04408* 0.04454* 
1988 .02359 0.02681 0.01860* 0.02066* 0.01714* 0.01779* 
1989 .02010 0.02287 0.01744 0.01980 0.01852 0.01964 
1990 0.04182 0.04061 0.02062* 0.02247* 0.02175* 0.02332* 
1991 0.02514 0.02495 0.01770· 0.01981· 0.01883* 0.01947* 
1992 0.01629 0.01640 0.01193· 0.01467 .02234** 0.02265** 
1993 0.02550 0.02503 0.01044· 0.01193· 0.01253* 0.01363* 
1994 0.03824 0.03407 0.01326· 0.01545· .01857* 0.02002* 
·Slgnificantly 4iffe~ezlt (l.e.,lowe~ than the ELSB' •• tan4ar4 4eviation 
~eturn.) at 5\ level (u.ini the ,-te.t). 
**Slgn1fioantly different (i.e., higher than the ELSI' •• tandar4 
of return.) at 5\ level (u.ing the ,-ta.t) . 
In thla coapar1.on, the XLSBMAS 1. coapare4 with the NYSBALL an4 the 
vb.rea. the XLSBCONP i. compared with the DJCNP65 end the 'TSB100. 
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Table 7.12 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE WEEKLY STOCK RETURNS (L02) 
FOR THE KLSE. HKSE AND THE AJSE: 
1984 - 1994 
1984-1994 0.03161 0.03357 0.03922** 0.03795** 0.02555* 
1984 0.01671 0.02710 0.04933** 0.04777** 0.02066** 
1985 0.02711 0.03679 0.02933** 0.03001 0.01666* 
1986 0.03032 0.03487 0.02698 0.02783 0.02033* 
1987 0.05572 0.05832 0.07550** 0.06813 0.06035 
1988 0.02359 0.02681 0.02290 0.02289 0.02233 
1989 0.02010 0.02287 0.04133** 0.03933** 0.01841 
1990 0.04182 0.04061 0.03123* 0.02977* 0.02014* 
1991 0.02514 0.02495 0.02047 0.02071 0.01593* 
1992 0.01629 0.01640 0.03387** 0.03402** 0.01699 
1993 0.02550 0.02503 0.03271** 0.03439** 0.01611* 
1994 0.03824 0.03407 0.03694 0.03870 0.01903* 
*SllDlflCaDtly41ffar.at (l.a., lowar than the E~SB' •• tan4ar4 
IG.IV~I.li~'OD of~atUZ1)..) at 5\ hval (udng the ,·te.t) • 
**Sigu1f:1cmtly 41Ua~nt u..... bigher than tha ELS.' •• tan4ar4 
Ig.'v;a,;.,"~.ga· of ratu~.) at 5\ leval (u.ing the p·t •• t) . 
In thi. co.pari.on, tha ELSBKAS i. compared with th. TOTNXBX and 
tha AlJSTALL J the ELSBCOMP ia compared wi th the J1ANGSBNG. 
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parameters24• As advocated by Hsu (1984). stock market return variability is 
frequently on the move. reacting to shifts of the general economic conditions or 
occurrences of some special political-economic events. 
(ii) Fluctuations in the means and standard deviations - or more generally, the 
behaviour - of stock returns on the KLSE are inclined to correlate with the movements 
of returns on the developed exchanges2s • For example. in 1984 and 199426• the 
KLSE performed badly (negative means of returns) when other exchanges also did not 
2"For example. the 'negative' performance of the Malaysian stock market in 1984 might be explained 
by a number of political economic events that had taken place in Malaysia and overseas. Among these 
events as recorded in the Keesing's Contemporary Archives: Record o/World Events. Volume XXX (1984). 
Longman. are as follows: 
(i) The five-month constitutional crisis in Malaysia (which started on August 1. 1983 and ended on 
January 10. 1984); 
(ii) The general assembly of UMNO. the dominant party in the ruling coalition Government of Malaysia 
(which was held on May 25. 1984). "The election campaign had been particularly intense and divisive" (p. 
33029). 
(iii) The banking scandal which involved the Bank Bumiputera Malaysia, the Malaysia's largest Bank. 
The scandal was revealed in October. 1983. 
(iv) The uncertainty over the political future of Hong Kong led to a continued decline in the value of 
the Hong Kong dollar. " ... ; the lack of progress in the Peking talks led to a crisis of confidence in the stock 
market in September. however, and the index fell from 1 ,000.23 on August 22 to 690.06 on Oct. 4, the 
lowest level of the year" (p. 32626). In 1984, the Hong Kong financial markets were reported as "remained 
highly volatile during the period of talks between Britain and China over Hong's future" This general 
political and economic uncertainties in 1984 "subsequently brought the index down to 746.02 on July 13, 
although by early August it had recovered to around 900" (p. 33097). (iv) The United States 
presidential election in November. 1984 [see e.g .• Neiderhoffer et.al (1970)]. 
2SIt is expected that. being a very open economy. the Malaysian economy and hence the performance 
of the KLSE would be easily affected by the business cycles of the developed nations. Moreover, Solnik 
(1996) postulates that. in some periods when developed markets drop. emerging markets also drop and by 
a large amount. because of their high volatility. He refers to 1974 - the year of oil shock - as an example. 
26 As reported in the World Economic and Financial Surveys: Private Market Financing for Developing 
Countries. International Monetary Fund. Washington, DC (November, 1995, p. 2). in 1994 private market 
financing to developing countries declined from the level reached in 1993 - reflecting in part a less 
favourable external environment: 
(i) "The tightening of monetary policy in the United States early in 1994 set off considerable 
turbulence in world financial markets". 
(ii) "The Mexican fmancial crisis in December 1994 prompted a relatively broad sell-off of developing 
country securities in late December and early January 1995" [see also the IMF Survey (February 19, 1996»). 
See also The Economist (January 28th, 1995). p. 92; (May 13th, 1995), p. 109. 
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perform well. In 1993, the KLSE performed extremely well 27 (high means of returns) 
when the HKSE also did extremely well. More glaringly is the market performance 
in 1987: Due to the stock market crash of 1987, following other exchanges, the means 
of stock returns on the KLSE were very low while the standard deviations were very 
high28. Similar observations suggesting a tendency of stock markets to move together 
(as indicated in Tables 7.9 through 7.12) can be identified in 1990 - the year of Gulf 
crisis29• In this year, all of these exchanges (except the HKSE) exhibited negative 
means of returns. 
Based on these preliminary observations, it appears that national stock markets 
tend to move similarly. It is at least plausible that stock markets are inclined to move 
together more closely with the occurrence of special international political-economic 
events. This subject of international stock market covariation is considered in further 
detail in Sub-section 7.3.2 
7.3.2-Correlations Between the KLSE and Other Exchanges 
The present sub-section discusses the results of our tests in trying to quantify 
as well as qualify the extent to which the KLSE is integrated with the overseas 
exchanges. In these inspections, stock markets around the world are in general, 
categorised into the following groups: 
27Some explanations for this actuality are provided in Chapter Two. 
28Several studies using high-frequency data surrounding the crash of 1987, have found that international 
stock market correlation tends to increase in periods of high turbulence. See e.g., Bertero and Mayer (1990). 
King and Wadhwani (1990), King et.al (1994) and Longin and Solnik (1995). 
2Ths approximately eight months period of Kuwait InvasionlDesert Storm started on August 2. 1990. 
Additionally. as noted in Roll (1992), a large Japanese market decline occurred in early 1990. 
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(i) well-established/developed exchanges (or stock markets in the developed 
countries); 
(ii) stock exchanges in the Asia-Pacific region; and 
(iii) emerging stock exchanges (or stock markets in the developing countries). 
As featured in Chapter Six, this investigation of stock market linkages involves 
three procedures: cluster analysis, correlation analysis and partial correlation analysis. 
a) Cluster Analysis 
Our purpose in employing cluster analysis here is, to get a visual impression 
of how stock markets around the world could be grouped based on the similarity of 
their price and/or returns movements30• More specifically, we use the cluster 
procedure with the objective of identifying which stock markets are 'close,31 to the 
KLSE in terms of the comovement in their prices/returns. 
Results of our cluster analysis32 are depicted in Figures 7.1 through 7.5. In 
words, these results are outlined below: 
(i) The KLSE and Developed Exchanges (1984 - 1994): As displayed in Figure 
7.1, the KLSE is moving (relatively speaking) in tandem with the HKSE. In other 
words, the KLSE and the HKSE form a primary cluster, which is defined by Panton 
et.al (1976) as a two-market cluster. Other markets which appear to be very 'close' 
30 As underlined in Chapter Five, employing the procedure of cluster analysis would involve an 
extensive use of dendrograms in analyzing structural properties of the comovement data. Panton et.al (1976) 
emphasize that the opportunity afforded for visual inspection, is the appealing feature of dendrograms. 
31 As noted in Chapter Six, since we are using Minitab in impelemnting our clustering process, we use 
correlation (as given in Minitab) to measure closeness. 
321n this analysis, the data that we use are changes in the logarithm of share price indices. The names 
of share price indices (for all of the countries) involved in this study are given in Table 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1 
THE KLSE AND DEVELOPED MARKETS 
A Hierarchical Cluster Ana1yasis of Stock Markets Based 
on the Daily Logarithm of Returns. 
Sirrilarity 
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to the Malaysian stock market are in Canadian, United States and United Kingdom. 
The Japanese stock market, which is in the same (broad) geographical region with the 
Malaysian market, surprisingly, is 'located' in these terms, quite far from the KLSE. 
(ii) The KLSE and Some Selected Developed and Emerging Markets (1988 -
1994)33: Referring to Figure 7.2, when data from both developed and emerging 
markets are analysed, stock markets are classified into two major (regional) groups. 
The first group comprises the countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with the exception 
of Japan and South Korea. These countries are Malaysia, Hong Kong, Australia, 
Thailand, the Philippines and Taiwan. Here, once again, Malaysia and Hong Kong are 
in the same primary cluster. 
The second major group is made up of countries in the developed world, the 
majority of which are European countries. Japan is found to be in this group. 
(iii) The KLSE and Other Markets in the Asia-Pacific Region (1990 - 1994): 
In our foregoing cluster analysis (the results of which are depicted in Figure 7.2), 
some of the countries in the Asia-Pacific Basin are not included. Now, we concentrate 
on the Asia-Pacific Basin by including all the countries in this part of the world. 
Being among the world's biggest and most influential stock markets, the United States 
and United Kingdom markets are also included in the sample - in order to visualise 
their 'locations' and 'influence' among the markets in the Asia-Pacific countries. 
Our sample period here is only 1990 through 1994. We have to choose 1990 
as the starting year in order to include Singapore in the sample. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, prior to the 1990, the Malaysian and Singaporean stock markets were 
3~ote that even though some of the countries included here are similar to those used in Figures A3.5a 
and A3.Sb. different indices are employed. Additionally. our analyses here (Le., Figures A3.6a and A3.6b) 
involve a different sample period (i.e .• !!!tt 1987). 
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Figure 7.2 
DEVELOPED AND EMERGING MARKETS 
A Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of Stock Markets Based on 
the Daily Logarithm of Returns. 
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twin markets. 
As shown in Figure 7.3, Malaysia is now in same group with Japan, even 
though they are recorded not to be very 'close'. As expected, Singapore which is 
geographically a neighbour of Malaysia, is depicted here as the 'nearest' country to 
Malaysia (i.e., in the same primary cluster), followed by Hong Kong, Australia and 
Japan. 
In this dendrogram (Figure 7.3), the U.S. and U.K. markets are depicted 
together as a 'special family' (primary cluster) - a 'family' which seems to have no 
close relationship with other 'families'. The Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan are 
depicted here as members of one more family of stock markets; whereas South Korea 
and Indonesia in this mapping, come out as two 'outliers': they do not belong to any 
group of markets. 
(iv) The KLSE and Other Emerging Markets (1990 - 1994)34: This part of our 
cluster study of stock markets involves data which are different from the previous 
ones. They are different in a number of important ways. First, the data that we use 
here are the price indices provided by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
whereas the previously used data are local stock price indices. Secondly, all the stock 
markets included in this sample are emerging markets: They come from five parts of 
the globe (continents) - Asia, Africa, Europe. Latin America and Central America. 
Thirdly, the results of cluster analysis using local price indices reported above, are 
based on the daily prices datalS • On the other hand, for the IFC indices we have to 
34Here, in order to include as many emerging markets as possible, we have to begin our sample period 
with the 1990. 
3SIndeed, in these investigations we have also employed weekly data. However, since the results are 
not much different from the ones based on daily data - and to conserve space - they are not reponed here. 
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Figure 7.3 
THE KLSE AND OTHER MARKETS IN THE ASIA-
PACIFIC REGION 
A Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of Stock Markets Based on 
the Daily Logarithm of Returns. 
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use the weekly data because the daily data are not available. 
Another important difference is that. two categories of indices are employed. 
They are, the indices which measure prices in local currencies, and the ones which 
measure prices in U.S. dollars. The purpose of using price indices which are measured 
in U.S. dollars here (in addition to the ones measured in local currencies) is to 
investigate whether exchange rates are influential in determining the covariations or 
the 'closeness' between and among stock markets. 
Figures 7.4 display the results of our hierarchical cluster analyses based on 
price indices which are in local currencies. As expected, Malaysian stock market is 
shown to be moving very closely together with the stock markets in Thailand. 
Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Stock markets are clustered in quite different ways or configurations 
(arrangements) when the data used are in U.S. dollars. They are portrayed in Figure 
7.5. Nevertheless. we can still find that several stock markets which are in the same. 
group when the data are based on local currencies, are also in the same group when 
the data are based on the U.S. dollars. Comparing Figures 7.4 and 7.5, one will find 
that in both figures. the Malaysian market is in the same group with Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Similarly, Korea and Jordan which are in the same 
group in Figure 7.4. are also placed in the same group in Figure 7.5. Another example 
is that Greece and Portugal which form a primary cluster in both Figures 7.4 and 7.5. 
In a nutshell. the evidence detected and collected from these results corroborates the 
fact that the influence of exchange rates in determining the group or the covariations 
between and among national stock exchanges, is not great. 
To generalise, our empirical investigation on stock market linkages applying 
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Figure 7.4 
THE KLSE AND OTHER EMERGING MARKETS 
A Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of Stock Markets Based On 
the IFC Weekly Logarithm of Returns (Local Currency), 
1990 - 1994 
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the hierarchical cluster procedure, has produced a number findings which can be 
summarised as follows: 
(i) The regional factor is crucial in determining the magnitude of stock market 
covariations36 [see e.g.,Figure 7.2]. The Malaysian stock market for example, is 
moving closely together with its counterparts in the same region: Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. 
(ii) Given the present era of information technology, it is not very clear 
whether the time zone is an important element in affecting the tendency of stock 
markets to be regionally integrated. The Japanese stock market for example, is found 
not to be consistently moving closely together with its neighbours in the same time 
zone. 
(iii) The impact of movements in exchange rates on stock market 
interrelatedness is not likely to be profound. 
Lastly, our survey of literature on the application of cluster analysis in studying 
stock market. reveals that there has been only one published study which applied this 
method to study Asian stock markets. The study was conducted by Cheung and Ho 
to examine the stability of relationships Asian equity markets and some developed 
markets. Examining these relationship on a yearly basis, among others, they found that 
the "Malaysian and Singapore markets form primary clusters in ten out of twelve years 
and the Japan and US markets form primary clusters in seven out of twelve years" (p. 
248). Their results are similar with our results in the sense that the Japanese stock 
market is not moving very closely together with its counterpart in Asia. and that the 
36.y,us finding aligns with the finding demonslrated in Solnik (1996) that national stock markets tend 
to exhibit strong regional links. 
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Figure 7.5 
THE KLSE AND OTHER EMERGING MARKETS 
A Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of Stock Markets Based On 
the IFC Weekly Logarithm of Returns (US$), 
1990 - 1994 
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Malaysian stock market is moving very closely together with the Singapore stock 
market. 
However, as far as the Malaysian stock market and the Singapore stock 
markets are concerned, Cheung and Ho's (1991) results appear to be biased because, 
as noted in Chapter Six, the sample period for their study is from January 1977 to 
June 1988. During this period, as highlighted in Chapter Two, the Malaysian stock 
market and the Singaporean stock market were twin markets. Shares from the same 
companies (Le., Malaysian companies and Sigaporean companies) were listed on both 
exchanges. 
b) Correlation Analysis 
The method of cluster analysis provides us a procedure to identify visually 
which groups of stock markets are more integrated and which ones are relatively 
segmented. However, using this method, we are unable to quantify the amplitude of 
stock market covariations. Given this shortcoming. the method of correlation analysis 
is used as a complement. 
The results of our study on stock market linkages applying the correlation 
procedure are offered in Tables 7.13 through 7.23. 
Whilst Table 7.13 details the correlation coefficients between the KLSE and 
developed markets, Table 7.14 and Table 7.15 show the size or dimension of 
correlations between the KLSE and its counterparts in the developing countries. The 
linkages between the KLSE and its neighbours in the Pacific Basin are detailed in 
Table 7.16. Our findings derived from these four tables are summed up below: 
(i) The KLSE is significantly (positively) correlated with all developed 
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Table 7.13 
CORRELATIONS (log) OF THE KLSE AND DEVELOPED EXCHANGES; 
1984 -1994 
BJtBRLAM 0.163- 0.12.* 0.111- 0.300* 0.070 0.062 
0.208- 0.295* 0.045 0.327- 0.180* 0.051 0.078 
0.211- 0.081 0.0.5 0.209* 0.060 0.072 
0*-* 0.211- 0.123* -0.036 0.227- 0.153* -0.015 0.2"- 0.192 -0.092 
0.195- 0.110* 0.0'2 0.232- 0.120* 0.011 0.259* 0.116 0.001 
0.25.- 0.103- 0.011 0.H5* 0.112* 0.019 0.32t- 0.026 0.108 
.275* 0.072 O.OU 0.356* 0.107** 0.045 0.362* 0.039 0.102 
0.190* 0.058 O.OU O.OU O.OU 0.2H* -0.Ot7 -0.U7 
0.2U- 0.059 0.050 0.005 -0.008 0.256* 0.082 -0.012 
0.25.* -0.006 0.087 -0.024 -0.011 0.215** 0.136 0.021 
0.290- 0.1"- 0.503* -0.033 0.198** 
0.193- .026 O.Ul* 0.05' 0.10. 
0.2'5- 0.30'- 0.3U- 0.037 0.029 
0.270- 0.323- 0.086 .12:1- 0.415* O.OH 0.189-* 
0.318* O.lU- 0.022 0 .• 07- 0.157* 0.071 0.396* 0.035 0.139 
0.333- 0.132* O.OU 0.'09- 0.125- .073 0.170 
0.216- 0.2U* 0.0.2 0.3"- 0.197- 0.006 
0.223· 0.211- 0.053 0.382- 0.1"- .02:1 0.015 
0.270- O.U'- 0.07l1 O.U'- 0.150- 0.013 
0.157- 0.337- -0.020 0.323- 0.317-
-0.072 
0.177- 0.310- -0.007 0.30'- 0.22.- -0.005 0.'88* 0.035 O.OH 
·Sigu1fiaantly 41fferant from .aro at 1\ laval (1. a., two-tailad t-ta.t) • 
·-Sigui!icaat1y different from •• ro at 5\ l.val ( i ••• , two-tail.d t-t •• t) . 
···The data.ra only for tka period of 1"8 through 19l14. 
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Table 7.14 
THE IFC STOCK PRICE INDICES (LOCAL CURRENCY): 
CORRELATIONS (log) OF THE KLSE AND OTHER EMERGING EXCHANGES 
(1988 - 1994) 
c,:;: 
·~::,.,c_ •. ""~,_., 
. . . . ~::-', ": 
.:~ .. c-: ':i'i,;;,'-': ,:;';;:"':;', ;-"-,-1';''''' ;1 ~ -,: . ,';:;: 
;~,';:' "', ',!If ;,::~-.L~~l:)_-::; ,",;.c:' ;, ,::,):: ,,~:J."l1fi~n.c. , •• ,,~~ ..... 
~!-'t_:.&.:~ ,,-:.;;' I~D~~ ~ ,._1~_·1 .-i ;;<' .,", I.oIU: ~t .. ~~;t ::~~" '~.L .~.' 'i~ "11 '~' .~;""i''''.:2;:;r:; :~ 
. ..:: . ..; .. ; " " ~; .~~ 1-,; ';: . '::'::;;: I, •• ~ .:.;;;. : '.;~*~:~,: 
[Argentina 0.050 -0 . 016 -0 .022 0 . 093 -0 . 053 0.100 
Brazil 0 .133** -0.026 0.042 0.293 * 0 . 006 -0.344 * 
Chile 0 .122 ** 0.041 0.031 0.179 -0.175 0.213 
Colombia - 0.012 0.029 0.046 0.045 0.010 0.031 
IMexico 0.175 * 0.031 0 . 048 0 . 223 ** 0 . 017 0 . 203 
Venezuala 0.010 - 0 . 035 - 0.057 - 0 . 097 -0 . 2 83 ** - 0 . 075 
India 0 .077 -0 . 047 -0.075 0.010 -0.081 0 . 105 
Indonesia 0.310* -0 . 003 0 .1 94 * 0.448* - 0.014 0.358 * 
Korea 0.242 * 0 .082 0 .003 0 . 292 * -0 .020 - 0 . 039 
Pakistan -0 .133 -0.043 0.039 0.145 -0.059 0 . 020 
Philippines 0 . 360 * 0 . 003 0 . 094 0.568 * - 0.036 0 . 107 
Taiwan 0 . 170* 0.002 0.035 0.328 * 0 . 035 0 .123 
iThailand 0.521 * 0.044 -0 .047 0.630 * 0.045 0.097 
IGreece 0 .079 - 0 . 045 -0 .024 0 . 025 0 . 079 0.099 
Jordan 0.156* 0.042 0 .046 0. 165 0 .14 9 0.050 
Portugal 0 . 242 * 0 . 016 -0 . 034 0 . 221 ** -0 . 047 0.068 
Nigeria N.A. 'N.A. iN.A. 0.043 0.021 0.265** 
Turkey 0.186* 0.011 - 0.065 0.197 0.089 0.117 
Zimbabwe 0.01 2 -0 .139* 0.102 0.056 -0. 14 5 0 . 124 
NB: •• t ..... t'i ........ ';' di~"~ .. ~Z'ClII aero at 1 .. l.-.rwtl (1 • •. , two- t&11ed t-teat). 
··81gn1~1cantly difterent from •• ro at 5' 1.ve1 (1 .•. , two- tailed t - teat) . 
N .1.: Data are not available. '!'h. data for Indone.1a are only for a period of 
;lJJO - lJJt . ft. "..u.y data for pu1.tan u. only for a period of 18J2 - lU4 . 
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exchanges [see Table 7.13]. Thus, as far as developed exchanges are concerned, the 
null hypothesis of zero correlation between the KLSE and other national exchanges 
can be rejected (even at the 1 % level using the t-test). 
(ii) The stock markets in the U.S, U.K., Switzerland, Canada and (surprisingly) 
Norway and Sweden37 are among those markets in the developed world which are 
relatively highly correlated with the Malaysian market. 
(iii) While the contemporaneous correlation coefficients between the KLSE and 
developed exchanges are significantly positive, correlations (in general) fade away 
when they are examined on a lead-lag basis38• As shown in the column four of Table 
7.13, for a number of countries such as the U.S., Canada, U .K., Switzerland and 
France, however, the daily lagged correlation coefficients (with the KLSE) are still 
significantly different from zero. In fact. it is interesting to note that the lagged daily 
correlation coefficients are higher than the contemporaneous ones for the U.S. and 
Canadian Stock markets. These findings suggest that, to some extent, the Malaysian 
stock market is being lead by some stock markets in the developed countries such as 
the U.S., Canada, U.K. and Switzerland. 
In his study, Roll (1992) also found lagged correlation between the Malaysian 
market and the U.S. market. He attributed such a lagged correlation to time zone 
locations. This is because, according to the author, unexpected events during the 
370iven the fact that New York, London and Zurich are influential international financial centres, one 
might expect the Malaysian capital market to be relatively highly correlated with those in the U.S .• U.K .• 
and Switzerland. However. we did not expect the Malaysian market to be highly correlated with the stock 
markets in Norway and Sweden because these countries do not appear to have close economic relations with 
Malaysia. Perhaps. such relatively high correlations could be explained by the 'global factors' that over time, 
might provide the impetus for global stock market covariations. Alternatively, the apparent correlations could 
be due to coincidental relationships in the data. 
38Due to limited space, only the correlation coefficients at lag one are reported in the thesis. 
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Table 7.15 
THE IFC STOCK PRICE INDICES (U.S. DOLLARS): 
CORRELA TIONS (log) OF THE KLSE AND OTHER EMERGING EXCHANGES 
(1988 - 1994) 
Argentina -0.046 - 0.029 -0.023 
Brazil 0.149* -0.036 -0 .009 0.104 0.242** 0.109 
Chile 0.120** -0.015 0.021 0.092 -0 .108 0.228** 
Colombia 0.031 0.003 0.010 0.078 0.032 0.045 
!Mexico 0.137* 0.008 0.002 0.211 -0 .002 0.193 
Venezuala 0.059 -0.0 43 -0 .065 - 0.081 - 0.273** - 0 .058 
India 0.071 -0.012 -0.076 0.021 - 0.062 0 .1 22 
Indonesia 0.330* -0 .010 0.150** 0. 453* -0.025 0.359* 
Korea 0.361* -0.070 -0 .084 0.262** - 0.054 - 0.056 
Pakistan 0.044 -0 .165** 0.153 0.095 -0.070 -0.019 
IPhilippines 0.362* 0.009 0.065 0.558* -0.039 0.136 
Taiwan 0.023 0.045 0.072 0.296* 0.012 0.015 
Thailand 0.503* 0.003 -0 .043 0.617* 0.029 0.074 
G: ce 0.146* -0 .088 -0.07 4 - 0.012 0.072 0.017 
Jordan 0.200* - 0.028 0.005 0.137 0.110 -0.040 
Portugal 0.135· - 0.016 - 0.072 0.141 -0 .073 - 0.060 
:Nigeria N.A. N.A. N.A. -0 .188 0.067 0.062 
ITur key 0.000 0.136* 0.081 0.168 0.080 0.166 
Zimbabwe 0.018 0.030 0.072 0.173 -0 .177 0.000 
RB: ..... _. tit ~ra. sero at 1. level (i .e., twO'·ta11ed t-teat). 
··.1gn1t1aantly different 'frca .. ro at 5. 1_1 (1 . e., two-tailed t-teat) . 
".~.: Data are not ava.11abl. • . n. data for Indonaa1a are aoly for a par1cx1 of 
leeO - llee. ~. weekly data for Pak1atan are only ~or a per1cx1 of lle2 - 1114. 
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Indone.ia++ 
Japan 
++ 
South lCorea 
i1and 
Table 7.16 
CORRELATIONS (log) OF THE KLSE AND OTHER EXCHANGES 
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: 
1988 - 1994 
- 0.009 0.067 0.322- 0 . 085 0.017 0 . 372- - 0.02 3 
RANGSENG 0.H1· 0 . 088 0.030 0 . • 74· 0 . 11.·- - 0 . 018 0.573- - 0.060 
TOTMJtHX 0.420- 0 . 075 0 . 060 0 . • 5 6- 0.122·- 0.004 0 . 102 0. 59 9-
JAXCOKP 0 . 157- -0.015 0.213- 0.13 5- - 0.021 0 . 071 0 . 20 5 0 . 1 6 5 
JAPASOO 0.309- 0.038 0.068 0.370- 0.006 - 0.016 0.346- 0.104 
0.193- 0 . 015 0.145- 0.233- 0 . 072 0.146- 0.U8- 0.093 
SNGPORI. 0.677- 0 . 187· 0.156- 0.346- 0.100 0.550- 0 . 764- 0.022 
SNGALLS 0.668- 0.189· 0.179* 0.336- 0.121-* 0.603* 0.799* 0 . 050 
ItORCOKP 0.1:10* 0.040 O.OU 0.183- 0.040 0 . 026 0.285-0 - 0 . 038 
TAIWGHT 0.161- -0. 0 01 0.119- 0 . 177 - - O. OU 0 . 097 0.337* 0 . 044 
0 .• 06* O.OU 0.178- 0 .• 26- 0.062 0 . 1 56- 0.648- 0.093 
0 . 179 
0 . 077 
- 0 . 122 
0 .253 --
- 0 . 057 
0.13 5 
0 . 00 2 
0.011 
- 0 . 014 
0.163 
0.13 5 
*Significantly different from z.ro at 1\ level (i ••• , two-tailed t-test). 
*.Singnificantly different from zero at 5\ level (i . e., two-tailed t -
teat ) . 
++'.l'he data 'cover the period of only 1990 through 1994 . 
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trading day in the U.S., could not possibly be reflected in Far Eastern markets until 
the next calendar day. 
On weekly basis, as shown in column seven of Table 7.13, the KLSE is again 
being (significantly) led by most markets in developed countries. The exceptions here 
are Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Sweden. Again, the interesting issue here whether 
this is an indication of market inefficiency or just a time zone effect. 
According to Bailey an Stulz (1990), for weekly and monthly returns, the time 
differences between markets are not important. Moreover, if the time zone effect is 
the important factor, why is the Malaysian market not being (significantly) led by 
stock markets in Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Sweden? Perhaps, this issue deserves 
further investigation 
(iv) Whilst, under the cluster analysis we have found that the Japanese stock 
market is not in the same group with the KLSE, under the correlation analysis we 
have found that there is no significant lagged correlation between the Japanese market 
and the Malaysian stock market. Of course, the Japanese and Malaysian markets are 
located in similar time zone. 
A study by Cheung and Mark (1992) has also documented similar results: 
Unlike the U.S. market, the Japanese market plays a less important leading role in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Similarly, Bailey and Stulz (1990) in their work claim that the 
American markets led the Pacific Basin markets. 
(v) Tables 7.14 and 7.15 display the results of correlation analysis between the 
Malaysian stock market and other emerging markets. based on share price indices in 
local currencies and in U.S. dollars. respectively. These tables reveal that, in general, 
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Table 7.17 
CORRELATIONS (Io~) OF THE KLSE EMAS (ALL-SHARE) INDEX 
ANn 
THE AUSTRALIAN JOINT STOCK EXCHANGE (AJSE) ALL-ORDINARY INDEX 
(Examined on a Yearly Basis): 
1984 -1994 
1984 - 0 . 325* -0 . 033 0 . 325* 0.453* 0.120* 0.161* 0.494* 0 . 067 0 . 053 
1994 
1984 0 . 219* 0.001 0 . 009 0.079 - 0.019 0 . 131 0 . 348 0. 418 - 0 . 3 4 2 
985 0 . 096 0.012 0 . 074 0 . 218 0.140 0 . 014 0 . 60 9** - 0. 162 - 0 . 312 
1986 -0 . 020 - 0 . 017 0 . 042 0.090 0.126 - 0 . 108 0 . 018 - 0 . 2 82 - 0 . 4 36 
1987 0 . 481* - 0 . 09l 0 . 386* 0 . 805* 0.199 0 . 4 33 * 0 . 86 9* 0 .231 0.124 
1988 0 . 453* 0.050 0.112 0 . 339** 0 . 260 0 . 016 0 . 135 0.4 6 0 0 . 030 
1989 0.553* - 0 . 209* - 0 . 236* 0 . 186 - 0 . 0 99 0 . 08 9 0. 339 - 0 . 48 2 - 0 . 025 
990 0 . 370* 0.089 0.212* 0 . 505* 0 . 080 - 0 . 147 0 . 73 2 * - 0 . 1 58 0 . 139 
991 0.348* -0 . 079 0.028 0 . 337** 0 . 033 0 . 2 66 0.4 5 7 0.413 - 0 . 08 2 
1992 0.206* 0.060 - 0 . 007 0.010 - 0.106 - 0. 2 74** - 0.107 - 0 .52 1* 0 . 040 
1993 0.121** 0.082 0.044 0 . 380* - 0 . 111 0 . 103 0 . 399 - 0 .332 - 0 . 4 96 
1994 0.273* - 0 . 062 0.138** 0.199 0.088 - 0.132 0 . 033 0 . 307 0 .32 0 
*Significant1y diLfarant from .ero at 1\ level (i.e. , two-tailed t-te.t). 
**Significantly different from sero at 5\ level ( .i. •• , two-tailed t •• t ) . 
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1984 -
1994 
1994 
1985 
986 
987 
1989 
989 
990 
991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Table 7.18 
CORRELATIONS (log) OF THE KLSE COMPOSITE INDEX 
AND THE HKSE HANG SENG INDEX 
(Examined on a Yearly Basis); 
1984 - 994 
0.329* 0 .1 09* 0.085* 0.409* 0.136* 0.186* 0.547* 0.0 26 
0 . 137** 0.143** 0 . 141** 0 . 227 0.048 0.356* 0 . 455 - 0 . 141 
0.017 0.079 0.074 0.192 - 0 . 029 -0.250 0.065 - 0.36 9 
0.155** 0.034 - 0.096 0.003 0.150 - 0 . 038 - 0.293 0 . 750· 
0 . 341* 0.168* 0.215* 0.582* 0.300** 0.684* 0.871* 0.078 
0 . 497* 0.136** 0.032 0.435* 0 .2 79** 0 . 027 0.638** - 0.021 
0 . 444* 0 . 058 -0.10 4 0 . 625* 0 . 002 - 0.191 0.597 *· -0 . 251 
0.590* 0.267* 0.168* 0.772* - 0 . 007 - 0 . 08 2 0 . 856* 0.162 
0 . 493* - 0 . 129*· - 0.086 - 0.018 0.119 0.188 0.466 0.105 
0.275* 0.159* 0.037 0.330*· 0.102 0 .1 98 0.489 -0.211 
0.155** .123** 0.021 0.452* 0.031 0 . 038 0 . 491 - 0 .387 
0.567* 0.039 0.096 0.425* 0.254 - 0.144 0 .3 04 0 .290 
*Significantly different from .ero at 1\ level(i.e., two-twiled teat ) . 
0.087 
- 0.083 
0.094 
0.360 
0.086 
0.0 24 
- 0.462 
- 0 .082 
0 . 045 
- 0.304 
- 0 . 071 
0.54 2 
·*Significantly different from .ero ,at 'S\ level (i. •. , two-tailed t-te.t). 
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the Malaysian stock market is less correlated39 with other emerging markets 
compared with its correlation with developed markets [Table 7.13]. In fact, the 
Malaysian market is found to be negatively correlated with a number of emerging 
markets - Venezuela, for example. 
(vi) When the results shown in Tables 7.14 (correlations in local currencies) 
and 7.15 (correlations in U.S. dollars) are compared, one can find a number of 
differences in the magnitude (including different signs) of correlations for some 
countries. Even so, these differences do not appear to be great: Stock markets which 
are shown to be relatively highly correlated in local currency terms with the KLSE in 
Table 7.14 - Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia - are stilI found in Table 7.15, 
to be highly (positively) correlated (in dollar terms) with the KLSE. Likewise, both 
of these tables exhibit low correlation coefficients for countries such as Argentina, 
Colombia, Venezuela, India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. 
(vii) Another group of stock markets examined under correlation analysis - the 
results of which are shown in Table 7.16 - are those from the Asia-Pacific countries. 
As expected, the results indicate that the KLSE is highly (positively) correlated with 
all exchanges in this region. For all of these exchanges the null hypothesis of zero 
correlation has to be rejected (even at the 1 % level, using the t-test). Among the 
exchanges which have the highest correlations with the KLSE are those from 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand and Australia. 
From table 7.16, it is interesting to note that the KLSE is leading a number of 
stock markets in the Asian countries. For the daily returns [column 5], the KLSE 
39The exception here is the stock markets in the same region such as in Thailand. the Philippines and 
Indonesia. 
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Table 7.19 
CORRELATIONS (10K) OF THE KLSE EMAS (ALL-HAREl INDEX 
AND 
THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF SINGAPORE (SES) ALL-SHARE INDEX 
(Examined On a Yearly Basis); 
1990 -1994 
0.668* 0.189* 0.179* 0.336* 0.121 0.603* 0.799* 0.050 0.011 
1990 0.791* 0.406* 0.296* 0.252 0.109 0.717* 0.916* 0.251 -0.156 
1991 0.689* 0.034 0.049 0.377* 0.127 0.500* 0.B46* 0.567** O.OBB 
992 0.494* 0.136** 0.125** 0.305** -0.062 0.436* 0.217 0.123 0.157 
1993 0.492* 0.198* 0.126** 0.182 0.342* 0.618* 0.736* -0.216 -0.021 
1994 .698* 0.069 0.157** 0.474* 0.027 0.539* 0.7B7* -0.342 -0.169 
*Significantly different from .ero at 1\ level (i.e" two-tailed t-
te.t). 
"Significantly different from .ero at 5\ level (i.e. I two-tailed t-
te.t) • 
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1984-
1994 
1984 
19B5 
19B6 
1987 
19BB 
19B9 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Table 7.20 
CORRELATIONS (10&) OF THE KLSE COMPOSITE INDEX 
AND 
THE SWISS BANK CORPORATION (SBC) GENERAL INDEX 
(Examined on a Yearly Basis); 
1984 - 1994 
0.318* 0.166* 0.022 0.157* 0.071 0.396* 0.035 
0.098 -0.042 0.195* -0.118 0.052 0.023 0.070 
0.104 0.044 0.007 -0.047 -0.185 -0.179 -0.619** 0.255 
-O.OOB 0.083 0.059 0.249 0.003 0.055 0.263 -0.512 
0.431* 0.384* 0.056 0.707* 0.375* 0.407- 0.722- 0.072 
0.450* -0.039 0.016 0.295** -0.048 -0.287** -0.089 -0.115 
0.596* -0.lB4* -0.236* 0.262 -0.028 -0.104 0.057 0.263 
0.554* 0.371* 0.036 0.703* 0.188 -0.093 0.807* 0.324 
0.436* 0.135** 0.052 0.437* 0.209 0.162 0.752- 0.233 
0.161* 0.204- -0.013 0.462* 0.058 0.031 0.491 0.384 
0.005 .157** -0.050 0.246 0.194 -0.129 -0.011 - 0.146 
0.176* 0.011 0.005 0.146 0.353* -0.383* -0.314 0.274 
* ai9DificaDtly differeat frca •• roat ·1\ 1",e1 (i ••• , two-tailed t-te.t). 
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0.139 
-0.027 
0.292 
-0.309 
0.304 
0.191 
-0.466 
-0.176 
0.130 
-0.350 
0.196 
0.362 
appears to lead the stock markets in Indonesia, The Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan 
and Thailand. For the weekly data [column 8], the KLSE is leading the stock markets 
in The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
In short, the Malaysian stock is positively correlated with overseas markets 
around the globe. By and large, these correlations are significantly different from zero. 
The question now is, is this phenomenon stable over time? To examine this issue, we 
choose seven stock markets which are highly correlated with the KLSE and break up 
the data according to years. The correlation coefficients are then examined on a yearly 
basis. Included in the sample are the 'Australian Joint Stock Exchange' (AJSE), the 
HKSE, LSE, NYSE, the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES), the Swiss stock market 
and the Securities Exchange of Thailand (SET). The results of this analysis are given 
in Tables 7.17 through 7.23. 
On examining Tables 7.17 through 7.23 the following findings, inter alia, can 
be gleaned: 
(i) Even though the KLSE is highly correlated with the SES, HKSE, SET, 
AJSE, NYSE, LSE and the Swiss stock market, these correlations as expected, are not 
inter-temporally stable40• 
(ii) In most cases, the correlations between the KLSE and these overseas 
exchanges are relatively low in 1984, 1985, 1986, 1992 and 1993. 
(iii) Correlations between the KLSE and foreign exchanges escalate with the 
outbreak of important international political-economic events. The evidence for this 
40Several previous studies also found that the interrelatedness between national stock exchanges are 
not stable over time. See e.g., Makridakis & Wheelwright (1974), Panton et.ai (1976), Maldonado & 
Saunders (1981), Othman Yong (1993) and Erb et.ai (1994). 
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1986-
1994 
1986 
1987 
988 
989 
990 
991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
: 
Table 7.21 
CORRELATIONS (10K) OF THE KLSE COMPOSITE INDEX 
AND. 
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE OF THAILAND (SET) INDEX 
(Examined on a Yearly Basis); 
1986 - 1994 
0.337* 0.054 0.219* 0.434* 0.089 0.231* 0.627* 0.058 
0.002 0.019 0.127** 0.128 -0.013 0.178 0.353 0.124 
0.276* 0.043 0.412* 0.579* 0.219 0.509* 0.756* 0.006 
0.496* -0.028 .128** 0.427* 0.016 -0.059 0.286 0.145 
0.489* -0.150** -0.147** 0.320** 0.004 -0.058 0.257 -0.115 
0.479* 0.173* 0.374* 0.586* -0.031 -0.046 0.810* 0.131 
.342* 0.068 0.212* 0.393* 0.032 0.428* 0.427 0.572** 
0.160* 0.022 0.072 0.104 0.085 0.315** 0.576** 0.355 
.227* 0.153** 0.111 0.172 0.138 0.279** 0.373 0.035 
0.525* 0.033 .173* 0.461* .182 0.112 .696* -0.062 
0.147 
0.316 
0.187 
0.284 
0.136 
0.082 
0.356 
-0.292 
0.062 
0.349 
·Signifioantly diUerent from .ero at l' level (i .e., two-tailed t-
te.t). 
·.Significantly different from .ero at 5' level (i.e. , two-tailed t-
t •• t). 
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1994 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
I 
Table 7.22 
CORRELATIONS (10K) OF THE KLSE COMPOSITE INDEX 
AND 
THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE (LSE) ETSE 100 INDEX 
(Examined On a Yearly Basis); 
1984 -1994 
0.216- 0.214- 0.042-- 0.379- 0.197- 0.097-- 0.576- 0.030 
0.117 -0.106 0.084 -0.028 0.076 0.286** 0.128 0.325 
-0.014 -0.006 0.032 -0.066 -0.037 0.033 -0.205 -0.113 
-0.045 0.121-* -0.041 0.212 0.089 -0.047 0.325 -0.878* 
.413* 0.418* 0.088 0.744- 0.408* 0.293** 0.966* 0.211 
.196- 0.393* 0.024 0.396- -0.012 0.16 0.647* -0.099 
0.105 0.162* 0.003 0.147 0.150 .157 0.452 -0.050 
.344- 0.309* 0.047 0.502* 0.190 -0.236 0.635* 0.112 
0.309- 0.111 .072 0.326** 0.094 0.113 0.395 0.034 
0.115 0.136** -0.073 0.224 0.129 -0.154 0.397 0.286 
0.130** 0.080 .160- 0.331** 0.387- 0.093 0.223 -0.186 
0.161* 0.169* -0.028 0.243 0.230 -0.108 0.415 0.082 
0.006 
-0.108 
0.208 
-0.438 
0.241 
-0.045 
-0.532 
-0.054 
-0.014 
-0.325 
0.136 
-0.132 
*Sipif.i.oantly clifferent from .ero at 1% level (1 ••• r two-tal1.cl t-
t •• t) ~ 
·*Sipifloantly different from .ero at 5% level {i .e. r two-tailed t-
.t) • 
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Table 7.23 
CORRELATIONS (10K) OF THE KLSE COMPOSITE INDEX (KLSECOMP) 
AND 
0.157-
1984 0.275* 
1985 -0.119** 
1986 -0.050 
1987 0.279* 
988 0.078 
989 -0.002 
1990 .341-
1991 0.166-
1992 0.111 
1993 .012 
1994 0.147" 
I 
THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (NYSE) 
DOW JONES COMPOSITE 65 INDEX (DJCMP6S) 
(Examined on a Yearly Basis); 
1984 -1994 
0.323* 0.217* -0.021 0.510* 0.062 
0.030 0.425* -0.251 0.029 -0.130 0.133 
0.026 0.003 -0.100 -0.157 -0.169 -0.067 -0.338 
0.060 -0.015 0.074 0.189 -0.044 0.507 -0.742* 
0.542* -0.095 0.601* 0.580* 0.002 0.835* .325 
0.509* 0.001 0.266*- 0.060 -0.135 0.352 0.051 
0.416- 0.008 0.062 0.271** 0.091 0.516 -0.194 
.467* 0.024 .467* 0.237 -0.028 0.534** 0.191 
.310- 0.137** .229 0.182 -0.017 0.467 0.438 
0.227- -0.007 .425- 0.167 -0.128 0.612** -0.419 
0.053 0.016 0.119 0.024 -0.059 0.232 -0.163 
0.166- -0.066 0.195 0.138 -0.004 0.255 0.062 
0.018 
-0.096 
0.072 
-0.629** 
0.351 
-0.029 
-0.399 
-0.166 
-0.469 
0.165 
-0.283 
0.135 
*Bignificantly ·different from .ero at l' level (i. e., two-tailed t-
t) • 
**8ignificantly different from .ero at " level (i.e. , two-tailed t-
) . 
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can be found for example, in 1987 and 199041 • 
(iv) Claims by some authors that world stock markets are more integrated after 
198742 - as far as the KLSE is concerned - to some extent, appear to be true. The 
correlation coefficients between the KLSE and these national exchanges are higher 
starting from the 1987 onward, compared with the previous period [see e.g., Tables 
7.17,7.18 and 7.19] 
(v) Interestingly (as has been mentioned above), for most years (essentially for 
the daily returns), the correlation coefficients between the KLSE and the NYSE are 
highest not on the same date (i.e., contemporaneous correlation) but at lag 1. 
c) Partial Correlation Analysis 
Our final step in investigating the linkages between the KLSE and foreign 
exchanges involves the employment of the partial correlation procedure. The purpose 
of this approach is to measure and to compare the importance of 'common factors' 
from certain foreign exchanges in affecting the movements in the Malaysian market. 
In conducting this aspect of study, three foreign exchanges which are identified to be 
influential and instrumental (highly correlated) in determining the nature and 
magnitude of fluctuations in stock prices on the KLSE, are chosen. They are, the SES, 
the HKSE and the NYSE. The outcomes of these inspections are reported in Tables 
41A study by Cheung and Mak (1992) suggests that bad news affects the world's markets more than 
good news or no news. Erb et.ai (1994) conclude their paper by claiming that correlations are highest when 
any two countries are in a common recession, and they are lower during recoveries and when the business 
cycles in the two countries are out of phase. 
42Koutmos and Booth (1995) in studying the transmission mechanism of price and volatility spillovers 
across the New York, Tokyo and London stock markets, found that the linkages and interactions among the 
three markets have increased substantially in the post-crash era. Based on this finding, they claimed that 
since the 1987, national markets have grown more interdependent. 
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Table 7.24 
PARTIAL CORRELATION (102) OF THE KLSEMAS. AND THE SNGALLS. 
Woldjn2 the KLSEMASt_1 and the DJCMP6St_1 Constant); 
1990 -1994 
1990-1994 0.639* 
(0.408) 
0.300* 
(0.090) 
0.792* 
(0.627) 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
a 
0.731* 
(0.534) 
0.673* 
(0.453) 
0.456* 
(0.208) 
0.482* 
(0.232) 
0.692* 
(0.479) 
0.432* 
(0.187) 
0.311** 
(0.097) 
0.198 
(0.039) 
0.050 
(0.003) 
0.456* 
(0.208) 
0.927* 
(0.859) 
0.885* 
(0.783) 
0.237 
(0.056) 
0.861* 
(0.741) 
0.887* 
(0.787) 
·Significantly different from zero at l' level 
U •• e. ;two·tailed t-te.t) • 
• *Signifieantly different from .ero at 5' level 
U. .e. #tW'O-tailed t-te.t) • 
Inthepar.nth •••• ar. coefficients of (partial) 
termina tion. 
302a 
7.24 through 7.29. 
Table 7.24 displays the partial correlation coefficients between the KLSE Emas 
(All-share) Index (KLSEMAS) at time t and the SES All-share Index (SNGALLS) at 
time t - holding the KLSEMAS at time t-l (i.e., lag 1) and the Dow Jones Composite 
65 (DJCMP65) Index at time t-l constant. Table 7.25 exhibits the partial correlation 
coefficients between the KLSEMAS at time t and the SNGALLS at time t - holding 
the KLSEMAS at time t-l and the DJCMP65 at time t, constant. 
Comparing Table 7.24 and Table 7.25 with Table 7.19, reveals that the 
DJCMP65t•1 as well as the DJCMP65t (and the KLSEMAS t• 1) have some influence on 
the correlation between the KLSEMAS t and the SNGALLSt • Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the interrelatedness of the KLSE and the SES is still very sound and substantial 
even with the absence of the 'New York factor'. For the daily data, as indicated by 
the coefficients of (partial) deterrnination43 in both Tables 7.24 and 7.25 - on the 
whole - about 40% of the movements on the KLSE could be explained by factors or 
influences common to the movements on the SES (when the 'New York factor' is held 
constant). 
The partial correlation between the KLSE and the SES is further examined in 
Table 7.26. This time, the partial correlation between the KLSEMAS t and the 
SNGALLSt is examined by holding the KLSEMASt•1 and the Hang Seng Bank Index 
at time t (HANGSENGt), constant. By comparing Table 7.26 with Tables 7.24 and 
7.25, a conclusion can be drawn that the 'Hong Kong factor' is more influential than 
43 As discussed in Chapter Five. the coefficient of determination or also often referred to as r. is simply 
the square of the correlation coefficient. It indicates the percentage of common variance between the two 
markets (say. markets A and B). So, an r of 0.10 or 10% for instance, may be interpreted as follows: Ten 
percent of price movements on market A are the results of influences common to the market B. See e.g. 
Walsh (1990); Solnik (1996). 
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Table 7.25 
PARTIAL CORRELATION (10K) OF THE KLSEMAS. AND THE SNGALLS. 
WoldjoK the KLSEMAS._1 aod the DJCMP65. Coostaot); 
1990 - 1994 
1990-1994 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
0.646* 
(0_417) 
0.741* 
(0.549) 
0.681* 
(0.463) 
0.476* 
(0.227) 
0.483* 
(0.233) 
0.690* 
(0.476) 
0.330* 
(0.109) 
0.505* 
(0.255) 
0.407* 
(0.166) 
0.179 
(0.032) 
0.054 
(0.003) 
0.466* 
(0.217) 
0.761* 
(0.579) 
0.840* 
(0.706) 
0.778* 
(0.605) 
-0.156 
(0.024) 
0.828* 
(0.686) 
0.703** 
(0.494 ) 
·*Signifiaantlydifferent from zero at 1111 level 
(i ••• , two-tailed t-t •• t). 
**Signifiaantly differ.nt from z.ro at Sill level 
(i ••• , two-tailed t-te.t). 
In the par.nth •••• are coeffici.nt. of (partial) 
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Table 7.26 
PARTIAL CORRELATION (log) OF THE KLSEMASt AND THE SNGALLSt 
UIolding the KLSEMASt_1 and the HANGSENGt Constant): 
1990-1994 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
; 
0.577* 
(0.333) 
0.649* 
(0.421) 
0.560* 
(0.314) 
0.453* 
(0.205) 
0.473* 
(0.224) 
0.575* 
(0.331) 
1990 - 1994 
0.296* 
(0.088) 
0.210 
(0.044) 
0.350** 
(0.123) 
0.222 
(0.049) 
0.107 
(0.011) 
0.476* 
(0.227) 
0.671* 
(0.450) 
0.437 
(0.191) 
0.845* 
(0.714) 
0.114 
(0.013) 
0.796* 
(0.634) 
0.796* 
(0.634) 
·*Sign1f1cantly different from zero at 1\ level 
(i.e. ~ two-tailed t-te.t). 
**Significantly different from.ero at 5\ level 
(i ••• , two-ta1ledt-te.t). 
In theparenthe8e. are coefficients of (partial) 
termination. 
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the 'New York factor' in affecting price/returns movements on the KLSE (Le., for the 
period of 1990 - 1994): If, without the 'New York factor' about 40% of price/returns 
movements on the KLSE are common to the KLSE and SES [see columns 2 of Tables 
7.24 and Tables 7.25], with the absence of the 'Hong Kong factor' only about 33% 
(Le., coefficient of determination) of the daily price/returns movements on the KLSE 
are determined by factors common to both the KLSE and the SES [see Table 7.26, 
column 2]. 
How influential factors common to the KLSE and the HKSE are in affecting 
price/returns movements on the KLSE are quantified in Table 7.27. With the absence 
of factors common to both Malaysian and Singaporean markets, only about 4% of the 
daily price/returns movements on the KLSE are identified as being determined factors 
common to the KLSE and the HKSE (Le., during the period of 1990 - 1994). 
For a longer period (i.e., 1984 - 1994), the influence of factors common to the 
KLSE and the HKSE, and the influence of factors common to the KLSE and the 
NYSE - respectively - are demonstrated in Table 7.28 and Table 7.29. Evidence 
provided by Table 7.28 [columns 2] denotes that about 8% of the daily price/returns 
movements on the KLSE could be explained by factors common to both the KLSE 
and the HKSE. Likewise, as manifested by Table 7.29 [column 1], when the 'Hong 
Kong factor' is held constant, daily movements on the KLSE still could be explained 
by about 8% of the factors common to the KLSE and NYSE (at time t-1). 
Lastly, to recapitulate, the results of our empirical inspections on the behaviour 
of price/returns interrelationships between the KLSE and the SES, the KLSE and the 
HKSE, and the KLSE and the NYSE, could be generalised in the following: 
(a) The SES is not only geographically the nearest foreign exchange to the 
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Table 7.27 
PARTIAL CORRELATION (10K) OF THE KLSECOMP t AND THE HANGSENG t 
WoldjDK the KLSECOMP t_1 and the SNGALLSt CODstant): 
1990-1994 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
0.207* 
(0.043) 
0.199* 
(0.040) 
0.024 
(0.00058) 
0.070 
(0.00049) 
0.017 
(0.00029) 
0.302* 
(0.0912) 
1990 -1994 
0.458* 
(0.210) 
0.739* 
(0.546) 
-0.084 
(0.0071) 
0.318** 
(0.101) 
0.453* 
(0.205) 
0.457* 
(0.209) 
0.244 
(0.060) 
0.549 
(0.301) 
0.053 
(0.0028) 
0.445 
(0.198) 
0.123 
(0.015) 
-0.111 
(0.012) 
*Significantly 4iff.r.nt from zero at 1\ l.vel 
(i ••• , two-tailed t-t •• t). 
**Significantly 4ifferent from •• ro at 5' l.v.l 
(i ••• ltwo-tail.dt-t •• t). 
In the par.nth •••• ar.co.fficienta of (partial) 
termination. 
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Table 7,28 
PARTIAL CORRELATION (10K) OF THE KLSECOMPt AND THE HANGSENG t 
WoldinK the KLSECOMPt_1 and the DJCMP65t_1 Constant): 
1984 -1994 
1984-1994 0.288* 0.373* 0.552* 
(0_083) (0.139) (0_305) 
1984 0.115 0.311** 0.009 
(0.013) (0.097) (0.000081) 
1985 0.024 0.222 -0.265 
(0.000576) (0.049) (0.069) 
1986 0.162* 0.049 -0.480 
(0.262) (0.0024) (0.2304) 
1987 0.334* 0.371* 0.889* 
(0.112) (0.138) (0.790) 
1988 0.325* 0.321** 0.688** 
(0.106) (0.103) (0.473) 
1989 0.428* 0.619* 0.323 
(0.183) (0_383) (0.104) 
1990 0.511* 0.756* 0.900* 
(0.261) (0.572) (0.810) 
1991 0.462* -0.070 0.481 
(0.213) (0.005) (0.231) 
1992 0.255* 0.329** 0.511 
(0.065) (0.108) (0.261) 
1993 0.141** 0.453* 0.526 
(0.020) (0.205) (0.277) 
1994 0.553* 0.437* 0.746* 
(0.306) (0.191) (0.557) 
· •• lpUlaaatly 41ffereDt fr_ .ero at 1\ :leT.l U •••• two-tail.d t-
41ffereDt f~ .ero at 5\ leTel (i.e.,tva-tailed t· 
lD tbe pareo~ .. are coeffieienta of Cp.rtial) lSeterain.tiCAI 
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Table 7.29 
PARTIAL CORRELATION (log) OF THE KLSECOMPt AND THE DJCMP65t_1 
(Holding the KLCOMPt_1 and the HANGSENG, Constant): 
1984 - 1994 
1984-1994 0.289* 0.120* 0.019 
(0.084) (0.014) (0.0004) 
1984 0.080 -0.224 0.085 
(0.006) (0.050) (0.007) 
1985 0.012 -0.154 -0.421 
(0.0001) (0.050) (0.007) 
1986 0.058 0.180 -0.740* 
(0.003) (0.032) (0.548) 
1987 0.528* 0.390* 0.288 
(0.279) (0.152) (0.083) 
1988 0.335* 0.042 -0.326 
(0.112) (0.002) (0.106) 
1989 0.418* 0.301** 0.091 
(0.175) (0.091) (0.008) 
1990 0.234* 0.149 -0.189 
(0.055) 0.022) (0.036) 
1991 0.193* 0.156 0.268 
(0.037) (0.024) (0.072) 
1992 0.162* 0.167 -0.551 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.304) 
1993 0.028 0.050 -0.048 
(0.0008) (0.003) (0.002) 
1994 -0.087 0.089 0.347 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.120) 
1 
-Signifioantly d1ffereat fro. .ero at 1\ lev.l (i ••. , two-tail.d 
-t .. t) • 
-·.ignifioantly 4iffer.at fro. .ero at 5' l.vel (1 ••• , two-tal1.d 
-t .. t). 
1D the p&raath .... are coeffieient. of (partial) deter.inatlon. 
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KLSE, but also the closest exchange to the KLSE in terms of the common factors 
affecting price movements. Expressed differently, the role of factors common to both 
the KLSE and the SES in impelling price/returns movements on the KLSE is relatively 
large. 
(b) Factors common to the NYSE and the KLSE are as important as factors 
common to the HKSE and the KLSE in impelling movements on the KLSE. 
(c) While the KLSE is moving contemporaneously together with the SES and 
the HKSE44, to some extent and more often than not (as evidenced by Tables 7.13, 
7.23 and 7.29) its movements are being led by the NYSE4S (particularly beginning 
from 1987 - for the daily data),6. As noted earlier, a study by Cheung and Mark 
(1992) has documented that the U.S. market led most of the Asia-Pacific market 
during the period of 1978 through 1988. 
7.3.3-Stock Market "Forecastability" 
Early researchers found little evidence that stock prices and returns statistically 
and economically are forecastable [see Chapter Three]. 
Our investigation of the "forecastability" of stock prices and returns on an 
emerging market is motivated by a number of developments in recent literature: 
(i) As reviewed in Chapters Four and Five, it has become almost a consensus 
among recent researchers that stock returns are statistically predictable. 
440ivecha el.al (1992) have also documented the same result. 
4SCf. Eun and Shim (1989). 
46A study by Ko and Lee (1991) indicates that the U.S. market leads the Asian markets. with the 
exception of Korea. Jeon and Von Furstenberg (1990) find that. since October 1987. the degree of 
international co-movement between international stock indices has increased. 
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(ii) In his paper, Harvey (1995) claims to have provided evidence that the 
emerging market returns are generally more predictable than the developed market 
returns. 
(iii) In the forecasting literature (as highlighted in Chapter Six), it is widely 
advocated that the accuracy of forecasts could be improved by combining models; that 
"combining" is "the more pragmatic way of producing better forecasts"47. If 
combining is a more efficient approach to forecasting, then, employing this approach, 
could we improve the "forecastability" of stock returns? 
Our empirical objective here is twofold: To investigate and assess how 
'efficient' the Malaysian stock market is; to examine the capability of some 
procedures offered by the discipline of forecasting in predicting stock prices and 
returns. 
A relatively new development in combining forecasts (or composite 
forecasting) is the multi-process models (or the Bayesian approach to combining 
forecasts). In trying to justify and assess the "forecastability" of an emerging market, 
as featured in Chapter Six, we are comparing the performance of three models. They 
are, the Steady Model (SM), the Linear Growth Model (LGM) or simply the Growth 
Model and the 'Combined' Model (or the multi-process models) which 'combines' the 
element of SM and LOM. 
As noted in Sun-section 7.2.2, our tests of the "forecastability" of stock returns 
on the KLSE (employing the three aforementioned models) involve a sample of fifty 
individual companies. For the purpose of illustration - just to show how the three 
forecasting approaches 'perform' - we detail some of our results in Tables 7.30, 7.31 
47Clive W.J.Granger.lnternational Journal of Forecasting. Vol. 11. No.4. December 1995. p. 587. 
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and 7.32. They are based on the daily data from three companies - the Kuala Lumpur 
Kepong Bhd., the Malaysian Airline system Bhd. and the Tanjong Plc4H• 
As specified in Chapter Six, the quality or the accuracy of forecasts here is 
assessed using four standard statistical measures of errors. They are, the sum of 
squared errors (SSE), the mean squared error (MSE) and the root mean squared error 
(RMSE). 
For each of the Tables 7.30, 7.31 and 7.32, the forecasting errors at various 
time periods ahead (column six) - measured in terms of the SSE, MSE and RMSE -
are listed in columns two, three and four. Column two exhibits the results from the 
'Combined' method; whereas the results from the SM or the Exponentially Weighted 
Moving Average (EWMA) method and the LGM or the Exponentially Weighted 
Regression (EWR) method respectively, are displayed in columns three and four. [The 
forecasting formula for each of these models are given in Chapter Six]. 
Comparing these three columns for each of the three tables, reveals that the 
method of EWR does not produce 'accurate' or 'satisfactory' results [i.e., in most 
cases, it produces higher errors] compared with the ones produced by the EWMA and 
the 'Combined' method. Thus, we will concentrate on the performance of the EWMA 
and the 'Combined' method only49 - to assess their potential capability of forecasting 
48We do not use any specific criterion in choosing these companies. Among the characteristics of these 
companies are as follows: 
(i) The Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd. and the Malaysian Airline System Bhd. are the Malaysian 
incorporated companies, whereas the Tanjong Pic. is a U.K. incorporated company. 
(ii) In tenns of their industry classifications, the Malaysian Airline System Bhd. and the Tanjong Pic. 
are from the trading/service:: sector, whereas the Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd. is from the plantation sector. 
49While factors related to implementation, such as ease of interpretation and ease of use are among the 
popular criteria used by researchers, practitioners, educators and decision-makers in selecting forecasting 
methods, a study by Yokum and Armstrong (1995) documented that research in forecasting has commonly 
assumed that accuracy is the primary criterion in selecting among forecasting techniques. "In fact, it has been 
used as the sole criterion in many studies. In the sixteen 1992 International Journal of Forecasting papers 
that compared the results of different techniques and series, only one used criteria other than accuracy" 
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Table 7.30 
THE KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD SHARE: 
RESULTS OF FORECASTS FOR THE DAILY RETURNS 
(Using the EWMA. EWR and the 'Combined' Methods) 
0.000590 0.000 5 86 0.000790 1.00718 1 
0.024285 0 . 024198 0.028108 
1.550368 1. 53 
0 . 001164 0.001149 0 . 001482 1. 012884 2 
0.034117 0.033899 0.038496 
2 . 271949 2.22914 . 014577 
0.001707 0.001675 0 . 002265 1. 0192 3 
0.041315 0.040924 0 . 047 591 
1 3.654818 5. 
0.002845 0 . 002750 0.004202 1.034366 5 
0.053334 0.05 244 1 0 . 0 64823 
14.64108 
0 .0 05808 0.005390 0.011058 1.077644 10 
0.073417 0 . 105158 
9.6 4.81569 
0.008197 0 . 007352 0 . 018814 1 . 115011 15 
0.090540 0.085743 0 .137164 
21. 273 77 . 0 5193 
0.016541 0.014005 0.059089 1.181078 30 
0 .12 8613 0.118343 0 .243082 
43.89321 3 7 261. 2066 
0.034453 0.026028 0.205029 1.323669 60 
0.185615 0.161333 0 . 452801 
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stock price and returns. 
As indicated in columns two and four for each of the Tables 7.30, 7.31 and 
7.32, the results produced by the 'Combined' method and the EWMA method do not 
appear to be much different. Accordingly, to compare the performance of these two 
approaches, we divide the MSE for the 'Combined' method by the MSE for the 
EWMA method. The results of this division which could be termed as the comparative 
mean square error (CMSE) of forecasts, are displayed in column five for each of the 
three tables. 
A CMSE equal to 1.00 would imply that the accuracy of forecasts for the two 
methods are the same. The MSE for the 'Combined' method is higher than the MSE 
for the EWMA method when the CMSE is greater than one. By the same token, a 
CMSE of less than one would mean that the 'Combined' method produces a more 
accurate forecast than the EWMA procedure. 
On examining column five for each of the three tables, one can readily 
discover that, except for Table 7.32, the CMSE values are greater than one for alI time 
periods ahead. The CMSE values of slightly less than one can be found in Table 7.32 
(for the Tanjong Pic.) - for the forecasting periods of thirty and sixty days ahead. 
The CMSE values (at selected forecasting periods ahead) for all the fifty stocks 
in the sample are illustrated in the form of histograms depicted in Figures 7.6 through 
7.13. Upon reviewing these charts, one would infer that the 'Combined' method could 
contribute some improvements in the accuracy of forecasts (i.e., CMSE < 1). 
Particularly for long horizons, the accuracy of forecasts is slightly improved 
when the 'Combined' (multi-process models) method is employed. As evidenced by 
(p.591 ). 
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Table 7.31 
THE MALA YSIANAIRL/NE SYSTEMBBD SHARE; 
RESULTS OF FORECASTS FOR THE DAILY RETURNS 
(UsinK the EWMA. EWR and the 'Combined' Methods) 
0.001655 
0.040687 
3.377424 
0.002672 
0.003553 
0.074384 
10.60068 
0.008453 
.372993 
0.001629 
0.040365 
3. 97483 
0.002609 
0.000729 
0.027002 
1.756060 
0.001386 
0.037229 
2.680069 
0.002117 
0.046010 
4.754320 
0.003761 
1. 012218 1 
1. 014433 2 
1.015988 3 
1. 024243 5 
1.049352 10 
1.064195 15 
1.080605 30 
0.041051 0.035676 0.198322 1.150662 60 
0.202611 0.188881 0.445333 
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Table 7.32 
THE TAN/DNG nc SHARE: 
RESULTS OF FORECASTS FOR THE DAILY RETURNS 
(Usina= the EWMA, EWR and the 'CombiDed' Methods) 
0.0007158 
0.026754 
1.14 14 
0.0013914 0.0013854 
0.0020471 
0.045245 
2.652722 
0.0032508 0.0032232 
0.057016 0.026774 
5.740855 5.704578 
0.0070182 0.0069738 
0.083774 0.083509 
0.025439 0.0257922 
0.159496 0.160600 
46.08205 47.38743 
1.00435 1 
0.0016446 1.004347 2 
0.040554 
2.010694 
0.0024372 1. 003539 3 
0.049368 
3.438324 
0.0041778 1. 008543 5 
0.064636 
9.066570 
0.0110838 1.006359 10 
0.1052798 
17.54959 
0.0215862 1.000812 15 
0.986306 30 
0.0600027 0.0617024 0.0235441 0.972453 60 
0.244954 0.248400 0.485223 
30Sh 
Figure 7.11 (for thirty days ahead) and figure 7.12 (for sixty days ahead), about 7% 
of the fifty stocks in our sample are "forecastable" (i.e., CMSE < I). 
Nonetheless, under the null hypothesis that the 'Combined' model does not 
improve the forecasts obtainable from the Steady (EWMA) Model, we would expect 
half the forecasts based on the 'Combined' model to be worse than the corresponding 
tests using the Steady Model and only half to be better. In fact, we find that no more 
than seven percent of the forecasts based on the 'Combined' model are an 
improvement (i.e., CMSE < 1) on the forecasts based on the Steady Model. As such, 
this result is consistent with the random walk hypothesis. 
We proceed with our study on stock market "forecastability" by examining how 
"forecastable" the KLSE is, compared with other exchanges. To conduct this aspect 
of study, the daily and weekly share price indices from the KLSE, NYSE, LSE and 
the HKSE are employed. These data are transformed into logarithms of returns [see 
equation 7.1]. Using the same methodology as discussed above, the results are 
displayed in Table 7.33. 
Quite similar to the results based on cumulative logarithms of returns (for fifty 
individual companies from the KLSE) , the 'Combined' method also fails to show 
much improvements in stock market "forecastability" with market index data from the 
KLSE, NYSE, LSE and the HKSE [as can be seen Table 7.33]. The KLSE seems to 
be "forecastable" (i.e., the CMSE < 1) only for a horizon of five weeks ahead (i.e 
based on weekly data). The LSE appears to be "forecastable" only when the prices are 
forecasted three days, five days and sixty weeks ahead. Likewise, the HKSE appears 
to be "forecastable" when its prices are forecasted sixty weeks ahead. These five cases 
of apparent improvement in "forecastability" have to be weighed against the remaining 
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51 cases in the table in which the "forecastability" appears to be reduced when the 
'Combined' (or the mUlti-process models) method is employed. 
To conclude, the findings of our empirical investigations into the 
"forecastabiIity" of stock prices/returns, could be interpreted as follows: 
(i) Relatively few stocks listed on the KLSE appears to be "forecastable". 
Those few cases in which the forecastability of a stock appears to have improved may 
be the result of chance relationships rather than power of the 'Combined' method to 
make better forecasts. 
(ii) In terms of "forecastability", we have no evidence that the KLSE is any 
less efficient than the LSE and the HKSE50• 
Results of our out-of-sample forecasts support the statements made by 
Makridakis (1986) and Granger( 1992) as quoted in Chapter Five that forecasting stock 
market in a meaningful way is a very difficult manoeuvre. Clive W.J.Granger, "one 
of the most successful and influential time series analysts and econometricians of our 
time"'1 who, in 1970, co-authored (with Oskar Morgenstern) a book entitled 
Predictability of Stock Market Prices, was recently interviewed by the International 
Journal of Forecasting (Vol. 11, No.4, December 1995). Responding to a question 
asking him whether he still held the same view on the predictability of the stock 
market prices and whether he has got any new insights from developments after 1970, 
~bably we could relate this to the fact that the KLSE is a relatively big stock exchange in the 
developing world. As listed in Table 2.7. in 1993 the KLSE was the ninth largest stock market in the world 
(in terms of market capitalisation and value traded). According to Solnik (1966. p. 281). Malaysia and 
Mexico are classified as developed markets by some institutions. 
A study by Kumar and Tsetsckos (1994) has found that some emerging markets - Greece. Korea. 
Malaysia and Mexico - have activity. size and pricing characteristics approaching those of developed 
markets. 
"lntematio1Ul1 Joumal of Forecasting. Vol. 11. No.4. December 1995. p. 285. 
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Table 7.33 
THE KLSE. NYSE. LSE AND THE HKSE: 
THE COMPARATIVE MSE (CMSE) OF FORECASTS FOR 
THE LOGARITHMS OF THE DAILY/WEEKLY RELATIVE PRICE INDICES'" 
1.02859 1.02511 1.01556 1.01544 1.01671 1.01551 1.01958 1 
(1. 01816) (1. 03299) (1. 00587) (1. 00914) (1. 01920) (1. 01510) (1.01879) 
1.02623 1.02516 1.0ll36 1.01028 1.00215 1.00614 1.01386 2 
(1. 00845) (1. 02071) (1. 02392) (1.01757) (1.01682) (1.0142) (1.01317) 
1.02763 1.02544 1. 01052 1.00988 0.99871 1. 00510 1. 02842 3 
(1.00124) (1. 00461) (1.02883) (1.02284) (1.01766) (1.016221) (1. 01166) 
1.043127 1.03633 1. 01939 1. 01651 0.99960 1.00866 1. 035912 5 
(0.995193) (0.99787) (1.03957) (1.03037) (1. 02615) (1.02746) (1.00742) 
1.07594 1. 05702 1. 02866 1.02243 1. 00036 1.01324 1.06654 10 
(1.00347) (1. 06480) (1.04155) (1.05982) (1. 04443) (1.04486) (1. 02220) 
1.08358 1. 06044 1. 03198 1.02487 1. 01677 1.02604 1.11469 15 
(1. 03870) (1.15693) (1.01903) (1.05127) (1.04340) (1.04376) (1.04535) 
1.09828 1. 06131 1.07674 1.07399 1.08437 1.07759 1. 36967 30 
(1.10577) (1.40863) (1. 06451) (1.09368) (1.06637) (1.06502) (1.07434) 
1.19892 1.14260 1.15520 1.13161 1.42922 1.36401 1.79753 60 
(1.00151) (1.06086) (1.04696) (1.16374) (1.05615) (0.167763) (0.97818) 
*.ere, the e~.r.tj .... aD .quare error (eNSI) of foreeaat. i. defined a. the 
aquu-e .ezoror (1I81)tozo the 'COIIbined' •• thod cSiv1deIS by the IISI for the KWKA 
~e natural logadtha (111) of relativ. price indlce. (LRPI)l. defined a., 
LRPI • 11l (I~/I.), .me" I~'. the CNZ'ZO&1lt »rice index and 10 i. thef1rat pric. 
of th •• ezote •• 
III the l»&~tlae.e. .zoe the zoe.u1 tafor th ... ekly data. 
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DAMAGED TEXT IN 
ORIGINAL 
Granger was reported to have made the following remarks: 
"I basically hold the same view as then. I don't think there is much 
)' ,j 
forecastability in means. What forecastability there is can be found in volatility, 
as we now know. I think many of the lessons in the book have been 
rediscovered" (p. 586). 
)C;',:, to be 
The EWMA method - the underlying assumption of which is the random walk .. ' 
.:,lt~ tc. h::..,,~ 
in stock price/returns (when the smoothing coefficient is equal to 1.00)52 - could ge ",-
, ;, 'Cot ·bi 
viewed as representing the conventional forecasting technique. The 'Combined' (or th~ 
mUlti-process models) method, as discussed in Chapter Six, is a relatively new 
" 
methodology in the discipline of forecasting. Our forecasting results employing the 
:. ";e that til 
'Combined' method do not provide support for the claim based on recent findings tha~ 
. if: 
stock markets are somewhat "forecastable" [see Chapter Four]. Perhaps, this might b~.:, . 
Fi\ 
explained by the fact that most evidence for the claim that stock markets are ' 
tha': -r 
'0" ~ 
, , ... \.. JI \'-~ \\. 
"forecastable" are the results of in-sample forecasts, whereas our tests are based on -
out-of-sample approach. 
". : .:Slerr~ 
As noted in Chapter Six, forecasting stock returns from an out-of-samplf 
.. ~~ .. 
perspective in still not widely practised in the literature. As such, it difficult t~ 
compare our results with the results of such previous studies. Our review of tl\e 
",' 
'edictahi: 
literature indicates that so far, there are only two published works [by Fuller and Kling 
i'l.leveio 
' .)1 (1990, 1994)] which deal with stock market forecasting from an out-of-sample.,) . 
.. 
i. 
approach. Fuller and Kling (1990, p. 35) for example reexamined the forecasting' 
power of Fama and French's (1988a) "dividend yield model", and concluded that: '~tj:v~lY bill ~, 
)'Cl."@!~'<1 Sit. --i 
l"~; t196{,: -. 
"Given the model's erratic results, it is not clear that investors would have ';. ' . ';) 
52See Chapters Fjve and Sjx. 
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.~' :.lllg n~ 
j' ' I ('a, "I '\t 
.. ' ~ 
.q, . 
:-
ia~.:r\ p .. 
... -- '. '.:"1 
: 
been able to identify its predictive ability and then capitalize on it to earn 
abnormal returns. Most investors do not have a fifty-one-year time horizons" 
7.3.4-Mean Reversion and/or Mean Aversion in Stock returns? 
Similar to the evidence provided by Fuller and Kling's (1990, 1994) out-of-
sample tests, results of our out-of-sample tests do not suggest that stock markets are 
forecastable: The "forecastability" of stock returns cannot be improved even when a 
relatively newly developed forecasting technique known as the Bayesian approach to 
the combination of forecast (the mUlti-process models method) is employed. 
Given the evidence that the mUlti-process models (or the 'Combined') method 
is not powerful enough to improve the "forecastability" of stock returns, we proceed 
with our empirical study by examining the possibility of mean reversive/mean aversive 
behaviour of stock returns on the KLSE, from a forecasting perspective (i.e., using the 
EWMA). The finding of this study might be useful for investors in selecting stocks 
to construct long term portfolios: Stocks which are mean reversive in their returns 
would be less risky in terms of the variability of their returns. Stocks which exhibit 
mean aversion in their returns could be viewed as more risky, because their returns 
are relatively more volatile. 
Using the same data as the ones employed in the previous sub-section, we 
calculate variance ratios of the returns (at various horizons) for each of the fifty 
individual stocks in the sample. A variance ratio of .less than one would imply a 
tendency for mean reversion. whereas a variance ratio of greater than one would 
indicate that the stock tends to be mean aversive [see Chapters Four and Five]. 
Tables 7.34. 7.35 and 7.36 respectively, exhibits (for the purpose of 
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illustration) the results for three individual companies; namely, the Kuala Lumpur 
Kepong Bhd. (KLK), the Malaysian Airline System Bhd. (MAS) and the Tanjong Pic. 
(TP). Referring to Table 7.34 for example, column one shows the horizon (k) or 
number of forecasting period (days) ahead. Column two lists the mean square errors 
(MSEs) from the forecasts - or variance - at various time periods ahead. 
Forecasting errors are obtained from our forecasting process using equation 
6.22. These errors are then squared and divided by the number of data points, n - to 
get the MSEs. [See equation 6.34]. 
Column three of Table 7.34 - ratio - is obtained by dividing the MSE at a 
particular time period ahead by the MSE for one period ahead. For example, the ratio 
for k = 3 (which is 2.870) is obtained by dividing 0.0017 by 0.0006. Column four 
(ratiolk) lists the variance ratios. 
As can be seen from Tables 7.34, 7.35 and 7.36, KLK appears to exhibit mean 
reversion, while the returns for the MAS and the TP appear to be mean aversive. 
The findings of our variance ratio tests for all of the fifty stocks in the sample 
are condensed into a number of histograms. These histograms, each of which 
represents the results for different horizons, are displayed in Figures 7. I 3 through 
7.20. Observing these diagrams reveals that, over long horizons, some stocks are mean 
reversive, some are clearly mean aversive. while the rest appear to follow a random 
walk. 
It is worth noting that some stocks exhibit a tendency to be mean reversive 
(i.e., variance ratio < 1), while others exhibit a tendency to be mean aversive (i.e., 
variance ratio> 1) - even for short horizons [see Figure 7.13], However, clear 
evidence of mean reversion/mean aversion in stock returns can be found for periods 
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Table 7.34 
THE KUALA LUMPUR KEPDNGBBD SHARE: 
VARIANCE RATIOS FOR THE DAILY RETURNS 
1 0.0006 1.000 1.000 
2 0.0011 1.973 0.986 
3 0.0017 2.870 0.'57 
4 0.0022 3.771 0.943 
5 0.0027 4.686 0.937 
7 0.0038 6.504 0.929 
10 0.0054 9.205 0.921 
15 0.0073 12.612 0.841· 
20 0.0097 16.630 0.831· 
30 0.0139 23.959 0.7"· 
'0 0.0187 45.472 0.758· 
to 0.0277 67.280 0.748* 
120 0.0338 82.318 0.68'· 
150 0.0363 88.258 0.588· 
110 0.0412 100.158 0.55'· 
210 0.0571 138.944 0.662· 
240 0.0769 186.995 0.779· 
270 0.0943 229.403 0.150· 
300 0.1022 248.682 0.82.* 
O. 
·.tati8tically .igDificant at 5\ level (u.ing the P·te.t) 
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Table 7.35 
THE MALA YSIANAIRLINE SYSTEM BHD SHARE; 
VARIANCE RATIOS FOR THE DAILY RETURNS 
1 0.0005 1. 000 1.000 
2 O. DOll 2.047 1.023 
3 0.0016 3.086 1.029 
4 0.0021 4.016 1.004 
5 0.0026 4.926 0.985 
7 0.0036 6.780 O.t69 
10 0.0052 9.901 O.UO 
15 0.0079 14.906 0.914 
20 0.0100 19.043 0.952 
30 0.0150 28.487 0.950 
60 0.0347 B5.490 1.425* 
90 0.0553 136.106 1.512* 
120 0.0689 169.541 1.413· 
150 0.0840 206.857 1.37'· 
180 0.0999 245.9B7 1.367* 
210 0.1148 282.539 1.3U* 
240 0.1234 303.697 1.265* 
270 0.121B 299.761 1.110* 
JOO 0.1139 280.252 0.934 
*.tatl.tica1ly .lgnlflcant at 5\ laval (ualug the Ft •• t) • 
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Table 7.36 
THE TANJONG PLC SHARE: 
VARIANCE RATIOS FOR THE DAILY RETURNS 
RATIO/It 
;.:.:: .. :::::::;::":::::;:.::.:.: ;::;::::;.:;;';::=:=::<;';: 
" .:.<::-:<::<:: .. ::-: .... :.:.:.:: ... : •. : .. :.: .•.•...•. 
·:·:'::~ift:!?·>\: .. )·: .. :i)<;\~!!;;?:;:!::;·(::;:~:::·:.',:",:,,::, .'.:."', 
1 0.0007 1.000 1.000 
2 0.0014 1.958 o.n, 
3 0.0021 2.898 0.966 
0.0027 3.659 o.ns 
0.0033 4.495 0.899 
, 0.0046 6.391 0.913 
10 0.0070 9.610 O.t61 
15 0.0114 15.738 1.045 
20 0.0162 22.218 1.111 
30 0.0265 36.504 1.217* 
0.0642 90.841 1.5H* 
90 0.1187 168.048 1.U7* 
1.20 0.1756 248.605 l.07l· 
150 0.2416 342.040 2.lIO· 
1.80 0.3016 427.014 2.372* 
210 0.3710 525.364 2.502* 
.240 O.U41 628.828 2.620* 
2'10 0.5039 713.574 :Z.U3* 
lOO 0.5151 729.430 2.431* 
[RBI 
·Stati.tically .iguificaDt at 5\ level (u.iug the P-t •• t). 
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of thirty days and above [see Figures 7.15 through 7.20]. As such, our results align 
with the results of previous researches [see Chapter Four] that mean reversion/mean 
aversion in stock returns are long-term phenomena. 
Evidence of negative serial correlation (mean reversion) for monthly and 
annual returns have been found in studies, inter alios by Poterba and Summers (1987) 
and Fama and French (1988a). French and Roll (1986) and Lo and MacKinlay (1988) 
found evidence of negative serial correlation for daily and weekly data of individual 
companies. Lo (1991) and Mills (1993) to name a few, provide evidence of the 
tendency for stock returns to be positively serially correlated (mean aversive). 
One serious issue raised in the literature concerning the variance ratio test is 
overlapping observations [see e.g., Richardson and Stock (1989); Jog and Schaller 
(1991)]. To examine the seriousness of this problem, we split up our data - each into 
twenty data points - and implement a forecasting procedure which 'jumps' every 
twenty data points. The results based on the samples of 'twenty data points' (Le., 
"without overlapping") and the larger sample size (i.e., the ones "with overlapping") 
are found to be not much different: Even though the distribution of the values of the 
ratio appears to be different, stocks which are mean reversive/mean aversive in the 
sample with overlapping observations are also mean reversive/mean aversive in the 
sample without overlapping observation. 
For the purpose of illustration (and comparison), the results for a horizon of 
twenty days ahead for the data "with overlapping observations" and the data "without 
overlapping observation" are summarised in Figures 7.19 and 7.20, respectively. Table 
7.37 lists all the stocks which are found to exhibit mean reversion andlor mean 
aversion over long horizons. 
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Ho",oo: TlairtvDHS 
VARIANCE RATIO OF STOCK RETURNS 
(Horizon: 30 Days) 
-r r 
r r- -
n 
r- r-r- r-r-r 
I 
, 
I 
0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 
Variance Ratios 
~ 
-tr\ 
-c: ~ 
L-
CD Q. 
15 r-
10 
r-
5 
o 
Figure 7.16 
STOCK RETURNS AND VARIANCE RATIOS 
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Table 7.37 
STOCKS EXHIBITING MEAN REVERSIONIMEAN AVERSION 
IN LONG HORIZON OF RETURNS 
l ••·;;~·!~~~i··~~r •• · •• ···········'·······'···' .:::;:; ......... !;~:~:~; .....•......... "" .......• ••·· .• ·~·.··· •• ·•··.· •.••• · .• ·.8;jj!~~5::i.:~.~··'·~-~Tio· 
AraL ••••. , ..... - 1.087 1.213 0.392 0.270 0.391 0.472 0.522 
Asia Pacific Land 1.07S 0.904 0.414 0.313 0.306 0.212 0.211 
Bandar Raya :::. .. IU 1.428 1.886 0.723 0.555 0.599 0.624 0.618 
Chemical c.. 0.787 2.024 2.849 3.410 4.339 7.131 8.795 
Diversified Resources 1.997 1.933 1.277 0.832 0.3S6 0.123 0.128 
Golden Hope Plantations 1.254 1.461 0.203 0.187 0.552 0.843 0.924 
Guinness Anchor 0.860 0.845 0.768 0.667 0.564 0.436 0.347 
Hume Industries (M) 1.314 1.774 2.081 1.933 1.859 1.912 2.0S2 
Kuala Lumpur· 0.S88 0.829 0.228 0.178 0.265 0.292 0.37S 
Landmarks J.S40 1.499 0.521 0.382 0.S18 0.501 0.464 
Malayan Cement 1.889 2.413 2.408 1.919 1.94S 2.121 2.236 
0.674 0.S79 0.478 0.343 0.343 0.191 0.182 
Malakoff 4.036 4.334 0.633 3.432 7.SS8 1 J.S32 12.748 
M.Ii.ysian Airline System 1.379 0.934 0.616 0.4S5 0.496 0.3SS 0.250 
Malayan Bankina 2.27S 3.082 1.280 1.129 1.901 2.513 2.914 
MISC 1.079 0.949 0.353 0.213 0.432 0.S38 0.S89 
Malaysian Minlna ::VII'V' ."VII 1.028 1.085 0.329 0.312 0.411 0.604 0.5S8 
•• .•. _.. n_ •• __ _ 
•••••• " ••••• ""'1."'U 2.093 2.624 11.S40 11.186 10.098 9.711 9.745 
The New Straits Times Presl 1.670 2.259 2.835 2.931 2.971 2.829 3.002 
PerUI Plantations 1.219 1.144 1.224 0.971 0.703 0.629 0.761 
Public Bank 1.261 1.839 0.242 0.298 0.94S 1.337 1.S24 
2.277 3.020 S.S03 S.719 4.833 4.423 4.310 
Yeo Blap Sena 2.412 3.710 0.971 1.330 2.604 4.336 5.884 
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Whilst our investigation into this aspect of the behaviour of stock returns 
(using forecasting approach) could be viewed as preliminary in nature, studying, 
identifying and understanding the detailed characteristics and idiosyncrasies (incJuding 
price as well as earning behaviour and perfonnance) of these companies might be 
interesting and useful for investment decisions and portfolio management. Such an 
area might deserve further research. 
7.4·Concludin2 Comments 
There are a number of conclusions that could be drawn from the findings of 
the present study. There are a number of implications for investment management and 
decisions that could be deduced from the results of the present empirical work. Our 
research also seems to provide some insights into the areas and issues which might 
be interesting and useful to be the focus of future research. However, to avoid 
repetition, we reserve our comment on these issues in this chapter. These subjects are 
to be covered in Chapter Eight. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1-Introduction 
Portfolio theory suggests that expected returns commensurate with the level of 
risks investors have to bear could be the common stimuli behind their willingness to 
participate in the movements of a stock market. Expected returns in the form of price 
appreciations (capital gains) andlor dividends, considered to be the common goals 
being pursued by investors when they buy and sell in an exchange. 
Market microstructure considerations· also suggest that the behaviour and 
activities of participants in a stock market are influenced and determined in part, by 
the behaviour of equity prices and returns. In tum, the behaviour of equity prices and 
returns in an exchange is of course. determined by the behaviour and activities of 
market participants. 
This thesis examines some aspects of the behaviour of equity prices and returns 
in an exchange. The behaviour of stock priceslreturns in an emerging stock market is 
studied from comparative. descriptive and inferential perspectives. 
The methodology employed in the present study is featured in Chapter Six. 
Results of our empirical work presented in the forms of tables and charts are discussed 
·See e.,., Blume and Siegel (1992), Malkamlki (1989), Schwartz (199] a); Amihud and Mendelson 
(1991), Cohen cui (1986) and Garman (1976). 
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in Chapter Seven. 
The present chapter concludes the thesis. An outline of the rest of the chapter 
is as follows: Section 8.2 summarises some of the major developments and issues that 
can be found discussed in the stock market literature. Salient empirical findings (of 
this study) are given in the ensuing section. 
In Section 8.4 we provide some likely implications for investment management 
that could be conjectured from the findings of the present study. Like any empirical 
work, our empirical research has limitations, some of which are highlighted in Section 
8.5. Some areas and issues which are considered worthy of further study are 
spotlighted in Section 8.6 . Section 8.7 offers some remarks that conclude the chapter. 
Be2-Some Issues From the Literature 
The foundation for stock market theory and research was perhaps, first laid 
down by Louis Bachelier in 1900. Notwithstanding that the tradition of stock market 
research had been pioneered as early as the tum of the twentieth century, subsequent 
empirical studies in this field only started some fifty years later with, inter alia, the 
work of Kendall (1953), Roberts (1959) and Osborne (1959). 
With the advent of computer technology, more-serious empirical study 
examining the issue of random walks in stock price and returns - as well as other 
studies of stock market efficiency - took place around the 1960s and the 1970s. 
Indeed, by 1970, there had been a consensus among researchers that stock markets in 
general are informationally efficient - that historical prices/returns cannot be used to 
predict future prices/returns; that public information cannot be exploited to eam 
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abnonnal returns in the stock markets. 
By the 1980s, using newly developed procedures, researchers and analysts 
started to question the validity of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). Literature 
on excess volatility, the overreaction hypothesis, noise trading and mean reversion in 
stock returns appears to suggest that stock markets are not perfectly efficient; that 
investors are not completely rational and that many traders trade on noise rather than 
on information. 
While there had been common agreement among early researchers that stock 
prices/returns are not predictable, recent researchers contend that stock returns are, to 
some extent, predictable. While there appears to have been a consensus among some 
recent researchers and scholars that stock markets are statistically predictable, it is still 
not very clear whether they are also economically predictable. Puzzles in this area, 
remain. 
The decade of 1980s also witnessed a number of cataclysmic changes which 
took place on many parts of the globe. Concurrent with, and as a result of, these 
global economic and political reforms, global investing has become an increasing 
phenomenon in stock market practice, research and literature. Moreover, it is often 
stated that these new global developments - the progressive removal of impediments 
to international investment as well as growing political, economic and financial 
integration - affect international stock market linkages [see e.g., Longin and Solnik 
(1995)]. 
Since about the beginning of the 1980s, as part of this rapid growth in global 
investing, emerging stock markets have become a focus of interest for global 
investors. Characteristics of emerging markets have captured the attention of both 
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investors and researchers. It is widely proposed in the literature that emerging equity 
markets are viable tools for diversification; and that these developing exchanges have 
an important role to play in effective investment diversification [see e.g., Speidell and 
Sappenfield (1992)]. 
Given the fact that global markets have become more integrated, and that the 
developed markets have displayed greater synchronization; given recent liberalization 
of emerging markets and their increasing integration into the world markets - an 
interesting concern is whether the benefits of diversification into emerging exchanges 
have been reduced. It is being suggested that as the emerging markets become 
increasingly integrated into the global market and economy, they will begin behaving 
increasingly like other markets and lose their diversification potential [see e.g., Barry 
and Lockwood (1995)]. 
8.3-Researched Areas and Empirical Findin2s 
The focus of the present thesis is the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), 
an emerging market located in a South-east Asian country: Malaysia. Since emerging 
exchanges in general are not well researched and comparatively little is known by 
scholars about them, Chapter Two of the thesis introduces the KLSE. Historical 
developments, institutional and organisational structure as well as the trading system 
of the Exchange - among others - are detailed in this introductory chapter. 
Since the literature on stock market theory and evidence is voluminous, we 
devote two chapters to reviewing literature. Whereas Chapter Three concentrates on 
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the EMH, Chapter Four essentially examines the various theories and evidence that 
appear to contradict or refute the EMH. 
Our literature review as encapsulated in Section 7.2, reveals a number of 
intriguing issues and matters of contention. The subjects which are empirically 
addressed in the present thesis, are compressed into the following points: 
Emerging stock markets - stock markets which are relatively young, emerging, 
developing and being modernised in the economies which are categorised as 
developing - are considered as having several idiosyncrasies which make them 
different from their matured counterparts in the developed economies. Whilst relatively 
not much is known about these young exchanges, they are often noted for their 
impressive realised returns and high volatility. Does the KLSE, which can be 
described as an emerging market, have such characteristics? We study these arguments 
by comparing some statistical propenies of stock returns on the KLSE with those on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the London Stock Exchange (LSE), the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), and the 'Australian Joint Stock Exchange' (AJSE). 
Emerging equity markets are also noted as having low correlations with 
developed markets as well as among themselves. For this reason, it has become a 
widespread belief among analysts (and investment practitioners) that these exchanges 
could provide excellent diversification benefits in combination with investments in the 
developed markets. As underlined in the foregoing section, however, given the current 
tendency for the financial markets to be increasingly integrated. is such a contention 
still true for an exchange like the KLSE? We study this question by examining the 
linkages and interactions between the KLSE and overseas exchanges - both developed 
and developing exchanges - employing cluster analysis, correlation analysis and 
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partial correlation analysis. 
Our research on some statistical properties of stock returns on the KLSE as 
well as correlations between the KLSE and foreign exchanges. is extended by 
examining whether these variables are constant/stable over time. We do so by breaking 
up the data according to years and then examine them on a yearly basis. 
Another topical subject which still appears to be unsettled in the literature is 
whether stock returns are economically forecastable or not. In this thesis. we 
investigate this issue of stock market "forecastability" from an 'out-of-sample' 
forecasting perspective, employing the relatively newly developed techniques known 
as multi-process models or the Bayesian approach to combining forecasts. In the 
meantime, how powerful and efficient this approach is - as a forecasting procedure -
is assessed by comparing its performance with that of a 'conventional' forecasting 
method known as the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) method. 
As noted in the previous section, early researchers have contended that stock 
prices/returns follow a random walk. Recent findings on the contrary. suggest that 
stock returns, particularly over long horizons. tend to exhibit mean reversion/mean 
aversion. A lack of published literature in this area concerning the KLSE provided an 
incentive for us to explore mean reversion/mean aversion in stock returns from the 
forecasting perspective. 
Our empirical investigations into such questions have produced severa) results: 
a number of these findings (as far as the KLSE is concerned) appear as intriguing. 
Among the major ones are abridged as follows: 
(1) The distributions of logarithms of stock returns on the KLSE are similar 
to those on the NYSE, LSE, HKSE and the AJSE: They are asymmetric; they are 
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leptokurtic and negatively (leftward) skewed. 
(2) By and large, the means of stock returns on the KLSE have not been 
significantly different from those on the NYSE, the LSE, the HKSE and the AJSE. 
Nonetheless, the standard deviation of stock returns on the KLSE was relatively high, 
about as high as for the HKSE2 and higher than for the NYSE, LSE and the AJSE. 
(3) With very few exceptions, stock returns on the KLSE have been positively 
correlated with all other exchanges. In general. the KLSE is more highly correlated 
with developed exchanges than with other emerging markets. 
(4) Similar to many other national exchanges. the KLSE has tended to exhibit 
strong regional links. The Exchange is found to have been quite highly correlated with 
the markets in Singapore. Hong Kong. Thailand, the Philippines and Australia. 
(5) The KLSE is found to have had significant lagged correlations with a 
number of developed exchanges including those in the U.S., Canada, Switzerland, the 
U.K. and France3• 
(6) Three exchanges are identified as having been the most influential markets 
to the KLSE in terms of their comovements (and/or lagged correlations). These 
exchanges are, the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES). the HKSE and the NYSE. 
About 40% of the contemporaneous movements on the KLSE could be 
explained by factors common to the KLSE and the SES. About 8% of the movements 
on the KLSE could be attributed to the factors which are common to the KLSE and 
2A study by Meric and Meric (1989) bas revealed that, out of the 17 country indices tested. stock 
markets in Hong Kong and Sin,apore Ire amon, the most volatile. 
3Solnik (1996) arlUes that the laued COITelation of Tokyo and London with New York can be 
explained by the difference in time zones, and not by some international market inefficiency that could be 
exploited to make a profit. 
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the HKSE. About 8% of the movements on the KLSE at time t could be explained by 
factors common to the NYSE at time t-l. 
(7) Within the eleven-year period of our study, considerable year-to-year 
variations were found in the levels of returns and volatility and also in correlation 
coefficients4 (and hence coefficients of determination) between the KLSE and 
overseas exchanges: 
(a) Considerable changes in the year-to-year performance (in terms of 
mean and standard deviation of returns) of the Malaysian stock market might partly 
be explained by the fact that Malaysia is a very open economy. The market appears 
to be very sensitive to various major international political and economic events. 
(b) Correlations between the KLSE and other national exchanges have 
increased in periods of high turbulence or during recessions/down markets (e.g., in 
1987 and 1990): International correlation as suggested in Longin and Solnik (1995) 
increases when global factors dominate domestic ones and affect all financial markets. 
Expressed differently. correlations between and among national stock exchanges tend 
to increase with the advent of news that increases global uncertainty. 
(c) In general. the KLSE appears to have been integrated/correlated with 
foreign exchanges (essentially the developed exchanges) since 19875• 
(8) Our tests of the "forecastabiHty" of stock returns based on a sample of 
fifty stocks from the KLSE do not support that the performance of 'out-of-sample' 
4Hsu (1984), based on his study, noted that stock market return variability is frequently on the move. 
reacting to shifts of the Jenera! economic conditions or the occurrences of some special political-economic 
events. Similarly - like a barometer· the Malaysian stock market bas evolved in a way thBl reflects the 
general investment climBle and the influences of special/major socia-political and economic events. 
'For evidence. see columns two and five (and even column ei,ht - for monthly returns) for each of 
Tables 7.17. 7.18, 7.20 and 7.22. See also Table 7.24 (columns three and six). 
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forecasts on stock returns can be improved significantly when a relatively newly 
developed technique known as the mUlti-process models technique (or the Bayesian 
approach to combining forecasts) is employed. Relatively few companies on the KLSE 
appear to be "forecastable". 
(9) Using price indices as the data base, we compare the "forecastability" of 
the KLSE with the NYSE, the LSE and the HKSE. We find only isolated instances 
of apparent "forecastability" at particular horizons. 
Our evidence does not suggest that the multi-process models approach is 
capable of improving the "forecastability" of the KLSE, the NYSE, the HKSE and the 
LSE. 
(10) Lastly, our research has provided evidence that stocks listed on the KLSE 
could be classified, based on the behaviour of their long term returns, into three 
genera: stocks which are mean reverting in their returns; stocks which are exhibiting 
mean aversion in their returns and stocks which appear to be following a random 
walk. 
Based on our review of literature, we found that some aspects of our 
investigations have not been addressed in previous studies. Some of the procedures 
used in the present research also have not been employed in previous studies. As such. 
some of the discoveries highlighted above, could be considered as providing some 
contributions to knowledge in the following ways: 
(1) Testing the "forecastability" of stock markets using 'out-of-sample' data is 
still not widely implemented in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, the 
method of 'out-of-sample' forecasting based on the multi-process models employed 
in the present study, has never been employed in previous stock market studies. 
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2) Even though there are several previous studies which examine the 
correlations between the KLSE and overseas exchanges. our study in this aspect of the 
KLSE is different or new compared with the previous studies. on the following 
grounds: 
(a) The method of partial correlation analysis (used in our study) 
appears never to have been employed in previous stock market studies. 
(b) These correlation coefficients. partial correlation coefficients (and 
partial coefficients of determination) - are not only investigated on a yearly basis. but 
also from lead-lag perspectives. We find no previous research which has examined the 
interrelatedness of the KLSE and other exchanges in such detail (by including most 
other stock markets). 
(3) In the present research, we compare some aspects of the behaviour of the 
KLSE with a number of selected foreign exchanges. To the best of our knowledge. 
there is no previous research as comprehensive as this - in examining the behaviour 
of the KLSE from a comparative perspective6• 
S.4-Some Possible Implications for Inyestors 
Some of the findings of this study as discussed in the foregoing subsection 
have some implications for investment management. Some of these possible 
implications for investors could be conjectured as follows: 
60thman Yong (1989). in his brief "Performance Comparison" ltudy. used only weekly data of the 
KLSE Industrial Index to compare its "performance" with the Hang Seng Index. Neikei Index and the Dow 
Jones Industrial Index. The sample period for the study was only 1983:01 through 1987:12. 
In our study. we have used the daily. weekly and monthly share price indices coverinl the period of 
1984:10 and 1994:12.1bese data are examined on a yearly basis. 
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(I) Positive correlations between the KLSE and most foreign exchanges 
suggest that global factors affect their covariations. Attempting to identify such 
factors/variables and estimating their expected future behaviour might be beneficial 
for investors in projecting expected portfolio performance and accordingly, planning 
their investment decisions. 
(2) Even though these correlations are positive. as displayed in several tables 
in Appendix II, they are far from unity: by and large, they are less than 0.5. and in 
a few cases they are estimated to be negative. This implies that. there is ample room 
for successful risk diversification [see e.g .• Watson (1980); Solnik (1996)]. 
(3) Given the fact that the correlations between the returns from the KLSE and 
from developed exchanges are relatively high compared with their correlations with 
those of most emerging markets. better diversification benefits could be enjoyed if the 
Malaysian stocks are combined with those from emerging markets (rather than 
combining the Malaysian stocks with stocks from the developed exchanges). 
(5) Given the fact that the KLSE tends to exhibit strong regional links, 
expectations of future returns on the markets in the same region - Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Thailand. the Philippines and Australia - might be used to help form 
expectations of returns on the KLSE. On the other hand. portfolio theory would 
suggest that combining the Malaysian stocks with the stocks from these exchanges is 
less attractive than other combinations. 
(6) Since the SES, the HKSE and the NYSE are identified as the most 
influential markets to the KLSE in terms of their comovements (and/or lagged 
correlations). in planning investment decisions and portfolio strategies. 
(8) it should be worth keeping track of the behaviour of these markets -
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their expected movements, volatilities and correlations; and 
(b) major socio-political, economic and financial developments/events 
which are taking place or expected to take place in Singapore, Hong Kong and the 
u.S. would be useful to be taken into consideration. 
(7) The tendency of the KLSE (and other exchanges) to exhibit changes in 
long-tenn behaviour and perfonnance, underlines the need for an active/dynamic asset 
allocation strategy in portfolio management. 
(8) The tendency of correlations between the KLSE and overseas exchanges 
to change through time suggests that portfolios need to be constructed on the basis of 
expected correlations rather than past averages. If a portfolio is fonned based on 
average correlations, the perfonnance of the investment could be worse than expected 
because, for example, as suggested in Erb et.ai (1994), correlations tend to increase 
in down markets. 
(9) There appears to be no advantage for investors to try to predict share price 
changes on the KLSE using share price history alone. 
(10) Over long horizons, returns for some stocks listed on the KLSE appear 
to be mean reversive; some to be mean aversive. while the rest tend to follow a 
random walk. The presence of mean reversion in long period stock returns, as 
suggested by Frennberg and Hansson (1993). implies that the portfolio choice is not 
invariant to the investment horizon. Stocks which are mean reverting should be 
attractive to long tenn investors because they are relatively less risky for long 
investment horizons [see also Chapter Four]. 
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8.5-Limitations of the Study 
Like any empirical work, this study has limitations. They include the 
following: 
(1) Similar to other studies, our investigations are based on ex post data. Since 
stock markets are evolutionary rather than stationary, ex ante behaviour of a stock 
market might be significantly different from its ex post behaviour. 
(2) Our study is based on linear statistical methods. However, in a social 
institution such as the stock market, relationships between variables might be 
nonlinear. 
(3) As we have discussed in Chapter Four. variance ratio tests which we have 
employed in our study have several statistical problems which are not resolved in this 
research. 
(4) Whilst we have confined our study to data for indices and the most actively 
traded stocks, our results especially for the emerging markets will have been biased 
to a degree by thin trading effects. 
8.6-Some Directions for Future Research 
The objective of this section is to suggest some of the many possible directions 
that could be pursued by future researchers. While not claiming it to be exhaustive. 
this section provides some guidelines into the areas and issues which we think could 
be promising and interesting for the focus of future studies: 
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(I) In examining some statistical properties of stock returns on the KLSE. we 
found that the mean of returns on the Exchange have been similar to those on some 
developed exchanges. but its standard deviation of returns has been relatively higher. 
The related question is, will the Exchange provide adequate compensation for 
relatively higher risk? This subject could become an interesting area for comparative 
study. 
(2) One of our findings suggests that there are strong linkages between the 
KLSE and its neighbours in the same region (vis-a-vis other foreign exchanges). As 
noted in the previous chapter, we have no clear evidence to suggest that time zone is 
the major factor in determining this tendency. Additionally, our research has also 
revealed that there are quite strong lagged correlations between the KLSE and a few 
of the developed exchanges. Could this phenomenon be attributed only to time zone; 
or, is it also an indication of market inefficiencies which could be exploited for a 
profit? As far as we are aware, the issue of time zone heretofore has been neglected 
in studying the interrelatedness of the KLSE and foreign exchanges. For this reason, 
and because of its potential importance, this may be an area deserving detailed 
investigation. 
(3) As part of our empirical research, we have examined the "predictability" 
of stock prices/returns on the KLSE using 'out-of-sample' data. To the best of our 
knowledge, no previous research of this type has been implemented on the KLSE's 
stocks. Accordingly, to justify and/or to improve our results - to contribute towards 
what might be phrased as 'a more definitive conclusion' - it is advocated that our 
results be reexamined by employing different time series or other econometric models 
and techniques. 
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(4) In comparing the "forecastability" of stock returns on the KLSE with those 
on some selected developed exchanges, we have used share price index data. Future 
researchers could feasibly reexamine and/or amplify the results of this comparative 
study by employing individual company share price data from various national equity 
markets. 
(5) We have found evidence that over long horizons, some stocks listed on the 
KLSE tend to exhibit mean reversion in their returns. Given the fact that such stocks 
could be attractive for long-term investors, it might be worthwhile for researchers to 
extend this study with a larger sample size. It could also be interesting to examine 
closely the various characteristics of these mean reverting companies. The findings of 
such studies of course, could be of interest to practitioners in making portfolio 
choices. 
(6) One of the methods that we have used in examining the covariations 
between and among stock markets, is known as hierarchical cluster analysis. Even 
though this method is not very new, it does not seem to have been widely applied as 
a tool in stock market research. We have the view that this method could potentially 
be used to examine other aspects of stock market behaviour. For example, this method 
could be used to classify companies listed on an exchange. Perhaps, this procedure 
could also be employed to group various companies listed on different exchanges. 
Results obtained from such studies could be advantageous for portfolio choice and 
diversification. 
(8) All research concerning share prices in emerging markets have been 
afflicted to a degree by the effects of thin trading. Efficient methods of adjusting 
correlations between stock market indices affected by thin trading of constituent stocks 
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need to be derived. 
8.7-Concludin& Remarks 
The present research has resulted in a number of findings. We have found that 
the average return on the KLSE has been similar to those on some well-established 
exchanges. whereas its standard deviation of returns has been relatively higher. We 
have found that the returns on KLSE are positively correlated with returns on most 
exchanges and the Exchange appears to exhibit strong regional links. We have found 
that the KLSE is so integrated with a number of overseas exchanges that innovations 
on these exchanges could perhaps. be useful in explaining movements on the KLSE. 
We have found that returns for relatively few stocks on the KLSE appear to be more 
"forecastable". Some stocks listed on the KLSE are identified as having the tendency 
towards exhibiting mean reversion in their long-term returns and others exhibit mean 
aversion. 
Some of these findings could conceivably be advantageous for practitioners. 
Some of our findings are novel for a relatively unresearched market like the KLSE. 
As implied earlier. we do not claim that our results are totally definitive. In empirical 
science. in the academic 'journey' of searching for reality, many things could and 
should possibly be done to justify, verify. or improve an empirical result'. 
'According to De Groot (1969), "Empirical science seeks to lain knowledge of the world. that is. of 
the reality in which we live" (p. 1). 
De Groot (1969) further stresses that, 
"Scientific knowled,e should be uue knowledae .... we can in fact say that a striving for truth 
is characteristic of all scientific ICtivity. 
" ... , since the concept of 'uuth' poses many problems of interpretation. Be that as it may. one 
of its implications is undoubtedly that • scientific investi,ator will not be euily satisfied with his 
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For instance. our results could be justified or verified by revisiting them from 
different perspectives - reexamining them based on different procedures. Future 
research could also focus on the same subjects/issues but using a different data set. 
a different sample size or a different sample period. 
Indeed. being a member of the family of emerging exchanges. the KLSE 
represents an element of the rich variety of institutional structures. trading 
arrangements and regulatory paradigms which exist across different markets. Behaving 
much like developed markets in a number of important ways - and yet differing in 
other ways - the KLSE serves as a segment of the massive financial laboratory of 
emerging equity markets. 
findings or their formulation. In particular. he win strive for a grealer measure of certainty than is usual in 
ordinary life" (p. 19). 
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